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Chapter 1 
Introduction and background 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Welke Effecten, ten Comptoire van den Administrateur bewaard zullen worden, in 
eene suffiçante yzere Kist met drie different werkende Slooten voorzien, waar van on-
der ieder der Heeren Commissarissen en gemelde Notaris, eene Sleutel zal blyven be-
rusten; in welke Kist mede jaarlyks, de respectivelyk afgelost en geroyeert wordende 
Aandelen, en ingetrokken Coupons, zullen worden gelegt.”1 
                                                                
1 Translation from Dutch: “The securities will be kept at the office of the administrator in a sufficient iron 
chest with three different locks, of which a key will be held by each of the directors and the notary public 
mentioned. In the same chest, also respectively the repaid and redeemed shares (in the fund) as well as 
withdrawn coupons will be placed.” 
Text is a section from article X of the offering document of the first investment fund in history, launched in 
Amsterdam in 1774 under the name “Negotiatie onder de Zinspreuk Eendragt maakt Magt” (Fund under the 
Motto Unity is Strength). The whole of article X is shown as figure 1.2.  
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1.1 Introduction 
Millions of investors worldwide have entrusted assets to investment funds2 as part of 
their financial planning, with the goal of securing a healthy financial future for them-
selves and their families. Assets under management of investment funds worldwide as 
of the end of 2009 were estimated at EUR 15.9 trillion. Investment funds provide in-
vestment solutions to individuals and play an important economic role intermediating 
savings and investments. This role makes the investment funds sector highly relevant, 
economically and socially. 
One of the benefits of, and reasons for, investing in investment funds is profes-
sional portfolio management. Portfolio managers managing investment funds actively 
aim to outperform the market (market indices), passive managers (index funds) and 
eachother (their peer group). Investors investing in actively managed funds that are 
successful in achieving those aims, will see their wealth grow faster than those invest-
ing in passive or unsuccessful funds. Thus, they can save less or reach their financial 
goals sooner. 
Although some fund managers have been very successful in achieving superior 
performance for their investors, even to the extent that they have become stars in 
their own right, the performance of investment funds as a group has been disappoint-
ing. Academic research shows that the average investment fund underperforms the 
market and passive funds. Swensen (2005, p. 213) formulates the critics’ view as fol-
lows:  
“Equity mutual-fund returns in recent decades provide a textbook example of 
the negative-sum game of active management. Recall that active managers as 
a group must underperform the market by a margin equal to the cost of trad-
ing (market impact and commissions) and the burden of fees. The theoretical 
possibility exists that mutual funds as a group might exhibit superior perform-
ance, with other market players producing shortfalls sufficient to counterbal-
ance the superior mutual-fund results. Unfortunately for the mutual-fund in-
vestor, U.S. equity markets contain insufficient mullets for fund managers to 
exploit for active management gains. … Because well-informed institutions de-
fine the market, would-be-market-beating investors as a group face the unwel-
come prospects of losing to the market by the amount that it costs to play the 
active management game”. 
Conflicts of interest and high fees are often cited as reasons for the disappointing re-
sults of the average investment fund. The primary stakeholders of an investment fund 
are the fund investors and the fund management company. Their interests are not 
necessarily aligned and can even conflict. This conflict stems from a typical agency 
problem, where, in this case, managers (agents) manage assets on behalf of investors 
(principals). The investor invests in a fund aiming for a maximum risk-adjusted return, 
                                                                
2 An investment fund pools assets of investors in order to invest these collectively for their benefit. The term 
investment fund or fund will be used throughout this dissertation. However, where U.S. studies are quoted, 
these generally use the term mutual fund. Studies of the OECD and IOSCO, also quoted in this dissertation, 
use the term Collective Investment Scheme, in short CIS. For the purpose of this dissertation, these terms 
can be seen as equivalent.  
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net of costs. The fund management company receives a management fee, which is a 
percentage of the assets under management. Higher fees are in the interest of the 
fund management company, but are at the expense of the investor’s return. The in-
herent conflict of interest has led to a group of critical followers of the fund manage-
ment industry, both among practitioners and academics. The position of the critics 
with regard to the conflict of interest between investors and the fund management 
company is articulated well by Ambachtsheer (2005, p. 31):  
“In my judgment, the premier agency issue in the financial services industry 
continues to be the inherent conflict that results from for-profit organizations 
providing management services directly to millions of mutual fund investors. 
The combined forces of acute informational asymmetry and pronounced prin-
cipal-agent problems logically lead to many clients paying too much for too lit-
tle. These forces, and their adverse effects on clients, continue to be a major 
public policy issue today, despite being identified by Jack Bogle3 as early as 
1950. More than 50 years later, despite token efforts by securities regulators, 
this issue has yet to be addressed in the fundamental manner it deserves.” 
When an investor is not satisfied with the operations or results of an open-end fund, 
he can always sell his units in the fund at the net asset value. This possibility of inves-
tors voting with their feet is a disciplining force that helps to ensure that the fund 
management company acts in their best interest. Furthermore, regulations are de-
signed to ensure that fund management companies act in the investor’s best interest. 
Given the economic and social relevance of the investment fund industry and the in-
herent conflicts of interest present, it is not surprising that investment funds are strict-
ly regulated, with investor protection as the main area of focus. 
In the mitigation of the conflicts of interest between fund investors and the fund 
management company, funds’ boards of directors have a role to play. In some jurisdic-
tions, such as the U.S., by law, a certain minimum proportion of the directors must be 
independent from the fund management company. These independent directors are 
positioned as the guardians of the investor’s interest. In other jurisdictions, such as 
Luxembourg, there is no requirement to have independent directors.  
This dissertation is an economic study into investment fund governance and the 
added value of board members who are independent from the fund management 
company. Central to this dissertation is the position of the fund investors and the 
question of whether or not they benefit from independent governance. Two aspects of 
investment funds will receive the most attention, specifically costs and investment 
performance. The empirical part of this study uses a sample of funds domiciled in Lux-
embourg to analyse the relationship of governance characteristics with costs and in-
vestment performance. 
The central research question of this dissertation is formulated in section 1.2. In 
that same section, the contribution of this dissertation to the literature on Finance is 
also described. Sections 1.3 to 1.6 are meant to provide relevant background to the 
                                                                
3 John C. Bogle is the founder and retired CEO of The Vanguard Group, one of the largest U.S. fund manage-
ment companies. The ownership structure of Vanguard is different from most fund management companies 
in that it is owned by the funds it manages. In 1975, Vanguard launched the first index fund, the Vanguard 
500 Index Fund.  
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central research question. Section 1.3 describes the development of the investment 
fund, by highlighting some of the most important product innovations in its history, as 
well as governance aspects of these funds. In section 1.4, the benefits of investment 
funds will be listed, several of which are similar for the modern, open-ended invest-
ment fund, distributed on a cross-border basis, and its ancestors from earlier centuries. 
In that same section, the economic relevance of the investment fund sector will be 
addressed, along with statistics on the development of the assets under management 
in the last decades. In section 1.5, fund performance and fund flows are the main areas 
of focus, while section 1.6 explores conflicts of interest in further detail. The goal of 
these two sections is to provide insight into how boards of directors can add value for 
investors. The structure of the rest of the dissertation is provided in section 1.7. 
1.2 Monitoring forces and the central research question 
There are numerous potential conflicts of interest present in the investment fund in-
dustry between the investors and the other stakeholders, most notably the fund man-
agement company. Without any or sufficient monitoring, these conflicts of interest 
could lead to suboptimal investment performance, either as a result of excessive man-
agement fees and other costs, or as a result of behaviour by fund management com-
panies that is suboptimal for investors. This is depicted in the centre of figure 1.1. As 
shown in this figure, there are three types of monitoring forces that are active in help-
ing to align the interests of investors and the fund management company. 
The first monitoring force is that of market forces. By the possibility of withdraw-
ing or adding assets to a fund, depending on whether investors like or dislike the op-
erations and results of the fund, they force the fund management company to act in 
their best interest. Investors may buy or sell the fund at their own initiative or with 
help from their advisors. In other words, the recommendations of advisors and dis-
tributors also form part of the market forces exercising oversight over the investment 
fund industry. However, the effectiveness of this monitoring force might be limited in 
reality, due to conflicts of interests between the investor and his advisor. Monitoring 
as exercised by, for example, consumer organisations and the press, can also be seen 
as part of the market forces. High market forces help to align the interests of investors 
and the fund management company. In that case, good performance – which is the 
primary interest of investors – is also what the fund management company strives for 
as an effective method to increase fund size and revenues. 
The second monitoring force is that of regulators, operating in the legal and regu-
latory framework of the domicile in which the fund is established. IOSCO (2000, p. 10–
11) states that:  
“The regulatory mechanisms which are used to address conflicts of interests 
share a common regulatory objective, which is to ensure investor protection by 
eliminating or minimising the adverse impact of any possible conflicts of inter-
est of the CIS operator and its affiliates on the CIS and its investors. … The 
range of regulatory mechanisms that are used by member jurisdictions to ad-
dress conflicts of interests include:  
I N T R O D U C T I O N  A N D  B A C K G R O U N D  
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- general duty imposed on the CIS operator to act in the best interests of CIS 
investors; 
- review/oversight of a CIS operators’ activities by an independent third par-
ty; 
- direct prohibitions of transactions which are likely to give rise to conflicts of 
interests; 
- review and/or approval of certain transactions by the regulator or an inde-
pendent third party where they raise conflicts of interests; 
- disclosure of information relating to conflicts of interests to investors 
and/or regulators; 
- detailed standards and procedures that must be followed by a CIS operator; 
- restrictions relating to certain conduct; 
- use of Codes of conduct that deal with conflicts of interest situations; and  
- regulator’s power to monitor and impose sanctions in appropriate cases.” 
 
The third monitoring force is that of the fund’s own governance framework, which 
includes, for example, the fund management company’s risk management and compli-
ance function, the fund’s depositary and auditor, as well as the fund’s board of direc-
tors. Meschke (2007, p. 6–7) sees a role for fund boards only when market forces fail:  
“In a competitive market with reasonably informed fund investors, market dis-
cipline imposed by their purchase and redemption decisions will sufficiently 
mitigate conflicts of interest between advisors and investors. … In the presence 
of informational and institutional frictions, board oversight of mutual funds 
may potentially serve an important economic purpose.”  
Although its influence might be indirect, the board can have an influence on the per-
formance of a fund, for example, by not approving excessive fees or by urging the fund 
management company to take action in the case of continued underperformance. 
 
Regulators
Market 
forces
Fund 
governance
Conflicts of 
interest
Suboptimal 
performance
High costs
Suboptimal 
behaviour
 
Figure 1.1: Investment funds’ monitoring forces 
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The three different monitoring forces identified can influence and enforce eachother, 
which is graphically depicted in figure 1.1 by the arrows between these monitoring 
forces. For example, the fifth regulatory mechanism of IOSCO mentioned above, dis-
closure of information, is there to facilitate market forces being able to do their moni-
toring work. Examples are requirements to clearly disclose costs and risks in a fund’s 
prospectus, which investors can then interpret and respond to. The second mecha-
nism, independent oversight, is part of the regulatory forces and imposes require-
ments on how funds may organise their governance. In some jurisdictions, such as the 
U.S., the requirement to have independent directors on the boards is such an example. 
In other jurisdictions, such as Luxembourg, there is no requirement for the fund direc-
tors to be legally independent. Nevertheless, many funds in Luxembourg have volun-
tarily appointed independent board members.  
Market forces can also influence fund governance. If investors see independent 
governance as superior and direct their investments to funds with independent 
boards, it would force other fund management companies to organise their funds that 
way as well. Furthermore, if investors value independent boards, one would expect 
that fund management companies with funds with independent boards to use that 
characteristic as a key sales argument. 
 
Whether or not boards with independent board members are more effective for inves-
tors in their monitoring and decision-making than boards with dependent board mem-
bers only, and thus, whether independent board members add value for investors, is 
an empirical question. Which brings us to the central research question of this disser-
tation: 
Are (more) independent boards more effective for investors, leading to lower costs 
and/or better investment performance? 
 
The central research question is relevant from at least two perspectives: 
• Fund selection. Investment funds provide certain services to investors, in particu-
lar, professional portfolio management and risk reduction by means of diversifica-
tion. Small differences in annual performance can make a significant difference in 
the amount of capital that is available at the end of the investment horizon. If more 
independent governance leads to or helps achieve better performance, as a result 
of lower costs or otherwise, then that is of high social-economic relevance. In that 
case, investors should select investment funds by taking into account fund govern-
ance characteristics. 
• Regulatory implications. In Luxembourg, there is no regulation imposing funds to 
have independent board members. Funds in the U.S. are required to have inde-
pendent board members. These independent directors have been assigned certain 
responsibilities, such as the annual approval of the fund’s investment advisory con-
tract, including the advisory fee. Following scandals in 2003, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) aimed to impose additional regulations, increasing the 
required minimum of independent directors from 40% to 75% and introducing a 
mandatory independent chairman. However, these new regulations were vacated 
in court on the basis that the SEC had not provided sufficient evidence that the new 
rules could be expected to be effective. When funds with independent boards 
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would achieve better results for investors, but market forces are somehow unable 
to enforce such governance best practices across the industry, there would be a 
role for lawmakers and regulators to enforce (more) independent governance. 
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in Finance in several ways. By using a 
sample of Luxembourg-domiciled funds for the empirical part of the study, the disser-
tation sheds light on a fund domicile that is of high economic importance, but has 
received little academic attention to date. European-domiciled funds in general, and 
Luxembourg funds in specific, are hugely underrepresented in empirical studies in the 
field of Finance when compared to funds domiciled in the U.S. Whereas the ratio of 
assets under management of the U.S. and European funds is approximately 5:3, the 
relative number of empirical studies analysing European fund data is much lower. 
Indicative is that out of the 50 academic, empirical studies referred to in this disserta-
tion, only three use European data, which implies a U.S. to European ratio of 47:3. 
Presumably, this is at least partly a consequence of academic quality data being readily 
available for U.S. funds, but not for European funds. Indeed, much effort had to be put 
into gathering data for this study of Luxembourg-domiciled funds and ensuring that 
the quality of the data was good. 
As far as could be determined, this study is the first empirical study into the effec-
tiveness of boards, analysing a sample of European-domiciled open-end funds. In Eu-
rope, a different legal and regulatory framework is in place and different governance 
practices apply than for U.S.-domiciled funds, which were analysed in earlier empirical 
fund governance studies4. Compared to other European fund domiciles, Luxembourg is 
an ideal testing ground for such a study, because the market has sufficient size to form 
a meaningful sample of fund management companies and funds operating in a single 
legal and regulatory environment. As part of the study, the development of fund gov-
ernance in Luxembourg was analysed as well, in particular, whether boards of Luxem-
bourg UCITS have become more independent in the past decade. 
By using Luxembourg fund data for the empirical part of the dissertation, this 
study provides further evidence for the discussion about the effectiveness of inde-
pendent versus dependent boards. The most notable difference between fund govern-
ance in the U.S. and Luxembourg is that in the U.S., having independent board mem-
bers is mandatory, whereas in Luxembourg, that is not the case. In Luxembourg, many 
fund boards do have independent members, but on a voluntary basis. In studies of U.S. 
fund governance, the level of independence in funds is always above the regulatory 
minimum. In the sample of Luxembourg funds analysed for this dissertation, there are 
funds without any independence and funds with independent board members on their 
boards. In fact, of the 45 top cross-border fund management companies at the end of 
2009, approximately half had at least one non-dependent director on the board of 
their flagship umbrella fund5, whereas the other half had dependent board members 
only. This different and, perhaps stronger, distinction between the different govern-
ance structures of funds in the sample may lead to new insights. 
                                                                
4 See Chapter 3.  
5 An umbrella fund, in this dissertation also referred to simply as an umbrella, is a single legal entity consist-
ing of more than one compartment, each with a different investment policy. These compartments are re-
ferred to as sub-funds or funds.  
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In addition to a regression-type methodology, also applied by earlier studies, a survey 
was conducted among board members of the funds in the sample regarding their role 
in general and their influence on costs and performance. The approach with both the 
regression and survey methodologies is a powerful combination to achieve clearer and 
stronger results. 
1.3 Historic development of investment funds 
This section describes some of the most important milestones in the development of 
the investment fund as a financial product, from the first investment fund that was 
launched in the eighteenth century in the Dutch Republic, to the modern, cross-border 
fund held by investors in multiple countries. 
1774: First investment fund in history 
The history of the investment fund dates back to the second half of the eighteenth 
century. The development and launch of the first investment fund followed from the 
financial crisis that had started in England and then hit the Dutch financial market in 
1772 and 1773. In this context, the Amsterdam broker, Abraham van Ketwich, 
launched a fund in 1774 in the Dutch Republic under the name “Negotiatie onder de 
Zinspreuk Eendragt maakt Magt” (Fund under the Motto “Unity is Strength”6). Risk 
reduction through diversification for smaller investors was one of the fund’s main 
objectives. Interestingly, the diversification rules were laid down in the offering docu-
ment by specifying ten different categories of bonds across which the investments had 
to be spread. Those categories included bonds from Austria, Denmark, German king-
doms, Spain, Sweden, Russia and plantations in Latin America and the West Indies 
(Berghuis, 1967, p. 46–56). Because the fund did not invest in equity or domestic 
bonds, it can be characterised as an international bond fund avant la lettre. 
The fund had a closed-ended structure, but the shares were traded on the Am-
sterdam stock exchange to provide liquidity. The fund was set up for a period of 25 
years, after which the portfolio would be liquidated and the proceeds would be dis-
tributed to the participants, unless the participants were to decide to continue the 
fund. Different from modern investment funds, one of the product characteristics of 
“Eendragt maakt Magt” was a complicated lottery element, which at the time was 
common for securities. Each year, participations were drawn that were repaid at par 
plus a premium of 10% (Berghuis, 1967, p. 46–56). 
What may well be the first advertisement in history for an investment fund is 
shown as figure 1.27. In the section “Bekentmaakingen” (Announcements) of the Gron-
                                                                
6 “Eendragt maakt magt” was also the motto of the Dutch Republic (1588-1795); in its coat of arms, usually 
shown in its Latin form “Concordia res parvae crescunt”. That was also the name of the second fund 
launched by Abraham van Ketwich in 1779. Literally, “Concordia res parvae crescunt” means Unity makes 
small things grow.  
7 This was the first reference to the fund that was found in any of the Dutch newspapers that are available 
via the website of the National library of the Netherlands (“Koninklijke Bibliotheek”). It cannot be ruled out 
that there were similar announcements for the same fund slightly earlier, in Dutch newspapers not available 
through this source.  
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inger Courant of 6 September 1774, it is announced that investors can subscribe for 
the fund “Eendragt maakt Magt” during that month. The text mentions that a plea 
regarding its absolute certainty and interesting advantages can be obtained from 
Abraham van Ketwich in Amsterdam and from representatives of the fund in several 
other Dutch cities. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Newspaper announcement with regard to “Eendragt maakt Magt” 
Translation from Dutch: “In the FUND under the Motto ‘UNITY IS STRENGTH’, established in Amsterdam,
can in this running month be participated for 527 guilders 10 stuivers per share, including the interest since 
July 1st; the contribution shall be increased in the Month September by 2 guilders and 10 stuivers per share. 
The receipts Nr. 1 to 500 can be exchanged now against the Original shares and Coupons and the shares of 
Nr. 500 to 1000 will be ready in 2 to 3 weeks; this Fund, which is already far advanced, will extend itself to 
the sum of ONE MILLION GUILDERS and not more; the NOTICE as well as a PLEA REGARDING ITS ABSOLUTE 
CERTAINTY AND INTERESTING ADVANTAGES can be obtained from ABRAHAM van KETWICH Broker in
Amsterdam, as well as at the offices of the gentlemen A.J. HESHUYSEN and Comp. in HAARLEM, A. and S.
BOAS and J. HUYGENS in The Hague, A.A. VERMEULEN, ROTTERDAM, WILLEM VAN VLOTEN and D.W. van 
VLOTEN in UTRECHT as well as from the Bookseller L. HUISINGH in GRONINGEN and further in local cities 
from Brokers in Bonds.” 
Source: Groninger Courant, 6 September 1774, available via http://kranten.kb.nl/ 
 
An aspect worth noting in the context of fund governance is that Van Ketwich seemed 
to be aware already of potential conflicts of interest in the fund’s management and 
operations. On the basis of the offering document, the daily management of the port-
folio was entrusted to the two directors (“commissarissen”). They could make invest-
ment decisions, but only within narrow limits, which were specified in the offering 
document as well. Van Ketwich looked after the administrative aspects of the fund. 
Berghuis (1967, p. 54) writes about the fund:  
“Active management was only reserved for the two directors. Abraham van 
Ketwich was entrusted with a more passive role. He was accountable to the di-
rectors on an annual basis with regard to the administration. Through this sep-
aration of management powers, it at least appeared that the conflict of inter-
est between the founder-director of the fund and the collective of participants 
was avoided. Churning of the portfolio could be profitable for Abraham van 
Ketwich from the viewpoint of generating commissions. Since he had no influ-
ence on this, the investment fund could not be misused as a cash cow.”8 
The offering document also described the arrangement that was in place to ensure 
that the investments of the fund were safe. This depositary function consisted of an 
iron chest with three different locks, in which the portfolio of securities would be kept. 
The keys were in the possession of the two directors and the notary (see figure 1.3). 
                                                                
8 Translation from the original text in Dutch.  
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Figure 1.3: Article X from the offering document of “Eendragt maakt Magt” (1774) 
Translation from Dutch: “Article X. The original deed of this fund, of which the below imprimatur is signed 
by the gentlemen directors and the administrator, will be deposited among the minutes of the notary Mr.
Paulus Huntum and all shares issued will be logged on the original deed so that those interested can be 
ensured that the shares issued will never exceed the capital of securities (invested in) belonging to this
fund. The securities will be kept at the office of the administrator (of the fund) in a sufficient iron chest with 
three different locks, of which a key will be held by each of the directors and the notary mentioned. In the
same chest, also respectively the repaid and redeemed shares (in the fund) as well as withdrawn coupons 
will be placed.” 
Source: Amsterdam City Archives, Archive of Notaries residing in Amsterdam (access code 5075), Archive of
Mr. Paulus Huntum (inventory number 14163). 
 
The management fee of the fund is estimated at 0.2% of the assets per annum, which 
consisted of a commission of 0.5% at the launch of the fund plus 100 guilders per 
annum for each of the 20 classes of participations (Rouwenhorst, 2005, p. 257)9. The 
838,550 guilders that Van Ketwich raised with this first fund in history was only a 
relatively small amount compared to the estimated 1.5 billion guilders that Dutch 
investors had invested abroad at the time, hence the fund was of limited commercial 
success (Berghuis, 1967, p. 65). The investment results were disappointing as well. In 
the first few years, the results of the fund were satisfactory, but starting from 1782, 
the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784) had an adverse influence on the fund, 
especially on the fund’s investments in colonial bonds. As of 1782, Van Ketwich had to 
suspend the annual redemptions. After the war, the situation did not improve due to 
continued turmoil in Europe. By 1799, when the fund reached its planned maturity 
date, it was decided to continue, in an attempt to recover losses and hoping that the 
participations could be repaid at par on a later date. Finally, the fund was liquidated in 
1824 (Berghuis, 1967, p. 62–69). 
                                                                
9 This is low compared to today’s management fees: The asset-weighted average management fee (including 
transparent distribution fees) of retail shares of global bond funds domiciled in Luxembourg is 0.77% 
(source: Lipper Luxembourg Funds Encyclopaedia 2009).  
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1873: Fund manager discretion 
Investment funds of various forms and shapes were developed and launched after the 
first fund in the Netherlands in the eighteenth century. Slot (2004, p. 101–112) de-
scribes several predecessors of the modern investment fund, both in the Netherlands 
and in the Anglo-Saxon world. Outside of the Netherlands, the first funds were 
launched in the second half of the nineteenth century in the United Kingdom (U.K.). 
Slot mentions the launch of the First Scottish American Investment Trust by Robert 
Fleming in 1873 in Scotland, as an important innovation in the development of the 
investment fund. A characteristic of Fleming’s fund was that, unlike other funds avail-
able in the U.K. at the time, the fund manager had complete freedom to change the 
composition of the portfolio. In the two decades that followed, some 50 similar trusts 
were launched in England and Scotland. These trusts were balanced funds, normally 
investing approximately one third of the portfolio in bonds. The remainder of the port-
folio was invested in equity and preferred stocks. With regard to the governance of 
these funds, Slot (2004, p. 104) states that:  
“The managers of the funds – usually no more than one person with a number 
of assistants – in most cases had considerable personal investments in the 
funds they had under their care, which of course was conducive to the trust 
other participants in the fund could have. Furthermore, there was a board of 
trustees that monitored the investments on behalf of the other participants.”10 
1924: Open-end funds 
The first open-end fund worldwide was The Massachusetts Investors’ Trust, launched 
in the United States (U.S.) in 1924 (Wilcox, 2003, p. 645). After a relatively slow start, 
this fund would become the largest U.S. investment fund in the 1950s. In this period, 
modern techniques for the marketing and sales of funds to the mass market became 
popular. The open-end concept was copied by other funds in the U.S. in the 1920s and 
in other countries after World War II (Slot, 2004, p. 107–108). However, these funds 
turned out to have their shortcomings as well, in particular due to conflicts of interest 
between the manager and the investor. Slot (2004, p. 109) writes that:  
“The providers of these funds were in many cases investment banks and secu-
rities firms, but also commercial banks and business people threw themselves 
at the fast growing and – in the 1920s – very lucrative market of investment 
funds. The quality of the hastily established funds left much to be desired. It 
was not always clearly stated what the objectives of the new funds were. The 
rights of the participants were not well-protected. With high turnover in the 
portfolio, it was attempted to generate additional revenues. It often happened 
that funds invested in each other, leading to dangerous, pyramid-like struc-
tures.”11  
As a result of poor design, funds, especially those launched shortly before 1929, were 
affected negatively by the stock market crash. The lessons learned in this period were 
a reason for the United States Congress to regulate investment funds by means of the 
                                                                
10 Translation from the original text in Dutch.  
11 Translation from the original text in Dutch.  
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Investment Company Act of 194012. One of the measures enforced by means of this 
act, aimed at improving investor protection, is that a minimum proportion of the board 
of directors is required to be independent from the fund management company. 
1985: Cross-border funds 
A more recent milestone in the development of the investment fund was the adoption 
of the UCITS13 Directive in 1985. This European Union (EU) Directive marks the start of 
the development of cross-border funds. Before then, fund management and fund 
distribution were primarily local-for-local activities, both in the U.S. and in individual 
European countries. The goals of the UCITS Directive were to harmonise EU national 
laws for investment funds, including rules to enhance investor protection, and to cre-
ate a single market for investment funds in the EU. Under this directive, funds domi-
ciled in one EU country and operating within the UCITS rules can obtain a European 
Passport, which facilitates registration and distribution outside of the country of the 
fund’s domicile14. The UCITS Directive allows a fund authorised as a UCITS in its home 
country, to market its units in other Member States. Such a fund does not need to go 
through a full registration process in each country of sale; a relatively simple notifica-
tion procedure is sufficient. 
On 30 March 1988, Luxembourg was the first EU Member State to transpose the 
UCITS legislation into its national law. In 1959, the first Luxembourg fund (Eurunion) 
had been established. By the time the UCITS Directive became law in Luxembourg in 
1988, 463 Luxembourg-domiciled funds were in existence (Lipper, 2010, p. 9). The new 
legislation allowed many of these funds to convert to UCITS funds, in order to facilitate 
their cross-border distribution. Firms that were among the first to launch cross-border 
investment fund activities from Luxembourg were Commercial Union, Robert Fleming 
& Co., Fidelity Investments and Franklin Templeton (Evans, Fessey and Saluzzi, 2008, p. 
59). By the end of 1988, 120 new vehicles had been created in Luxembourg, benefiting 
from the new legislation (Brausch and Kremer, 2008, p. 23). 
Due to its first mover advantage, combined with an entrepreneurial spirit applied 
to the developing investment fund industry, Luxembourg was more successful than 
other domiciles in positioning itself as the location of choice for cross-border fund 
distribution (Zurstrassen, 2008, p. 12). Other aspects that contributed to Luxembourg’s 
success as a fund domicile were its neutral position in the EU among the larger coun-
tries with domestic interests, its multilingual workforce and the fact that it could bene-
fit from its position and experience as a centre for private banking. 
Although the number UCITS established in Luxembourg increased strongly in the 
following years, in the early years of UCITS, the majority of funds were used for what is 
referred to in the industry as round-tripping. This is the use of a Luxembourg-domiciled 
UCITS, rather than a locally domiciled fund, to offer to investors in the home country of 
the fund management company. At the end of 1993, 984 of the 1,691 (58%) Luxem-
bourg UCITS were only sold in one market (Lipper, 2010, p. 11). 
At the time, the majority of European banks, which were the main distributors of 
investment funds, had what is referred to as a closed-architecture, meaning that they 
                                                                
12 The U.S. regulatory framework for funds will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2.2. 
13 UCITS stands for Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities.  
14 Since 1994, the UCITS Directive applies in the whole European Economic Area (EEA).  
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only actively offered funds managed by their in-house fund management company. 
Opportunities for cross-border fund management companies, often firms from the U.S. 
or U.K. without an affiliated distribution network, were limited to private banks, 
wealth managers, institutional investors and (networks of) independent financial advi-
sors. From the early years of this millennium however, an important trend has been 
the development of less restricted distribution models, with online brokers and fund 
supermarkets embracing a fully open-architecture distribution strategy, in principle 
offering any fund available. Many banks have opted for a guided-architecture, in which 
they offer funds of a limited, selected group of fund management companies. In the 
period from the end of 2001 to the end of 2009, the percentage of Luxembourg-funds 
sourcing at least 80% of their assets from more than one country – funds qualified by 
Lipper as international funds – increased from 57% to 67% (Lipper, 2010, p. 19), which 
indicates that the importance of round-tripping has decreased and true cross-border 
distribution has become more important. 
 
Luxembourg-domiciled UCITS are distributed in 58 countries and more than 75% of 
UCITS funds distributed internationally are based in Luxembourg (ALFI, 2010). Luxem-
bourg UCITS are not only registered and distributed in EU countries, but also in non-EU 
European countries (Switzerland, Norway), Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South 
Korea), the Gulf region and Latin America (Chile, Peru). Whereas at the end of Decem-
ber 1993, only 112 Luxembourg UCITS were registered in five or more countries, by the 
end of 2009 that number had increased to over 3,500 Luxembourg UCITS, of which 700 
were registered in twenty countries or more (Lipper, 2010, p. 9, 20). Lipper (2010, p. 6) 
states:  
“In the twenty years since its launch, Ucits has become a brand recognised 
around the world as a well-regulated investment vehicle suitable for all levels 
of retail saver. … Although the intention of the Ucits Directive was to facilitate 
the cross-border trade of investment funds in Europe, the outcome has been 
global with Europe becoming the centre of international investment in mutual 
funds. Luxembourg, in turn, sits right at the centre of this activity.” 
The international registrations and cross-border distribution gives fund management 
companies an enormous potential market to sell funds and raise assets under man-
agement, which in turn can lead to economies of scale for the investor. However, 
cross-border distribution comes with complexities in all areas of the fund management 
value chain – including fund governance – that could well be expensive for the fund 
management company and ultimately, also for the investor. 
Conclusion 
Abraham van Ketwich, who in 1774 was the initiator of the first investment fund in 
history, already seemed aware of certain potential conflicts of interest between the 
fund manager and the investor, in particular that of the manager generating excessive 
portfolio turnover to boost brokerage commissions. To mitigate these conflicts of in-
terest, a distinction was made between persons with administrative responsibilities 
and those with portfolio management responsibilities. 
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Conflicts of interest continued to be an important theme in the centuries that fol-
lowed. Funds that were developed in the U.K. in the nineteenth century had a board of 
trustees that monitored the investments on behalf of participants. In the U.S., cases in 
the interwar period in which the trust of fund investors had been abused, led to the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. Typical for this legislation, aimed at protecting the 
interests of investors, is that a minimum proportion of the board of directors is re-
quired to be independent from the fund management company. Although for UCITS, 
funds domiciled in Europe that have the possibility to be distributed on a cross-border 
basis, extensive regulations apply, there is no requirement to have independent board 
members.  
1.4 Economic relevance 
Benefits of funds 
Hazenberg, Kamphof and Roelofs (1996, p. 15–18) provide the following overview of 
the benefits of and reasons for investing in investment funds: 
• Risk reduction, by means of diversification. 
• Professional portfolio management. 
• Higher convenience and lower administrative burden, compared to direct invest-
ments. 
• Lower transaction costs, compared to direct investments, in particular when invest-
ing relatively small amounts. 
• Wide choice, as a result of which it is possible to find funds meeting individual 
needs and preferences. 
• Flexibility to increase or reduce exposure to certain asset classes. 
• Access to markets that are otherwise not accessible or difficult to invest in. 
• Tax benefits of certain types of fund investments, compared to direct investments. 
• Liquidity. 
 
The early investment funds and modern investment funds share many of the same 
benefits for their investors. Especially the first two benefits mentioned, risk reduction 
and professional portfolio management, have played a role throughout the centuries 
since the establishment of the first investment fund in history. No doubt, these bene-
fits have been important reasons for the popularity of investment funds, which have 
developed into an important building block of individual investor portfolios. The OECD 
calls investment funds (OECD, 2005, p. 137):  
“…one of the most significant developments in financial intermediation during 
the past few decades. OECD data indicate that CIS assets have been rising 
sharply as a share of national income and a share of financial assets in most 
Member countries. In addition to functioning as an effective vehicle for indi-
viduals to implement their preferred investment strategies, CIS already play a 
major role in providing for retirement income. This role is likely to grow in com-
ing years, as increased responsibility is placed on the average citizen, as op-
posed to governments or companies, in meeting critical needs such as educa-
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tion, retirement and health care. In this context, CIS can be used, either alone 
or in combination with other forms of institutional savings, such as pension 
funds and insurance products, to enable individuals to meet their financial 
planning goals.” 
Market size 
Assets under management of investment funds worldwide as of the end of 2009 were 
estimated at EUR 15.9 trillion. The U.S. was the largest fund market globally, with EUR 
8.2 trillion of assets under management (48.6% of total). On the same date, European-
domiciled funds had EUR 5.3 trillion (33.0% of total) of assets under management (ICI, 
2010a).  
Despite the history of investment funds going back to the eighteenth century, the 
rapid growth of the assets under management in funds has only occurred in the last 30 
years. Table 1.1 shows the development of the total net assets and the number of 
funds in the U.S., Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Whereas in the U.S. there were 
only 564 funds with US$ 134.8 billion of assets under management in 1980, this num-
ber had grown to over US$ 11.1 trillion invested in almost 8,000 funds by the end of 
2009. A significant driver behind the growth of the U.S. fund market has been the ac-
cumulation of retirement assets, in particular in individual retirement accounts and 
employer-sponsored defined contribution pension plans, which are invested in funds 
to a large extent (ICI, 2010b, p. 95–103). In terms of growth rates (CAGR), Luxem-
bourg’s record is even more impressive. Since the UCITS Directive was transposed in 
national law in Luxembourg in 1988, that fund domicile has undergone a rapid devel-
opment and is now the second largest worldwide. In the period from 1980 until 2009, 
assets under management have grown from only EUR 2.9 billion to EUR 1.6 trillion. 
 
Table 1.1: Growth of the fund industry 1980-2009: Number of funds and Total Net Assets (TNA)* 
 U.S. Luxembourg Netherlands 
 Year Funds 
(number) 
CAGR 
(%) 
TNA 
(US$ bn) 
CAGR
(%) 
Funds 
(number)
CAGR
(%) 
TNA 
(EUR bn)
CAGR
(%) 
Funds 
(number)
CAGR 
(%) 
TNA 
(EUR bn) 
CAGR 
(%) 
1980 564  134.8  76  2.9  50  6.7  
1990 3,079 18.5 1,065.2 23.0 805 26.6 72.2 37.7 213 15.6 24.6 13.9 
2000 8,155 10.2 6,964.6 20.7 6,084 22.4 792.8 27.1 473 8.3 91.3 14.0 
2009 7,691 -0.6 11,120.7 5.3 9,017 4.5 1,592.4 8.1 458 -0.4 66.3 -3.5 
* Funds investing in transferable securities and money market instruments 
Sources:  
U.S.: ICI (2010b, p. 124).  
Luxembourg: 1980: ALFI; 1990: Lipper (2010, p. 7); 2000, 2009: EFAMA (2010b, p. 268, 281). 
Netherlands: 1980, 1990: Slot (2004, p. 312, 370); 2000, 2009: EFAMA (2010b, p. 268, 281).  
 
Whereas Luxembourg is almost entirely a domicile for cross-border distribution, the 
Netherlands is an example of a fund domicile almost purely used for domestic distribu-
tion. The Netherlands as a domicile has clearly suffered from the competition from 
abroad, especially Luxembourg funds. The Dutch market has been open to investment 
funds domiciled in Luxembourg, offered by international fund management compa-
nies. In addition, Dutch fund management companies offer their Luxembourg funds on 
the Dutch market. Leading Dutch/Benelux fund management companies, such as the 
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former Fortis Investments in 2003, Robeco in 2004 and the former ABN AMRO Asset 
Management in 2005, transferred their Dutch-domiciled funds to Luxembourg, which 
contributed to the drop in assets under management in the 2000–2009 period. Com-
pared to the U.S., the Dutch fund market has hardly benefited from the development 
of individual and defined contribution retirement plans. With most of the assets of 
Dutch pension funds held in defined benefit plans, defined contribution and individual 
forms of retirement plans form a relatively small part of the total retirement savings of 
the Dutch population. Also unfavourable to the size of the Dutch fund market, at least 
in official statistics, is that contrary to what is market practice in most other markets, 
many providers of individual or defined contribution retirement plans in the Nether-
lands use non-public, unit-linked funds as underlying investment vehicles. Due to their 
non-public nature, the assets of these funds are not part of the stated assets of Dutch-
domiciled investment funds. 
Whereas assets under management in the U.S. are higher than that of the Euro-
pean domiciles combined, the number of funds in the U.S. is much smaller (7,691 in 
the U.S. versus 35,946 in Europe). As a result, the average fund size in the U.S. is al-
most seven times that in Europe. This is at least partly the result of the history of Euro-
pean investment funds being one of domestic markets with domestic fund manage-
ment companies. Only since the UCITS Directive became effective in the second half of 
the 1980s, is it possible to develop pan-European distribution of funds.  
 
Developments within Europe are shown in figure 1.4, which depicts the development 
since 2001 of the total net assets of funds domiciled in the EU core-countries15. Lux-
embourg is the largest fund domicile within Europe, a position that has strengthened 
in the period since the end of 2001. Whereas at the end of 2001, Luxembourg ac-
counted for 27.6% of the fund assets of the twelve core countries, by the end of 2009, 
that percentage had increased to 36.0%. Fund assets expressed as a percentage of GDP 
for the EU core-countries stood at 34.9% at the end of 2001, which had increased to 
52.2% at the end of 200916. 
                                                                
15 EU core-countries defined here as those that were among the countries signing the Maastricht treaty in 
1993, i.e., Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain and the U.K.   
16 Fund assets concern funds domiciled in the twelve EU core-countries. Note that these assets are not 
sourced from these countries only.  
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Figure 1.4: Development of assets under management in EU core-countries 
Source: Lipper FMI 
 
With assets under management in Europe amounting to over half the annual GDP, 
investment funds are already an important component of the Europeans’ wealth. In 
light of demographic developments, in particular the ageing of populations, changing 
pension arrangements and budget deficits of governments, individuals are expected to 
have to bear a greater responsibility for their financial future. These trends are ex-
pected to provide a further stimulant for the amount of assets under management in 
the fund industry. In a March 2010 press release of the European Fund and Asset Man-
agement Association (EFAMA), which accompanied the publication of a report on long-
term savings in Europe, Jean-Baptiste de Franssu, President of EFAMA, stated (EFAMA, 
2010a, p. 1):  
“Securing the financial future of Europe’s citizens is at the heart of EFAMA’s 
strategy for the coming years. Pension solutions in Europe, where demographic 
challenges are forcing governments to act, are fragmented and often inade-
quate and we in the industry have a key role to play in building an EU pensions 
framework in partnership with others who share the responsibility of safe-
guarding Europe’s economic future. We believe the recommendations of the 
report are a valuable distillation of progressive industry thinking that provide a 
strong basis for regaining the confidence of investors across Europe in savings 
and investment. With the UCITS vehicle we already have one of the most ro-
bust underlying investment products for retirement plans, but the successful 
development of long-term savings and private retirement products also relies 
on the quality of distribution, educating investors about the optimum solu-
tions, and on knowing client needs better.” 
C H A P T E R  1  
 26 
This statement shows that the fund industry certainly has the ambition to take a lead-
ing role in providing solutions for Europeans saving for their retirement, with invest-
ment funds (UCITS) having a pivotal role. 
Abuses of trust and fraud 
Despite the success of the investment fund in terms of growth of the total assets en-
trusted, there have also been numerous cases in which the trust of investors has been 
abused. The OECD (2005, p. 141) states:  
“Governance failures in CIS can span a wide range of problems. Chronicled 
abuses have included simple theft or misappropriation of assets, sales or re-
demptions at inappropriate valuations, deceptive promotion techniques, un-
clear title to assets, negligent or self-interested investment selection or man-
agement, poor disclosure about essential details of the undertaking, unreason-
able fees, unenforceability of the obligations of the promoters and lack of an 
accountable party from whom redress can be sought. Some schemes have be-
come insolvent, leading to very large losses for some investors. Some schemes 
may avoid the outright abuses categorised above but they may still operate 
primarily to the benefit of the promoters and other insiders rather than inves-
tors.” 
Recent examples include the late trading17 and market timing18 scandal in the U.S., in 
which certain large clients received preferential treatment and benefited at the ex-
pense of other clients. The scandal surfaced in 2003, when New York Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer announced the issuance of a series of complaints against fund manage-
ment companies and other firms that had either benefited from or facilitated such 
practices. Nearly all firms charged by Spitzer with allowing market timing or late trad-
ing settled with his office and the SEC in the course of 2004 and 2005. The funds in 
which the late trading and market timing took place were U.S.-domiciled and regulated 
funds. On the basis of the Investment Company Act, these funds were required to have 
at least 40% of their board seats taken by independent board members, but this form 
of independent governance could not prevent these abuses of trust from taking place. 
                                                                
17 Late trading occurs when investors are allowed to purchase fund shares after the cut-off time for orders, 
still at that day’s closing price. Such trades can be made with information about after-hours market devel-
opments in the U.S. or other countries. This gives such late traders an unfair advantage at the expense of 
other investors in the fund. Late trading was illegal under regulations of the SEC.  
18 In this context, market timing refers to trading frequently in and out of a market segment in order to profit 
from short-term market movements, using a fund to get exposure to that market segment. Market timers 
are costly to the other investors in the fund, since the fund may need to keep a higher cash balance in order 
to have sufficient liquidity and the higher volume leads to higher administrative and transaction costs, borne 
by all investors in the fund. Market timing is especially attractive for arbitrageurs and detrimental for long-
term investors in the case of so-called stale pricing. Then, the prices used to calculate the NAV are not cur-
rent. An example of this is when U.S. funds invest in non-U.S. stocks listed on markets that, due to time 
differences, have closed long before the NAV of the fund is determined. In the case of a stale price, arbitra-
geurs can take advantage of information that has become available that is not reflected in the NAV of the 
fund. Market timing was not illegal, but, in many cases, frequent trading was restricted according to fund 
documents and prospectuses. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer nevertheless charged funds, which allowed 
frequent trading, with fraud, arguing that fund management companies allowed this trading in order to 
increase their assets under management.  
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In fact, Meschke (2007), Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Qian (2011)19 did not find evidence 
that boards with a higher percentage of independent directors or with independent 
chairs were less likely to be involved in these scandals. 
At the end of 2008, the Madoff affair shocked fund investors in both the U.S. and 
Europe. What had seemed for years to be a brilliant investment opportunity to many, 
turned out to be nothing more than a so-called Ponzi scheme, where new investments 
are used to pay old investors and fund redemptions. In 2009, Bernard L. Madoff pled 
guilty to eleven felonies and was sentenced to 150 years in prison and ordered to pay 
restitution of US$ 170 billion. Prosecutors estimated the size of the fraud at US$ 64.8 
billion. The investments with Madoff were channelled to his firm through various feed-
er funds, operated by other firms. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC initi-
ated and executed trades on the accounts of those feeder funds through discretionary 
brokerage agreements, while also being the sub-custodian for the assets.  
The largest of the feeder funds was Fairfield Sentry Limited, with US$ 7.3 billion of 
assets under management at the end of April 2008. The fund was domiciled on the 
British Virgin Islands and managed by Fairfield Greenwich (Bermuda) Limited, a com-
pany belonging to the Fairfield Greenwich Group. In addition to one of the founding 
partners of Fairfield Greenwich Group, the three-member board of directors of the 
fund consisted of two independent, non-executive directors. These independent direc-
tors, as well as the independent auditor, custodian and administrator, were all unable 
to prevent the fraud from taking place. 
With US$ 1.9 billion of assets under management20, the largest Luxembourg-
domiciled feeder fund investing with Madoff was LUXALPHA SICAV – American Selec-
tion. The fund, initiated by Access International Advisors LLC, had several UBS group 
entities involved in various roles, including that of depositary/custodian. The board of 
the fund consisted of six members in total, four of them were representatives of UBS, 
one was the fund’s legal advisor in Luxembourg and one was a partner of the invest-
ment advisor. The fund was approved and operated under the UCITS regime, implying 
that it could be distributed to retail investors, based on a high degree of investor pro-
tection. Nevertheless, the parties involved, including the supervisory authorities, the 
depositary/custodian, the auditor and the board of directors, did not protect the fund 
investors against the fraud. Investors in the fund suffered substantial losses or even 
their whole investment. 
Conclusion 
Millions of investors depend on funds for their financial future. Professional portfolio 
management and risk reduction through diversification are the main benefits of in-
vestment funds that have allowed them to become an industry with EUR 15.9 trillion 
of assets under management worldwide at the end of 2009. Despite the success of the 
industry in terms of growth, there have also been cases in which the trust of investors 
was abused. In recent cases, such as the late trading and market timing scandal of 
2003 and the Madoff fraud uncovered at the end of 2008, independent governance 
was unable to prevent fraud from taking place. 
                                                                
19 These and other empirical studies are analysed in more detail in chapter 3.  
20 Source: Semi-Annual Report of LUXALPHA SICAV as of 30 June 2008.  
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1.5 Fund performance and fund flows 
In this section, studies into the actual performance of funds are analysed, along with 
studies explaining the levels of flows into funds from previous periods’ performance 
and other factors. 
Performance versus benchmarks: Outperformance 
Several academic studies analyse whether investment funds as a group perform better 
than their benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis, in other words, whether they are able 
to outperform. An early study into the performance of investment funds, analysing 
funds in the U.S. in the period 1945–1964, is Jensen (1968). This study finds that on a 
risk-adjusted basis and net of expenses, funds on average underperformed the S&P 
Index. Gross of expenses, there was no evidence that funds were able to outperform 
either. There were individual funds that outperformed the index in the period ana-
lysed, but the number of outperforming funds and the magnitude of outperformance 
was not greater than what would be expected on the basis of chance.  
Studies in which the performance of investment funds is compared to indices or 
index funds have the risk of overstating fund performance, due to survivorship bias21. 
Later studies explicitly controlling for survivorship bias generally confirm the conclu-
sion that the average fund underperforms net of expenses. However, the results gross 
of expenses differ, either showing a slight underperformance (e.g. Malkiel, 1995) or 
showing a slight outperformance of benchmarks (e.g. Gruber, 1996). On the whole, the 
value added of professional, active fund management by security selection and/or 
market timing of the average fund seems insufficient to recover the fees charged. This 
result is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, which says that prices of secu-
rities always incorporate and reflect all relevant information. Under this hypothesis, 
active managers on average would not be expected to outperform market indices on a 
risk-adjusted basis. When markets are efficient, the track record of an individual port-
folio manager would not give any indication for future performance either. Individual 
managers with excess risk-adjusted performance in a certain period would just be 
lucky, not skilled. 
Performance persistence: Hot hands 
The underperformance of the average investment fund found by various studies does 
not end the debate between proponents of active and passive management. Even if 
portfolio managers on average do not outperform, that in itself does not prove that 
the efficient market hypothesis holds. It might be possible that certain portfolio man-
agers are skilled (often referred to as having hot hands) and that these managers are 
able to systematically earn higher risk-adjusted returns than market indices, index 
funds and their average actively-managed competitors. When there are two categories 
of managers, skilled managers and unskilled managers, with the former being able to 
                                                                
21 A sample of funds selected to measure performance in a certain period, might only include funds that still 
existed at a point in time after the measurement period (the survivors) and therefore exclude funds that 
existed in that period, but have since closed down. Because poorly performing funds are more likely to be 
merged into more successful funds or to be liquidated, the average performance of surviving funds is likely 
to overstate the actual average performance. 
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pursue security selection and/or market timing strategies successfully, one would ex-
pect to find performance persistence in samples of investment funds. Funds selected 
in a formation period on the basis of their superior risk-adjusted performance, would 
be more likely to persist in their superior performance in a subsequent evaluation 
period. Past performance of funds would be indicative of skill and would have predic-
tive power for future performance. As a consequence, track records and performance 
rankings would be a useful and valuable tool for fund selection by investors. 
Hazenberg (1993), Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) and Goetzmann and Ib-
botson (1994) indeed find evidence of performance persistence, the former in a sam-
ple of global equity funds in the Netherlands and the latter two in samples of domestic 
equity funds in the U.S. Malkiel (1995) comes to similar results, but is sceptical wheth-
er this is the result of portfolio managers’ skills. Over the whole period (1971-1991), 
strategies of investing in investment funds selected on the basis of past performance 
outperformed, but this was only due to strong outperformance of such a strategy in 
the 1970s. Furthermore, following such a strategy would have resulted in considerable 
transaction costs, which were not taken into account in the analysis. 
Other problems in these earlier studies into performance persistence are that 
there are risk factors not corrected for with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
and that differences in expense levels across funds and survivorship bias might have 
had an influence on the results. Four studies published in the 1995–1997 period explic-
itly address these shortcomings, all using U.S. equity fund data. Brown and Goetzmann 
(1995), Gruber (1996) and Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) find performance persis-
tence. This is not merely due to higher fees, but mostly due to losing funds continuing 
to do badly. The costs of funds with superior performance are not increased subse-
quently. Carhart (1997) finds performance persistence as well. However, most of the 
persistence is explained by differences in exposures to the common risk factors (book-
to-market, one-year momentum and size), expense ratios and transaction costs. Re-
maining persistence is due to the continued underperformance of the worst perform-
ing funds. Past performance seems to be a useful indicator of funds to avoid, but it 
remains doubtful that it can used to consistently beat market indices or even the aver-
age fund. 
Four more recent studies provide new insights for the discussion about perform-
ance persistence and come to results that are promising for believers in portfolio man-
ager skills as a driver of investment results. Morey and Gottesman (2006) analyse the 
predictive power of Morningstar stars22 and find that funds rated in the top category 
significantly outperformed the other funds. In the fund management industry, Morn-
ingstar ratings are seen as highly influential, since they are intuitive, available free of 
charge and widely-used by individual investors. Therefore, they are more likely to be 
actually used for investment decisions than academic performance measures.  
Bessler, Blake, Lückoff and Tonks (2010) find that manager changes and fund flows 
are counterbalancing forces for performance persistence. A manager with good per-
formance can be promoted to a larger fund or leave the fund management company 
for a better-paid position at a competitor, whereas a manager with poor performance 
                                                                
22 Morningstar is a rating agency originating in the U.S. that assigns ratings to investment funds in the form 
of Morningstar stars.  
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might be replaced. Inflows into winning funds can lead to transaction costs and capac-
ity issues, reducing performance in a subsequent period, even when the manager is 
skilled. Ibbotson and Patel (2002) argue that much of the performance difference be-
tween a fund and a broad market index is attributable to the fund’s style, rather than 
the manager’s skill. Ranking funds on the basis of style-adjusted performance, they 
find evidence of performance persistence in the top funds.  
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) dissect the way individual funds are managed by cal-
culating funds’ active share, the fraction of portfolio holdings that differ from the 
benchmark, and tracking error, the volatility of fund returns is excess of the bench-
mark. They find that tracking error does not predict performance, but active share 
does. Among the highest active share funds, there is significant performance persis-
tence. Funds with a high active share and high tracking error, so called concentrated 
stock pickers, as well as diversified stock pickers, funds with high active share and low 
tracking error, display superior skill, which persists over time.  
Fund flows and performance: Performance chasing 
Gruber (1996) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) analyse the relationship between fund per-
formance and subsequent cash flows from investors buying or selling fund participa-
tions. Both studies find that this relationship is not symmetrical. Outperformance is 
associated with inflows, but underperformance is not associated with the same level of 
outflows. Keswani and Stolin (2008) find the same pattern for domestic equity funds in 
the U.K. Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) find that the asymmetric relationship between 
performance and flows holds when analysing the relationship between Morningstar 
ratings and flows. According to Gruber (1996, p. 807), the existence of two clienteles 
explains why not all investors redirect their money invested on the basis of past per-
formance: 
“The sophisticated clientele directs its money to funds based on performance. 
The disadvantaged clientele consists of three groups: 
1)  Unsophisticated investors—a group that directs its money to funds based at 
least in part on other influences such as advertising and advice from bro-
kers. 
2) Institutionally disadvantaged investors—a group primarily represented by 
pension accounts that are restricted by the plan they are part of to a set of 
funds that underperforms the best active funds. 
3) Tax disadvantaged investors—a group that has held one or more funds for 
enough time so that capital gains taxes make it inefficient to remove money 
from these funds. This group can still act as sophisticated investors in plac-
ing new money.” 
 
Lynch and Musto (2003) add as explanation for the convex relationship between per-
formance and fund flows that when the performance falls below a certain threshold, 
investors might anticipate a change in the way the fund is managed, either due to the 
replacement of the portfolio manager or a change in the fund’s investment approach. 
When such changes are made and it is unlikely that poor performance will persist, it is 
sensible for investors not to react to poor performance with redemptions. Their em-
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pirical results show that, indeed, bad fund performance is more likely to be followed 
by manager changes and changes to the profile of the fund.  
Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) find that there are strong spillover effects within 
fund families, which is the effect that in a fund family with a star performer, other 
funds benefit with inflows as well. By offering a high number of funds and/or funds 
that have returns with a low correlation among each other, the likelihood of having a 
star in the fund family can be increased. The results of the study are consistent with 
the hypothesis that fund families with inferior investment capabilities pursue such 
star-creating strategies, in order to benefit from the spillover effect. The results also 
indicate that families with superior capabilities do exist.  
Performance on flows: Smart money 
The conclusion of several empirical studies that performance persists, in combination 
with studies that find that investors select funds on the basis of past performance, 
suggests that there is a sophisticated client group, making the right investment and 
disinvestment decisions, so that their money can be called smart. Gruber (1996) in-
deed shows that investors that subscribe into and redeem from funds have a positive 
risk-adjusted performance on their positive and negative cash flows, exceeding the 
return of the average active, as well as, the average passive fund. Zheng (1999) con-
firms Gruber’s results, however the performance of the positive flow funds is not sta-
tistically significantly higher than the market return. Fund flows are related to past 
performance, but there seems to be other fund-specific information that affects flows 
playing a role as well. Keswani and Stolin (2008) do a similar analysis on domestic eq-
uity funds in the U.K. They confirm the conclusion that money is smart and this is the 
case both for individual and institutional money. Although the result is statistically 
significant, the effect is small from an economic perspective.  
Fund flows and marketing: Search costs 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) argue that which funds investors buy might not only depend on 
past performance, but could be a function of search costs as well. When collecting and 
processing information is costly, consumers buy funds that are easier or less costly to 
find. Three proxies for search costs are used in their study, namely fund complex size, 
marketing and distribution expenditures and media coverage. Funds with more media 
attention and belonging to larger complexes indeed grow more rapidly than other 
funds. Funds with higher marketing efforts, measured as higher fees (which are in part 
spent on marketing), benefit more in the form of inflows in the case where perform-
ance is good. However, fund complex size in combination with strong performance is 
not associated with additional inflows. Jain and Wu (2000) study investment fund ad-
vertising in relationship to performance and flows. They find that in the one-year pe-
riod prior to the advertisement, the performance of the funds advertised is signifi-
cantly better than that of benchmarks, but that in the year after the advertisement, it 
is inferior to the benchmark. In the sample of funds that advertise, there is no evidence 
of performance persistence, but rather a reversal of performance. Investors, however, 
seem to be sensitive to advertising. Compared to a control group of funds that are 
similar in terms of past-performance, past-flows and fund size, flows into funds that 
advertise are larger than flows into funds that do not advertise.  
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Frye (2001) compares the performance of bank-managed and non-bank managed 
bond funds in the U.S., pointing out that banks have the reputation of providing funds 
with inferior investment performance. Reasons for investing in bank-managed funds, 
other than for performance, could be related to lower search costs. Investors investing 
in bank-managed funds are likely to have a relationship with the same bank for other 
financial services and might appreciate the convenience of one-stop shopping. From 
the viewpoint of the bank, it can also be beneficial and cost advantageous to cross-sell, 
using client relationships and information for offering different services. The study 
finds that non-bank funds have higher returns, but there is no evidence that bank 
funds underperform non-bank funds on a risk-adjusted basis. Bank funds are managed 
more conservatively, leading to a lower standard deviation of returns and a lower risk 
relative to the index. The conservatism of banks is also expressed in the type of funds 
offered. Banks are underrepresented in equity funds and in the higher risk fixed in-
come investment objectives, such as corporate high yield and convertible bonds. This 
might be the result of banks attracting a different, more risk-averse and possibly less 
experienced clientele than non-bank fund management companies. An alternative 
explanation for banks offering lower risk funds is that they do so because of the risk of 
losing investors as bank clients when their funds underperform by a wide margin. The 
results show that the average expense ratio of bank-managed funds is lower than that 
of non-bank managed funds, despite bank-funds being smaller and thus less able to 
benefit from economies of scale. These lower costs could be a result of the revenues 
that banks make on other services offered to the same clients. Furthermore, the study 
shows that flows into bank-managed funds are less dependent on past performance 
than flows into non-bank managed funds, which suggests that bank clients invest ba-
sed on marketing efforts and the reputation of the bank.  
Fund flows and costs: Fee sensitivity 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that fund buyers are sensitive to fees; funds that have 
lower fees and funds that reduce their fees grow faster. However, fee increases are 
not associated with outflows. This could be the result of the counterbalancing effect of 
lower search costs, in the case where the higher fees are spent on marketing or incen-
tives for distributors. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) find a statistically significant 
negative relationship between fund flows and front-end loads. There is no statistically 
significant relationship between total operating expenses and flows. The authors find a 
positive relationship between flows and 12b-1 fees23, the part of the ongoing expenses 
that are meant for marketing and distribution expenditures. The authors argue that 
investors have learned more quickly to avoid front-end loads, which are very visible 
(e.g. on transaction confirmations), than ongoing fees.  
                                                                
23 12b-1 fees are “fees paid by the fund out of fund assets to cover distribution expenses and sometimes 
shareholder service expenses.”12b-1 fees” get their name from the SEC rule that authorizes a fund to pay 
them. The rule permits a fund to pay distribution fees out of fund assets only if the fund has adopted a plan 
(12b-1 plan) authorizing their payment. “Distribution fees” include fees paid for marketing and selling fund 
shares, such as compensating brokers and others who sell fund shares, and paying for advertising, the print-
ing and mailing of prospectuses to new investors, and the printing and mailing of sales literature. The SEC 
does not limit the size of 12b-1 fees that funds may pay. But under FINRA rules, 12b-1 fees that are used to 
pay marketing and distribution expenses (as opposed to shareholder service expenses) cannot exceed 0.75 
percent of a fund’s average net assets per year.” (source: SEC website, www.sec.gov, 16 June 2011).  
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Wilcox (2003) analyses investor preferences with a group of participants in an experi-
mental setting and concludes that investors emphasise past performance and that 
they make an incorrect trade-off between front-end loads and annual expense ratios, 
overweighting the former and underweighting the latter. Wilcox (2003, p. 658) states 
that:  
“Investors appear to make substantial cognitive errors when evaluating a 
fund’s fee structure. Disclosure requirements that allow greater transparency 
into the total cost of owning the shares of a mutual fund would likely lead to 
better investment decisions. Seemingly small differences in fees can lead to 
very substantial differences in total asset value over time horizons of 2 or 3 
decades.” 
Conclusions 
Academic studies analysing the performance of investment funds generally find that, 
on a risk-adjusted basis, the average fund underperforms the market, certainly after 
fees. The costs included in expense ratio as well as transaction costs and load fees, all 
have a direct, negative impact on performance. Investors pay too little attention to the 
ongoing expenses of funds to achieve optimal investment results in the long term. 
Several studies find evidence of performance persistence, which indicates that 
fund performance is not a random process. The performance persistence of funds 
performing poorly is stronger than that of those performing well. Apparently, it is eas-
ier to consistently destroy value than to consistently add value. Differences in cost 
levels are an important contributor to the performance persistence found, but also 
different levels of skills of portfolio managers seem to play a role. Manager changes 
and large inflows after a period of strong performance disrupt the performance persis-
tence of funds performing well. On the other hand, manager changes after poor per-
formance are positive for the subsequent performance. 
Good performance is associated with inflows, but poor performance is not associ-
ated with the same level of outflows, due to switching and search costs and other 
market frictions. This asymmetry indicates that the external governance of market 
forces could be insufficient to align the interests of the investors and the fund man-
agement company, and that it is likely that additional monitoring could be effective. 
Ongoing costs, manager changes and protecting funds against the costs of excessive 
flows are all examples of factors that a board of directors can potentially influence in 
the interest of investors. 
1.6 Conflicts of interest 
This section is dedicated to different conflicts of interest that exist in the fund man-
agement industry between the fund investor and other parties involved. Figure 1.6 
displays the structure of Luxembourg funds, showing the fund itself in the core of the 
chart, surrounded by the main parties involved in its management, operations and 
distribution. Whereas the inner circle can be seen as the fund in a narrow, legal defini-
tion, the outer circle, including the main parties involved, can be seen as the fund ac-
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cording to an economic definition, namely as the total financial product that the inves-
tor buys and experiences. 
The activities of the various parties involved can be divided into three types: 
1. Commerce, mainly consisting of the marketing, sales and distribution of the fund. 
2. Services, mainly consisting of fund management and administrative services. 
3. Oversight. 
 
Fund
Auditor
Depositary / 
Custodian
Board
DistributorInvestor
Fund 
Management 
Company
FA / TA
Other 
clients
Mgt & 
staff
Commerce
Oversight
Services
Shareholder(s)
 
Figure 1.5: Stakeholder model for Luxembourg funds 
 
The fund management company24 is placed in both the Commerce and Services sec-
tions. It is the provider of professional portfolio management services to the fund. It is 
usually a commercial, profit-seeking company, selling its services in the market. A fund 
management company normally does not manage only one fund, but several, and can 
manage portfolios for individuals and institutions as well. The fund management com-
pany staff – its management, portfolio managers and other employees – is included as 
stakeholders separately, since they also have their own personal interests. 
 
                                                                
24 Fund management company, as shown in the chart, is the combination of the management company of 
the fund and the investment manager, the company to which the actual management of the portfolio is 
delegated. In most cases, these companies belong to the same group. For that reason, the investors see 
them as one organisation. Examples of such groups are BlackRock, DWS and Franklin Templeton. In Luxem-
bourg the term promoter is often used for the fund management group. This is equivalent to the term spon-
sor, used in the U.S.  
The management company can also provide administrative services to the fund or choose to outsource 
those activities to another company, either in the same group or outside. Luxembourg funds set up as con-
tractual vehicles must have a management company, whereas Luxembourg funds set up as a corporate 
vehicle can either be self-managed or appoint a management company. This is elaborated in chapter 2.  
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A fund management company can have a direct relationship with its investors, but 
usually a distributor is positioned in between them, in particular where retail investors 
are concerned. Main fund distributors are banks, insurance companies, fund platforms 
and (independent) financial advisors. It should be noted that the relative importance 
of the various distribution channels differs, both between the U.S. and Europe, as well 
as between the different European countries. 
The administrative services are divided into fund accounting (“FA” in the chart), 
which involves the calculation of funds’ net asset value, and transfer agency (“TA“ in 
the chart), which involves managing the shareholders’ registrar, including keeping 
records of subscriptions and redemptions and executing dividend distributions. The 
depositary is the fund’s central custodian, which has three main functions: 
1. Safekeeing of the assets of the fund.  
2. Day-to-day administration of the assets of the fund, including receiving the assets’ 
income.  
3. Oversight of the fund’s operation, including compliance with investment policies. 
 
Whereas the first and second functions of the depositary can be seen as Services, the 
third function is clearly an Oversight role. For that reason, the depositary is placed in 
two of the three sections, Oversight and Services. The depositary is appointed by the 
board, whereas the auditor is proposed by the board and appointed by the sharehold-
ers. The board, the auditor and the depositary all have oversight responsibilities. 
The distributor, the fund management company, the fund accountant (FA), trans-
fer agent (TA) and the depositary are usually all commercial companies, which are part 
of larger (financial) groups. It is not uncommon that, for a specific fund, several or all of 
these functions are provided by companies of the same group, i.e., sharing the same 
ultimate shareholder. 
 
The different stakeholders, their primary interests and how these interests potentially 
conflict with the interests of the investor will be explored in the remainder of this sec-
tion on the basis of figure 1.5. Several theoretical and empirical academic studies will 
be referred to in this context. The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) paper published in May 2000 and titled, “Conflicts of interest of CIS Opera-
tors” (IOSCO, 2000; hereafter IOSCO Conflicts Paper), has been used for this section as 
well. 
Fund management company 
The most fundamental conflict of interest in the fund management industry exists 
between the fund investor (at the same time being a shareholder or participant of the 
fund and a client of the fund management company) on the one hand, and the fund 
management company (the provider of the financial product) on the other hand. It is a 
typical agency problem, resulting from the separation of ownership and management 
of the fund’s assets. The payoff structures of these two stakeholders are not fully 
aligned. At the same time, the manager of the assets has an information advantage 
over the owner of the assets. The fund management company is remunerated for its 
services with a management fee, which in general, is a percentage of assets under 
management. In Europe, the general practice is that the fund management company 
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pays the distributor of the fund for its distribution and advisory services with a trailer 
fee, also referred to in the industry as retrocession or rebate. The trailer fee is usually a 
percentage of the management fee and arranged for in a distribution agreement. In 
some cases, funds charge a separate, transparent distribution fee to the fund, on top 
of the management fee. These are usually funds of firms originating from the U.S., 
used to the 12b-1 fees in that market. A fund management company seeking to maxi-
mise fee income will strive to increase assets under management and will prefer higher 
fees to lower fees.  
Although investment funds often come with secondary services that could be of 
value to the investor (e.g., reporting services with regard to the value and performance 
of investments, for example, for tax filings, ability to easily buy and sell funds, availabil-
ity of other financial products via the same provider, linkage to an insurance scheme), 
the investor primarily invests in a fund aiming for a maximum risk-adjusted return, net 
of costs. This equals the gross risk-adjusted return of the fund minus the management 
and distribution fee, minus any other costs charged to the fund. For fund investors, 
management fees and other fees charged are the price paid for the services received. 
Ceteris paribus, higher fees imply lower risk-adjusted net returns. Therefore, a fund 
investor will prefer lower fees to higher fees. 
Charging excessively high costs would be a way for the fund management com-
pany to exploit fund investors. This could be in the form of high management fees, but 
overcharging can also take on more subtle forms. The IOSCO Conflicts Paper mentions 
the following as examples: 
• When the fund management company may use fund assets to pay for marketing 
and distribution expenses25, there is an incentive to spend excessive amounts. The 
costs of marketing are for the fund, while the benefits – management fee over in-
creased assets under management – are for the fund management com-
pany (IOSCO, 2000, p. 9). 
• When the fund management company obtains goods or services from a third party 
for both itself and for the fund (e.g. audit services), there is an incentive to charge a 
larger than fair part of the total fees to the fund or to use the total purchasing 
power for a discount on the fees paid by the fund management company (IOSCO, 
2000, p. 8-9). 
 
The practice of so-called soft dollar arrangements26 gives rise to potential conflicts of 
interest as well. It gives the fund management company the possibility to transfer 
expenses that would normally be paid from its own resources to the fund it manages. 
Examining U.S. funds, Siggelkow (2004) finds that soft dollars are positively related to 
expense ratios, implying that soft dollar revenues are not used to lower expense ratios. 
Hence, soft dollars transfer expenses from the fund management company to fund 
investors and are not beneficial for investors. 
 
                                                                
25 In several jurisdictions this is permitted, because the fund investors would benefit from increased assets 
under management in the form of economies of scale being passed on in the form of lower costs. 
26 A soft dollar arrangement is in place when trade execution services are bundled with research services, 
sometimes including providing data sources, and are paid for through broker commissions.  
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A decline of assets under management results in a decline of the fund management 
company revenues. Therefore, market discipline, the possibility of investors selling the 
units of funds that charge excessive fees or underperform, is a mitigating factor for the 
conflict of interest between the fund management company and the investor. If mar-
ket forces work properly, charging excessive fees is unlikely to be a value optimising 
strategy for fund management companies in the long run. Analysing the situation in 
the U.S., Coates and Hubbard (2007) conclude that price competition is a strong con-
straint on fund management companies and as a result, they cannot earn monopoly 
rates. The market concentration is low and market shares of different funds and fund 
management companies have fluctuated significantly. Barriers to entry in the industry 
are low and new entry is common in practice. Fee information is highly transparent 
and easily available, fee decreases are common and finally, price competition has 
proven to be an effective way to increase market share. 
Khorana and Servaes (2007) investigate empirically whether the conflict of interest 
between investors and fund management companies is mitigated by competition. The 
study uses U.S. market data during the period 1979–1998, in which assets under man-
agement increased by a factor of twenty, while the number of fund families increased 
by a factor of three. Analysing the development of fund management company market 
shares, overall and within different investment objectives27, in relationship to annual 
fund expenses and loads, the study finds that both price and non-price competition 
have an effect on market shares. Fund families that charge lower fees than funds with 
the same objective have higher market shares. The same applies to fund families that 
share more of the economies of scale with investors. Both suggest that market forces 
indeed mitigate conflicts of interest, since investors reallocate assets from expensive 
to cheaper groups. Good performance, in particular when measured as Morningstar 
ratings, is also associated with higher market shares. There is evidence of a spillover 
effect, since fund families are able to increase their market share in a certain invest-
ment objective when they perform well in other objectives. Innovation, measured by 
the number of new launches, and more diversified product offerings are also associ-
ated with higher market shares. 
In the same study, however, there are also indications that fund families can fol-
low pricing strategies to increase their market share that are not in the interest of 
shareholders. The market share of low cost fund families is not impacted negatively 
when expenses are increased towards the average, thereby increasing the revenues of 
the firm. When splitting the total fees in loads, 12b-1 fees and other fees, the impact 
on market share of higher other fees is negative, but higher loads are associated with 
higher market shares. Higher 12b-1 fees, expenses for marketing and distribution, have 
a neutral influence on market shares. Loads and 12b-1 fees are paid directly by fund 
shareholders, but are meant to increase assets under management. However, the 
study shows that this does not translate into lower other costs, due to economies of 
scale. 
 
                                                                
27 A fund’s investment objective is the asset class in which it invests and/or its investment style. Examples 
are Aggressive growth, Balanced, High quality bonds, High-yield bonds, Global equity and Growth and in-
come. In Europe, the term fund sector is commonly used.  
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The convex nature of the performance-flow relationship found by Gruber (1996), Sirri 
and Tufano (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) and Keswani and Stolin (2008), which 
indicates that investors reward strong performance more than they punish poor per-
formance, gives rise to conflicts of interest. It is in the fund management company’s 
interest to make risky investments in order to create a star performing fund, which, 
when successful, would lead to a high payoff in the form of additional assets under 
management and additional fee income. When the investment strategy fails and the 
fund underperforms, it is the investor who suffers the losses. The fund management 
company comes out relatively unscathed, since it is not punished with significant out-
flows. The payoff function of the fund management company is comparable to an 
option, the value of which can be increased by increasing the variance of returns and 
thus the risk profile of the fund in which the investor invests.  
Several empirical studies find evidence of types of fund management company 
behaviour that are in their interests, but go against the investors’ interests. Brown, 
Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find evidence of fund man-
agers changing the risk profile of their fund, depending on the year-to-date return. This 
behaviour is a consequence of the competition in the fund industry, where funds that 
are the winners in the annual tournament among competing funds are rewarded with 
additional assets. Brown et al. (1996) find that funds that are behind the market in the 
first half of the year increase their volatility to a greater extent during the second half 
of the year, compared to funds that are ahead of the market.  
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that, in particular, young funds that are slightly 
behind the market, gamble in an effort to catch up by year-end, whereas funds that 
are ahead of the market tend to lock-in their favourable results by indexing the portfo-
lio. The strongest incentive found is that of funds that are well ahead of the market, 
increasing their risk profile in what seems to be an attempt to make it to the list of top 
performers as per the end of the year. This type of behaviour can be a value maximis-
ing strategy for the fund management company, given that it competes with other 
fund management companies for new assets on the basis of relative performance that 
is assessed per calendar year. However, it is not in the interest of the investor, who is 
pursuing a maximum risk-adjusted performance over his holding period.  
Carhart, Kaniel, Musto and Reed (2002) find that some investment fund managers 
inflate the quarter-end and, especially, year-end net asset value of their fund, by ag-
gressively purchasing stocks they already hold. Since the stock prices fall back shortly 
thereafter, this behaviour, which the authors call leaning for the tape, moves returns 
from one period to the next. This happens particularly in funds that have the greatest 
incentive to do so, namely funds that are already placed well in the performance rank-
ing for the period, and through this practice get a further push up the rankings. The 
logical explanation is that they do so to attract new flows in the subsequent period. 
Investors buying at inflated prices will have a reduced investment performance. In 
addition, investors are misguided by overstated results, which can lead to different 
investment decisions than they might have taken otherwise. 
Other clients 
Most fund management companies do not offer a single investment fund, but offer a 
range of funds, and might also offer discretionary portfolio management services to 
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individual or institutional clients. Offering a range of funds potentially leads to econo-
mies of scope28. Scope advantages can exist in the area of production, for example, 
resulting from investment analysts providing research for more than one product, as 
well as in staff functions, such as legal, compliance and risk management, working 
across the fund range. When a range of products is offered, sales staff can be on the 
road promoting more than one product, as fund distributors require more than one 
fund on their shelves. In marketing and advertising, a scope economy occurs when the 
whole range of funds benefits from increased brand awareness. This, in turn, can be of 
benefit to investors, lowering their search costs. 
Certain conflicts of interest are introduced when offering and managing a range of 
funds. When funds are managed side by side, fund management companies can be 
tempted into unethical or even illegal behaviour. The convex relationship between 
performance and flows and the spillover effect, make it more profitable for the fund 
management company to produce one top performing fund and one poor performing 
fund than to produce two average performing funds. This creates the incentive for the 
fund management company to produce good performing funds, even if that is at the 
expense of having additional poor performing funds in the range. The late trading and 
market timing practices uncovered in 2003 can be explained by the conflict of interest 
between different clients, since with late trading and market timing possibilities, cer-
tain large clients received preferential treatment and benefited at the expense of oth-
er clients. Fund management companies got something in exchange for making these 
practices possible, such as additional assets under management in other funds. 
While recognising potential scale advantages, Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006, p. 
74) point out that:  
“…family affiliation may distort the incentives of fund managers, possibly in-
ducing them to sacrifice the interest of fund shareholders if the overall family 
stands to benefit. Families are liable to coordinate actions across funds in the 
complex in order to enhance the performance of funds that are the most valu-
able to the family, even if this comes at the expense of the performance of 
other member funds. This family strategy of “favoritism” is the result of the di-
vergence of interests between fund management companies and sharehold-
ers.” 
Cross-subsidisation is an example of a strategy under which the performance of one or 
more funds is subsidised at the expense of the performance of other funds. In a range 
of funds, cross-subsidisation can be strategy that increases the profitability of the fund 
management company, but is against the interests of the investors in the funds that 
are not favoured by the fund management company. Gasper et al. (2006) empirically 
find that strategic cross-subsidisation in fund families takes place and observe that the 
performance of high value funds is enhanced at the expense of low value funds. High 
value funds include funds with high fees and funds that perform well currently (funds 
with high year-to-date performance, likely to be well placed in year-end fund rank-
ings). They find evidence that high value funds are favoured in the allocation of under-
                                                                
28 Economies of scope is the effect that occurs when the costs to produce two or more products jointly are 
lower than the costs to produce them independently.  
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priced initial public offerings (IPOs) and by placing opposite trades. In the latter case, 
the fund family coordinates the trades of its funds in such a way that the low value 
funds trade in the market to buffer the price pressure of orders by high value funds or 
directly crosses buy and sell orders without going to the open market. 
Cici, Gibson and Moussawi (2009) and Nohel, Wang, and Zheng (2010) analyse the 
performance of funds of fund management companies with what is referred to as a 
side-by-side business strategy, where regular investment funds and hedge funds are 
managed by the same firm. Firms with such a strategy often share portfolio manage-
ment, research and other resources between the two activities. Proponents of such an 
approach argue that these firms might be able to attract the best portfolio managers, 
research analysts and other staff, giving them a competitive advantage over firms 
managing regular investment funds only. Hedge funds could offer a larger financial 
compensation, which is often performance-related, and, due to being less constrained, 
might provide a more challenging and stimulating environment in which to work. On 
the other hand, there are reasons to have concerns about such a side-by-side ap-
proach. Revenues per euro or dollar under management are higher for hedge funds 
and hedge funds usually have a performance-related fee. There are several ways in 
which favouritism could take place, subsidising the hedge fund at the expense of the 
investors in the investment fund in order the increase the firm’s total revenues. Cici et 
al. (p. 2009, 1–2) mention the following possibilities:  
“First, firms can front run the execution of hedge fund trades ahead of mutual 
fund trades. Second, in a practice known as ‘cherry-picking’, decisions about 
how a trade is allocated can be delayed, with trades experiencing favorable 
subsequent price movements allocated to hedge funds. Third, rather than allo-
cating the average price paid in a bunched trade, shares bought at the lowest 
price and shares sold at the highest price can be allocated to hedge funds. 
Fourth, mutual funds can pay trade commissions inflated by soft dollar pay-
ments, but hedge funds can benefit from services purchased with the soft dol-
lars. Fifth, firms can allocate disproportionately more underpriced IPO shares 
to hedge funds and fewer to mutual funds. In the sixth and final example, the 
favoritism is quid pro quo: For hedge fund investors who agree to commit as-
sets for extended periods, firms extend stale-price or late-trading privileges in 
the mutual funds they oversee. In this last example, the wealth transfer may be 
more circuitous than in the other examples, but the end result is that hedge 
fund investors’ stale-price or late-trading profits come at mutual fund inves-
tors’ expense.” 
Cici et al. (2009) find that firms that run regular funds and hedge funds side-by-side 
favour their hedge funds. Side-by-side mutual funds get less benefit from participating 
in underpriced IPOs than affiliated hedge funds and than similar funds managed by 
other firms. However, Nohel et al. (2010) do not find any evidence that conflicts of 
interest result in a welfare loss for fund investors when these funds are managed by 
the same portfolio managers who are managing hedge funds. 
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Shareholder of the fund management company 
Fund management companies act as agents of two principals, namely the shareholders 
of the funds, the investors, and the shareholders of the fund management company. 
Siggelkow (2004, p. 2) describes the fund management company as being caught be-
tween two principals:  
“In the context of the mutual fund industry, if asset managers at mutual fund 
providers would not be maximizing profits … the owners of the fund providers, 
i.e., the shareholders who have invested in the fund providers (e.g., Merrill 
Lynch’s shareholders), would also have reason to complain of an agency prob-
lem. The owners of the fund providers can reasonably demand that the fund 
providers’ managers maximize profits for them, as long as the providers do not 
engage in illegal activities. In short, asset managers are caught between two 
principals: fund shareholders, who want fund providers to maximize returns, 
and the owners of the fund providers, who want fund providers to maximize 
profits. Yet any dollar given to one principal comes directly out of the pocket of 
the other principal, and pleasing one principal might be seen as an agency 
problem by the other principal.” 
The type of fund management company shareholder might be of influence on the 
severity of the conflict of interest between the fund management company and the 
investor. In a report based on a survey among fund management companies, KPMG 
(2006, p. 6, 12) argues that investment managers that are subsidiaries of large banks 
and insurance companies tend to have a sales-driven, as opposed to an investment-
driven culture. By being able to take a long-term view when meeting client needs, 
independent houses and partnerships have a better alignment of interests between 
investors and managers. Similarly, Ferris and Yan (2009, p. 619) state:  
“Since fund management companies with a short-term focus emphasize near-
term profits over long-term value creation, they are more likely to adopt strat-
egies that increase their current fee revenue, but conflict with the interests of 
fund shareholders. For instance, they might raise fees or allow market timing 
trades by favored clients. By contrast, fund management companies possessing 
a long-term focus are less likely to employ such myopic strategies because they 
tend to decrease long-term fee revenue due to lower fund performance and 
investor cash flows. Instead, long-term fund management companies tend to 
focus on fund performance maximization. Consequently, the interest of fund 
shareholders is better aligned with that of long-term fund management com-
panies than with fund companies having a shorter-term orientation.”  
Indeed, Ferris and Yan (2009) find empirically that agency costs are higher when fund 
management companies are publicly owned. Such firms charge higher fees, are more 
likely to be implicated in the mutual fund scandals and significantly underperform 
privately-owned families. 
 
Often, a fund management company is part of a larger financial group, such as a bank-
ing or insurance group. Dealing with affiliated parties within the same group can give 
rise to a wide-variety of conflicts of interest. For example, when the fund management 
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company is involved in a transaction with an affiliated party within the same group for 
the account of the investment fund, there are several ways in which that transaction 
can be against the interests of the fund and its investors, but for the benefit of the 
group. IOSCO (2000, p. 4–7) distinguishes three types of such transactions:  
1. Principal transactions involving a fund and its affiliated parties. 
2. Transactions using affiliated party intermediaries.  
3. Joint transactions with affiliated parties.  
 
Whereas IOSCO focuses on transactions in the fund portfolio, conflicts of interest also 
arise when delegating certain functions, such as fund accounting, transfer agency and 
depositary/custody, to affiliated parties. There is the risk of overcharging relative to 
the quality of the services provided. Paying more than market rates or receiving a sub-
par service level, in effect subsidises the group to which the fund management com-
pany belongs at the expense of the fund investors. With the depositary, which has an 
oversight function, there is the additional risk that it is less inclined to take appropriate 
action when overseeing a fund management company that belongs to the same group.  
A different area in which conflicts of interest can arise is that of proxy voting. As 
any other shareholder in publicly traded companies, funds are entitled to vote at 
shareholder meetings on proposals put forward by a company’s board or its share-
holders. This proxy voting power gives fund managers and fund management compa-
nies the ability to affect the outcome of shareholder votes and to monitor corporate 
events. This also creates a potential conflict of interest. The fund manager, the fund 
management company or the group to which the fund management company belongs 
might have business or personal ties with company management and therefore might 
sacrifice the interest of the investors in the fund by voting on the basis of their other 
interests. Chou, Ng and Wang (2007) find evidence that governance practices of fund 
management companies affect their investment decisions and the monitoring efforts 
of corporate activities. Well-governed investment funds showed a higher level of fidu-
ciary duty and acted in the interest of their shareholders.  
Management and staff 
In addition to conflicts of interest between fund management companies and inves-
tors, agency issues within fund management companies can also lead to unfavourable 
outcomes for investors. For example, employees of fund management companies 
might be tempted to front run transactions of the funds their firm manages or allocate 
favourable trades to their personal accounts and non-favourable trades to the funds. 
Fund management companies need to have adequate rules and controls in place to 
avoid this type of behaviour (IOSCO, 2000, p. 9, 10). Mahoney (2004, p. 175) points out 
a number of cases that came up in the market timing and late trading scandal where  
fund management company employees were permitted to market-time their firms’ 
funds, benefiting at the expense of their clients.  
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that following underperformance, younger man-
agers have a higher risk of being demoted to a smaller fund or losing their position as 
portfolio manager altogether. As a result of this higher risk, young managers have the 
incentive to be more risk-averse in the way they manage their portfolio. Younger man-
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agers hold portfolios with less unsystematic risk (i.e., with smaller bets) and have more 
conventional portfolios (i.e., they are less likely to deviate from the herd).  
Certain remuneration schemes can also give rise to conflicts of interest. Perform-
ance fees are often promoted as aligning the interests of the investor and the man-
ager, but in practice, can lead to the opposite result. In particular, when there is no 
downside to underperformance, performance fees can lead to risk-seeking behaviour, 
either at the initiative of the portfolio manager or encouraged by his employer.  
Distributor 
In the U.S., most funds are sold through brokers or by the fund management company 
directly. In continental Europe, banks are the dominant distribution channel. When 
funds are sold through a financial advisor or a bank, these distributors have to be com-
pensated for their efforts and service. In the U.S., distributors are paid in the form of a 
front-end load or are compensated from the 12b-1 fee. In Europe29, the distributor can 
charge a front-end load to the investor and is paid a part of the management fee as a 
trailer fee by the fund management company. Some funds have a transparent distribu-
tion fee. The fund distributor maximises its ongoing revenues by maximising distribu-
tion fee plus management fee times trailer fee percentage times assets under man-
agement. Both a fund management company and a distributor seeking to maximise fee 
income will strive to increase assets under management and will prefer higher fees to 
lower fees. The distributor and the fund management company are better off with a 
higher management fee than a lower management fee, whereas a higher management 
fee reduces the performance of the investor. As a result, the pay-off function of the 
distributor is more aligned with that of the fund management company than that of 
the investor.  
The risk of such arrangements is that the trailer fees have an influence on the 
range of investment products offered and actively recommended to investors. This 
form of compensation is prone to conflicts of interest, possibly leading to pushing high 
margin products, rather than advising products which are the optimal solution for the 
client. Furthermore, commission-based distribution can lead to high turnover. The 
value of advice is difficult to measure. It is not only the superior risk-adjusted return of 
the fund recommended versus its peers that determines its value. The nature of the 
advice can be much broader than fund selection alone and can include advice regard-
ing financial and tax planning, asset allocation, portfolio composition and diversifica-
tion, as well as the suitability of certain investments. One could argue that when com-
paring the performance of actively-managed funds to indices or index funds, one 
should first add back the part of the funds’ expenses that compensate the distributor 
for advice.  
                                                                
29 The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), which was introduced on 1 November 2007, is a 
EU Directive that provides harmonised regulation for investment services across the European Economic 
Area. Its main objective is to increase competition and consumer protection in investment services. Current 
MiFID regulations do not prohibit rebates, there referred to as inducements, provided that certain condi-
tions are met to avoid conflicts of interest between distributor and investor. The 2011 proposal for MiFID II 
prohibits rebates when funds are offered in the context of independent advice and portfolio management. 
Further regulatory developments in Europe in the area of fund distributor remuneration can be expected in 
the coming years. A detailed analysis of the current regulations or the development thereof is out-of-scope 
for this dissertation.  
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The role of banks in the fund industry in the U.S. is different from that in Europe. In the 
U.S., banks were latecomers to the fund management industry. The Glass-Steagal act 
of 1933 allowed banks to manage fund assets, but only to distribute funds they did not 
manage. These regulations were relaxed as of 1992, allowing the growth of banks as 
managers and distributors of funds (Frye, 2001, p. 422). In most continental European 
countries, the funds market is traditionally dominated by the fund management arms 
of domestic banks. Only since the adoption of open-architecture distribution models 
by these banks in the last decade are independent fund managers able to distribute 
their funds through these channels.  
In a series of non-academic studies, Lipper, a firm providing fund data, analytical 
tools and commentary, analyses different aspects of the fund industry in Europe. Lip-
per (2011a) compares the performance of funds managed by funds operated by pure 
play asset managers to funds managed by asset managers that are part of banking, 
insurance or bancassurance companies. The study covers four separate universes of 
funds, namely funds registered for sale in France, Germany, Switzerland and the U.K 
respectively. For each market, funds of several bond, balanced and equity fund sectors 
are included in the sample. Within each sector and market, funds are ranked in quin-
tiles based on their risk-adjusted return, according to a proprietary Lipper-
methodology, and their total return over 3, 5 and 10 years. The general pattern that 
emerges across the four markets is that pure players have relatively more funds in the 
first and fifth quintile, whereas the fund management arms of financial services groups 
have relatively more funds in the second, third and fourth quintile. The results are 
more pronounced over 3 and 5 years than over 10 years. Although the study does not 
test the statistical significance of the results, this result of banks missing the top-
quintile, but avoiding the bottom-quintile, is consistent with Frye’s (2001) finding that 
banks offer products that are more risk-averse.  
Lipper (2009a) and Lipper (2011b) analyse the sales of newly launched funds ver-
sus existing funds. The studies show that historically, fund managers in Europe relied 
much more on newly launched funds for raising new assets under management than 
fund managers in the U.S. Within Europe, France, Germany, Spain and Italy favoured 
newly launched funds, whereas in the U.K., the Nordics, as well as the cross-border 
segment of the market, existing funds tended to gather most of the net new money. 
These differences are related to the way funds are distributed. In the U.K., Independ-
ent Financial Advisors are the primary distribution channel for funds. This channel 
requires funds to have a multi-year track record, whereas in continental Europe, banks 
have been able to distribute proprietary, newly launched funds through their own 
networks. Lipper (2009a) shows that in the 2002-2008 period, bank-related asset man-
agers have raised assets with newly launched funds and suffered redemptions from 
their existing funds. For pure play asset managers, the flows into new and existing 
funds were more balanced, with existing funds outselling new funds each year, except 
in the 2008 financial crisis year. These results for Europe are consistent with the results 
of Frye (2001) for the U.S., where flows into bank-managed funds were less dependent 
on past performance and appeared to be driven more by marketing and the bank’s 
reputation. Lipper (2009a, p. 25) states in the concluding section:  
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“Particularly in markets where banks dominate fund distribution the domi-
nance of new fund launches in capturing the lion’s share of sales can be clearly 
seen: ‘product push’ is a key business driver.”  
Board of directors 
The board of an investment fund plays, or can play, an important role in defending the 
interests of fund investors against conflicts of interest between various stakeholders, 
in particular, that between the investors and the fund management company. In fulfill-
ing their oversight role, independent board members, as opposed to dependent board 
members, might be more inclined to put the interests of the fund investors first and to 
act against the interests of the fund management company, if necessary. Having at 
least some independent board members might well bring a certain perspective and 
discipline lacking in boards that are only internal. In the U.S., having independent di-
rectors is mandatory. These directors are to serve as watchdogs for the fund investors, 
able to negotiate with the fund management company at an arms length basis. 
Independence can be defined in various ways. Independent directors at least ex-
clude anyone who is employed by the fund management company. A stricter definition 
would exclude anyone who was previously employed by the fund management com-
pany, anyone who is employed within the group to which the fund management com-
pany belongs and anyone with ownership or business ties with the fund management 
company, such as employees of companies that are service providers to the fund or 
the fund management company. The investor might be served best when those en-
trusted with an oversight role can and do act independently from the fund manage-
ment company, irrespective of their legal status. 
 
There are several reasons why the added value of independent directors for investors 
might be limited or non-existent in practice. The way board members are selected and 
appointed might influence how effective boards are in mitigating conflicts of interest. 
An investment fund is created by the fund management company, which also appoints 
the fund’s initial board of directors. That way, the fund management company selects 
the initial board and usually also has a significant influence when new board members 
are appointed. This implies that the fund management company nominates or has 
influence over who is appointed in the role to oversee and monitor them. Although the 
fund management company may not have the right to fire board members, it will not 
ask a demonstrated troublemaker to serve on the board of a fund it may establish in 
the future. 
Since independent board members generally receive a financial compensation for 
their role, there is also a financial incentive not to disregard the interests of the fund 
management company. In fact, directors on the board of a fund are economic agents 
in their own right. When independent directors are recruited from the circle of friends 
of the management of fund management company, their independence can be of 
limited added value to the investors. Financial, business or personal connections may 
lead to favouritism, which can limit effectiveness for investors. One can also wonder 
how much power an independent board member really has, especially when he is on 
his own or forms part of a small minority. In addition, there is the argument of asym-
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metric information. Internal board members could be better informed than external, 
independent board members. 
Conclusion 
There are numerous potential conflicts of interest in the fund management industry, 
between the fund investor and other parties involved in the management, operations 
and distribution of funds. The most fundamental conflict is that between the investors 
and the fund management company. The fund management company receives a per-
centage of the assets of the fund as an annual management fee. The investor aims to 
achieve an optimal risk-adjusted return, net of costs. The higher the management fee 
that the fund management company receives for its services, the lower the risk-
adjusted return. An investor in an open-end fund can always sell his participation at 
net asset value when he is not pleased with the results of the fund. This market force 
helps align the interests of investors and the fund management company. 
However, the convex nature of the performance-flow relationship has the result 
that fund management companies benefit from strong performance more than they 
are punished for poor performance. This has the effect that various types of behaviour 
that go against the investors’ interests, are optimal for the fund management com-
pany. Therefore, it is unlikely that market forces alone are sufficient to ensure that 
conflicts of interest are fully mitigated. Where market forces fail, there is room for 
other forms of oversight, such as that of regulators and the board of directors, to add 
value for investors. 
1.7 Structure of the dissertation 
The following chapters of this dissertation are organised as follows: Chapter 2 is dedi-
cated to the legal and regulatory framework in which investment funds operate, as 
well as to various codes of conduct published by industry associations and governance 
studies published by consultancy firms. These are described and analysed to provide 
the relevant background to the empirical studies presented in chapters 3 through 7. 
Chapter 3 analyses earlier empirical studies into the effectiveness of governance 
by fund boards. These studies investigate the relationship between, on the one hand, 
board characteristics and on the other hand, fund costs, performance and/or fund 
management company behaviour. Most of these studies analyse data with respect to 
funds domiciled and offered in the U.S. 
Chapters 4 through 7 are dedicated to the analysis of fund governance using a 
sample of Luxembourg-domiciled funds. All funds in the sample are regulated under 
the UCITS regime, which allows them to be distributed on a cross-border basis. Chap-
ter 4 describes the population and sample analysed. It uses descriptive statistics to 
investigate the sample from various angles, including how (independent) governance 
developed in the period from 2000 to 2009. The goal of chapter 5 is to establish 
whether board characteristics explain variation in fund costs, for which a multiple 
regression analysis is used. Chapter 6 is similar in its methodology, but is dedicated to 
the relationship between governance and performance.  
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In chapter 7, the results of a survey among board members of Luxembourg cross-
border funds are presented, which consisted of questions related to funds governance, 
board independence, costs and performance. An inherent shortcoming of the meth-
odology used in chapters 5 and 6 is that when statistically significant relationships are 
established, it still does not prove causality. The goal of the survey is to gain more 
insight into the influence of boards on costs and performance in order to substantiate 
any relationships found in chapter 5 and 6.  
Chapter 8 provides the summary and conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 
Regulation and best practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Examining the history of the mutual-fund industry leads to the disheartening conclu-
sion that legislation and regulation prove no match for the greed-inspired creativity of 
mutual-fund companies.”30 
                                                                
30 David F. Swensen, 2005, Unconventional success; A fundamental approach to personal investment (Free 
Press, New York), p. 271.  
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2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the legal and regulatory framework in which investment 
funds operate, as well as various codes of conduct, best practice recommendations 
and governance studies published by industry associations and consultancy firms. 
These are described and analysed to provide the relevant background to the empirical 
studies presented in chapters 3 through 7. 
Section 2.2 provides an international overview of the legal and regulatory frame-
work for investment funds in general, and fund governance by boards and other enti-
ties in specific. The U.S., Luxembourg and the Netherlands are analysed individually. 
The reason for selecting these fund domiciles is that the majority of earlier empirical 
research regarding the effectiveness of governance by fund boards was done in the 
U.S. Luxembourg was chosen as the largest domicile for cross-border fund distribution 
and because the empirical study done for this dissertation uses a sample of Luxem-
bourg-domiciled funds. The Netherlands is an example of a typical domestic market in 
Europe and was chosen because of the discussions that took place in the last decade 
between regulator, government and industry regarding the model for fund governance 
regulation and best practices. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 contain an analysis of fund govern-
ance best practices and codes of conduct, again focusing on the three selected domi-
ciles. Given the central research question of this dissertation, the focus is on regula-
tions and recommendations regarding independent oversight, as well as on costs and 
performance.  
2.2 Analysis of the legal and regulatory framework 
In this section, the legal and regulatory framework of funds is analysed, focusing on 
aspects relating to fund governance and costs and performance. After an international 
overview in section 2.2.1, section 2.2.2 focuses on the U.S., 2.2.3 on European legisla-
tion, 2.2.4 on Luxembourg and 2.2.5 on the Netherlands.  
2.2.1 International overview 
The international overview of the legal and regulatory framework for governance of 
investment funds in this section is based on two influential papers on the topic of fund 
governance, namely the OECD White Paper of March 2005 (OECD, 2005) and 
the IOSCO Report of June 2006 (IOSCO, 2006a and 2006b). It should be noted that both 
these documents are not binding rules. There are no binding rules for investment 
funds at this level. The reason for presenting these papers here is that they provide a 
good overview of the legal and regulatory framework in different domiciles, focusing 
on fund governance, while listing several general principles. Thereby, they give a rele-
vant background to the binding rules of the U.S., the EU, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands, which are discussed in subsequent sections. Furthermore, these papers have 
strongly influenced the development of fund governance thinking, as well as best prac-
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tices, as laid down in several industry association recommendations. Several of these 
recommendations are discussed in section 2.3 
OECD White Paper 
In March 2005, the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published the “White paper on 
Governance of Collective Investment schemes (CIS)” (OECD, 2005; hereafter referred 
to as the OECD White Paper). The analysis and recommendations in the OECD White 
Paper are aimed at open-ended funds that are offered to the general public. In the 
document introduction, reference is made to the fact that there is an agency relation-
ship between the fund manager and the investor, as well as asymmetry of information 
and market power. Furthermore, it states that investors tend to focus on relative per-
formance, risks and costs of funds and the suitability of a particular fund given the 
investor’s objectives, but that governance gets little attention, unless a serious breach 
is discovered. Investors apparently rely on the fund industry and individual funds to 
have sound internal governance in place, so that the interests of investors are safe-
guarded. The internal governance is to monitor management on behalf of investors 
and to ensure that supervisory, regulatory and risk management requirements are 
met. The supervisory authorities mainly assess the adequacy of that governance sys-
tem and take action in case of shortcomings. The purpose of the OECD White Paper is 
to present the elements of robust fund governance to policy makers and the fund 
industry. In separate sections, the OECD White Paper covers the legal and regulatory 
framework, rights of investors, the role of the private sector, market discipline and 
infrastructure, transparency and disclosure and internal governance. 
The legal form of funds differs across jurisdictions, and often the legal and regula-
tory framework of a jurisdiction allows for more than one form31. In order to protect 
investors and ensure confidence in and stability of the financial system, all countries 
with well-developed markets have a legal and regulatory framework in place for the 
management and offering of funds, which is part of a broader framework for capital 
markets legislation and regulation. General principles are that the investor in the fund 
bears the investment risk and that regulation is not designed to prevent or limit in-
vestment losses. In this respect, the OECD White Paper states (OECD, 2005, p. 142):  
“The objectives of the investor protection regime are to protect investors 
against fraud, negligence and conflict of interests, to ensure that each CIS ob-
serves the rules of fair and transparent operation and that investors are ade-
quately informed of the risks involved in their investment.”  
A regulatory authority oversees the fund sector and ensures that firms active in the 
sector have the appropriate governance framework in place. Investors are entitled to 
transparency with regard to costs and performance. The paper mentions the invest-
ment policy, the assets held and their valuation, financial performance and costs and 
expenses as the aspects that the fund should present transparently (OECD, 2005, p. 
                                                                
31 The UCITS Directive of the European Union allows UCITS to be constituted in accordance with contract law 
(as common funds managed by management companies), trust law (as unit trusts) or statute (as investment 
companies).  
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147). Within the legal and regulatory framework, the private sector also has its role to 
play, particularly the industry associations. The influence and power of the industry 
associations varies by jurisdiction, ranging from the development of common positions 
within the industry to functioning as self-regulatory organisations, with the power to 
impose sanctions. A general practice among industry associations from different juris-
dictions is the development of codes of conduct and standards. Industry associations 
can promote higher standards than the legal and regulatory minimum, using peer 
pressure to enforce such industry best practices among market participants (OECD, 
2005, p. 150)32.  
Distributors play a role as intermediaries between the fund management company 
and the investor, and sales commissions are usually a main source of revenue for these 
distributors. It is the responsibility of the distributor to assess the suitability of an in-
vestment and they may not mislead the investor with regard to the nature of the in-
vestment and the costs associated (OECD, 2005, p. 151). For transparency and the 
disclosure of information, two documents play a vital role, namely the offering docu-
ment (prospectus) and the periodic reports. Information to be included in the offering 
documents usually consists of a minimum of:  
• Basic features of the fund. 
• Parties responsible for the fund (fund management company and investment man-
ager, as well as parties with oversight roles, such as the trustee, depositary (custo-
dian) and auditor). 
• Fees and commissions, as well as sales and distribution costs. 
• Explanation of the investment policy, including investment restrictions. 
• Explanation of the types and degrees of risk. 
The fund management company must inform investors of any material subsequent 
changes. 
 
Periodic information must be provided at least annually in financial statements certi-
fied by an independent auditor. These are to include: 
• Assets of the fund and their valuation. 
• Portfolio turnover. 
• Investment performance. 
• Costs and expenses, including brokerage fees. 
 
Fees, commissions and expenses affect performance. In order to prevent the misuse of 
the information advantage over investors, fund management companies must provide 
full transparency on fees, commissions and expenses. Market forces should be able to 
do their work restraining costs. With regard to costs and performance, comparability 
of costs and performance figures of competing funds is of high importance and stan-
dardisation is encouraged. The OECD is in favour of a standard fee table to ensure that 
fees, commissions and expenses can be easily compared (OECD, 2005, p. 154–157). 
Because of the relevance to the central research question of this dissertation, the 
complete section on fees, expenses and commissions is included in table 2.1. 
                                                                
32 The guidelines and codes of conduct related to fund governance of the industry associations in the U.S., 
Europe, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are addressed in section 2.3.  
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Table 2.1: OECD White Paper’s section on fees, commissions and expenses (OECD, 2005, p. 156–158) 
Fees, commissions and expenses 
 
One important area in which CIS operators as well as other parties, such as distributors and financial advi-
sors, may use their information advantage to the detriment of investors is fees, commissions and costs. Fees 
and commissions may be charged in a wide variety of ways. Investors may not have the capability to deter-
mine whether fees are reasonable or to assess whether they are high relative to those of competitors, and it 
may not be obvious whether additional services offered by one provider are sufficient to justify higher fees. 
It is clear that fees and expenses affect total performance. Full and transparent disclosure and competitive 
pressure that restrain the level of fees and expenses are defining characteristics of a fair market. 
In addition to the standard fees for operating the CIS and managing the portfolio, many CIS charge fees that 
vary according to the performance of the CIS. Some CIS also charge fees that are used to defray marketing 
costs. Some CIS are subject to sales fees at the time of sale and/or at the time of redemption. Fees are often 
divided by the operators among the operator, investment manager, service providers, distributors and 
investment counsellors. Often the distribution of fees is not explained in a transparent manner. 
CIS incur expenses which are passed on to the final investors. Normally, investors will want to examine 
expenses carefully and compare expenses of competing CIS. The investor may conclude that higher expenses 
are justified by better services or investment results. A CIS may incur comparatively high expenses by ineffi-
cient operation. Alternatively a CIS may incur high expenses by dealing with affiliated service providers (e.g. 
brokers, advisers etc.) at uncompetitive rates. The use of techniques such as “soft commissions”, rebates 
and the sharing of fees among operators, managers and distributors all complicate the transparent presenta-
tion of costs and give rise to possible conflicts of interest. 
The difficulties in identifying the full extent of fees, commissions and expenses and in assessing the relative 
costs of competing CIS are magnified when information regarding fees and expenses is not presented in a 
uniform manner by competing CIS. Therefore it is good practice to promote standardisation in presentation. 
The most desirable means to achieve an equitable fee structure is through strict disclosure standards and 
market discipline. In order for market discipline to be effective, strong disclosure requirements need to be 
imposed on CIS operators and parties involved in distribution while requiring the highest possible consis-
tency in disclosure. Simultaneously, investor education and the financial press can sensitise investors to the 
need to monitor fees and expenses. Regulations normally specify the information that must be disclosed in 
the offering documents and periodic reporting and may set rules regarding information provided in advertis-
ing and promotional material. It is desirable for efforts of the regulatory authority to be supplemented by 
the efforts of the CIS industry and SROs33 to set standards that encourage transparency and consistency. It is 
considered good practice for CIS to include a discussion of their fees structure, with a comparison to industry 
standards, in material that is disclosed to investors. 
While market discipline is the preferred way of obtaining an equitable fee structure, in some cases the 
regulatory authority may decide that an official determination of some fees, the prohibition of certain fees 
or official ceilings on some charges are the only practical way of obtaining a fair fee structure or of removing 
conflicts of interest. In order to maintain a fair fee structure the authorities may also decide to limit or 
impose conditions on transactions between the CIS and its affiliates. 
Regulatory practices, industry standards, policies of firms and market infrastructure should ensure a high 
degree of transparency concerning fees, commissions and costs. In some cases, the authorities may decide 
that direct regulation or limitation is necessary in order to achieve an equitable fee structure or to minimise 
conflicts of interest. 
 
Conclusion 
Regulatory practices, industry standards, policies of firms and market infrastructure should ensure a high 
degree of transparency concerning fees, commissions and costs. Transparency and market competition are 
the strongly preferred means to achieve a reasonable fee structure, but in some instances the authorities 
may decide that direct regulation or limitation is necessary. 
 
 
                                                                
33 SRO stands for Self Regulatory Organisation.  
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The OECD White Paper also addresses conflicts of interest and states that, in virtually 
all countries, funds are required by law to be operated exclusively for the interests of 
investors (OECD, 2005, p. 160). The internal governance of the fund is to mitigate con-
flicts of interest and should be designed to monitor the execution of the investment 
policy and to protect the interest of investors (OECD, 2005, p. 159).  
In the internal governance structure of funds that are organised as a separate cor-
poration, the board of directors has final accountability, whereas in other cases it is 
often the board of the fund management company. The final section of the OECD 
White Paper covers the independent review function, an area where there are signifi-
cant differences between fund domiciles. The OECD White Paper mentions two dimen-
sions of independence (OECD, 2005, p. 165):  
“i) sufficient independence from the management of the operator to be able to 
engage in effective monitoring, which is an accepted standard everywhere and 
ii) independence from all parties having any ownership, control or other busi-
ness relationships with the operator, which is an additional requirement in 
some jurisdictions.” 
In some domiciles, there is an additional layer of review, such as in the U.S., where 
each fund has a separate board of directors with independent members. Under the 
EU’s UCITS Directives however, there is no requirement for such an additional, inde-
pendent layer of review, but there is an oversight responsibility assigned to the deposi-
tary. The OECD White Paper concludes (OECD, 2005, p. 165):  
“In cases where the final authority for monitoring for standards of integrity 
rests solely with the board of the operator, it is essential to erect very robust 
internal safeguards to address conflicts of interest and prevent the abuse of in-
sider positions. This obligation is particularly strong when the board members 
have links to affiliated companies and/or when an affiliated company acts as 
depositary.” 
The responsibilities and powers of the independent review function also differ across 
domiciles, from assuring compliance with regulations and avoidance of conflicts of 
interest to explicitly representing the shareholders in relation to the fund management 
company. In the U.S., the latter is the case. In the U.S. fund governance model, the 
independent directors are to review the contracts with the investment adviser and 
ensure that their fees and expenses are at a level that is in the best interest of the 
investors. In other countries, there is only the general responsibility of persons in an 
oversight role to act in the best interest of investors. Industry associations often make 
this responsibility more concrete by issuing specific guidelines for the execution of 
oversight roles and by prescribing how to ensure that persons in such positions can act 
sufficiently independently and are incentivised to do so. Several guidelines and codes 
of conduct related to fund governance will be addressed in section 2.3. 
IOSCO Report 
In June 2006, the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the international association of securities regulators, published 
its report, “Examination of Governance for Collective Investment Schemes” (IOSCO, 
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2006a and 2006b; hereafter IOSCO Report). The IOSCO Report provides a comprehen-
sive overview of the different legal forms and governance characteristics that invest-
ment funds have in different jurisdictions. It is based on a survey among the member 
jurisdictions and aims to establish broad general principles of fund governance. The 
report recognises that there are differences between the legal structure of investment 
funds, as well as the legal and regulatory framework in which funds operate, resulting 
in different approaches to fund governance. However, the primary general principle of 
independent review and oversight of the fund management company’s34 fiduciary 
duties, including the prevention of conflicts of interest, is universal. The IOSCO Report 
also recognises the difference between general corporate governance and the specific 
governance for investment funds that is to be aimed at ensuring that the fund is oper-
ated in the interest of the fund investors, as opposed to the interests of those involved 
in operating it. This is clarified as follows (IOSCO, 2006a, p. 4; note that the footnotes 
in this citation are the footnotes in the cited IOSCO text):  
“A framework for CIS Governance must reflect the unique nature and purpose 
of CIS. CIS are a vehicle for pooling the investments of individuals in order to 
obtain professional management of the investors’ pooled assets. The purpose 
of a CIS is to successfully invest the pooled assets for the primary benefit of CIS 
Investors.35 As a consequence, a robust CIS Governance framework should seek 
to protect, through oversight and review, the CIS assets from loss due to mal-
feasance or negligence on the part of those that organize or operate the CIS 
and should strive to ensure that investors are adequately informed of the risks 
involved in their investment and the rewards they can obtain, and above all 
that the CIS is operated in the investors’ best interests at all times36.” 
According to the report (IOSCO, 2006a, p. 4–9), investment funds are typically organ-
ised according to one of two structural forms, corporate or contractual (or as a hybrid 
of the two). Table 2.2 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the different 
forms and states in which of the three jurisdictions of analysis in this dissertation, the 
U.S., Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the respective models can be found.  
 
The IOSCO Report describes the main purpose of the Independent Oversight Entity as 
follows (IOSCO, 2006a, p. 10):  
“The Independent Entity’s or Independent Entities’ main purpose should be 
ensuring that when faced with a conflict, CIS Operators respect the applicable 
rules, their contractual obligations and their duties, from “an outside, although 
objective and informed, perspective”, and therefore protect CIS Investors from 
divergent behaviors of the CIS Operator.” 
 
                                                                
34 In the IOSCO Report referred to as CIS Operator.  
35 We recognize that CIS Operators and others benefit from a CIS through (sic) compensation for the services 
that they render to the CIS.  
36 The definition of a CIS Governance regime, should not, however, disregard that commercial mechanisms 
and competition, together with the need to preserve and enhance firm reputation are factors that continu-
ally enhance the alignment of CIS Operator and investor interests.  
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Table 2.2: Structural forms of investment funds 
Model Characteristics Oversight entity Countries 
Corporate  
model (1) 
Investors hold shares in the investment company. 
Investment manager/advisor is appointed by the board 
of directors. 
Board of directors Luxembourg, 
U.S. 
Corporate  
model (2) 
Investors hold shares in the investment company. 
Portfolio is managed by an investment man-
ager/advisor. 
Depositary Netherlands 
Contractual  
model (1) 
Investors hold units in fund. Fund has no legal person-
ality. Management of the portfolio entrusted to man-
agement company. 
Depositary Luxembourg,  
Netherlands 
Contractual  
model (2) 
Investors hold units in unit trust, which is established 
and governed by a trust deed. Portfolio is managed by 
management company. 
 
Trustee Form not seen 
in U.S., Luxem-
bourg or the 
Netherlands, 
but e.g. in the 
U.K.  
Hybrid  
model 
Investors hold units in unit trust, which is established 
and governed by a trust deed. Portfolio is managed by 
management company. 
Supervisory board at 
the level of the fund or 
fund management 
company. Independent 
review or compliance 
committee. 
Netherlands 
 
To be effective, especially in conflict of interest situations, the oversight entity should 
be independent, have sufficient financial resources and be sufficiently empowered 
versus the fund management company, for example, by means of reporting possibili-
ties to regulatory authorities and to the external auditor. The various jurisdictions in 
the sample differ in how this independence or outside perspective is to be ensured, 
ranging from directors who are independent from the fund management company and 
other entities involved in the fund, to regulations requiring the trustee and the fund 
management company to be unrelated in terms of ownership and board composition. 
The IOSCO Report does not go as far as requiring legal and economic independence of 
the oversight entity, but states that when there is no legal and economic independ-
ence, at least it should be able to act independently from the interests of the fund 
management company. Depending on the legal and regulatory framework in the juris-
diction and the set-up of the fund, the structure of the oversight entity can differ. This 
can range from a simple solution consisting of an independent board of directors in the 
case of a corporate entity, to a complex solution in the case of a contractual set-up of 
the fund, with oversight responsibilities being spread over different entities, such as 
independent members within the board of directors of the fund management com-
pany, the depositary, the trustee, an independent review or compliance committee or 
the supervisory board of the fund or fund management company. Also, the regulator 
and external auditor contribute to the oversight function (IOSCO, 2006a, p. 11-13). 
Whereas part I of the IOSCO Report is mostly descriptive, analysing and describing 
the forms of fund governance that were observed in the member jurisdictions, part II 
of the report is more normative in its approach. Part II takes as a starting point the 
principle of independent oversight by Independent Oversight Entities from part I and 
aims to develop the concept of independence and the powers and functions that an 
R E G U L A T I O N  A N D  B E S T  P R A C T I C E  
 57 
Independent Oversight Entity should possess (IOSCO, 2006b, p. 3–4). The concept of 
independence is defined as follows (IOSCO, 2006b, p. 4):  
“a set of arrangements that provide Independent Entities with appropriate le-
gal conditions and autonomy to exercise their powers and functions without 
constraints or interferences from the CIS Operator or its related parties, and al-
low adequate and objective oversight of the CIS and CIS Operator’s activities, 
with the objective of protecting CIS Investors and their assets.” 
In the text that follows, the document lists principles and criteria to ensure independ-
ence that should apply in any jurisdiction. However, the way they are or can be imple-
mented differs depending on the jurisdiction. The principles are (IOSCO, 2006b, p. 5–
8):  
“1. The Independent Oversight Entities should be set up, composed, appointed 
or dismissed under conditions that prevent the decision making process from 
being tainted by any type of conflicts of interests with the CIS Operator and its 
related parties. 
2. The organization and the practical functioning of the Independent Oversight 
Entities should allow them to be out of the control or the influence of the 
management of the CIS Operator or its related parties. 
3. There should not be any confusion between responsibilities of the Inde-
pendent Oversight Entities when exercising their oversight function on the one 
side and the CIS Operator in its asset management role over the CIS on the 
other side.” 
Examples of ways in which the first principle can be implemented are a direct election 
of the members of the Independent Oversight Entity, self-appointment and appoint-
ment in a transparent manner. Dismissal by the fund management company should 
not be possible without disclosed and motivated explanations or after involvement of 
the fund unit holders or the regulator. The Independent Oversight Entity should have a 
majority of independent members. In its criteria of independence, the IOSCO Report 
largely follows U.S. legislation, such as having no affiliation with the fund management 
company and not being an immediate family member of an affiliated person. In the 
case where a Trustee or Depositary functions as an Independent Oversight Entity, 
these functions should be segregated from the fund management company in a legal 
and organisational sense. 
The second principle is to ensure that management and supervisory functions are 
separated. The consequence of the third principle is that members of the Independent 
Oversight Entity have a supervisory function and should not be involved in the man-
agement of the assets or in operational aspects of the fund. Furthermore, they should 
not receive any remuneration from the fund management company.  
The Independent Oversight Entities should always have the following powers, irre-
spective of the legal structure of the fund (IOSCO, 2006b, p. 9–10):  
“1. The Independent Oversight Entities should be entitled to receive all rele-
vant information enabling them to perform their oversight function in a proper 
manner. 
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2. The Independent Oversight Entities should be given the necessary means to 
carry out their duties without relying exclusively on the CIS Operator’s assis-
tance. 
3. The Independent Oversight Entities should be given the right to review the 
legal and operational conditions of the CIS management in relation with the CIS 
in a reasonable way.” 
An example of relevant information that the Independent Oversight Entity should 
receive is information concerning management of conflicts of interest between the 
fund and fund management company, as well as, any compliance or legal issues that 
might be of relevance to the investors. The contract of the fund with the fund man-
agement company should be subject to review by the Independent Oversight Entity.  
Finally, the report (IOSCO, 2006b, p. 11–13) addresses the functions to be per-
formed by the Independent Oversight Entity:  
“1. The Independent Oversight Entities, collectively, should have the function 
of overseeing the CIS Operator and CIS Operator’s activities.  
2. The Independent Oversight Entities, collectively, should have the function of 
ensuring that appropriate mechanisms are in place to prevent or avoid the ero-
sion or expropriation of CIS investor’s wealth and interests in the CIS.  
3. The Independent Oversight Entities should have a duty of reporting to the 
regulatory authorities or the CIS unit holders.” 
These functions are directly related to investor protection and aim to prevent and 
avoid the inappropriate loss of entrusted assets. Examples of functions mentioned, 
which are most relevant to this dissertation, are overseeing potential conflicts of inter-
est when concluding transactions with or outsourcing to related parties, ensuring that 
fees and expenses charged are appropriate and assessing the accuracy of the Total 
Expense Ratio (TER). In the corporate model case, these oversight functions can be 
fulfilled by the board of the fund, while in the contractual or hybrid model, oversight is 
typically provided by independent directors sitting on the board of the fund manage-
ment company, a Supervisory Board, or an Independent Review or Compliance Com-
mittee. Certain functions can also be performed by the auditor. 
2.2.2 U.S. – 1940 Act 
In the U.S., a fund management company can set up an investment fund as either an 
investment company (corporate model) or an investment trust (contractual model). An 
investment fund set up as an investment company is overseen by a Board of Directors, 
whereas an investment fund set up as a trust is overseen by a Board of Trustees. This 
legal distinction makes no difference from an economical point of view. The require-
ments with regard to the independence of these boards are also the same. Most fund 
management companies establish a series of investment funds with different charac-
teristics, thereby forming a product range or fund family. Individual funds in the prod-
uct range of a fund management company are separate entities from a legal point of 
view and they each have their own board. Economically, they normally have a lot in 
common, such as having the same investment advisor. In practice, the composition of 
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the boards is also usually similar or even exactly the same across the fund manage-
ment company’s product range. 
A central role in the regulatory framework for U.S. investment funds is played by 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (hereafter 1940 Act). This Act of the U.S. Con-
gress was passed as a United States Public Law (PL 76–768) on 22 August 1940 and was 
amended in 1970 and 2001. The Act defines the responsibilities of investment compa-
nies that are offered to the public and is enforced by the SEC. The Act protects the 
public primarily by requiring disclosure of important information to the investor and 
the financial situation of the fund, rather than supervising the investment company’s 
investment decisions. Furthermore, conflicts of interest are regulated and the board of 
directors plays an important role as watchdogs. The SEC describes the Act as follows:  
“This Act regulates the organization of companies, including mutual funds, that 
engage primarily in investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities, and whose 
own securities are offered to the investing public. The regulation is designed to 
minimize conflicts of interest that arise in these complex operations. The Act 
requires these companies to disclose their financial condition and investment 
policies to investors when stock is initially sold and, subsequently, on a regular 
basis. The focus of this Act is on disclosure to the investing public of informa-
tion about the fund and its investment objectives, as well as on investment 
company structure and operations. It is important to remember that the Act 
does not permit the SEC to directly supervise the investment decisions or ac-
tivities of these companies or judge the merits of their investments.”37 
The 1940 Act imposes on directors a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of investors 
and gives fund investors the right of legal action against the directors in case of breach 
of that duty. Relevant for this dissertation is that the 1940 Act requires investment 
companies to have a minimum proportion of independent directors on their boards, 
while also defining independence38 and assigning independent directors with certain 
specific responsibilities. The standard is that at least 40% of the directors on a fund 
board need to be independent. This is raised to a majority of independent directors in 
the case of funds that rely on certain Exemptive Rules39, such as e.g., open-end funds 
offering shares through an affiliate of the adviser. Approximately 90% of U.S. funds rely 
on at least one such Exemptive Rule (IOSCO, 2006a, p. 16). Phillips (2003, p. 3) summa-
rises the legal definition of independence according to the 1940 Act as follows:  
“The definition of “interested person” contained in Section 2(a)(19) of the 1940 
Act essentially disqualifies a person from serving as an independent director of 
a fund if such person: (1) is an “affiliated person” of the fund, other than solely 
by reason of his or her directorship or ownership of fund shares; (2) has, at any 
time during the prior two years, served as legal counsel to the fund; or (3) is af-
filiated with a person who has, at any time during the prior six months, en-
gaged in any portfolio transactions, as principal or as agent for, or distributed 
                                                                
37 Source: SEC website www.sec.org, 22 December 2009. 
38 Literally, the 1940 Act speaks of not interested. The 1970 amendment of the 1940 Act made the definition 
stricter. 
39 The 2001 amendment of the 1940 Act included changes to the Exemptive Rules.  
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shares of, any fund or account advised by the fund’s investment adviser. The 
term “affiliated person” is broadly defined to include any officer, employee or 
5% shareholder of the fund, its investment adviser or principal underwriter or 
any person controlling, controlled by or under common control with such fund, 
investment adviser or principal underwriter. … In addition, the SEC has the au-
thority to issue an order to declare a person an “interested person” of a fund if 
it finds that such person has or had, at any time during the prior two years, a 
“material business or professional relationship” with certain specified persons 
and entities, including some fund affiliates.” 
Following the late trading and market timing scandals in the U.S. in 2003, the SEC an-
nounced rule changes in June 2004, increasing the independence of the board by rais-
ing the minimum percentage of independent directors to 75% and by requiring the 
chairman to be an independent director. The new rules were to become effective 18 
months after the announcement, but were controversial from the beginning. Fund 
management companies, such as Fidelity Investments, were vocal opponents in the 
press40 and backed the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in a suit against the SEC to block 
implementation. Their argument was that the benefits of the increased independence 
were not proven, while they did impose a significant cost to the industry. In April 2006, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the new requirements of 
at least 75% independent directors and the independent chairman, on the basis that 
the SEC had not provided a robust cost-benefit analysis of the rule change. To date, the 
SEC has not re-proposed these or alternative adjustments to the regulations. 
 
The responsibilities of the independent directors include the selection of the fund’s 
auditor, the annual approval of the contract with the fund’s principal underwriter and 
the annual approval of the fund’s investment advisory contract, including the advisory 
fee. Phillips (2003, p. 8–9) describes the responsibility of the board with regard to fees 
as follows:  
“While directors, particularly independent directors, have an important re-
sponsibility with respect to mutual fund advisory fees, nothing in the 1940 Act, 
the court decisions thereunder or basic concepts of fiduciary duty impose on 
the directors a continuing duty to negotiate the lowest possible fee. To the 
contrary, the fiduciary duty of the independent directors is and should be to 
approve reasonable fees. … Mutual fund directors approach the contract re-
newal process with the knowledge that fund shareholders have had extensive 
disclosure concerning the fees and other costs incurred in connection with 
their investment. Clearly, the directors have no reason to believe that investors 
have purchased fund shares in the belief that the fees are unreasonable but in 
reliance on the efforts of the independent directors to reduce those fees and 
other costs. … A determination of reasonableness generally focuses on an 
evaluation of changed circumstances, particularly, changes in management 
                                                                
40 See e.g. Joseph Checkler, Fidelity Says Not So Fast’ To Independent Chair Push, Money Management 
Executive, 23 February 2004 and Amy Borrus and Paula Dwyer, Who’s Right, The SEC Or Ned Johnson?; The 
agency says independent chairmen at mutual funds are better for shareholders, Business Week, 28 June 
2004.  
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performance, fund growth or other changes in the factors affecting the eco-
nomics of the management function. Directors cannot ignore such circum-
stances; each year they have a responsibility to approve an advisory fee that 
reflects a sharing of the economies of scale realized from fund growth or from 
other changed circumstances.” 
This view is in line with remarks of the then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in his speech to 
the Investment Company Institute (1998):  
“Fees have to be questioned. Directors don’t have to guarantee that a fund 
pays the lowest rates. But they do have to make sure that fees fall within a rea-
sonable band. There are some who say fund directors need not be as strong as 
corporate directors -- that their role is different. That it requires less effort, less 
independence or less vigilance. Those who buy into this myth are making ex-
cuses for directors who don’t have the time or the interest to stand up for 
shareholders.” 
Funds may use affiliated service providers, on the condition that the terms are reason-
able and fair. In practice, many U.S. investment funds use an affiliated transfer agent. 
A fund can also have an affiliated custodian, but that is considered self-custody and 
therefore subject to significant conditions. Several regulatory requirements relate to 
transparency with regard to costs and the investment policy. The expense ratio and its 
components, as well as the sales load for U.S. mutual funds are displayed in the fee 
table in the prospectus, which is standardised across the industry on the basis of SEC 
rules. The table is to be placed near the beginning of a fund’s prospectus. When a fund 
manager wants to make changes to an existing U.S.-domiciled mutual fund, e.g. in-
creasing the management fee or adjusting the investment policy, the fund’s board 
must approve the change. Increases in advisory fees, as well as changes to the invest-
ment objective of the fund must also be approved by the shareholders. A 60-days’ 
advance notice to shareholders is required before the change can be effected in the 
case of a change that creates a conflict with the so-called names rule. According to that 
rule, funds with, for example, large cap in their name are required to invest at least 
80% of their assets in equity of large capitalisation companies. 
2.2.3 Europe – UCITS Directive 
In 1985, the European Economic Community (EEC) – the predecessor of the European 
Union (EU) – issued the original Directive for Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (Directive 85/611/EEC), in short UCITS. The aim of the Directive 
was to harmonise the domestic regulations regarding retail investment funds in each 
of the EEC Member States and to facilitate cross border activities, thereby contributing 
to the goal of a single market for financial services in Europe. With the larger market 
available, economies of scale were to reduce the investment manager costs, which 
were expected to be passed on to consumers in the form of a lower Total Expense 
Ratio (TER). The Directive laid down binding, harmonised rules for management com-
panies and investment funds, which had to be and were transposed into national law 
of the Member States. The Directive specifies the key features of these funds, the 
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permitted legal forms of UCITS (common funds managed by management companies, 
unit trusts and investment companies), as well as investment and borrowing rules, 
liquidity requirements (regular valuation and redemption of units at the request of 
unit-holders), prospectus disclosure rules and rules relating to annual and semi-annual 
reporting. Also rules with regard to the role and duties of UCITS depositaries and man-
agement companies are included in the Directive. On the basis of this Directive, in-
vestment funds that meet the criteria can be offered throughout the EU – only a rela-
tively light notification procedure needs to be followed – on the basis of the authorisa-
tion from the home state of the fund. This is often referred as the funds having a Euro-
pean passport. 
 In July 1998, the European Commission published a proposal to amend the 1985 
Directive. These proposals were adopted in December 2001 and are known as UCITS 
III41. UCITS III consists of the following two directives: 
• Directive 2001/107/EC (the Management Directive).  
• Directive 2001/108/EC (the Product Directive). 
 
UCITS III was a significant overhaul of UCITS on different aspects, such as how the 
funds are managed, what they can invest in and how they can be marketed and sold. 
One of the new elements of the Management Directive was the concept of a simplified 
prospectus, which was intended to provide consistent information about the funds 
that would be easier to understand for retail investors than the full prospectus. The 
Product Directive widened the investment possibilities of UCITS and, since it came into 
force, it is possible to set up money funds, derivatives funds, index-tracking funds and 
funds of funds as UCITS. 
Following several rounds of consultations, the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) issued its recommendations regarding eligible assets for investment 
by UCITS in January 2006. The Eligible Assets Directive (Directive 2007/16/EC) followed 
in March 2007. A further adjustment of the UCITS framework is the UCITS IV Directive 
of 13 July 2009 (Directive 2009/65/EC), aimed at increasing efficiency in the fund man-
agement industry, which should ultimately lead to lower costs for investors, and at 
improving investor information. Concretely, UCITS IV involves changes in the following 
areas: 
• Simpler and faster notification procedure. 
• Introduction of a framework for (cross-border) mergers of UCITS, irrespective of 
their legal form. 
• Master-feeder structures with UCITS status are made possible. 
• A standardised Key Investor Information document (KIID), which replaces the sim-
plified prospectus. 
 
Management companies are now permitted to manage funds on a cross-border basis. 
This implies that the fund and the management company may be domiciled and 
authorised in a different country. Except for the depository, the other service providers 
                                                                
41 In the early 1990s, the first UCITS Directive was to be updated. However, the draft UCITS II Directive was 
abandoned when the Council of Ministers could not reach a common position. 
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do not need to be domiciled in the same country as the fund. Member States were to 
transpose the provisions of the UCITS IV Directive into national law by 1 July 2011. 
 
The UCITS Directive includes several articles that relate to the governance of invest-
ment funds authorised as UCITS. Table 2.3 provides the text of the articles that are 
most relevant to the central research question of this dissertation and concern gov-
ernance, management of conflicts of interest, as well as costs and investment per-
formance.  
The general principle of a fiduciary duty of the management company towards 
fund investors can be found in Article 14, where it states that the management com-
pany is to act honestly and fairly in conducting its business activities in the best inter-
ests of the UCITS it manages. It is to exercise due skill, care and diligence. Conflicts of 
interest are to be avoided or, when that is not possible, there should be fair treatment 
of the UCITS managed, while the best interest of the investors is to be promoted.  
The UCITS Directive requires funds with UCITS status to have a depositary, and on 
the basis of Article 25, the management company and the depositary are required to 
act independently and in the interest of the unit-holders. In addition to its responsibil-
ity for the safekeeping of the assets of the fund, the depositary has several oversight 
functions, which are included in Article 22–3. Of a more practical nature are Articles 7 
and 12. Article 7 requires the persons who manage a fund management company to be 
of sufficiently good repute and be sufficiently experienced. On the basis of Article 12, 
management companies are required to have sound administrative and accounting 
procedures and rules for personal transactions by its employees. Furthermore, their 
structure and organisation should be such that the risk of investors suffering from 
conflicts of interest is minimised.  
The KIID, referred to in Article 78, is to play an important role in ensuring that in-
vestors can make an informed investment decision. The standard KIID is two sheets of 
A4 paper. The description of the strategy and objectives of the fund should be com-
bined in one section and be written in plain language that is comprehensible for the 
retail investor. In addition, the KIID is to provide information on past performance, 
costs and risks in a standardised fashion, which increases transparency and facilitates 
comparisons between funds.  
The Implementing Directive of 1 July 2010 (Directive 2010/43/EU) contains organ-
isational requirements to which management companies managing funds with UCITS 
status must conform, as well as rules related to conflicts of interest, conduct of busi-
ness, risk management and the agreement between depositary and management 
company. The directive lays several criteria for the identification of conflicts of inter-
est, such as situations where the management company makes a financial gain at the 
expense of the fund and where the management company has an incentive to favour 
the interest of another client. The management company is obliged to implement an 
effective policy concerning conflicts of interest. Potential conflicts of interest must be 
identified and when conflicts of interest occur, they must be handled in accordance 
with the policy. When the arrangements are insufficient to prevent risk of damaging 
the interests of the fund, senior management should be promptly informed in order to 
take action. In such cases, investors need to be informed of the situation and the deci-
sions made.  
C H A P T E R  2  
 64 
Table 2.3: Selected articles in UCITS IV Directive on governance as well as costs and performance 
Article 7 (1) Without prejudice to other conditions of general application laid down by national law, the 
competent authorities shall not grant authorisation to a management company unless the
following conditions are met: 
…  
(b) the persons who effectively conduct the business of a management company are of 
sufficiently good repute and are sufficiently experienced also in relation to the type of UCITS 
managed by the management company, the names of those persons and of every person 
succeeding them in office being communicated forthwith to the competent authorities and 
the conduct of the business of a management company being decided by at least two per-
sons meeting such conditions; 
Article 12 (1) Each Member State shall draw up prudential rules which management companies authorised 
in that Member State, with regard to the activity of management of UCITS authorised accord-
ing to this Directive, shall observe at all times.  
In particular, the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State, 
having regard also to the nature of the UCITS managed by a management company, shall 
require that each such company: 
(a) has sound administrative and accounting procedures, control and safeguard arrangements 
for electronic data processing and adequate internal control mechanisms including, in par-
ticular, rules for personal transactions by its employees or for the holding or management of
investments in financial instruments in order to invest on its own account and ensuring, at 
least, that each transaction involving the UCITS may be reconstructed according to its origin, 
the parties to it, its nature, and the time and place at which it was effected and that the
assets of the UCITS managed by the management company are invested according to the 
fund rules or the instruments of incorporation and the legal provisions in force; 
(b) is structured and organised in such a way as to minimise the risk of UCITS’ or clients’
interests being prejudiced by conflicts of interest between the company and its clients, 
between two of its clients, between one of its clients and a UCITS, or between two UCITS. 
Article 14 (1) Each Member State shall draw up rules of conduct which management companies authorised
in that Member State shall observe at all times. Such rules shall implement at least the prin-
ciples set out in this paragraph. Those principles shall ensure that a management company: 
(a) acts honestly and fairly in conducting its business activities in the best interests of the 
UCITS it manages and the integrity of the market; 
(b) acts with due skill, care and diligence, in the best interests of the UCITS it manages and 
the integrity of the market; 
(c) has and employs effectively the resources and procedures that are necessary for the 
proper performance of its business activities; 
(d) tries to avoid conflicts of interests and, when they cannot be avoided, ensures that the
UCITS it manages are fairly treated; and 
(e) complies with all regulatory requirements applicable to the conduct of its business activi-
ties so as to promote the best interests of its investors and the integrity of the market. 
Article 22 (1) 
Article 22 (2) 
 
The assets of a common fund shall be entrusted to a depositary for safe-keeping. 
A depositary’s liability as referred to in Article 24 shall not be affected by the fact that it has 
entrusted to a third party all or some of the assets in its safe-keeping. 
 
Table continues on the next page 
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Article 22 (3) 
 
A depositary shall: 
(a) ensure that the sale, issue, repurchase, redemption and cancellation of units effected on 
behalf of a common fund or by a management company are carried out in accordance with 
the applicable national law and the fund rules; 
(b) ensure that the value of units is calculated in accordance with the applicable national law 
and the fund rules; 
(c) carry out the instructions of the management company, unless they conflict with the
applicable national law or the fund rules; 
(d) ensure that in transactions involving a common fund’s assets any consideration is remit-
ted to it within the usual time limits; 
(e) ensure that a common fund’s income is applied in accordance with the applicable national
law and the fund rules. 
Article 25 (1)  
Article 25 (2) 
No company shall act as both management company and depositary. 
In the context of their respective roles, the management company and the depositary shall 
act independently and solely in the interest of the unit-holders. 
Article 26 The law or the fund rules shall lay down the conditions for the replacement of the manage-
ment company and the depositary and rules to ensure the protection of unit-holders in the 
event of such replacement. 
Article 78 (1) 
 
 
 
 
Article 78 (2) 
 
 
 
Article 78 (3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 78 (5) 
Member States shall require that an investment company and, for each of the common funds 
it manages, a management company draw up a short document containing key information 
for investors. That document shall be referred to as ‘key investor information’ in this Direc-
tive. The words ‘key investor information’ shall be clearly stated in that document, in one of 
the languages referred to in Article 94(1)(b). 
Key investor information shall include appropriate information about the essential character-
istics of the UCITS concerned, which is to be provided to investors so that they are reasonably 
able to understand the nature and the risks of the investment product that is being offered to
them and, consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis. 
Key investor information shall provide information on the following essential elements in 
respect of the UCITS concerned: 
(a) identification of the UCITS; 
(b) a short description of its investment objectives and investment policy; 
(c) past-performance presentation or, where relevant, performance scenarios; 
(d) costs and associated charges; and 
(e) risk/reward profile of the investment, including appropriate guidance and warnings in 
relation to the risks associated with investments in the relevant UCITS. 
Those essential elements shall be comprehensible to the investor without any reference to 
other documents. 
… 
Key investor information shall be written in a concise manner and in non-technical language. 
It shall be drawn up in a common format, allowing for comparison, and shall be presented in
a way that is likely to be understood by retail investors. 
 
In December 2010, as a response to the financial crisis and even before the UCITS IV 
became effective, the European Commission launched a consultation to adjust the 
UCITS Directive. The UCITS V consultation paper focuses on two areas, the depositary’s 
role and fund manager remuneration. Through this consultation, the commission seeks 
views and input from UCITS industry stakeholders. The publication of the draft UCITS 
Directive was originally planned for July 2011, but has been delayed. 
In the introductory section of the consultation paper, the Madoff fraud and the 
Lehman Brothers default are mentioned as reasons for updating the requirements 
relating to UCITS depositaries. These events revealed divergence in the interpretation 
by different EU Member States regarding the functions and responsibilities of deposi-
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taries. The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) is also a reason 
for the UCITS update. This directive came into law in July 2011 and Member States 
have a period of two years to transpose it into national law. The level of investor pro-
tection offered by the UCITS regime, which is aimed retail investors, should be equiva-
lent to or higher than that offered to professional investors through AIFMD.  
With the UCITS V Directive, both the oversight and safekeeping responsibilities of 
the depositary42 are to be further strengthened and harmonised. With the new rules, 
the European Commission intends to extend the more onerous oversight duties of 
depositaries for UCITS with a contractual form to UCITS of the corporate form. With 
implementing measures, the oversight duties will be clarified further in due course. 
Consistent with the AIFMD, UCITS V would give the depositary oversight and responsi-
bility over all the assets of the UCITS, including cash, in order to avoid fraudulent cash 
transfers. Consistent again with AIFMD, UCITS V would distinguish between safekeep-
ing physical custody of financial instruments (for example, securities) and asset moni-
toring duties relating to assets that are not held physically (for example, over-the-
counter derivatives), as well as restricting delegation of depositary tasks to safekeep-
ing duties, and putting forward conditions and requirements for such delegation. Fur-
thermore, the liability of the depositary will be increased under UCITS V and the bur-
den of proof shifted onto the depositary for negligence or intentional failure to per-
form its duties. Specifically, the consultation paper differentiates between cases when 
a UCITS suffers a loss as a result of the depositary’s negligence or intentional failure to 
perform its duties, so-called unjustifiable failures, and circumstances in which a failure 
to perform may be justifiable. In the case of unjustifiable failures, depositaries would 
be obliged to return the identical financial instruments or a corresponding amount of 
assets to the fund, even when safekeeping tasks have been delegated to a third party. 
In cases where negligence or intentional failure to perform its duties are alleged, the 
burden of proof is on the depositary to demonstrate that it has performed its duties to 
the required standard. It is envisioned to introduce an exhaustive list of entities that 
are eligible to act as UCITS depositories, in order to give more clarity and certainty to 
investors that these institutions are capable of effectively fulfilling UCITS depositary 
functions. 
As reasons to propose remuneration measures, the consultation paper refers to 
the financial crisis and specifically mentions that the crisis revealed that existing remu-
neration policies in the financial sector led to short-termism and excessive risk taking, 
thereby increasing levels of systemic risk. The measures proposed can be seen in light 
of commitments made at the G20 level to address systemic risk in the financial system 
and are consistent with similar measures being introduced in the AIFMD and other 
parts of the financial sector. The aim of the proposed remuneration measures is to 
align the interests of different players in the fund industry to those of investors. These 
measures address the types of conflicts of interest that are described in section 1.6 of 
this dissertation between investors and other parties involved in the management of 
investment funds, most notably, the fund management company and its staff. The 
consultation suggests that remuneration policies for UCITS managers should be de-
signed to (EC, 2010, p. 28–29):  
                                                                 
42 See section 1.6.  
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“- Promote sound and effective risk management, and discourage any risk-
taking which is inconsistent with the risk profiles, fund rules of instruments of 
incorporation of the managed UCITS; 
- Prevent conflicts of interest; 
- Ensure the protection of the interests of clients and investors in the course of 
collective portfolio management activities and other services provided.”  
In scope for the remuneration policies would be fund management company staff, 
whose professional activities may have a material impact on the risk profile of the 
UCITS, including senior management and persons with supervisory or risk management 
functions. The consultation paper pays specific attention to bonuses. For example, the 
remuneration structures would be required to include criteria for calculating compen-
sation for different categories of staff where remuneration is performance-related and 
there are rules for fixed and variable components of total remuneration. The man-
ager’s board of directors would be required to adopt the remuneration policy and 
would be responsible for its implementation and periodic review. The consultation 
paper speaks of proportionate application, meaning that the commission recognises 
that the principles of sound remuneration policy may be applied differently by differ-
ent fund management companies, depending on their size, internal organisation and 
the nature, scope and complexity of their activities. 
2.2.4 Luxembourg – 2010 Law 
The first fund-specific regulation in Luxembourg dates from 1972, followed by more 
systematic regulation of the organisation, operation and supervision of funds in 1983 
(Kremer and Lebbe, 2009, p. 6-7). In 1988, Luxembourg was the first EU Member State 
to transpose the UCITS Directive into national law. Regulated funds in Luxembourg can 
either be set up according to the corporate model (“Société d’Investissement à Capital 
Variable”, hereafter SICAV43) or the contractual model (“Fonds Commun de Place-
ment”, hereafter FCP)44: 
• SICAV, a limited liability company, which can be managed by its Board of Directors. 
• FCP, a co-proprietorship whose joint owners are only liable up to the amount they 
have contributed. The FCP does not have a legal personality and must be managed 
by a Luxembourg management company. 
 
Both these entities can be set up as an umbrella fund structure45, with different sub-
funds that each has a different investment policy. The assets of a sub-fund are exclu-
sively attributable to the investors in that sub-fund and, in that sense, each sub-fund 
can be considered as a separate entity, at least from an economic perspective. Since 
                                                                
43 Corporate model funds with a fixed capital (“Société d’Investissement à Capital Fixe”, SICAF) fall outside of 
the scope of this dissertation.  
44 For a comprehensive overview of the legal forms permitted under different regulatory regimes in Luxem-
bourg, refer to Kremer and Lebbe (2009, p. 45-59).  
45 When Luxembourg transposed the UCITS Directive in national law as of 30 March 1988, the umbrella fund 
structure was also formally recognised. As early as 1985, the regulator had already allowed the creation of 
such structures (Kremer and Lebbe, 2009, p. 59-60).  
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the umbrella forms the legal entity, all sub-funds in the umbrella are overseen by defi-
nition by one board. 
The “Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier” (Commission for the Su-
pervision of the Financial Sector, hereafter CSSF) is the Luxembourg regulatory author-
ity, which authorises and monitors all Luxembourg registered funds. Investment funds 
in Luxembourg are regulated on the basis of the Law of December 17th, 2010 (hereafter 
the 2010 Law), which differentiates between: 
• Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS, Part I of 
the 2010 Law).  
• Undertakings for Collective Investment (UCIs, Part II of the 2010 Law).46 
 
The UCITS law is based on the EU Directive and funds set up as UCITS benefit from the 
European Passport47. In Article 2 (2), a UCITS is defined following the UCITS Directive 
(Article 1) as an:  
“undertaking 
– with the sole object of collective investment in transferable securities or in 
other liquid financial assets referred to in Article 4148, paragraph (1) of this 
Law, of capital raised from the public and which operate on the principle of 
risk-spreading, and 
– with units of which are, at the request of holders, repurchased, directly or in-
directly, out of this undertakings’ assets. Action taken by a UCITS to ensure that 
the stock exchange value of its units does not significantly vary from their net 
asset value shall be regarded as equivalent to such repurchase.” 
The investment possibilities of UCIs are broader than for UCITS and can include alter-
native investments, such as hedge funds strategies, fund of hedge fund strategies, 
private equity and real estate. UCIs established under Part II of the 2010 Law do not 
benefit from a European Passport and hence may only market their units in the EU and 
other countries outside of Luxembourg, subject to the legal and regulatory require-
ments of those countries. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the different types of 
regulated fund structures available in Luxembourg.  
Funds with UCITS status are obliged to issue a prospectus and a KIID, containing in-
formation about the fund and its management company. This information allows the 
investors to make informed decisions about investing in the fund, taking the associated 
risks into consideration. Funds are also obliged to issue an annual report, audited by a 
Luxembourg-authorised independent auditor, and a semi-annual report, which de-
scribe the fund’s financial situation. Luxembourg regulations require that all changes 
qualified as material (i.e., substantial and/or not beneficial to the shareholders) must 
be published one month prior to the change becoming effective to allow dissenting 
shareholders to redeem free of charge. In line with the UCITS Directive, the 2010 Law 
                                                                
46 In February 2007, the Law for Specialised Investment Funds (the “SIF Law”) was enacted, but these non-
retail funds fall outside of the scope of this dissertation.  
47 All funds included in the sample for the empirical research of this dissertation are Luxembourg UCITS, 
which are marketed on a cross-border basis. 
48 Article 41 is the article in which the instruments that are eligible assets for UCITS are listed.  
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requires Luxembourg UCITS to appoint a depositary. The appointment of the deposi-
tary, as well as of the auditor, is subject to approval by the Luxembourg regulator CSSF. 
 
Investment funds created under the 2010 Law
Part I
UCITS investment funds:  
- Qualify for “European Passport”. 
- May be sold to retail and institutional investors with
minimum formalities). 
Part II
Non-UCITS investment funds: 
- Do not qualify for “European Passport. 
- Includes hedge, private equity and real estate funds. 
- May be sold to both retail and institutional investors,
subject to each country's local distribution rules. 
FCP or SICAV
Investment funds may take the form of an investment company with variable capital (SICAV) or a contractual 
form (FCP), which must have a management company. These different entities may create compartments, each 
with a different investment policy. The rights of investors and of creditors concerning a compartment or which 
have arisen in the connection with the creation, operation or liquidation of a compartment are limited to the 
assets of that compartment (i.e. protected cell concept), unless a clause included in the constitutional documents 
provides otherwise.  
SICAV
A SICAV under the 2010 Law must be set up as a 
public limited company (S.A.) or a European 
Company (S.E.). 
SICAVs created under Part I of the 2010 Law need to 
be either self-managed or appoint a management 
company. This entails meeting certain substance and 
capital requirements. 
FCP
All FCPs must have a management company. 
Management companies of Part I FCPs must fulfil 
additional substance and capital requirements. 
 
Figure 2.1: Luxembourg regulated fund structures 
Based on: Ernst & Young (2010, p. 8). 
 
The CSSF must also approve proposed directors of funds regulated as UCITS and UCIs, 
prior to their appointment. Boards of Luxembourg funds consist, in principle, of at 
least three private individuals, but corporate directors can be authorised as well. There 
are no conditions regarding nationality, residency or age. There is no legal or regula-
tory requirement to appoint independent directors. There are no specific qualifications 
required, but the CSSF will assess whether a proposed director is suitable to perform 
the required duties. Recently, the CSSF has paid particular attention to the number of 
mandates, in order to ensure that sufficient time can be allocated to each mandate.  
In addition, there is the extra-legal concept of the fund promoter49, to which the 
regulator and investors can turn in case of issues. The policy of the CSSF has been to 
prefer fund boards to consist of a majority of representatives of the promoter. The 
director of the CSSF said in a speech in December 2008 (Delcourt, 2008, p. 3–4):  
“The CSSF shares the view that investment fund governance must operate to 
act in the best interest of the investors. We are however of the opinion that 
                                                                
49 The fund promoter, often shortened to promoter, can be defined as the fund management group of which 
the Management Company of a fund is part. The promoter initiates the fund, gives direction to its activities 
and benefits financially from its operations.  
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the presence of independent Board Members is not necessarily a guarantee to 
reach that goal. Our experience has shown that the specific requirement that 
the fund promoter has a majority representation in the Board of Directors of 
the Management Company or the Investment Company of the fund has 
worked out well until today.” 
When asked, Jean-Marc Goy, Counsel for International Affairs of the CSSF clarified the 
position of the CSSF with regard to the proportion of representatives of the promoter 
on fund boards as follows50:  
“In addition to the fulfilment of the requirements regarding the professional 
experience and the good repute, the promoters must also dispose of sufficient 
financial resources in order to cope with claims of indemnification which may 
arise out of eventual irregularities, breaches of duty or insufficiencies in the 
administration or management of a fund.  
In view of the potential financial implications for the promoter in the case of ir-
regularities, breaches of duty or insufficiencies in the administration and man-
agement of an investment fund, the policy of the CSSF is to require that, in 
principle, the majority of the members of the decision-making bodies of an in-
vestment fund (Board of Directors of an investment company/management 
company) are representatives of the promoter. This requirement aims at mak-
ing sure that the promoter is in a position to direct and control the decisions 
relating to the orientation of the activities and the organisation of the invest-
ment fund. 
Notwithstanding this policy, the CSSF can accept that, as an exemption and 
based upon an adequate justification, the majority of the Board members are 
not representatives of the promoter. It has to be emphasized that the fact that 
the majority of the Board members are not representatives of the promoter 
cannot be used by the promoter as a discharge from the responsibilities im-
plied by the role of promoter of an investment fund and in particular the obli-
gation to be ultimately held responsible to cope with claims of indemnification 
which may arise out of eventual irregularities, breaches of duty or insufficien-
cies in the administration or management of a fund. 
It follows from the above that, even if there is under the current Luxembourg 
legal and regulatory framework for investment funds no obligation to appoint 
independent Board members, there are no provisions that would prohibit the 
appointment of independent Board members.” 
Directors are appointed at the general meeting of shareholders, generally after a pro-
posal by the fund management company. When there is a vacancy on the board be-
tween meetings, a replacement may be co-opted by the remaining directors. The sha-
reholders must approve such an appointment at the next meeting. The maximum term 
of a mandate is six years, but this may be extended with a re-election. General practice 
is to discharge and re-elect board members annually at the Annual General Meeting of 
Shareholders.  
                                                                
50 E-mail from Jean-Marc Goy to Jan Jaap Hazenberg, dated 25 August 2011.  
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2.2.5 The Netherlands: Act on Financial Supervision 
Retail funds in the Netherlands can be divided into two main types according to their 
legal structure: 
• Investment companies (“Beleggingsmaatschappijen”). These funds are set up ac-
cording to the corporate model, with legal personality. These funds usually, but are 
not obliged to, have a separate management company. 
• Mutual funds (“Beleggingsfondsen”). These funds are set up according to the con-
tractual model, without legal personality. For this type of fund, the legal title to the 
assets must be held by a separate and independent legal entity as depository (“be-
waarder”). Having a separate management company is obligatory.  
 
Investment funds in the Netherlands are regulated on the basis of the “Wet op het 
financieel toezicht” (Act on Financial Supervision, hereafter Wft). On the basis of the 
Wft, detailed requirements have been laid down in the “Besluit gedragstoezicht finan-
ciële ondernemingen Wft” (Supervision of financial companies decree, hereafter Bgfo). 
As per 1 January 2007, the Wft replaced the “Wet toezicht beleggingsinstellingen” (Act 
on the Supervision of Collective Investment Schemes), as well as several other acts 
that were previously in force for different sectors within the financial industry. The Wft 
makes the distinction between conduct of business supervision, with the Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten (Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, hereafter AFM) 
as supervisory authority, and prudential supervision, which is exercised by the Dutch 
Central Bank. 
Fund managers offering participation rights in their funds to the public need to 
comply with the provisions of the Wft in order to receive the required authorisation by 
the AFM. These provisions concern the trustworthiness and know-how of the fund 
manager, capital requirements, organisational and internal control requirements and 
transparency requirements. One of the requirements is that the board of directors 
needs to consist of at least two persons who are qualified and reliable.  
Once the fund manager is authorised, the funds offered do not need to be author-
ised individually and the prospectus for open-ended retail funds is not subject to the 
AFM’s approval. However, the manager of such a fund must issue a prospectus with 
content requirements and that contains an auditor’s statement that the prospectus is 
compliant with the relevant legislation. When an investment fund is set up as an in-
vestment company and does not have a management company, i.e., is self-managed 
by the directors of the fund, then the fund requires an AFM license.  
In addition to the prospectus, the fund manager must publish a financial informa-
tion leaflet (“financiële bijsluiter”) that includes information about the nature and 
purpose of the fund, costs, performance, tax aspects and risks. A standardised risk 
indicator has to be used, the calculation and presentation of which have to be applied 
in a consistent way by the fund industry. With the implementation of UCITS IV in Dutch 
law, the information leaflet is being replaced by the KIID. Information provided by the 
manager must be correct, clear and not misleading. Regulated funds must publish 
audited annual financial statements, as well as semi-annual financial statements, 
which are not required to be audited. The Wft requires the annual financial statements 
to include the Total Expense Ratio (TER) of the fund, as well as the Portfolio Turnover 
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Ratio (PTR). There is a possible exemption to the requirement to obtain a license for 
the fund manager. For example, a licence is not required if units are offered solely to 
qualified investors, as defined in the Wft, and which includes pension funds, invest-
ment funds, banks and other institutional investors. 
 
The fiduciary duty of those involved in the management of an investment fund is laid 
down in Bgfo Article 83 (1) and (2), on the basis of Article 4:25 Wft: 
“1. A management company, investment company or depositary acts in the in-
terest of the participants in the investment fund. 
2. A management company or investment company treats participants in com-
parable circumstances equally.” 
The role of the depositary for Dutch retail funds (non-UCITS) is, in practice, limited to 
protecting the assets that are held for the investors in the fund, particularly against the 
consequences of bankruptcy or unlawful actions by the management company. De-
positories in the Dutch model are not set up to perform a general supervisory role of 
an Independent Oversight Entity, as meant in the IOSCO Report. 
The rules and regulations applicable to UCITS have also been incorporated in the 
Wft. For UCITS, a more extensive licensing regime applies than for Dutch retail funds 
that do not opt for UCITS status. UCITS are always obliged to appoint a depositary, 
which in that case, has the oversight responsibilities as prescribed by the UCITS Direc-
tive. 
The rules and regulations that apply when a management company intends to 
change characteristics of the investment fund are included in Wft Article 4:47. The 
changes to the terms and conditions are to be announced in an advertisement in a 
national Dutch newspaper or to each unit holder individually, as well as on the website 
of the fund or fund management company. In the case of a change to the investment 
policy, an increase of fees or other changes that reduce the rights or security of unit 
holders, a one-month waiting period applies from the moment unit holders are in-
formed, during which the investor may redeem according to the old terms and condi-
tions. 
2.3 Analysis of governance best practices: Industry associations 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 analyse the governance codes and best practice recommendations 
as described and promoted by a number of organisations involved in the fund man-
agement industry. These organisations are either the industry associations of fund 
management companies in a certain country or region (ICI, EFAMA, ALFI and DUFAS, 
which are discussed in section 2.3) or consultancy firms advising market participants of 
the fund industry (KPMG and PwC, discussed in section 2.4). Given the central research 
question of this dissertation, the analysis of these governance best practices focuses 
on three aspects: 
• Recommendations regarding the independence of boards of directors. 
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• Recommendations on how to achieve the alignment of interests of boards of direc-
tors and investors, and regarding the identification and management of conflicts of 
interest by boards of directors. 
• Recommendations regarding the involvement of boards of directors in fee setting 
and monitoring, as well as in the monitoring and influencing of investment per-
formance. 
 
Several of the codes and recommendations analysed in this section also include advice 
on sound business practices in the asset management industry (e.g., best execution, 
independent valuation, internal controls and risk management), but these fall outside 
of the scope of this dissertation and are therefore not addressed in this section. Each 
section will start with a general introduction of the particular organisation, so that the 
governance best practices recommended by that organisation can be put in the right 
context. 
2.3.1 U.S.: Investment Company Institute 
The Investment Company Institute (ICI) is the U.S. association of investment compa-
nies. ICI members include SEC-registered investment companies (managing mutual 
funds, closed-end funds, exchange traded funds and/or unit investment trusts), their 
investment advisers and underwriters. According to the organisation’s website51:  
“ICI engages in three core missions: encouraging adherence to high ethical 
standards by all industry participants; advancing the interests of funds, their 
shareholders, directors, and investment advisers; and promoting public under-
standing of mutual funds and other investment companies.”  
In 1999, ICI published a report titled, “Enhancing a Culture of Independence and Effec-
tiveness” (ICI, 1999; hereafter ICI Report), authored by an advisory group it had cre-
ated and named the “Advisory Group on Best Practices for Fund Directors”. This advi-
sory group consisted of six members, three affiliated directors (at the same time senior 
executives of fund management companies) and three independent directors, who 
served on boards of funds that are part of some of the largest fund families in the U.S. 
The ICI Report states (1999, p. i-ii):  
“The Advisory Group’s mission was to identify the best practices used by fund 
boards to enhance the independence and effectiveness of investment com-
pany directors, and to recommend those practices that should be considered 
for adoption by all fund boards.” 
To come to their recommendations, the group consulted various other industry par-
ticipants – fund management representatives, auditors and lawyers – as well as regula-
tors, academics and representatives of consumer and investor organisations. The rec-
ommendations should also be seen in the context of U.S. regulations, more specifically 
the 1940 Act, which already then required funds to have a minimum proportion of 
independent directors on their boards, defined independence and assigned independ-
                                                                
51 Source: ICI website, www.ici.org, 5 December 2009.  
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ent directors with certain specific duties. Before providing its specific recommenda-
tions, the advisory group gives the following insight into the background to these rec-
ommendations (ICI, 1999, p. 9–10): 
“Ultimately, the Advisory Group believes that the fundamental responsibility of 
fund directors is to ensure that the fund’s shareholders receive the benefits 
and services to which they are fairly entitled, both as a matter of law (e.g., re-
sulting from the investment adviser’s fiduciary duties to the fund and specific 
requirements under the Act) and in accordance with investor expectations rea-
sonably created by the fund’s prospectus and other disclosure documents. 
Within this context, it is the responsibility of the fund’s board to evaluate the 
performance of the fund’s investment adviser and that of its other service pro-
viders on the basis of what is best for shareholders and to apply that same 
standard in evaluating any proposals for change in fund operations or ex-
penses. On those occasions where the interests of the adviser and fund share-
holders diverge, the fund’s directors and, in particular, the independent direc-
tors must effectively represent the interests of the fund and its shareholders. 
The Advisory Group has drafted the recommendations in this Report with the 
foregoing in mind.” 
With regard to board independence and alignment of interests, the ICI Report includes 
a number of very specific recommendations. When it comes to the proportion of inde-
pendent directors on the board, it recommends having a super-majority of at least 
two-thirds of independent directors. This is to ensure that independent directors con-
trol the voting process, in particular in conflict of interest situations, also when related 
to matters that, on the basis of the 1940 Act, do not require an independent directors’ 
majority vote. Interestingly, without advising against it, ICI (1999, p. 11-12) does not 
recommend boards of independent directors only, stating:  
“…as a general matter, the Advisory Group believes that fund boards can bene-
fit from having affiliated directors on the board. Board membership by repre-
sentatives of the adviser allows for more direct accountability on the adviser’s 
part and a better exchange of information with the adviser. In addition, repre-
sentatives of the adviser may have greater expertise in many aspects of the 
operations of the fund. Thus, their participation may enhance the board’s ef-
fectiveness. Finally, as noted above, affiliated directors are subject to the same 
fiduciary standards as independent directors.” 
The Advisory Group recommends not counting former officers and directors of a fund’s 
investment adviser and principal underwriter, as well as certain of their group compa-
nies, as independent directors, in order to ensure independence and enhance credibil-
ity. For existing independent directors, the recommendation is to reassess their affilia-
tions annually, to make sure that their independent status has not changed. 
With regard to the appointment of new independent directors, the recommenda-
tion is that incumbent directors take care of the nomination and selection process. 
One of the reasons given is that this avoids the impression that the directors are in fact 
selected by the fund adviser and cannot act independently. In practice, funds usually 
arrange this by having a nomination committee consisting of independent directors 
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only, which manages the nomination and selection process. It is also recommended 
that independent directors on the board set the appropriate level of compensation. 
Both in the case of board nominations and in the setting of the compensation, it is not 
discouraged to receive and consider input from the fund management company. 
Sufficient insurance coverage is recommended in order to ensure that the inde-
pendent directors can act independently, also towards the fund management com-
pany. The independent directors should control the retirement policy, finding the right 
balance between fresh perspectives and experience. 
The Advisory Group encourages fund directors to invest in funds they oversee in 
order to align their interests with those of the shareholders and to experience the fund 
management company’s shareholder services firsthand. A policy at the level of fund 
boards requiring fund directors to invest in one or more funds is recommended. 
In order to mitigate conflicts of interest, the Advisory Group recommends that in-
dependent directors have counsel independent from the fund adviser and service 
providers, as well as have access to independent accountants, if needed. The fund’s 
statutory papers should allow fund directors to retain such independent experts and to 
charge the expenses to the fund. 
On the basis of the 1940 Act, the selection of the fund’s auditor is a power given to 
the independent directors. The Advisory Group goes a step further, recommending the 
formation of an audit committee consisting of independent directors only, which can 
meet with the auditors without representatives of the fund management company. 
The audit committee is to also make sure that the auditor is sufficiently independent 
from the fund management company, considering any non-audit ties that may exist 
between the audit firm and the fund management company. 
Furthermore, it is recommended by the Advisory Group that the independent di-
rectors meet separately from representatives of the fund management company, at 
least for the annual review of the advisory contract of the fund with the fund man-
agement company. A designated lead independent director can chair the meetings of 
independent directors, act as their spokesperson and be the first point of contact for 
the fund management company. The board should evaluate its effectiveness periodi-
cally and directors should stay up-to-date with industry and regulatory developments. 
The Advisory Group believes that unitary boards – overseeing all the funds in a 
fund family – or cluster boards – overseeing groups of funds, e.g. according to invest-
ment objective, distribution channel or funds of the same former fund management 
company, after a merger or acquisition – can be more effective than separate boards 
for each individual fund. It can give the independent directors more leverage over and 
better access to the fund management company. Finding enough qualified board 
members could also be difficult if each director would serve on only one board. 
2.3.2 Europe: European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA) 
The European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), established in 2004, 
is the representative association for the investment management industry in Europe. 
Unlike its predecessor, the European Federation of Investment Funds and Companies 
(known as FEFSI, the acronym of the federation’s name in French), EFAMA’s member-
ship is open to national associations, as well as corporate members. At the end of 
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2009, EFAMA had 24 member associations and 42 corporate members. According to 
the website52, the organisation’s mission is:  
“To support a high level of investor protection through the promotion of high 
ethical standards, integrity and professionalism in the industry 
To promote the completion of an effective single market for investment man-
agement and the creation of a level playing field for competing savings and in-
vestment products 
To strengthen the competitiveness of the industry in terms of cost & quality by 
seeking and obtaining improvements in the legal, fiscal and regulatory envi-
ronment 
To promote scientific research concerning the industry”. 
In January 2006, EFAMA published a discussion paper, “A Code of Conduct for the 
European Investment Management Industry; High Level Principles & Best Practice 
Recommendations” (EFAMA, 2006a; hereafter EFAMA Code). Although the discussion 
paper was never upgraded to a final recommendation, it is still featured on EFAMA’s 
website. It has also been an influential piece, since several national associations based 
their national codes at least partly on this EFAMA Code. In the introduction, the publi-
cation says that its aim is to serve as a starting point for discussion with the European 
Commission and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and that the 
code applies to all types of investment management, segregated mandates, as well as 
collective investment schemes.  
The EFAMA Code consists of fifteen high-level principles and several best-practice 
recommendations for each of these principles. The text starts with the fiduciary re-
sponsibility of the investment management company to always act in the best interest 
of the investor, as the first of fifteen principles. In the second principle, the EFAMA 
Code pays attention to the position of the board of the Investment Management Com-
pany. The fundamental role of the board, as described by EFAMA, is very close to the 
text of ICI, so that it seems that EFAMA took inspiration from the ICI Report (EFAMA, 
2006a, p. 7):  
“The Board, its members and the senior management of an Investment Man-
agement Company shall be accountable that the Investment Management 
Company acts in the best interest of investors. They shall ensure that investors 
receive the benefits and services to which they are entitled as a matter of law, 
in accordance with contracts and prospectuses or in accordance with specific 
instructions clients may give.” 
In the absence of regulations in most European countries that require board members 
of a fund to be legally independent, EFAMA also does not go as far as to recommend 
legally independent board members, but they must be able to act independently 
(EFAMA, 2006a, p. 7):  
“In order to fulfil efficiently its responsibility towards investors and to resolve 
any conflicts of interests that arise the Board and senior management must act 
                                                                
52 Source: EFAMA website, www.efama.org, 13 December 2009.  
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in sufficient autonomy and independence of shareholders, service providers 
and other related parties. The principles and rules for the governance of the 
Investment Management Company must provide safeguards that ensure this 
independence.” 
How independence is to be achieved is clarified further in the best practice recom-
mendations. Having independent directors on the board is only seen as one of the 
possibilities to ensure that there is independent oversight (EFAMA, 2006a, p. 7-8):  
“The governance structure of the Fund Management Company and/or of the 
Fund shall provide for independent oversight of the management company and 
of fund operations through entities that can take different forms (i.e. auditor, 
depositary or a number of independent directors on the Board). Such entities 
can either be independent of management, shareholders of the Fund Man-
agement Company and service providers, or be related parties. In order to pro-
vide effective independent oversight and fulfil their fiduciary duty to protect 
investors’ interests, related parties shall take all necessary measures to mini-
mize conflicts of interest and maintain a functional and economical separation 
of group entities.  
The independent oversight shall ensure that the Fund Management Company 
and/or the Fund respect applicable rules, contractual obligations and duties 
and protect the interests of investors. 
The Board and the compliance organization of the Fund Management Com-
pany and/or of the Fund shall closely cooperate with the independent entity 
and support it in the exercise of its functions.” 
This approach is very similar to the views expressed in the OECD White Paper pub-
lished less than a year before this EFAMA Code and in the IOSCO Report, published five 
months later. 
The EFAMA Code also pays attention to conflicts of interest. Examples of areas 
where conflicts of interest can arise, which are mentioned in the EFAMA Code, are 
management of assets, order allocation and execution, relationships with service pro-
viders and distributors, pricing and incentive policies. The principle on conflicts of in-
terest is phrased as follows (EFAMA, 2006a, p. 8): 
“The Investment Management Company shall identify areas where the inter-
ests of investors may conflict with those of other parties such as the manage-
ment company, its staff, the service providers, in particular related parties, or 
other investors. It shall define rules and procedures for such cases to avoid, 
manage or disclose such conflicts of interest and to assure that the interests of 
investors are protected and all investors are treated equally.” 
In order to achieve this goal, the investment management company must have an 
appropriate conflicts policy, as well as organisational and administrative arrangements 
for identifying, preventing, managing or disclosing conflicts of interest. Areas that must 
be covered are a compensation policy (avoiding incentives to act against the interest of 
investors), a personal transactions policy, a confidentiality policy, a policy regarding 
inducements and a policy regarding dealings with related parties. The latter must be at 
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arms length and in line with market conditions. The compliance function, which is to 
be independent from operative functions, is to contribute to the management of con-
flicts of interest and to focus on the interests of investors. Delegation or outsourcing of 
functions does not relieve the investment management company from its responsibili-
ties to the investor. The principle on delegation and outsourcing recognises that this is 
a delicate situation when the outsourcing is to a related party. One of the best prac-
tices is to disclose the outsourcing of critical functions to investors.  
 
There are few recommendations on performance and costs. With regard to perform-
ance, the investment management company shall ensure that when the investment 
decisions are delegated, appropriate supervision and performance monitoring is in 
place. With regard to investor information, the management company (EFAMA, 2006a, 
p. 17): 
“Shall refrain from promises of future returns (unless guaranteed) and mislead-
ing performance comparisons.  
When referring to past performance, the IMC shall mention that historical re-
sults are no guarantee of future performance and whether the performance 
data takes costs into account. 
Marketing materials shall be objective, avoid raising unreasonable perform-
ance expectations, and give a balanced picture of potential benefits and risks.” 
Generally accepted professional standards are to be observed with regard to calcula-
tion methods and the selection of appropriate performance periods and benchmarks. 
The EFAMA Code does not give any direction on what the investment management 
company is to do in the case of unsatisfactory performance, nor does it provide guid-
ance concerning the exact role of the board in relationship to investment performance. 
There are even fewer words about fees and other costs. The EFAMA Code only gives a 
best practice recommendation that investor information is to contain information on 
all costs and that the information must be true, fair and not misleading. 
 
In October 2006, EFAMA published a response (EFAMA, 2006b) to the IOSCO Report. 
This response gives further insight into the EFAMA position. The association raises a 
number of interesting arguments against fully independent oversight, while also dis-
cussing how the oversight function could be organised. EFAMA concurs with the IOSCO 
position regarding the importance of independent oversight in the governance of 
funds. However, EFAMA’s position is that there is no single superior governance model 
(EFAMA, 2006b, p. 1):  
“… each independent oversight entity has certain slight advantages and disad-
vantages in the accomplishment of specific functions: the Board of Directors 
might be considered by some as more independent (depending on its composi-
tion), but in EFAMA’s view it is less involved in the day-to-day business vs. the 
Depositary and Auditors, therefore has less direct access to crucial information 
and as a result might be less effective in its supervisory activity. 
Since conflicts of interest may arise within different processes and at different 
levels, in EFAMA’s opinion a concentration of the oversight functions in one 
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specific entity is not an effective and efficient way forward. Such concentration 
would require extensive staff support for the Independent Oversight Entity, 
creating unnecessary costs and functional duplications. 
On the other hand, the lack of such support would impair the effectiveness and 
reach of the Independent Oversight Entity to the detriment of CIS investors.” 
EFAMA promotes internal compliance and control functions that are embedded in the 
fund management company carrying out daily supervision. Self-regulation by the fund 
management company is also mentioned as an effective way of dealing with fund 
governance. The independent oversight entity would be there for indirect oversight, 
overseeing and reviewing the control and compliance framework. The independent 
oversight function could be carried out by several parties, namely the board of direc-
tors, external auditors, the trustee and the regulator as well as the depositary, the 
latter especially for certain functions. EFAMA (2006b, p. 2) states:  
“As an equally – or more – effective alternative to the Board of Directors mod-
el, comprehensive oversight can be achieved through: 
1) the direct supervision of specific CIS Operator activities by the Depositary 
and/or the Auditors, and 
2) an effective internal compliance structure, in turn subject to controls by an 
Independent Oversight Entity (external Auditors, CIS Regulator).” 
EFAMA advocates the roles of the auditor and, in particular, that of the depositary as 
independent oversight entities. EFAMA does not agree with IOSCO’s preference for 
oversight by (an independent member of) the board of the fund (in the case of the 
corporate model) or board or supervisory board of the fund management company (in 
the case of the contractual or hybrid model), indicating that (EFAMA, 2006b, p. 5–6): 
“the Depositary is ideally suited to oversee … many of them (e.g. checking the 
compliance of the CIS portfolio with the applicable borrowing and investment 
limits and restrictions; controlling the appropriateness of the valuation process 
of the CIS assets and the proper calculation and disclosure of the CIS NAV53 and 
of the CIS unit price; and checking the correct application of the principles and 
procedures for the exercise of shareholder’s rights attached to the securities 
portfolio) and the CIS Auditors could effectively oversee the other functions, as 
well as some of those above.” 
EFAMA adds, with regard to the Depository, that it finds it acceptable and not funda-
mentally incompatible with effective oversight that the depositary (or trustee) belongs 
to the same group as the CIS Operator, given that in the UCITS Directive sufficient 
distance is enforced between these entities by means of so called Chinese walls54. 
 
Zurstrassen (2006) reports on a survey conducted by EFAMA in June-July 2006 among 
its then 22 national association members. Questions asked included whether these 
associations had adopted a code of conduct and, if so, whether that code was inspired 
                                                                
53 NAV stands for Net Asset Value.  
54 A Chinese Wall is an information barrier within a firm to separate persons in different functions, aimed at 
avoiding conflicts of interest.  
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by the EFAMA Code. Eighteen countries (82%), including the Netherlands, stated they 
had such a code, while two countries (9%) – Luxembourg and the U.K. – stated they 
had it partially, either in the form of a code of ethics or a set of guidances. Two coun-
tries (9%) did not have such a code at all, one of which had no plans to have a code in 
the future. Out of the countries having a code, 40.9% stated that it was inspired by the 
EFAMA Code, which indicates that is has been an influential piece, despite its status of 
being a discussion paper only. The main focus areas of the national codes of conduct 
are displayed in table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4: Main focus areas of national code of conduct (excludes countries not having a code) 
Focus area Average response 
Fund governance 81.8% 
Fiduciary duties 68.2% 
Best execution 63.3% 
Voting rights 59.1% 
Anti-Money Laundering 36.4% 
Other1 27.3% 
1. Includes market timing/late trading, fair value pricing, information duties and disclosure code,  
distribution quality, avoidance and handling of conflicts of interest, outsourcing and market integrity.  
Source: Zurstrassen (2006) 
2.3.3 Luxembourg: Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry (ALFI) 
The Luxembourg national member of EFAMA is ALFI, the Association of the Luxem-
bourg Fund Industry. According to its website55, ALFI’s mission statement is as follows:  
“Lead industry efforts to make Luxembourg the most attractive international 
center for investment funds”. 
The same website mentions that one of ALFI’s main objectives is to encourage profes-
sionalism, integrity and quality, which, among other means, it intends to do so by de-
veloping codes of conduct. In September 2009, ALFI published the “ALFI Code of Con-
duct for Luxembourg Investment Funds” (ALFI, 2009; hereafter ALFI Code), which is 
focused primarily on the role of fund boards. This is somewhat surprising, because in 
the Luxembourg model for fund governance, there are also oversight roles for e.g., the 
depositary and the auditor. The document refers to the implementation of the EU 
Directive 2006/46/EC on Company Reporting as the reason for introducing this ALFI 
Code. That is probably also the explanation for the focus on the role of the board, since 
the directive includes a mandatory corporate governance statement (EU Directive 
2006/46, article 10):  
“The corporate governance statement should make clear whether the com-
pany applies any provisions on corporate governance other than those pro-
vided for in national law, regardless of whether those provisions are directly 
laid down in a corporate governance code to which the company is subject or 
                                                                
55 Source: ALFI website, www.alfi.org, 13 December 2009.  
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in any corporate governance code which the company may have decided to 
apply.” 
The purpose of the ALFI Code is to provide a framework of high-level principles and 
best practice recommendations for the governance of Luxembourg investment funds 
(ALFI, 2009, p.1). Although the EU Directive only applies to listed companies, including 
listed funds, ALFI extends the scope of the code to all Luxembourg funds regulated by 
the CSSF. The structure of the ALFI Code is such that there are eight principles, each 
detailed further with various recommendations. 
With regard to the position of the board, the ALFI Code pays attention to inde-
pendence, but this relates to how the board acts, not to a legal or regulatory definition 
of the term independence. Under the first principle – regarding the standard of gov-
ernance – the ALFI Code (2009, p. 3) recommends as follows:  
“The Board should provide independent review and oversight, including effec-
tive oversight of delegated functions.” 
Under the third principle, in which the board should act fairly and independently in the 
best interests of the investors, one of the recommendations is that the interests of the 
investors should always come first. The ALFI Code clearly recognises the sensitivity of 
delegating to affiliated parties, by explicitly pointing to the attention that should be 
given by boards when such situations arise. The eighth and last principle is fully dedi-
cated to conflicts of interest. The text of the principle and the associated recommen-
dations is as follows (ALFI, 2009, p. 6): 
“The Board should identify and manage fairly and effectively, to the best of its 
ability, any actual, potential or apparent conflict of interest and ensure appro-
priate disclosure  
Recommendations 
1. The Board should identify where its members’ interests (including related 
party interests) might conflict with the interests of the investors. 
2. The Board should define the means to avoid, manage or disclose conflicts of 
interest, protecting the interests of the fund’s investors. 
3. The Board should maintain sufficient autonomy to resolve conflicts of inter-
est impartially.” 
The guidance for boards on performance and costs is minimal. As part of a recommen-
dation under the fourth principle, which mentions some of the duties of the board, the 
ALFI Code (2009, p. 4) mentions that the:  
“Board should oversee the activities and the performance of investment man-
agers …”. 
Furthermore, recommendations include that information with regard to investment 
objectives, risks and costs, is true, fair, timely and not misleading. Information with 
regard to the fund’s financial situation and performance should be compliant with 
relevant accounting standards, applicable laws and regulations.  
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2.3.4 The Netherlands – Dutch Fund and Asset Management Association (DUFAS) 
The Dutch national member of EFAMA is DUFAS, the Dutch Fund and Asset Manage-
ment Association. According to the association’s website56, DUFAS:  
“promotes the collective interests of asset managers operating on and from 
the Dutch market – both Dutch and foreign parties. Central to this (is) the pro-
motion of an optimal business climate for asset managers in the Netherlands. A 
level playing field for free supply of investment products and asset manage-
ment services within the European Union and a broadening of the market for 
investment products are the main starting points.” 
In February 2008, DUFAS published the “DUFAS Principles of Fund Govern-
ance” (DUFAS, 2008; hereafter DUFAS Code). The publication of these principles re-
lates directly to two reports about Dutch investment funds published in 2004. In the 
first report (AFM, 2004a), the Dutch regulator AFM identified a number of shortcom-
ings in the organisational set-up and operations of the Dutch investment fund industry, 
including the way the funds were traded on the stock exchange, the transparency of 
costs and the calculation of the NAV. The shortcomings identified also raised concerns 
about two related subjects, which were not in scope for the investigation, namely fund 
governance and the role of the auditor. The general principle is that investment funds 
are to act in the interest of investors and are to avoid conflicts of interest. Dutch law 
imposes requirements on investment funds with regard to the expertise and reliability 
of the directors of the funds, as well as requirements with regard to capital, organisa-
tion and provision of information. Nevertheless, AFM concluded that the above gen-
eral principle was not always sufficiently safeguarded.  
The second report (AFM, 2004b) is that of a committee with the assignment to put 
forward proposals for improvement, installed by AFM after the publication of its initial 
report. This Winter Committee57 recommended certain improvements to the Dutch 
trading system for investment funds in order to increase transparency and improve 
competitiveness, as well as with regard to cost transparency and the administrative 
organisation of funds. Most of these recommendations later found their way into law, 
regulations and practice. The committee also proposed measures to improve the gov-
ernance of investment funds by proposing to introduce a mandatory, independent 
supervisory board at each fund management company. In the English summary of the 
Winter Report (AFM, 2004b, p. 16) it is mentioned that: 
“In the organisational structure of CIS and their management companies, no-
one is explicitly charged with the task of monitoring the activities to ensure 
that funds are invested in the interest of these investors. In other words, in the 
current organisational structure the ‘trustee’ function is lacking. 
… 
Each management company of a CIS (or the investment company itself if it is 
the management company) has to have a supervisory board whose composi-
                                                                
56 Source: DUFAS website, www.dufas.nl, 8 January 2010.  
57 Winter Committee is formally known as the “Commissie Modernisering Beleggingsinstellingen” (Commit-
tee for Modernising Collective Investment Schemes).  
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tion and functioning is sufficiently independent of the management company 
and affiliated parties. This could be ensured by either having a supervisory 
board at least a majority of whose members are independent both of the man-
agement company and of parties affiliated to the management company, or by 
having a supervisory board that has set up a compliance committee containing 
only independent members with a minimum of two.” 
Although AFM supported all of the committee recommendations to the Ministry of 
Finance, including the independent Supervisory Board, the Minister of Finance voiced 
concerns. The reasons for these concerns were the associated costs, on the one hand, 
and maintaining a level playing field vis-à-vis funds from other fund domiciles, on the 
other hand. 
These concerns led to the Dutch investment funds sector, in consultation with the 
Ministry of Finance, taking the initiative to develop self-regulation in the area of in-
vestment fund governance as an alternative to the mandatory Supervisory Board as 
recommended by the committee. Under the leadership of DUFAS and with participa-
tion of representatives from several larger and smaller fund managers58, the sector 
developed a code of conduct for fund governance, the DUFAS Code. This code provides 
guidelines for the organisational set-up and procedures of management companies 
and independent investment funds and aims to safeguard the integrity of the sector 
for the benefit of investors. Members of DUFAS are obliged to adhere to the DUFAS 
Code and to publish their own governance code on the website (see DUFAS, 2008, p, 
3). The DUFAS Code is therefore clearly a form of self-regulation. The introductory 
section to the DUFAS Code states (DUFAS, 2008, p. 1): 
“The Principles are formulated in such a way that within their goal sufficient 
room is left for differences in Fund Governance that are related to differences 
in the type and size of the organisation of the management company. The de-
velopment (as far as necessary) of the Principles requires tailoring. The Princi-
ples offer flexibility by using general formulations and offering several options, 
as the set-up of Fund Governance depends among others on existing govern-
ance structures and on choices made by the organisation itself. 
This approach of using existing best practices leads to a clear documentation 
and implementation of good Fund Governance on the one hand, while on the 
other hand, an increase in the administrative and financial burden in the sector 
could be avoided. It is in the interest of the development of the Netherlands as 
an attractive domicile for funds that the integrity of the funds sector is safe-
guarded, while a level playing field vis-à-vis other domiciles and other financial 
sectors is maintained.” 59 
The DUFAS Code does introduce the requirement of an (independent) oversight entity, 
but provides various ways in which such oversight can be implemented (DUFAS, 2008, 
p. 2):  
                                                                
58 The author of this dissertation was a member of this Fund Governance working group representing an 
industry participant, ABN AMRO Asset Management.  
59 Translation from the original text in Dutch.  
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“An entity which is able to act sufficiently critically and independently of the 
management company and affiliated parties will be appointed to fulfil the role 
as oversight entity with regard to fund governance. This oversight entity has 
the task to check if the management company fulfils its duty to act in the inter-
est of the investors in its fund(s). Such oversight can be designed in various 
ways, as shown in the annex. 
In order to fulfil this task, the oversight entity has access to all relevant infor-
mation, e.g. reviews and additional requested information (if any).”  
The examples mentioned in the annex are the following (DUFAS, 2008, Annex p. 1):  
• Supervisory board management company/funds 
• Non-executive board members management company 
• Supervisory board at the level of the overarching financial group 
• Independent depositary 
• External auditor 
 
The oversight entity is to be provided with periodic reviews by a body within the man-
agement company (e.g., a compliance department) of the application of the govern-
ance principles in the fund manager’s operations.  
With regard to conflicts of interest, the DUFAS Code states that these should be 
avoided and that the management company should have a conflicts of interest policy. 
The principles mentioned are to act in the interest of investors and to treat investors 
equally in comparable situations (DUFAS, 2008, p. 2–3). The management company 
should be transparent, providing information that is relevant, clear and understand-
able, including (DUFAS, 2008, p. 4):  
“just, timely and fair information on investment policy, investments, risks, 
costs and management fees, affiliated parties and outsourcing. The character-
istics of a fund shall be clear, the risks shall be explained and there shall be no 
ambiguous conditions. All fees charged by the fund and their connection to 
services rendered shall be clear. The maximum subscription and minimum re-
demption prices in relation to the net asset value (NAV) shall be clear.” 
In the case of changes to the fund conditions – specifically mentioned are fee increases 
and changes to the investment policy – investors are to be informed in a way that is 
timely, easily accessible, clear and understandable for all investors. A notification pe-
riod is also to be respected.  
With the DUFAS Code on the table, the Minister of Finance decided not to opt for 
the direction of a mandatory independent supervisory board. The argument used by 
the Minister was, in particular, that the model of a mandatory supervisory board is not 
common in Europe. By imposing an obligatory supervisory board, the Netherlands 
would be out-of-line with Europe and the attractiveness of the Netherlands as domicile 
for investment funds would be diminished60. The effectiveness of independent boards 
for investors was not raised and is the topic of this dissertation. 
                                                                
60 See letter of the Minister of Finance to the House of Representatives dated 29 February 2008; reference 
FM 2008-499M.  
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2.4 Analysis of governance best practices: Consultancy firms 
2.4.1 KMPG International and CREATE: Towards enhanced business governance 
In 2006, audit and consultancy firm KPMG International, together with research and 
consultancy company CREATE, published the report “Towards enhanced business gov-
ernance; Causes and consequences in global investment” (KPMG, 2006; hereafter 
KPMG Report). In the introduction of the KPMG Report, failures of governance in the 
U.S. – the market timing and late trading scandals – are brought forward as a reason to 
choose governance as the topic for the report and for governance to be put higher on 
the agenda of asset management companies. The KPMG Report was based on a global 
survey of 192 investment managers based in 25 countries and some 50 follow-up in-
terviews with CEOs, CIOs and Compliance Directors. The vast majority of respondents 
in all regions indicated that they give a high priority to the adoption of sound govern-
ance practices in their business. According to the KPMG Report, governance principles 
in the industry have developed with the following aims in three years before the publi-
cation (KPMG, 2006, p. 5):  
“promoting and protecting client interests 
providing greater investment transparency 
adopting day-to-day business conduct that meet obligations to clients.” 
Based on this outcome, KPMG (2006, p. 6) provides an industry good practice govern-
ance model, which is shown below as figure 2.2. Each of the three aims is developed 
further with various recommendations and principles. Points to mention in relation-
ship to the central research question of this dissertation are that: 
• Fund managers are implementing processes to provide explanations when per-
formance deviates from the benchmark and disclosure of execution costs, in order 
to improve transparency. 
• Fund managers take measures to minimise conflicts of interest, e.g. by providing 
more transparency on the compensation of investment managers, in order to align 
interests of managers and investors. 
 
According to the KPMG Report, the best-practice governance examples set by partner-
ships and independent houses can be taken as an example for other fund management 
companies. Such firms have been able to better serve client interests, in absence of 
quarterly sales targets which investment subsidiaries of large banks and insurance 
companies typically have. Recommendations to CEOs include (KPMG, 2006, p. 14): 
“Core principles – Investment houses need to articulate governance principles 
which should be incorporated into the day-to-day conduct of their businesses. 
They should focus on promoting client interests, improving investment trans-
parency and adopting business practices that are fit and proper for meeting ob-
ligations to clients. 
Governance architecture – This should have three distinct layers: structures 
that comprise systems and controls that reflect the espoused principles, staff 
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behaviors that are consistent with the principles and a business culture that 
provides an environment that is conducive to the principles.” 
 
Aims
• Avoiding conflicts of interest
• Observing laws and exceeding their expectations
• Not distorting prices or artificially inflate trading volumes
• Disclosing cost comparisons with industry standards
• Disclosing full details of investment professionals
compensation
• Having independent boards of mutual funds
• Assessing enterprise-wide risks
• Having an independent board chairman
• Putting client interests first
• Having a clear value
proposition
• Understanding client
needs and risk tolerance
• Providing products that
meet client needs
• Ensuring client privacy
• Inviting clear feedback
• Creating an investor
protection committee
• Having a
disciplined invest-
ment process
• Providing simple accu-
rate information on invest-
ment performance
• Providing explanations
when performance
deviates from
benchmarks
• Disclosing full execution
costs
• Providing best execution
 
Figure 2.2: Industry good practice governance model 
Source: KPMG (2006, p. 6).  
 
2.4.2 PricewaterhouseCoopers and Caceis Investor Services: Ideal Fund 
In June 2009, audit and consultancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), together 
with custodian and services company Caceis Investor Services, published a paper titled 
“Ideal Fund; Reengineering the fund value proposition” (PwC, 2009; hereafter PwC 
Paper). The PwC Paper addresses some of the shortcomings and challenges of the 
European fund management industry and aims to give recommendations for govern-
ments and the industry. In the introduction, PwC (2009, p. 9) states:  
“In order to ensure the sustainability of the industry’s value proposition, we 
need well-educated investors who receive appropriate advice, with access to 
an industry with a sound governance framework and which provides them the 
right product at the right price and with the right level of transparency. 
Although the UCITS Directive already provides a sound regime for the regula-
tion and transparency of funds, there is a need for labelling and defining the 
characteristics of long-term investment products, as well as creating a level 
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playing field for all products designed to cater for the long-term investment 
needs of the investor.” 
The PwC Paper makes the distinction between three basic needs for long-term inves-
tors, namely retirement planning, liability management and wealth accumulation. The 
focus is on retirement planning and five dimensions of improvement to the value 
proposition are identified, namely education, advice, governance, fund cost and prod-
uct design (PwC, 2009, p. 10-11). Given the central research question of this disserta-
tion, only governance and fund cost are elaborated on here. With regard to govern-
ance, the paper states that there is no harmonised governance model for funds. Even 
within UCITS, governance models vary in the different regulatory regimes and on top 
of that, there are several codes of conduct, both at a European level and a national 
level. The paper recommends (PwC, 2009, p. 13):  
“As part of long-term savings vehicles, there should be a basic governance 
model which is established and consistently applied across all member states. 
The components of such a model require two basic features: 
- The product provider needs to assume legally an institutional responsibility 
for the proper operation of the vehicle within the best interests of the long-
term investor in accordance with the vehicles objectives; 
- A clear framework outlining proper conduct of business rules and inherent 
conflicts of interest which exist should be created and parties independent of 
the promoter should be legally tasked with monitoring adherence to such a 
framework. Responsibility for such monitoring may fall to parties such as the 
depository, independent directors or even the auditor. However, the frame-
work should be clear enough to ensure that the inherent conflict which exists 
in appointment of the independent party minimizes the risk of “oversight arbi-
trage” which may arise. … ” 
According to the PwC Paper, the governance framework to be developed should not 
be left to EU Member States’ discretion, but should be consistently applied across 
Europe and must apply to all long-term savings products. On the other hand, the over-
sight function should not diminish the product ownership of the promoter. 
With regard to costs, the paper recommends an industry-wide aligned definition of 
total fees (including transaction fees) as well as investor-friendly reporting. Contrary to 
the U.S., there is no single definition of the Total Expense Ratio (TER)61. This results in a 
lack of transparency, which makes fee comparisons by investors difficult. For retire-
ment products the recommendation is to have a fee structure that consists of a fee 
covering operational costs and an objective fee. Such an objective fee is to align the 
goals of the investor and the asset manager by linking the manager’s fee to achieving 
the investor’s final and intermediate risk-return objectives. Unfortunately, the paper 
does not specify how such a fee structure would exactly work. 
                                                                 
61 With the KIID, which is required under UCITS IV, there is a standard definition of the Total Expense Ratio. 
Note however that this figure is called the Ongoing Charges.  
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2.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter analysed the legal and regulatory framework as well as governance best 
practices in the U.S. and Europe (in particular Luxembourg and the Netherlands). This 
analysis is to provide the relevant background to chapters 3 to 7, which are dedicated 
to empirical research of board effectiveness. Table 2.5 provides a summary of the 
findings of the analysis by country or region, for each making the distinction between 
the legal and regulatory situation and what is recommended on top of that on the 
basis of governance best practices and self regulation. Given the central research ques-
tion of this dissertation, the table focuses on three aspects, each in a separate column: 
• Requirements and recommendations regarding the independence of fund boards.  
• Requirements and recommendations to achieve better alignment of interests of 
fund management companies and boards of directors with investors’ interests and 
regarding the identification and management of conflicts of interest by funds 
boards.  
• Requirements and recommendations regarding fees and fee setting as well as 
(monitoring of) investment performance. 
 
In all markets analysed, transparency of costs, performance and risks is an important 
principle. On the basis of this information, investors should be able to make an in-
formed investment decision. Furthermore, it should allow market forces to do their 
work, restraining fund managers wishing to increase their revenues by increasing 
costs. With the introduction of the KIID for funds with UCITS status, Europe will make a 
significant step forward in providing this information in a standardised fashion, manda-
tory across the fund management industry, thereby reducing the information advan-
tage of the fund management company versus the investor. With the KIID, Europe in 
effect follows one of the recommendations in the OECD White Paper (OECD, 2005) as 
well as the example of the U.S., where fee information in the prospectus has already 
been standardised on the basis of SEC rules. An important question from the viewpoint 
of investors as well as regulators is whether transparent, standardised information for 
investors is enough for market forces to be able to do their work, aligning interests of 
investors and fund managers. If not, oversight by independent board members, either 
voluntarily (self-regulation) or enforced by stricter regulation, could have significant 
benefits for investors. This question will be approached from an empirical angle in 
chapters 3 to 7. 
With regard to the legal set-up of a fund family by a fund management company, 
there is a notable difference between the U.S. and Luxembourg. In the U.S., each fund 
has a separate, legally empowered board. It is however customary that a single group 
of independent directors sits on all or most of the boards of the funds managed by a 
certain fund management company. In Luxembourg, as well as the Netherlands, in-
vestment funds are generally set-up as sub-funds in an umbrella fund. As a result, by 
definition, all investment funds in that umbrella have the same board. Note that fund 
management companies can have multiple umbrellas, with not necessarily the same 
board composition.  
The fiduciary responsibility to act in the interest of the investors is a concept found 
in both the U.S. and Europe. Nevertheless, the governance frameworks for investment 
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funds in the U.S. and Europe differ significantly. In the U.S., the investment fund’s 
board of directors is the primary body to ensure that effective governance is in place. 
Independent oversight is to be ensured by requiring a certain portion of the board 
members to be legally independent. Most funds are required to have a majority of 
independent directors. These independent board members have been assigned spe-
cific responsibilities, for example in the area of fees, where there is potentially a con-
flict of interest between the fund management company and the investor. The inde-
pendent fund directors must approve all advisory contracts and distribution contracts, 
including their fees, at least annually, as well as other contracts with the management 
company, the distributor and other service providers that carry out day-to-day activi-
ties of the fund. Expected of the directors is at least that they assess the reasonable-
ness of the fees. Fee increases require shareholder approval. In their best-practice 
recommendations, ICI goes a step further, by recommending a super-majority of inde-
pendent directors. However, ICI does specifically mention the advantages of a mixture 
of independent and affiliated directors on a board. It is also typical for the U.S. situa-
tion that, after the market timing and late trading scandals in 2003, the SEC proposed 
to increase the minimum proportion of independent board members and the require-
ment to have an independent chair, as measures to avoid the problems discovered in 
the future. Clearly, the reliance in U.S. investment funds regulations is on legally inde-
pendent oversight to ensure effective governance and avoid conflicts of interest. In 
Europe, the situation is different in that independent board members are generally not 
mandatory. Oversight responsibilities are spread over different entities. For funds with 
UCITS status, the appointment of a depositary is mandatory and the depositary has 
been assigned specific oversight responsibilities. The Winter Committee in the Nether-
lands recommended a legal and regulatory framework with an independent board at 
the level of the fund management company, however the Minister of Finance decided 
not to follow that recommendation. Instead, the Dutch industry association DUFAS has 
developed a code, mandatory for its members, requiring a form of independent over-
sight, but it leaves it to the market participants which body is assigned those inde-
pendent oversight responsibilities.  
Opinions whether the effectiveness of boards improves with independent board 
members differ. EFAMA is a strong advocate of the model where oversight responsi-
bilities are assigned to different entities, including the depositary and auditor, as these 
entities are more involved in the day-to-day activities than an independent board can 
be. In their view, having one independent oversight entity, such as a board with inde-
pendent board members, would lead to functional duplications and as a result be inef-
fective, inefficient and costly. In practice, this seems also the approach the Luxem-
bourg regulator, CSSF, takes on the basis of Luxembourg laws and regulations. In the 
Luxembourg governance model, there are important and distinct roles for the board, 
the depositary and the auditor. In addition, Luxembourg has extra-legal concept of the 
promoter, as sort of a lender of last resort to which the regulator and investors could 
and would turn in case of issues at the level of the Luxembourg Management Company 
of a fund. The ALFI Code is fully dedicated to the role of the board and gives the board 
an important oversight role. With regard to independence, ALFI stresses that the board 
should act independently, but does not define independence in a legal or practical 
manner. A difficulty of EFAMA and ALFI is that they need to serve many masters. 
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EFAMA, as a pan-European association, represents the fund management industry 
from over twenty jurisdictions, with a variety of legal and regulatory frameworks and 
governance cultures. ALFI is in a similar situation, as the body of the fund industry in 
Luxembourg, which is the primary domicile for cross-border fund distribution, with 
fund management companies that have their roots across the globe. As a result, 
EFAMA and ALFI are clearly in favour of a governance regime that is flexible and more 
principles than rules based. However, whether boards with independent members are 
more effective for investors is also an empirical question. Therefore, an empirical ap-
proach will be followed in the next chapters of this dissertation. 
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Table 2.5: Summary of the analysis of governance framework and best practice recommendations 
Country or 
region 
(law or 
industry  
association) 
Board independence 
 
Conflicts of interest / Alignment of 
interests 
Fees / Performance 
U.S. 
(1940 Act) 
 
≥ 40% independent (> 50% in case fund 
relies on Exemption Rules). 
 
Fiduciary duty (board legally 
charged with protecting the inter-
ests of fund’s shareholders). 
Board to assure that level of fees and 
expenses are in the best interest of 
investors. 
Fee increases to be approved by board 
and shareholders. 
U.S. 
(ICI) 
≥ 2/3 independent (former offi-
cers/directors of investment adviser 
not to be counted as such).  
Unitary or clustered boards recom-
mended.  
Independent directors to control the 
nomination process, retirement policy 
and board compensation, to also have 
meetings among each other and to 
have insurance coverage. 
Independent directors to have 
independent counsel and to form 
Audit Committee.  
Investment in funds overseen.  
Periodic evaluation of the board’s 
effectiveness. 
 
 
Fees to be reasonable in light of relevant 
facts and circumstances (including taking 
account of economies of scale).  
Performance: Not addressed. 
 
Europe 
(UCITS IV  
Directive) 
No requirement (depositary has been 
assigned certain oversight roles). 
Management company and the 
depository to act independently and 
solely in the interest of the unit-
holders. 
KIID includes information on past-
performance and costs in a comprehen-
sible and standardised format. 
Europe 
(EFAMA) 
 
Board must act in sufficient autonomy 
and independence, which is to be 
safeguarded in the principles and rules 
for the governance of the Investment 
Management Company. 
Independent oversight for fund man-
agement. 
 
Have conflict policy in place. 
Constantly monitor compliance with 
law, regulation and other rules. 
Areas where investors’ interests 
conflict to be indentified and rules 
and procedures to avoid, manage or 
disclose conflicts of interest to be 
defined. 
 
Pricing mentioned as conflict of interest 
area. 
Investor information to contain informa-
tion on all costs, which must be true, fair 
and not misleading. 
Appropriate supervision and perform-
ance monitoring. 
Information regarding past performance 
transparent (clear if costs are taken into 
account, appropriate period, suitable 
benchmark). 
Luxembourg  
UCITS 
(2010 Law,  
part I) 
No requirement (depositary has been 
assigned certain oversight roles). 
Management company and the 
depository to act independently and 
solely in the interest of the unit-
holders. 
 
KIID includes information on past-
performance and costs in a comprehen-
sible and standardised format. 
Notice period of 1 month for fee in-
creases during which redemption free of 
charge. 
Luxembourg 
(ALFI) 
Board to provide independent review 
and oversight (no recommendation of 
legal independence). 
 
Board to identify and manage 
conflicts of interest and ensure 
disclosure. 
Board to maintain sufficient auton-
omy to resolve conflicts of interest 
impartially. 
Investor information with regard to costs 
must be true, fair, timely and not mis-
leading and with regard to performance 
must be in accordance with relevant 
accounting standards and legal and 
regulatory requirements. 
Board to oversee the activities and 
performance of investment managers. 
Netherlands  
(Wft) 
No requirement. 
In case of UCITS, depositary has been 
assigned certain oversight roles. 
Management company, investment 
company and depositary to act in 
the interest of the participants in 
the fund. 
Mandatory financial information leaflet 
with information on costs and perform-
ance that is correct, clear and not mis-
leading. 
Notice period of 1 month for fee in-
creases during which redemptions on old 
terms. 
Netherlands  
(DUFAS) 
 
Independent oversight entity.  
Different bodies can play that role 
(required for DUFAS members on the 
basis of self regulation). 
Conflicts of interest to be avoided. 
Conflict of interest policy to be in 
place. 
Interest of the investors is leading. 
Information correct, clear and timely. 
For fee changes, a notice period is to be 
respected. 
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Chapter 3 
Earlier empirical research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Having boards with independent chairmen might be ideal but does not automatically 
create a fair deal to clients”62 
                                                                
62 Quote from an anonymous senior manager of fund management company in KPMG International and 
CREATE, 2006, Towards enhanced business governance; Causes and consequences in global investment, p. 
26.  
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses earlier empirical studies into the effectiveness of governance by 
fund boards. The published studies and working papers that are reviewed in this chap-
ter investigate the relationship between governance characteristics on the one hand, 
and fund costs, performance and aspects of fund management company behaviour on 
the other hand. The late trading and market timing scandals formed a trigger for aca-
demics to study whether boards can play a positive role in avoiding conflicts of inter-
est. All but one of the studies of open-end funds reviewed in this chapter are dated 
after 2003, the year in which the scandals were uncovered. Except for one study on 
U.K. closed-end funds and one on U.S. closed-end funds, all studies analyse data of 
U.S.-domiciled open-end funds.  
Effective governance should manifest itself in a fair level of fees, as well as in 
avoiding conflicts of interests and preventing misbehaviour by the fund management 
company. With fees, in particular, management fees, there is a potential conflict of 
interest between fund investors and fund management company. For the fund man-
agement company, higher fees imply greater profitability. For the fund investor, man-
agement fees and other expenses charged are the price paid for the service received. 
Ceteris paribus, higher expenses imply lower returns. Some might argue that higher 
management fees and other expenses do not matter to the investor, as long as they 
are associated with superior investment performance, after expenses. However, an 
economically and statistically significant negative relationship between expense ratios 
and performance is found for open-end funds by e.g., Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995) 
and Carhart (1997). Therefore, a fund investor will prefer lower expenses to higher 
expenses. Since good performance attracts inflows and is an effective way to increase 
fund size, good performance is in the interest of both the fund investors and the fund 
management company. This is, indeed, a mitigating factor against the conflicts of in-
terest between fund investors and fund management companies. 
Although boards are not directly responsible for achieving good performance, one 
could argue that they should take action against continued poor performance. Good 
governance by boards is probably not a source for outperformance, but it may help to 
create the circumstances in which fund managers can thrive and outperform. Addi-
tionally, good governance can potentially mitigate conflicts of interest and avoid or 
stop certain value-destroying activities, such as late trading, market timing and tour-
nament, which negatively impact performance. Therefore, performance is ultimately 
where all effects come together, making performance a relevant variable to consider 
when analysing board effectiveness. Ferris and Yan (2009, p. 620) state in this context:  
“Our final measure of agency costs is fund performance, which directly relates 
to the fundamental interest of fund shareholders. Fund performance might be 
the most comprehensive measure of agency costs since any such cost is ulti-
mately charged against performance.” 
Meschke (2007, p. 16–17) is somewhat more critical as to whether differences in board 
characteristics will result in performance differences:  
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“Other than through negotiating fees, there is no strong theoretical argument 
that links actions of mutual fund directors to performance of funds they over-
see. … To the extent (sic) that more independent and better incentivised 
boards are less tolerant of underperformance, one might expect a relation be-
tween fund performance and governance characteristics. In addition, one can-
not rule out that certain boards of directors are able to identify talented port-
folio managers. In that case, evaluating boards solely on how low they negoti-
ate fund expenses may result in an incomplete picture of their activity since 
one would expect that in equilibrium more talented portfolio managers charge 
higher fees. Hence, this section examines the relation between mutual fund 
governance characteristics and fund performance, albeit with a high degree of 
scepticism.” 
Section 3.3 analyses the results of several empirical studies into the effectiveness of 
board governance, which are relevant for the empirical study of Luxembourg funds in 
the subsequent chapters. Since the central research question of this dissertation con-
cerns fund costs and performance, results from earlier studies related to these aspects 
will receive the most attention. Section 3.2 is a general section about the methodolo-
gies that are applied (3.2.1) and the variables that are typically considered (3.2.2, 3.2.3 
and 3.2.4) in the empirical studies analysed in section 3.3. Section 3.4 summarises and 
concludes this chapter. 
3.2 Methodology and variables 
3.2.1 Methodology 
The empirical studies analysed in section 3.3 typically apply a multiple regression anal-
ysis to investigate the effectiveness of the fund governance. In a multiple regression 
analysis, two or more independent variables are analysed simultaneously in relation-
ship to the dependent variable. Dependent variables considered in most studies are 
fund costs and fund performance (see section 3.2.2.). In addition to one or more gov-
ernance characteristics (see section 3.2.3) as explanatory variables, several control 
variables are taken into account that might have an influence on the dependent vari-
able (see section 3.2.4). 
Because fund sponsors generally offer a range of funds, a fund family, most studies 
reviewed in section 3.3 face the issue of either analysing the data at the level of indi-
vidual funds or at the level of the fund families. An individual fund model treats each 
fund as a separate and independent observation. This approach is consistent with the 
fact that from a regulatory perspective, each U.S.-domiciled fund is a separate legal 
entity. In theory, each fund can have a different board and fees can be set for each 
fund independently. Additionally, many of the control variables are fund-specific, such 
as fund size, fund age and investment objective. On the other hand, many of the ex-
planatory variables are identical across funds of the same fund management company, 
resulting in a possible family effect. In practice, the boards’ composition is similar or 
the same across the fund range of a fund management company. Other tangible char-
C H A P T E R  3  
 96 
acteristics, such as fund management company size, are also identical across the 
range, as well as less tangible characteristics, such as the corporate culture, the distri-
bution approach and the pricing strategy of the fund management company. There-
fore, a drawback to the individual fund model is that standard errors for variables that 
are the same across funds of the same family in the sample might be underestimated, 
and that the statistical significance of these variables could be overstated. The family-
average model treats each fund management company as a separate and independent 
observation. Both the dependent and independent variables are aggregated at the 
level of the fund management company and measured as the average of fund-level 
variables. While this approach analyses fund management company characteristics at 
the proper level and clearly avoids the individual fund model pitfall of overstating sta-
tistical significance, the price is that valuable variation at the fund level is not used and 
thus coefficients are estimated inefficiently.  
A second distinction that can be made between the multiple regression analyses 
applied is whether the available dataset is a cross-section or a panel dataset. In the 
case of a cross-sectional dataset, there are observations of certain variables at a cer-
tain point in time. An example is Tufano and Sevick (1997), analysing cost and govern-
ance data for 1992. A panel dataset consists of repeated observations over time on the 
dependent and independent variables for the sample of funds. Examples of such stud-
ies are Meschke (2007) and Adams, Mansi and Nishikawa (2010). Both studies use a 
panel regression model with fixed effects per period. With such a panel regression 
model, the intercepts are permitted to vary per period, but the slope parameters are 
not. In an extension of such a panel regression, fixed effects can be allowed per spon-
sor as well, by including dummy variables for each fund management company. The 
drawback to this latter approach is that with this model specification, fund manage-
ment company-specific variables (such as fund management company size) need to be 
dropped. In effect, with this approach, variation within fund management companies 
is examined. An alternative approach to analysing a panel dataset is a model specifica-
tion, which is referred to as the Fama-McBeth approach (see Fama and McBeth, 1973). 
With this approach, a cross-sectional regression is first estimated for each period. 
Subsequently, time-series averages are calculated for the various coefficients.  
3.2.2 Dependent variables: Costs and performance 
Costs 
Most studies analysed in section 3.3, investigating the relationship between board 
characteristics and costs, consider the so-called expense ratio or total annual fund 
operating expenses. This is the ratio of a fund’s total annual operating expenses and its 
average net assets, expressed as a percentage. In the U.S., the operating expenses 
consist of the management fee, the 12b-1 fee and the other expenses. Management 
fees are paid out of fund assets to the fund’s investment adviser for managing the 
fund’s investment portfolio. The 12b-1 fee is the annual marketing and distribution 
fee. The other expenses consist of custody expenses, legal expenses, fund accounting 
expenses, transfer agent expenses and other administrative expenses.  
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In addition to costs included in the expense ratio, investors can be charged a sales load 
when purchasing (the so called front-end sales load) or redeeming fund shares (back-
end or deferred sales load) through a broker. To capture these loads in the analysis, 
several studies analyse board characteristics in relationship to a total shareholders fee. 
This is the expense ratio plus a portion of the total load charges (e.g., one-fifth or one-
seventh), depending on the holding period assumed. For U.S. funds, the expense ratio 
and its components, as well as the sales load, are displayed in the Fee Table in the 
prospectus and are available from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Data-
base. 
Performance 
Analysing fund performance in relationship to board characteristics requires some 
form of adjustment for the performance of similar funds or for risk. In the various em-
pirical studies analysed in section 3.3, a number of approaches are used. Most studies 
actually apply more than one performance measure, in order to check the robustness 
of the results. The main approaches applied are: 
• Investment objective adjusted return. This is the fund return minus the mean or 
median return of funds with the same investment objective. 
• Jensen’s alpha. Jensen’s alpha is the fund return over and above what is predicted 
by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM is a single-index model that 
takes into account a fund’s systematic risk (beta). 
• Fama-French alpha. The Fama-French 3-factor model (see Fama and French, 1993) 
is an empirical extension of the CAPM. The factors added are a market capitalisa-
tion factor and a book-to-market factor. 
• Carhart alpha. The Carhart 4-factor model (see Carhart, 1997) is a further extension 
of the CAPM, adding a momentum factor to the Fama-French model. 
 
All studies in section 3.3, analysing a sample of U.S.-domiciled funds, use the CRSP 
Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database for fund return data. This database also 
provides a fund’s investment objective according to various definitions. The return on 
one-month U.S. Treasury bills is generally taken as the risk-free rate. 
3.2.3 Governance variables 
The various governance characteristics that are typically considered by the empirical 
studies analysed in section 3.3 are discussed below. For U.S. funds, the source for this 
data, except for the Morningstar stewardship grades, is the Statement of Additional 
Information, a document that U.S. mutual funds are required to file with the SEC and 
that is available to shareholders upon request. 
Board independence 
Board independence is measured as the percentage of independent directors or  
whether or not the board has an independent chairman (dummy variable). The as-
sumption is that when it matters, dependent directors on the board will prioritise the 
interests of the fund management company with which they are associated as em-
ployee or as employee of a service provider (e.g., law firm or fund administrator) over 
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the interests of the investors. Obviously, this would render dependent board members 
less effective in their duties towards investors. On the other hand, dependent board 
members might have better information and specialised knowledge, for example with 
regard to aspects of the fund management organisation, with which to perform their 
function. The lesser ability of independent boards to monitor the fund manager might 
lead to such boards putting on more constraints, which could work counter-
productively. Critics have cast doubts about effectiveness of independent board mem-
bers for other reasons as well. For example, Cremers et al. (2009, p. 1350) state:  
“…mutual fund boards have been captured by their funds’ sponsors: Directors 
typically serve on the boards of many funds within a family and often earn sig-
nificant compensation; therefore, they may wish to develop a reputation for 
not rocking the boat and thus take actions aimed at protecting their compensa-
tion, as opposed to maximizing the fund’s returns to its shareholders.” 
Board size 
Larger boards might suffer from the problems of managing and coordinating bigger 
teams, along with an increased risk of free riding, i.e., board members not putting in 
their fair share of effort, leading to less effective decision-making. Ding and Wermers 
(2005, p. 22) state:  
“On the one hand, it would be hard for fund managers to control larger boards, 
and therefore larger boards may be related to better performance by monitor-
ing the managers better. On the other hand, when the board size is large, the 
coordination among board members may be more difficult and the board may 
lack efficiency in taking actions to monitor managers.”  
Some studies use the total number of board members as a measure for board size, 
whereas others take the total number of independent directors. 
Number of funds overseen 
Fund directors usually have that role for more than one fund. Overseeing many funds 
of one fund management company or even of multiple fund management companies 
could lead to a board member being too busy to provide effective oversight. Alterna-
tively, it could be a sign that such a board member has superior skills, knowledge 
and/or experience. Some studies consider the number of funds overseen by any direc-
tor as a governance variable in their analysis, while others only consider the number of 
funds overseen by independent directors. 
Board concentration 
Board concentration is a measure for the relative span of a director’s or a board’s 
oversight responsibility. At one extreme, each fund in a fund family can have a differ-
ent board, whereas at the other extreme, all funds in a fund family can have boards of 
the same composition. Tufano and Sevick (1997) calculate director share, board con-
centration and sponsor concentration as follows: 
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• Director’s share is the assets under management that a certain independent direc-
tor oversees, expressed as the percentage of the total fund assets under manage-
ment of the fund management company. 
• Board concentration is the average of the director shares of the directors on that 
particular board. 
• Sponsor concentration is calculated by averaging the directors’ shares at the level 
of the fund management company. 
 
A unitary board is in place when all funds of a fund management company are over-
seen by boards of identical composition. In that case, director share, board concentra-
tion and sponsor concentration are all 100%. In case of a clustered board, funds be-
longing to the same fund family do not all have the same composition, resulting in a 
board concentration and sponsor concentration of less than 100%. Several studies use 
a unitary board dummy variable, rather than the board or sponsor concentration.  
Unitary boards could have the advantage that such a board structure can result in 
more power and leverage in negotiations with the fund management company and 
other service providers. Unitary boards could also be more efficient using information 
and knowledge regarding the fund management company and the fund industry across 
the whole fund family. Boards overseeing all funds in a fund family might be better 
monitors against family strategies, where one fund benefits at the expense of others. 
Unitary boards might be better able to evaluate the benefits from economies of scale 
and make sure that they are reflected in the expenses charged. Furthermore, unitary 
boards might have a better balance between oversight and micro-management. Fi-
nally, for the fund management company, having to deal with only one group of direc-
tors might be more efficient.  
Disadvantages of a unitary board could result from the board members acting less 
independently from the fund management company. Their larger financial compensa-
tion, due to serving on more boards, might make them less critical monitors. Finally, 
the workload from overseeing a large fund family might be too large to be effective as 
a monitor for investors. 
Director compensation 
Several studies include unexplained compensation as a measure for how well a director 
is paid in relative terms. It is defined as the part of the total compensation that cannot 
be explained by factors such as the number of funds and assets overseen by directors. 
Higher compensation might result from a board member’s superior skills, knowledge 
and experience in that role. However, high compensation might also create a financial 
dependency for the director on his position, which can lead to a lesser alignment of 
interests between that board member and investors. For example, a higher compensa-
tion is a disincentive to initiate or approve a merger when it could potentially lead to 
loss of that board seat and its associated compensation.  
In the Statements of Additional Information, remuneration data is reported for in-
dependent directors only, since dependent directors are paid by the fund management 
company, not by the fund. 
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Director ownership 
Even a legally independent director might not act independently without the right 
incentive. The hypothesis in several studies is that the directors’ interests are better 
aligned with investors and that directors are more incentivised to act in investors’ 
interests when directors invest in the funds they oversee. Independent directors, who 
are only interested in the remuneration and status of their board position and in being 
asked to serve on the board of the next fund set up by the same fund management 
company, still might not act independently from the fund management company and 
would be ineffective in their duties towards the investors. A significant investment by 
directors in the funds they oversee might create the incentive to act independently, 
ultimately leading to a disciplining of the fund management company to the benefit of 
investors. 
In the U.S., as of 31 January 2002, ownership by fund directors in the funds that 
they oversee is disclosed in the Statement of Additional Information. It lists the dollar 
value, in specific ranges63, of all funds in the fund family owned by each director. Own-
ership can be measured as the absolute amount invested. Alternatively, Kong and Tang 
(2008) use a ratio of ownership and compensation as a measure for the relative signifi-
cance of the investment. The measure used by Ferris and Yan (2007b) is the percent-
age of independent directors not holding any shares in the fund. 
Independent directors’ tenure 
Over time, board members might lose their ability to act independently from the fund 
management company and therefore become less effective in serving the interests of 
the fund investors. On the other hand, a longer tenure might be a sign of greater ex-
perience and might also lead to a greater reputation at risk, which could align the in-
terests of board members and investors. 
Board committee structure 
Forming committees within a board could ensure that board members specialise in 
and focus on certain areas, which could be an effective way to perform their duties to 
investors. Committees typically seen in U.S. mutual fund boards are nominating64, 
governance65, audit and pricing committees. Ferris and Yan (2007b, p. 399) comment 
with regard to these committees:  
“The nominating and governance committees are typically restricted to inde-
pendent directors and reflect the board’s efforts at monitoring its own activi-
ties. The audit committee represents another dimension of fund governance 
and reviews the methods of financial reporting, the system of internal controls, 
and the audit process. The pricing committee monitors and establishes policies 
concerning the pricing of new shares, suggesting that the presence of such a 
committee discourages market timing abuses.” 
                                                                
63 These ranges are US$0, US$0-25,000, US$25–50,000, US$50–100,000 and US$100,000 and above. 
64 The nominating committee selects and nominates directors on the board.  
65 The governance committee oversees matters related to the governance exercised by the board, including 
the evaluation of board’s processes and performance.  
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Morningstar Stewardship Grade 
Several studies make use of the Morningstar stewardship grade, which was introduced 
by Morningstar in August 2004 (Morningstar, 2004). It is the assessment by Morning-
star analysts of how well the interests of the fund management company are aligned 
with those of the fund investors. The stewardship grade is constructed from the scores 
given in five equally weighted categories:  
• Regulatory Issues: Funds with no regulatory concerns receive the highest score, 
while those with serious breaches have points subtracted. 
• Board Quality. For this component, Morningstar assesses various aspects of board 
quality, such as the board’s independence and whether the board members are in-
vested in the fund. With regard to the factors that Morningstar assesses for the 
Board Quality, Morningstar (2004, p. 2) says: 
“• Has the board taken action in cases where the fund clearly hasn’t served inves-
tors well? 
• Do the independent directors have meaningful investments in the fund? To earn 
the maximum score, at least 75 percent of a board’s independent directors must 
have more money invested in the funds they oversee than they receive in aggre-
gate annual compensation for serving on the board. However, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission requires directors to report investments in dollar ranges 
with the top range being “more than $100,000.” As a result, we will assume that di-
rectors with more than $100,000 invested in the funds they oversee meet the 
above criterion. 
• Is the board overseeing so many funds that it may compromise the ability to dili-
gently protect the interests of shareholders at this specific fund? 
• Does the fund meet the maximum SEC requirement for the proportion of inde-
pendent directors, regardless of whether or not it is subject to the requirement? 
(Former fund company employees, family members, and current or former em-
ployees of fund service providers are not considered independent by Morning-
star.)” 
• Manager Incentives. Morningstar looks favourably at funds where the portfolio 
manager has a significant investment in the fund he manages and where the com-
pensation structure rewards long-term performance as opposed to short-term per-
formance or asset growth. 
• Fees. In this category, Morningstar assesses whether a fund’s expense ratio is be-
low the average of its peers and whether the fund’s expense ratio declined mean-
ingfully as assets have grown. 
• Corporate Culture. For this component, Morningstar looks at a wide range of fac-
tors to assess how seriously a firm takes its fiduciary duty. 
 
For the overall grade, Morningstar uses the American academic grading system, from A 
(highest) to F (lowest), where E is not used. The categories of Regulatory Issues and 
Fees can be observed and analysed more or less objectively. The categories of Board 
Quality, Manager Incentives and Corporate Culture are more subjective and therefore, 
the assessment by Morningstar analysts plays an important role. This also implies that 
the overall stewardship grade is, to some extent, a subjective measure, contrary to 
C H A P T E R  3  
 102 
other board characteristics listed in this section, such as, for example, board size, 
which is an observable variable. 
3.2.4 Control variables 
This section lists the various control variables that are included in several of the em-
pirical studies analysed in section 3.3.  
Fund size and fund management company size 
The variables for fund and fund management company size are to capture possible 
economies of scale that exist in the management of funds. On the other hand, too 
large funds might face capacity constraints, leading to lower performance. In the re-
gression analyses, the natural logarithm of the fund size is generally taken as control 
variable.  
Fund age 
The variable for the fund age is included because young funds might have start-up 
costs, leading to higher costs. Alternatively, young funds might be subsidised by the 
fund management company, leading to lower costs, while older funds might have 
higher fees, justified on the basis of established reputations. In the regression analy-
ses, the natural logarithm of the fund age is generally included as control variable.  
Past performance 
Past performance is included in order to capture that better past performance might 
justify or lead to higher fees. Past performance can be measured in various ways, such 
as the difference between a fund’s return and medium return of funds within the same 
investment objective or as the percentile ranking within a relevant peer group. 
Fund investment objective (fund sector) 
When funds in the sample have different investment objectives, for example, domestic 
equity, money market or municipal bonds, these differences can be captured by means 
of dummy variables by objective.  
3.3 Results of earlier empirical research into governance characteristics 
3.3.1 Costs and performance of open-end funds 
Section 3.3.1 covers empirical studies that are similar in their methodological ap-
proaches to the study of Luxembourg funds in chapters 5 and 6. This section starts 
with the first study of this kind, that of Tufano and Sevick, published in 1997, which 
analyses board characteristics and fees. Next are the studies by Meschke (2007), Ferris 
and Yan (2007b) and Kong and Tang (2008), which are similar in their approaches, but 
also analyse the relationship of board characteristics and performance, as well as 
whether or not the funds were involved in the late trading and market timing scandals. 
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The study by Cremers et al. (2009) is dedicated to investments by directors in the funds 
they oversee in relationship to performance. The study by Ferris and Yan (2009) looks 
into the organisational form – public or private – of the fund management company. 
Adams et al. (2010) analyse index funds. Given that the empirical research on a sample 
of Luxembourg funds, presented in chapters 5 and 6, regards the relationship between 
governance characteristics and costs and performance respectively, the focus in this 
section is also on the results of these measures for board effectiveness.  
Tufano and Sevick (1997): Board independence and costs 
Tufano and Sevick (1997) is the first empirical study examining mutual fund board 
characteristics. They examine the relationship between the composition and compen-
sation of boards of directors of U.S. open-end mutual funds and the fees charged by 
these funds to their investors. Tufano and Sevick (1997, p. 322) state:  
“…certain board characteristics, such as the size of the board and the percent-
age of outsiders, are observable features that can affect a board’s independ-
ence, its skill at deliberation and decision making, and ultimately its effective-
ness as a fiduciary.” 
The study examines this relationship using 1992 data for a sample consisting of the 
funds offered by the largest 50 sponsors in the U.S. This sample includes 1587 open-
end funds with US$ 1.1 trillion of assets under management, which is 37% of the num-
ber of funds available and 69% of the U.S. open-end mutual fund assets under man-
agement at the time. Three different definitions of fees are used as dependent vari-
able: 
• Total fees, including front and back-end fees amortised over a 5-year holding pe-
riod. 
• Marketing fees, consisting of 12b-1 fees and front and back-end fees amortised 
over a 5-year holding period. 
• Other fees, defined as total fees minus marketing fees. 
 
The size of the board, measured as the number of independent directors, the percent-
age of independent directors, board concentration and unexplained director compen-
sation are included as governance variables. The authors use four specifications of a 
multiple regression model to estimate the relationship between board characteristics 
and the fees charged, including two versions of the individual fund model (one without 
and one with fixed effects per sponsor) and a family-average model. The fourth model 
specification is a variation on the approach by Fama-McBeth, whereby Tufano and 
Sevick (1997) divide the sample into sub-samples by investment objective, estimate 
coefficients for each investment objective and then average these as if concerning a 
time-series. The authors control for fund and sponsor scale, fund age, fund objective, 
distribution method and past performance. Whether a fund is targeted at a retail pub-
lic or high-net-worth and institutional clients is also taken into account with a control 
variable.  
One conclusion of the study is that smaller fund boards and a higher percentage of 
independent directors are associated with lower fees. These variables are better able 
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to explain fee differences across sponsors than within them. A higher board concentra-
tion is associated with lower fees. Tufano and Sevick (1997, p. 348–349) state:  
“While critics have contended that board members sitting on all or virtually all 
of a sponsor’s boards might become captured by the complex, the empirical 
evidence does not support this assertion. Funds whose independent board 
members sit on a larger fraction of the sponsor’s assets tend to have lower, 
and not higher, shareholder fees. … This finding is consistent with breadth of 
oversight allowing independent directors to develop greater expertise, or exert 
greater bargaining leverage in negotiations with the fund sponsor”. 
In addition, there is some evidence that higher directors’ fees go hand-in-hand with 
higher fees for the shareholders, but this result is not statistically significant in all 
model specifications. The impact is much greater than only the direct effect of the 
director’s fees on the expense ratio. This result is consistent with the rent-sharing 
hypothesis (Tufano and Sevick, 1997, p. 335):  
“… directors who receive relatively large compensation might be less inclined 
to jeopardize this compensation by disagreeing with the fund sponsor, such as 
by forcefully insisting on lower fees for the sponsor. Under this view, high di-
rectors’ compensation can be thought of as a form of rent-sharing. Under an 
opposing view, higher director’s fees indicate payment for superior oversight, 
given a knowledgeable market for board members.” 
Table 3.1 shows the sensitivity of the fees charged for variations in the four board 
characteristics distinguished in the study. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of the results of Tufano and Sevick (1997) 
Board structure variable Delta Effect on total fees 
p.a. 
Board size One additional independent board member +7bp 
Percentage of Independent directors 10 percentage points -11 –  -10bp 
Director concentration  100% versus 50% -17 –  -12bp 
Unexplained compensation +US$ 33k +5bp 
 
The conclusion for the control variables is that there is evidence of economies of scale 
at the fund level, but only limited evidence of economies of scale at the sponsor level. 
Older funds charge higher fees. Furthermore, there is a significant variation in fees 
between funds with different objectives and different distribution models. There is no 
evidence that fee differences are related to differences in past performance.  
After providing their empirical results, Tufano and Sevick (1997, p. 349) state with 
regard to endogeneity:  
“It is tempting to interpret these statistical relationships as causal, implying 
that board structure affects fees. However, it is important to remember the 
earlier discussion in this paper about endogeneity. … However, while other el-
ements of board structure are partially constrained by laws and history, the 
fund sponsor plays an important role in determining board makeup. Sponsors 
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seeking to charge higher fees to capture rents may select different types of 
boards than other sponsors, thus the causality can run in reverse.”  
In order to investigate the causality of the relationships, in other words, whether the 
differences in fees are the result of differences in board structure, Tufano and Sevick 
(1997) analyse the relationship between board characteristics and fees paid to the 
fund sponsor versus fees paid to third parties. Potential conflicts of interest are larger 
when setting fees paid to the sponsor than when setting fees for third parties. They 
use marketing fees, as defined above, as the category of fees that is paid to third par-
ties, whereas other fees are the category of fees that is paid primarily to the sponsor. 
Particularly, more effective boards should be able to affect fees paid to the sponsor. 
The results are statistically insignificant for the variables for board size and the per-
centage of independent directors, and inconsistent for the variables for director con-
centration and compensation. Therefore, these results do no support the hypothesis 
that different types of boards have a causal effect on fee levels. 
Meschke (2007): Board characteristics, costs and performance 
Meschke (2007) examines the relationship between board independence and director 
incentives on the one hand, and fund costs, performance and the likelihood of being 
indicted for late trading and/or market timing on the other hand. He investigates a 
randomly selected sample of 400 investment companies from 91 sponsors in the U.S. 
in the period 1995–2004. This sample covers approximately one third of the funds on 
the CRSP mutual fund database, representing about 60% of assets under management. 
The position of the chairman – either independent from or affiliated with the fund 
management company (dummy variable) – and the percentage of independent direc-
tors are used as measures for board independence. Unexplained compensation is cal-
culated following Tufano and Sevick (1997).  
The cost measure used includes the annual expenses and the loads. For the latter, 
a holding period of seven years is assumed, therefore adding one-seventh of the total 
load to the annual expenses. The study uses two panel regression model specifications 
to analyse the panel dataset of fund expenses on the one hand, and governance char-
acteristics on the other hand, namely one with, and one without, fixed effects per 
fund. Furthermore, the Fama-MacBeth methodology is followed. The control variables 
are other board structure variables, several fund and sponsor characteristics, fund 
investment style and distribution type. 
Funds with boards that have an independent chairman charge lower fees. With the 
panel regression without fixed effects per fund, the difference is almost 13 basis points 
per annum for the entire sample and research period. The percentage of independent 
directors does not explain fee differences in a statistically significant manner, at least 
for the entire period. The percentage of independent directors is associated with high-
er fees during the first two sub periods (1995–1998 and 1999–2001) and with lower 
fees during the last sub period (2002–2004). Performing the regression analysis by 
asset class, the study finds that the negative association between an independent chair 
and fund expenses is more pronounced for equity funds than for bond funds, while 
there is no such relationship for money market funds.  
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The measure for unexplained director compensation is positively related to fees. Funds 
with independent directors who receive high unexplained compensation charge higher 
fees, in line with the hypothesis that the interests of such directors are less aligned 
with those of investors. The coefficient is statistically significant at a level of 1%, but 
hardly economically significant, since in none of the model specifications is the differ-
ence more than 0.2 basis points per annum.  
Funds with independent directors with a higher average tenure charge lower fees. 
This result is statistically significant at a level of 1% for the whole period, but not sig-
nificant for all sub-periods. With approximately 0.9 basis points, the economical signifi-
cance for this variable is also limited. The result for board size is not statistically signifi-
cant for any of the sub-periods.  
Directors’ investment in the funds is negatively associated with fees. Funds with a 
larger fraction of independent directors holding at least US$ 100,000 in the funds they 
oversee charge lower fees, but this result is only significant at a level of 10%. This 
board characteristic was only investigated for the 2002–2004 period, since this data 
was not a reporting requirement before 2002. With regard to the control variables, the 
study finds that older funds, larger funds and funds from larger sponsors, as well as 
funds with a higher redemption sensitivity66, charge lower fees. Funds with better past 
performance, high turnover, high number of holdings and from sponsors with a large 
number of funds charge higher fees.  
For the analysis of the relationship between governance characteristics and per-
formance, only the panel regression without fixed effects per fund is used. The study 
uses several measures for excess returns, including the Carhart alpha for equity funds. 
No evidence is found that board independence – measured both as percentage of 
independent directors on the board and with a dummy for the position of chairman – 
is associated with better performance. On the contrary, the Carhart alpha of equity 
funds overseen by an independent chair is 74 basis points per annum lower. Having 
relatively more independent directors also goes hand-in-hand with lower returns. 
These results are surprising, given the lower fees charged by funds with independent 
chairs and the results of studies on performance persistence that attribute perform-
ance persistence of funds at least partly to differences in fees (see e.g. Carhart, 1997). 
These seemingly inconsistent results between board independence and fees on the 
one hand, and board independence and performance on the other hand, might be 
explained by better portfolio managers wanting to work for more expensive funds with 
less independent boards, where they can earn higher salaries.  
There is a negative relationship between unexplained compensation and risk-
adjusted fund performance, both for equity and bond funds. However, the magnitude 
of the effect is small. The coefficient for average director tenure was not statistically 
significant for most performance measures. The coefficient for board size was statisti-
cally significant negatively for most performance measures, but not for the Carhart 
alpha. As mentioned above, the information about directors’ holdings was only avail-
                                                                
66 Meschke (2007) argues that both external market discipline and internal board oversight are expected to 
affect the level of fees, and therefore wants to control for the degree of investor-imposed market discipline 
when estimating the effects of board characteristics on fees. The negative sign and level of significance of 
this redemption sensitivity measure in the regression analysis suggest that funds, with a client base that is 
more likely to redeem in response to negative performance, charge lower fees.  
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able for the 2002–2004 period. The regression coefficient for directors’ holdings was 
not statistically significant for any of the risk-adjusted performance measures, includ-
ing Carhart alpha. Larger funds have a better risk-adjusted performance, but the re-
sults suggest that the relationship is hump-shaped, meaning that from some point, 
increased size is associated with lower performance. Fund age has a statistically signifi-
cant negative relationship with risk-adjusted performance. Table 3.2 summarises the 
results regarding fees and performance.  
The study finds no evidence that boards with a higher percentage of independent 
directors or independent chairs are less likely to be involved in litigation for late trad-
ing or market timing in the 2003–2005 period. However, greater unexplained compen-
sation and a larger fraction of sponsor assets distributed through brokers are both 
associated with a higher likelihood of being charged in the late trading and market 
timing scandal.  
 
Table 3.2: Summary of the results of Meschke (2007)1 
Board structure variable Delta Effect on total fees2 Effect on performance3 
Percentage of independent directors  Plus 10% - -25bp 
Independent chair (dummy) -13bp -74bp 
Board size  - - 
Unexplained compensation  Plus4 Minus4 
Average director tenure Plus 1 year -0.9bp - 
Director ownership  
(percentage of directors holding ≥ US$ 100k) 
Plus 50% -3bp - 
1. Results that are statistically insignificant or inconsistent are indicated with a dash (-).  
2. Results shown are for the individual fund regression model specification for the entire period, except for 
director ownership, which is only available for the period 2002-2004.  
3. Results shown are for equity funds, using Carhart alpha as the performance measure, for the entire pe-
riod, except for director ownership, which is only available for the period 2002-2004.  
4. Size of the effect not possible to provide based on results included in the study. 
Ferris and Yan (2007b): Independent directors and chairmen 
Similar to Meschke (2007), Ferris and Yan (2007b) investigate whether chair and board 
independence are related to fund fees, fund performance and the probability of being 
involved in the late trading and market timing scandal. Their sample is bigger than that 
of Meschke (2007), but concerns a cross-sectional analysis of 2002 data only. The sam-
ple includes the 448 fund families for which board data could be obtained, out of the 
531 fund families in the CRSP database as per the end of that year. These families 
managed 97.1% of the assets under management of the fund management industry at 
that point in time.  
The board characteristics considered are the chairman’s position, the percentage 
of independent directors, board size, fund ownership by independent directors (meas-
ured as a proportion of independent directors holding zero shares), unexplained inde-
pendent director compensation, number of funds overseen by the independent direc-
tors, independent directors’ tenure and board committee structure. The latter is in-
cluded in the regression analysis by using dummy variables for the presence of a nomi-
nating, a governance and a pricing committee, respectively. A dummy for audit com-
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mittees was considered as well, but not included, because nearly all fund boards in the 
sample had such a committee. 
Out of the fund families in the sample, 28 were indicted for late trading or market 
timing. The study finds that the probability of a fund management company being 
indicted is not related to the fund board having an independent chair or to the per-
centage of independent board members. There is also no statistically significant rela-
tionship between the likelihood of being indicated and the percentage of independent 
directors not invested in the fund, the independent directors’ tenure and the existence 
of a nominating or a governance committee. 
The results are statistically significant for several other board characteristics. Un-
explained independent director compensation, as well as the number of funds over-
seen by independent directors, is associated with a higher likelihood of being indicted. 
The presence of a pricing committee is negatively related to the likelihood of being 
indicted. A fund management company that does not have a pricing committee is 
approximately five times more likely to be indicted. Larger fund management compa-
nies are more likely to be indicted as well. Ferris and Yan (2007b, p. 405) provide three 
possible reasons for this result:  
“First, larger fund families might be more difficult to monitor due to organiza-
tional complexity and diseconomy. Second, larger fund families might be more 
attractive to market timers and other professional traders because they offer 
the potential for greater trading profits. Third, federal and state regulators 
might have a stronger incentive to uncover violations in larger fund companies 
because large fund families impact a greater number of investors.” 
The study applies four model specifications for the regression analysis of fund fees and 
performance, including an individual fund model and two variations of the family-
average model. The fourth specification is the same as that used by Tufano and Sevick 
(1997), whereby the Fama-McBeth approach is applied to sub-samples by investment 
objective. In addition to the annual expense ratio and the total shareholder fee (ex-
pense ratio plus one-seventh of total load), the study uses the operating expense ratio 
(expense ratio minus 12b-1 fee) as a third cost measure. These operating expenses are 
the costs directly related to the management of the fund, excluding the compensation 
for distributors.  
There is no evidence that a higher percentage of independent directors or an in-
dependent chair is associated with lower fees. The coefficients are insignificant in most 
model specifications and the sign is inconsistent. In the model specifications where the 
coefficient is statistically significant, the sign is actually positive. The coefficients for 
board ownership are inconsistent and mostly insignificant as well. The study does find 
that funds with larger boards charge higher fees, especially when analysing expense 
ratios and total shareholder fees. An increase in the number of board members by five 
is associated with a 9 to 11 basis points higher expense ratio.  
There is weak evidence that high unexplained independent director compensation, 
a high number of funds overseen and long tenures are associated with higher ex-
penses. For these variables, in several model specifications there are statistically sig-
nificant coefficients, in particular, for costs measured as the annual expense ratio and 
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total shareholder fee. However, the economic significance is small. The results for the 
board variables are summarised in table 3.3.  
Larger funds and larger fund families tend to charge lower fees, consistent with 
the existence of economies of scale, whereas younger funds tend to charge higher fees 
(expense ratio only). Furthermore, there is a statistically significant negative relation 
between the expenses and the performance in the previous period. When the analysis 
is repeated per performance quintile, among the poorest performers, there is also no 
statistically significant negative relationship between the percentage of independent 
directors and the dummy for the chair and expense ratios. Therefore, it cannot be 
concluded that board independence is more important for poor performing funds.  
To investigate the relationship between board characteristics and performance, 
Ferris and Yan (2007b) use a measure calculated as the fund’s return minus the aver-
age return of funds with the same investment objective, normalised by dividing this 
return difference by the cross-sectional standard deviation of the fund’s return within 
an investment objective. Only performance data for 2002 is used. Few coefficients for 
governance variables are statistically significant and none is significant in more than 
one out of four model specifications for governance variables. For the percentage of 
independent directors and the dummy variable for an independent chair, none of the 
coefficients are statistically significant. It can be concluded that there is no evidence 
that board independence as measured by these variables is associated with better 
performance.  
Of the control variables, there is a statistically significant positive relationship be-
tween performance and the previous period performance. For two out of four model 
specifications, there is also a positive relationship between fund size and performance. 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of the results of Ferris and Yan (2007b)1 
Board structure variable Delta Effect on 
expense ratio
Effect on 
total fees 
Effect on 
performance 
Percentage of independent directors   -  - - 
Independent chair  - - - 
Board size +5 board members +9–11bp +19–22bp - 
Unexplained compensation  Plus2 Plus2 - 
Number of funds overseen +3 (from median of 6) +2bp3 +4bp3 - 
Average director tenure (in years) +3 (from median of 7.59) +1bp3 +3bp3 - 
Director ownership  
(percentage of directors holding zero shares) 
- - - 
1. Results that are statistically insignificant or inconsistent are indicated with a dash (-).  
2. Size of the effect not possible to provide based on results included in the study.  
3. Not statistically significant in all model specifications.  
 
On the basis of the above results, Ferris and Yan (2007b, p. 417) write in their conclu-
sion:  
“Overall, our results suggest that board design and director compensation in-
fluence the quality of governance provided to a mutual fund. They question, 
however, the usefulness of recent SEC proposals for mutual funds to have in-
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dependent chairmen accompanied by a board that is at least 75% independ-
ent.” 
Kong and Tang (2008): Unitary boards 
Kong and Tang (2008) analyse mutual fund fees, performance, fund manager misbe-
haviour and Morningstar stewardship grades in relationship to board characteristics, in 
particular, unitary versus clustered boards. Their sample consists of all 969 U.S. mutual 
funds that had a Morningstar stewardship grade in 2004–2005, based on 2003 year-
end information. These funds were from 126 fund families and had US$ 2.6 trillion of 
assets under management, which was 35% of the assets under management of the 
U.S. open-end mutual fund industry at the time.  
Other board characteristics included in the analysis are board size, board inde-
pendence, both the percentage of independent directors and the independence of the 
chair, and directors’ ownership. As a measure for the latter, the director ownership as 
such is not taken, but rather the percentage of independent directors whose invest-
ment in the fund complex is greater than his compensation for serving as a director, or 
US$ 100,000, whichever is smaller. With this measure, the authors try to capture the 
relative size of the directors’ investment, rather than the absolute amount, which 
could be a better measure of the board’s willingness to discipline the fund manage-
ment company. As measures for costs, the study uses the annual expense ratio, broken 
down into management fee and 12b-1 fee, as well as the total fees. Assuming an aver-
age holding period of seven years, total fees are defined as the annual expense ratio 
plus one-seventh of the front-end and back-end loads.  
The results of the multiple regression analysis at the fund level for all four cost 
measures show that larger boards are associated with higher costs, whereas funds 
with a unitary board have lower costs. Funds with more than 75% independent direc-
tors have higher total costs, in particular, due to higher 12b-1 fees and loads and not 
due to higher management fees. The coefficients for the chair independence are not 
statistically significant. Funds with higher director ownership relative to their compen-
sation have lower costs, mainly due to lower 12b-1 fees. Larger funds and funds from 
larger families are associated with lower fees, which can be explained by economies of 
scale.  
The results of the analysis of objective-adjusted returns in 2003 show that funds  
with more independent boards and larger boards underperform. The relationships 
between the dummy variables for a unitary board and the chair position, as well as the 
director ownership variable and the funds’ performance, are not statistically signifi-
cant. The results are summarised in table 3.4 below. The analysis is repeated with the 
family-average model and the Fama-McBeth approach applied to investment objec-
tives and the results are found to be robust.  
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Table 3.4: Summary of the results of Kong and Tang (2008)1 
Board structure variable Delta Effect on  
expense ratio 
Effect on total 
fees 
Effect on  
performance 
Independent directors  >75% versus <75% (dummy) - +19bp -1.43% 
Independent chair (dummy) - - - 
Director concentration  Unitary versus clustered  
board (dummy) 
-10bp -23bp - 
Director ownership  >75% independent directors 
have significant investment in 
fund family (dummy) 
- -39bp - 
Board size +1 board member +2bp +5bp -0.29% 
1. Results that are statistically insignificant or inconsistent are indicated with a dash (-).  
 
In general, better governance might control or avoid agency problems and specifically, 
fund manager misbehaviour. After analysing fund fees and performance in the context 
of fund governance characteristics, Kong and Tang (2008) examine fund manager mis-
behaviour, considering Morningstar stewardship grades and whether firms were in-
volved in the late trading and market timing scandals.  
The study focuses on three of the five components of the Morningstar stewardship 
rating – Regulatory Issues, Fee Setting and Corporate Culture – which they expect 
effective governance to influence positively. They find that board independence, both 
the percentage of independent board members and the chair position, as well as 
board size, are associated with lower ratings for all three of these areas. However, 
funds with unitary boards score significantly better on Regulatory Issues and Corporate 
Culture. Higher director ownership is associated with fewer Regulatory Issues, but the 
impact on the scores for Fee Setting and Corporate Culture is not statistically signifi-
cant.  
The Fee Setting component in the Morningstar stewardship grade consists of two 
aspects: expense ratio versus category average and the setting of breakpoints. Upon 
further analysis of the fee setting score, the study shows that unitary boards set more 
effective breakpoints, whereas more independent boards and larger boards score 
poorly in this respect. Economies of scale seem to occur mainly at fund family level and 
not at fund level, since large fund families set more effective breakpoints, whereas 
larger funds do not. From the Board Quality rating in the Morningstar stewardship 
grade, which consists of four aspects, they consider one: has the board taken action in 
cases where the fund clearly has not served investors well? Unitary boards are found to 
be more likely to take action, whereas more independent boards and larger boards are 
less likely to take action.  
In the sample of 126 fund families, 23 were involved in the late trading and market 
timing scandal. Board independence – either in the form of an independent chair or 
more than 75% of the board members independent – and director investment have no 
statistically significant relationship with the firm being involved in these scandals. 
However, families with unitary boards were less likely to be involved. 
On the basis of their analysis of fees and performance, as well as Morningstar 
stewardship grades and board actions, the authors conclude that unitary boards and 
small boards are more effective for shareholders. The reverse is true for more inde-
pendent boards. 
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Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2009): Director ownership 
Cremers et al. (2009) investigate fund performance in relationship to ownership, by 
both independent and dependent directors, as a measure of directors’ incentive. They 
examine a sample of 134 U.S.-domiciled actively managed equity funds that belonged 
to the top 25 equity mutual fund families in January 1996 and could be matched to 
governance data. Performance is measured in the period from January 2002 to June 
2004. The ownership variables included are: 
• Average fund family ownership by independent directors. 
• Average individual fund ownership by independent directors. 
• Average individual fund ownership by non-independent directors. 
 
Average fund family ownership by non-independent directors is not included, because 
most non-independent directors have family ownership in the highest bracket. 
 
The study applies a methodology whereby long/short portfolios of funds are formed 
and the performance of these portfolios is evaluated using the Carhart 4-factor model. 
The long position is in funds with a high value for a particular governance variable (first 
quartile) and the short position is in funds with a low value for that governance vari-
able (fourth quartile).  
Both at an individual fund level and a fund family level, higher independent direc-
tors’ ownership is associated with better performance. Higher non-independent direc-
tor ownership at the level of individual funds is also associated with better perform-
ance. The relationship between director ownership and performance is not linear, but 
is the result of the fund underperformance where director ownership is low or even 
zero. A higher proportion of independent directors is not associated with a statistically 
higher or lower performance. With regard to their finding for non-independent direc-
tors, Cremers et al. (2009, p. 1360) state:  
“This is an important finding in light of the emphasis that regulators and re-
searchers have placed on the role of independent directors. This finding makes 
good economic sense, since nonindependent directors are, by the very nature 
of their legal classification, strongly involved in the life of the fund and perhaps 
more likely to need incentives to act in the interest of fund shareholders. Our 
results point to an important role for nonindependent directors, as long as the 
incentives are in place to make their interests align with those of the share-
holders of the funds they oversee.” 
The main results are summarised in table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Summary of the results of Cremers et al. (2009)1 
Board structure variable Effect on expense ratio Effect on performance2 
Average ownership in fund family shares by 
independent directors 
- +2.30% 
Average ownership in individual fund shares
by non-independent directors 
-9.8bp (for a one standard deviation 
increase in ownership) 
+2.11% 
Average ownership in individual fund shares
by independent directors 
- +1.42% 
Proportion of independent directors - - 
Board size +3–5bp (for each additional director) N.A. 
1. Results that are statistically insignificant or inconsistent are indicated with a dash (-).  
2. Not estimated with multiple regression analysis, but as the highest quartile minus lowest quartile funds in 
long/short portfolio.  
 
The study provides two hypotheses that can explain, in theory, the superior perform-
ance of funds with director ownership:  
• Private information mechanism. Directors may have superior, private information 
on the basis of which they decide whether or not to invest in a specific fund they 
oversee. In this case, the choice of directors in which funds to invest would be cor-
related, so that directors’ investments would, on average, be directed to the same, 
superiorly performing funds. At a director level, this would lead to the funds of 
choice outperforming the funds they choose not to invest in. 
• Monitoring mechanism. Directors without ownership in the fund might be less 
active monitors, leading to higher agency costs. In this case, the choice of directors 
in which funds to invest would be based on other considerations and would be un-
correlated. At a director level, funds they invest in would not perform better or 
worse than the funds they do not invest in. 
 
By analysing performance of funds at director level, the study investigates empirically 
which of the two hypotheses explains the phenomenon in practice. At the director 
level, the study finds no relationship between a lack of ownership and underperfor-
mance, which is evidence against the private information mechanism and in support of 
the monitoring mechanism. The non-linearity of the effect at fund level – low owner-
ship funds underperform, but no performance distinction between medium and high 
ownership funds – is also consistent with the monitoring mechanism. Further exploring 
the monitoring mechanism, the study finds that the underperformance of low owner-
ship funds is largest in those cases where monitoring is the most difficult or the most 
important, specifically: 
• Funds with risky investment strategies, as measured by their idiosyncratic volatility.  
• Funds that are very actively managed, as measured by their turnover.  
• Large funds that might suffer from liquidity issues and organisational diseconomies.  
• Funds with less independent boards. 
 
Subsequently, the study investigates the relationship between directors’ ownership 
and the expense ratio, using a multiple regression analysis, in order to determine 
whether or not the relationship between ownership and performance is, in fact, driven 
by fees. They find that higher non-independent director ownership in an individual 
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fund is associated with lower fees, whereas the results for independent director own-
ership in either the fund or family are not statistically significant. A larger board is 
associated with higher fees, whereas the result for the proportion of independent 
directors is not statistically significant.  
Higher turnover is associated with higher fees and larger fund family assets are as-
sociated with lower fees. More assets at the individual fund level are associated with 
higher expenses, but that is not consistently the case across the different model speci-
fications. On the basis of a further analysis of fund performance gross of fees and di-
rector ownership, they find that fees explain only a small part of the net performance 
difference between high and low director ownership funds. Cremer et al. (2009, p. 
1371) conclude that:  
“These results are consistent with the view that directors have roles that ex-
tend beyond negotiating advisory fees with the fund sponsor.” 
Ferris and Yan (2009 and 2007a): Organisational form 
Ferris and Yan (2009) and Ferris and Yan (2007a) analyse the impact of a fund man-
agement company’s organisational form, whether it is publicly or privately owned, on 
the magnitude of the agency conflict between fund investors and the fund manage-
ment company. Their hypothesis is that public funds suffer from greater agency costs 
than private funds, because public fund management companies have a shorter-term 
focus. Whereas public companies are faced with the continuous pressure to produce 
satisfactory results each quarter, private companies are in a position to have a longer-
term horizon, bringing their interests more in line with those of the fund investors. 
Although strictly speaking, a fund management company’s organisational form is not a 
board characteristic, this study is still included in this section, because it uses various 
board characteristics as control variables67.  
The study examines three different measures of agency costs. In addition to fund 
fees and fund performance, it also takes the number of funds acquired by a fund man-
agement company as a measure for agency costs. An acquisition strategy is a way to 
increase fee income for the fund management company, whereas earlier research has 
shown that fund mergers lead to inferior post-merger performance for the acquiring 
fund. The study uses a sample that includes all 750 fund management companies that 
existed at some at some point in time in the 1992–2004 period. They use fee and per-
formance data for that same period. When a fund management company or its parent 
company is publicly traded, the fund family it manages is classified as public.  
Using a family-average and a Fama-McBeth regression model, the study finds that, 
on average, funds of public fund management companies charge higher fees. The dif-
ference is 15.2 basis points, estimated with the family-average model. This dummy 
variable for a public versus a private fund management company is both statistically 
and economically significant. The study also finds that fees are inversely related to 
fund size and performance.  
                                                                
67 The results for these board variables are referred to in the 2009 article, but not tabulated and discussed in 
detail. The details are available in the more extensive working paper by the same authors (Ferris and Yen, 
2007a), which was also used for this summary. 
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The board characteristics data collected concerns the year 2002 and for 448 fund man-
agement companies, this data could be retrieved successfully. The board characteris-
tics included as control variables are board size, the percentage of independent direc-
tors, whether or not the chairman of the board is independent (dummy variable) and 
the average ownership of independent and inside directors (only used for the analysis 
of fund performance). The regression analyses mentioned earlier for the whole period 
are repeated for the 2002-2004 period, with these board characteristics as control 
variables. The conclusion remains that funds of public firms charge higher fees, so this 
is not due to their board structure. The results presented in Ferris and Yan (2007a) 
show that fund fees are positively related to board size (i.e., larger boards are associ-
ated with higher fees). Coefficients are also positive for the percentage of independent 
directors and the independent chairmen dummy; hence, funds with more independent 
boards charge higher fees, however these results are only statistically significant in 
2002, and not in 2003 or 2004. 
For the analysis of the relationship between organisational form and performance, 
three methodologies are used: 
• Comparison of the average return for public and private company funds for each 
investment objective. 
• Regression analysis (Fama-McBeth model) of the objective adjusted returns against 
various fund characteristics. 
• Regression analysis of the risk-adjusted performance (using three different asset 
pricing models, including the Carhart 4-factor model) against various fund charac-
teristics (for equity funds in the sample only). 
 
On the basis of the first methodology, the results are that for 19 of the 22 fund sectors 
analysed, private funds outperform public funds. In 13 cases, the difference is statisti-
cally significant. Controlling for fund size, fund family size, expense ratio, fund age, 
fund load, lagged fund flow and lagged fund return, the multiple regression results are 
in favour of private funds as well. The result of private fund management company 
funds significantly outperforming those of public fund families is robust for adding 
board characteristics (including director ownership) to the analysis for the 2002–2004 
period. Independent, and especially interested, director ownership is positively related 
to fund performance, whereas the other board characteristics are not statistically 
significant.  
The result that private funds outperform public funds is also robust for risk ad-
justment. Using the Carhart 4-factor model, the risk-adjusted outperformance of pri-
vate fund management company equity funds over those of public fund management 
companies, amounts to 4.3 basis points per month. Fund performance is negatively 
related to fund size, but positively related to fund family size and lagged fund returns. 
The latter implies that there is persistence in performance. The results for the other 
control variables are not statistically significant. 
Public fund management companies are more active in acquiring funds than pri-
vate fund families. Public fund management companies acquired almost seven times 
more funds than private fund management companies. This continues to hold, control-
ling for the three board characteristics in the 2002-2004 period. The coefficients for 
these board characteristics, board size, the percentage of independent directors and 
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the independent chairman dummy, are not statistically significant (see Ferris and Yan, 
2007a). 
In the concluding section of their article, Ferris and Yan (2009, p. 626) write:  
“We find that public funds charge higher fees than private funds, even after 
controlling for various fund characteristics and board governance variables. We 
find that public fund families are more likely to pursue fund proliferation strat-
egies that are consistent with revenue rather than performance maximization 
efforts. Finally, we observe that public funds underperform relative to private 
funds. Overall, these findings are consistent with our hypothesis that the agen-
cy conflict is more acute in those mutual funds managed by public fund fami-
lies.” 
Adams, Mansi and Nishikawa (2010): Index funds 
Adams et al. (2010) investigate the relationship between board characteristics and 
costs and performance of index funds. An interesting aspect of index funds is that 
these form a more homogeneous group than actively managed funds. Index funds 
have identical investment strategies and therefore, return differences versus their 
benchmarks are attributable to operational aspects, which in turn are negotiated and 
governed by the funds’ boards. Adams et al. (2010, p. 1262) argue that:  
“…by isolating operational performance from investment performance, index 
funds permit us to minimize measurement error and allow us to effectively ex-
amine the board-performance relation.” 
The sample analysed consists of 148 U.S.-domiciled funds from 78 fund management 
companies, with the analysis covering the 1998–2007 period, leading to 976 fund-year 
observations. The study examines the funds’ expense ratio, return differential (return 
of the fund versus the return of the index) and 1-factor alpha in relationship to board 
structure and director characteristics. The board structure characteristics include 
board size, a unitary board dummy, the percentage of independent directors, a dum-
my indicating whether all directors are independent, a dummy indicating whether the 
chairman is independent and a dummy for whether there is any director on the board 
who is an executive officer of the fund management company (referred to as sponsor 
officer dummy).  
The study also analyses several director attributes: average number of outside di-
rectorships, average age, average tenure, average number of funds overseen, propor-
tion of directors who are retired, average yearly compensation a director receives from 
all funds supervised and percentage of directors who have ownership in funds in the 
family. Control variables include fund management company size, fund size, fund age 
and institutional ownership, as well as several dummy variables for e.g., a fund’s 
benchmark index and for whether or not the fund employs a performance enhance-
ment strategy. The authors use a panel regression methodology with year fixed ef-
fects. They first present the results of the analysis with the board structure characteris-
tics only, and then with board structure characteristics as well as director attributes.  
Larger boards are associated with higher expense ratios and lower performance. In 
the analysis with board structure characteristics only, the study finds that there is a 
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statistically significant positive relationship between board size and expense ratio in all 
model specifications. Consistent with that result, the relationship between board size 
and return differential and alpha is negative and statistically significant. In the analysis 
where director attributes are added, board size is significantly related only to alpha. 
The results for the percentage of independent board members and the independent 
chair dummy are not statistically significant. The coefficient for the unitary board 
dummy is negative and marginally significant for expense ratios, and positive and sig-
nificant for differential returns in the model specification with director attributes. For 
alpha, the result is not statistically significant.  
In the model specification without the director attributes, none of the coefficients 
for unitary board is statistically significant. The dummy for sponsor officer is negative 
for expense ratio and positive for return differential and alpha. The results are statisti-
cally significant in all model specifications. This result suggests that insiders have a 
favourable impact on costs and performance. A fund with an executive officer of the 
sponsor on its board has an expense ratio that is approximately 8 basis points lower, 
compared to the median expense ratio of 40 basis points. Interestingly, the funds with 
only independent board members have lower costs and better performance as well. 
The all-independent director dummy is statistically significant negatively for the ex-
pense ratio and positively for the return differential in all model specifications. The 
coefficient for alpha is consistently positive, but not statistically significant each time. 
From the result that both the sponsor officer dummy and the all-independent dummy 
are associated with lower expenses, Adams et al. (2010, p. 1279) conclude:  
“These mixed results, where less independent boards (those with sponsor offi-
cer representation) and more independent boards (those comprising all inde-
pendent directors) are both associated with improved performance, suggest 
that the optimal board structure varies from fund to fund.” 
For the director attributes, there are few statistically significant results. The number of 
funds per director and the number of outside directorships, as well as average tenure, 
director ownership and unexplained compensation are all statistically insignificant. 
Only the coefficient for retired directors is significant and is positively related to ex-
pense ratios. For this variable, the results for return differential and alpha are inconsis-
tent. Fund size has a negative relationship with expense ratio and a positive relation-
ship with alpha. The coefficients for family size are not statistically significant. Of the 
other control variables, few have statistically significant coefficients. Institutional own-
ership is negatively related to expense ratio and positively related to return differential 
and alpha. Note, however, that this is the result of the fact that fund expenses are 
defined by the authors as the net asset value weighted average of the share class-level 
expenses. This result merely shows that institutional share classes are indeed cheaper, 
reflecting better bargaining power and economies of scale. The results are summarised 
in table 3.6.  
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Table 3.6: Summary of the results of Adams et al. (2010) 1 
Board structure variable Delta Effect on expense 
ratio 
Effect on  
performance2 
Independent directors   - - 
- 100% independent (dummy) -16 – -12bp +14bp 
- Sponsor executive (dummy) -13 – -8bp +11–14bp 
Independent chair (dummy) - - 
Director concentration  Unitary versus clustered board (dummy) -9 – -8bp3 - 
Board size +3 (from median 8) +4–5bp -7 – -6bp 
Unexplained compensation  - - 
Director ownership   - - 
Director tenure  - - 
1. Results that are statistically insignificant or inconsistent are indicated with a dash (-).  
2. Measured as 1-factor alpha.  
3. Marginally significant negative.  
 
Segmenting the sample into funds of private versus public fund management compa-
nies, the study finds that the positive results for smaller boards, boards with executives 
from the sponsor and fully independent boards occur primarily in the sub-sample of 
public firms. From these different results depending on the management companies’ 
organisational form, Adams et al. (2010, p. 1280, 1283) conclude:  
“Public sponsor status is associated with significantly lower differential returns. 
This finding is consistent with the idea that boards have a greater impact on 
operating performance where agency costs are expected to be higher (for pub-
lic sponsors) and less impact on performance where agency costs are lower 
(private sponsors)”. 
3.3.2 Costs and performance of closed-end funds 
This section is dedicated to two studies examining the effectiveness of closed-end fund 
boards, one with a sample of U.S.-domiciled funds (Del Guercio, Dann and Partch, 
2003) and the other with a sample of funds listed in London (Gemmill and Thomas, 
2006). Unlike open-end funds, closed-end funds do not have the continuous obligation 
to redeem or issue shares for cash. Typically, the shares of closed-end funds are listed 
on an exchange so that investors can buy or sell shares on a secondary market. The 
fund can trade at a premium, when the market price is higher than the net asset value, 
or at a discount, when the market price is lower than the net asset value. This possible 
deviation of the market price from the net asset value is an interesting aspect of 
closed-end funds in light of the funds’ governance. The analysis of these funds can 
provide insights that cannot be deduced from the analysis of open-end funds. The two 
studies in this section examine fees and the discount or premium in relationship to 
board characteristics, as well as actions that boards take to restructure funds when it is 
in the interest of shareholders, for example, by means of a liquidation, open-ending or 
the appointment of a different manager. 
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Del Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003): U.S. closed-end funds 
In a sample of closed-end funds, Del Guercio et al. (2003) investigate the relationship 
between board characteristics and shareholder interests, in particular, whether the 
outcome for shareholders is consistent with boards being effective monitors. They use 
three measures of board effectiveness, two under recurring circumstances and the 
third in special situations. The first is the expense ratio for shareholders. This measure 
reflects recurring involvement of the board, overseeing and negotiating with the fund 
management company. The second is the discount level. This measure also reflects 
shareholder interests and potential restructuring decisions by the board, although the 
discount, as such, is not directly controlled by the board. The third concerns decisions 
where funds consider structural changes with significant wealth implications for share-
holders, such open-endings, liquidations, share repurchases and rights offerings.  
The sample consists of all 476 U.S.-domiciled closed-end funds, out of a total of 
507 (94%) in existence in 1996, for which the required data could be retrieved. These 
funds were offered by 105 fund management companies. The number of closed-end 
funds offered by these fund management companies ranges from one to 57 per com-
pany, with many offering open-end funds as well. Three model specifications of a mul-
tiple regression analysis are applied: an individual fund model, a model with fund fam-
ily fixed effects and a family-average model. In addition to board characteristics also 
used in several other studies, such as board size, proportion of independent directors, 
a unitary board dummy and a dummy for the existence of a nominating committee, 
the model includes the following board characteristics:  
• Capitalised director compensation. For each director, the present value of the total 
annual director’s fee is calculated over his expected tenure. The expected tenure is 
until age 72 (the median retirement age for directors) or, if already 72, until the 
end of the current term on the board. The value for the board as a whole is the 
median of the values of the directors on the board. These anticipated director fees 
are a measure of how much value the directors have to lose and therefore, of their 
incentive to act in the interest of the fund management company, rather than in 
the interest of the shareholders.  
• Proportion of independent directors who have been on the board since the fund’s 
inception. Since the fund management company appoints these directors, they 
might be less independent from the fund management company. 
• Dummy variable for whether the fund has a staggered election of directors68 in its 
bylaws. This is seen as an anti-takeover measure because this potentially hampers 
outsiders from taking control of the fund.  
• Dummy variable for whether the fund has some form of an open-ending provision 
in its bylaws, e.g., on a certain date or conditional on the discount. 
• Proportion of common shares held by insiders and outside blockholders, since such 
shareholders can potentially influence the fund’s governance. The influence of 
blockholders on the market price of the fund is not obvious up front and depends 
on the type of investor and his motive. When directors of the fund management 
company, the fund management company itself or long-term investors friendly to 
                                                                
68 In the case of a staggered election, only a portion of the board members is elected in a given year. This 
prevents outsiders from replacing a majority of board members in one election.  
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existing management have a substantial stake in the fund that might align the in-
terests of other shareholders and the fund management company, leading to a 
smaller discount. However, a blockholding by these parties might be put in place to 
make sure that the fund management company can continue its mandate and thus 
form a hurdle for restructuring initiatives, leading to a bigger discount. When short-
term arbitrageurs hold a significant block, the prospect of a restructuring might lim-
it the discount at which the fund trades. 
 
The study finds a statistically significant positive relationship between board size and 
expense ratio in two of the three model specifications, individual funds and family-
average, but not in the fixed effects model. This finding suggests that the relationship 
is due more to variation across fund families than within them. There is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
expense ratio in two of the model specifications. The coefficients for the nominating 
committee dummy are not statistically significant, which also holds when that commit-
tee consists of independent directors only.  
Higher director compensation is associated with higher expense ratios in a statisti-
cally significant manner in two of the model specifications. This result holds when 
different measures of compensation are used, such as unexplained compensation 
calculated following Tufano and Sevick (1997). This result is consistent with the notion 
that higher compensation implies less independence and less alignment between the 
interests of independent directors and investors.  
A higher proportion of independent directors who have been on the board since 
the fund’s inception is associated with a lower expense ratio. This association is statis-
tically significant in both the individual funds model and fixed effects model. This result 
is not in line with the hypothesis that the directors appointed by the fund management 
company do not act independently, but is rather a sign that long-standing directors are 
valuable to investors.  
The results for a unitary board are inconsistent. The results for insider and block-
holder ownership are not statistically significant in most model specifications. An 
open-ending provision is associated with lower expenses in a statistically significant 
manner in two of the three model specifications.  
Control variables included are fund size, fund complex size and fund age, as well as 
dummies for the different investment objectives. There is a significant negative rela-
tionship between costs and size, both at the level of the fund and the fund complex, 
consistent with the existence of economies of scale.  
The results for the relationship between board characteristics and fund premium 
are weaker. The average premium in the sample is -7.0%. There is no statistically sig-
nificant relationship between the proportion of independent directors or insider and 
blockholder ownership and the fund’s premium. The coefficient for capitalised director 
compensation is also not statistically significant. However, the authors note that for 
some alternative measures for compensation, a statistically negative relationship with 
the fund premium is found.  
The study finds few statistically significant relationships between other board char-
acteristics and the fund premium with the following exceptions: there is a significant 
negative relation between board size and fund premium, and a significant positive 
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relationship between the presence of a nominating committee and the fund premium, 
but not in all model specifications. Furthermore, staggered boards are positively re-
lated to fund premium in a statistically significant manner in all model specifications. 
This finding contradicts the expected outcome that staggered boards are a blocking 
force to value-increasing restructuring, leading to a bigger discount. 
Subsequently, Del Guercio et al. (2003) analyse board characteristics in relation-
ship fund restructurings by means of open-ending or liquidation, repurchases of shares 
and rights offerings for new equity. Such proposals must be considered by the board 
and recommended to shareholders. The sample consists of 125 such events in the 
1996-1999 period. They argue that these actions are related to the discount of the 
fund, and that if boards do not act in the face of a large discount, they are less effec-
tive for shareholders. Decisions are classified as follows (the number of events of each 
type in the sample is listed between brackets):  
• Favourable to shareholders. Funds that open-end or liquidate (25) and share repur-
chases (45).  
• Unfavourable to shareholders. Funds that reject a proposal to open-end or liqui-
date (17) and rights offerings69 (38). 
 
In this sample, as expected, share repurchases and restructurings are more likely to 
occur following a period of large discounts, while rights offerings occur when there is a 
premium. With regard to board characteristics, the study finds that larger boards are 
significantly more likely to make decisions that are unfavourable to shareholders, in-
cluding recommending against a fund restructuring and approving a rights offering. 
Boards with a higher percentage of independents are more likely to make decisions 
that are favourable to shareholders, including not pursuing a rights offering and au-
thorising a share repurchase or fund restructuring. Staggered boards are significantly 
less likely to make decisions that are favourable to shareholders. The measure for 
capitalised director compensation is not related to the likelihood of the events men-
tioned.  
Gemmill and Thomas (2006): U.K. closed-end funds 
Gemmill and Thomas (2006) investigate board characteristics and blockholdings of 
shareholders in relationship to fund costs and the discount or premium on closed-end 
funds in the U.K. At the end of 1996, 331 closed-end equity funds traded on the Lon-
don Stock Exchange. These funds were managed by 90 different fund managers, with 
each managing between one and 22 funds. The funds were invested in different sec-
tors, such as U.K equity, but also, for example, in emerging markets and venture capi-
tal. The sample consisted of the 246 funds for which all required data was available 
and that had assets under management in excess of GBP 30 million. Expenses are 
measured for the year 1996, governance variables at the end of 1996 and fund returns 
for the period 1995-1998.  
The authors calculate both the net asset value return and the share price return of 
these funds and find a direct link between fund expenses and returns. A one-
                                                                
69 Rights offerings are assumed to be unfavourable for shareholders, because funds issue rights when they 
are selling at a premium and the premium declines after (the announcement of) the rights offering.  
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percentage point increase in expenses is associated with a 0.50% lower net asset value 
return and a 0.63% lower share price return. Subsequently, they analyse the relation-
ship between governance characteristics and the expense ratio, using a multiple re-
gression analysis. Among the board characteristics included are two measures for 
board independence: the board-insider index and the board-outsider index. The board-
insider index is calculated as the average number of other boards within the fund fam-
ily on which the fund directors sit. The authors argue that when this index is high, the 
directors could become too closely related to the fund management group. They might 
not be so critical because of the risk of losing several directorships. The board-outsider 
index is calculated as the average number of fund directorships held by members of a 
board that are outside the fund family. Outside directorships could provide outside 
influence, which might provide a downward pressure on fees. Also the board size, the 
percentage ownership by the manager, the notice period for the manager and the 
number of board members of the fund management company are included as govern-
ance variables. Control variables taken into account are fund size, fund age and a fund 
sector dummy.  
The study finds that larger boards, boards with a lower board-outsider index and 
boards with a higher board-insider index are associated with higher expense ratios. 
Funds with more manager ownership have lower expense ratios. The results are statis-
tically, as well as economically, significant. If one is added to a median board of five 
directors, the expense ratio rises by 4.3 basis points from the median of 1.09%. A 
change to the board-outsider index from zero to one is associated with a 10% increase 
in fees, while the same increase to the board-insider index is associated with a 10% 
reduction in fees. An increase in manager ownership from zero to 10% coincides with 
an 8% reduction in fees. Older funds and larger funds have lower expense ratios, con-
sistent with new funds being launched with a higher fee level and with economies of 
scale. The results for the notice period and the number of board members from the 
management company are not statistically significant.  
A similar approach is followed to investigate the relationship between governance 
characteristics and the funds’ discount or premium, which was -12.8% on average in 
the 1995–1998 period. Of the governance variables, the total blockholding in the fund 
replaces the number of board members from the management company. Control vari-
ables included are fund age, expense ratio, past performance and sentiment. The latter 
is measured as retail flows into open-end funds of the same fund sector. The results 
for the various board characteristics and for the notice period, age, expense ratio and 
past performance are not statistically significant. The coefficient for fund manager 
ownership is statistically significantly negative. Higher retail flows to the fund sector 
and lower blockholdings by outsiders have a statistically significant positive relation-
ship with the premium. Contrary to the findings of Del Guercio et al. (2003), this indi-
cates that the market sees block holders as a negative factor supporting incumbent 
management, rather than as a force enabling value-increasing restructurings.  
3.3.3 Other empirical studies into board characteristics 
This section summarises the results of other empirical studies analysing board charac-
teristics. The study of Ding and Wermers (2005) is an analysis of the relationship be-
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tween board characteristics and the replacement of portfolio managers. Wellman and 
Zhou (2007) analyse performance and governance, using the Morningstar stewardship 
grades. Chou et al. (2007) analyse the relationship between the quality of governance 
of the funds and that of the companies in which they invest. Qian (2011) investigates 
the effectiveness of monitoring by investors voting with their feet and monitoring by 
the board, in relationship to late trading and market timing. Khorana, Tufano and 
Wedge (2007) study fund mergers in relationship to board characteristics. 
Ding and Wermers (2005): Manager replacement 
Ding and Wermers (2005) analyse the relationship between the governance structure 
and the performance of U.S. open-end, domestic equity funds. They analyse whether 
the portfolio manager’s experience and track record predict future fund performance. 
In addition, they investigate whether the structure of the fund board of directors im-
pacts performance, both in business-as-usual circumstances and when replacing un-
derperforming managers. To answer these questions, they follow portfolio managers’ 
entire careers and examine stockholdings and net returns.  
The fund performance database covers the 1985-2002 period and includes a man-
ager’s name, start and end date of each fund managed in his career, age and CFA des-
ignation70. This data is combined with data regarding fund stockholdings in order to 
assess other manager characteristics, such as the stock picking track record on all 
funds managed over an entire career. The sample includes the fund categories Aggres-
sive Growth, Growth and Growth & Income or Income. In order to assess the inde-
pendence of the board, the above data was combined with data regarding fund boards 
for each fund during the fiscal year 2002–2003, including name, affiliation and com-
pensation of each fund director. 
In a multiple regression analysis, controlling for investment style and size, the au-
thors find that for growth funds, the following year’s performance is negatively related 
to managerial experience, but positively related to the stock picking track record. For 
larger funds, however, they find that there is a positive relationship between experi-
ence and performance and a negative relationship between track record and perform-
ance. Ding and Wermers (2005, p. 3–4) explain these relationships as follows:  
“…experience is a positive influence only for managers who are promoted to 
larger funds; those who are not promoted appear to have no particular stock-
picking skills—indicating, in turn, evidence of entrenchment of these managers 
in smaller funds. The opposite result holds for managers of large funds with 
good track records—the track record of these managers has a negative influ-
ence on future performance, indicating that they find it difficult to match their 
past performance when they are promoted to a larger fund”. 
To analyse the relationship between board characteristics and net return, a regression 
analysis is performed using data for 2002. They find that larger boards are associated 
with significantly higher net returns. Adding one board member to a board of nine 
would result in an approximate 0.3 percentage point increase in the annual net return. 
                                                                
70 The Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation is a qualification offered by the CFA Institute to finance 
and investment professionals who complete a series of three examinations.  
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The relationship with the percentage of independent directors is not statistically sig-
nificant. Performance is associated negatively with fund size, but positively with the 
previous year’s performance, both in a statistically significant manner. With regard to 
manager replacement, Ding and Wermers (2005, p. 21) state: 
“Although a manager replacement decision is made by the fund management 
company, board of directors may exert direct influence to the fund manage-
ment company in regard to the decision of retaining and hiring fund managers. 
For example, when a fund underperforms relative to market or peer funds, 
board directors may directly show dissatisfaction with the fund management 
company, and pressure the company to replace the incumbent manager with a 
new manager having a better track record. We expect to see that funds with 
more effective boards are more likely to replace underperforming managers 
and are associated with better fund performance.” 
The empirical results indicate that managers are replaced by managers with a better 
track record and that these skills persist. Larger boards and boards with more outside 
directors are more likely to replace managers with poor performance. No relationship 
is found between director compensation and the replacement of managers. 
Wellman and Zhou (2007): Stewardship 
Wellman and Zhou (2007) investigate the relationship between fund governance and 
fund performance, using the Morningstar stewardship grades released in August 2004. 
In this first release, Morningstar rated 653 funds on the U.S. market and prioritised 
larger funds. The study investigates the 367 U.S. domestic, diversified equity funds and 
excludes money market, bond, sector and international funds. The average fund size in 
the sample is US$ 4.0 billion of assets under management, which would rank number 
140 out of the 7,857 equity funds available on the U.S. market as per December 2003. 
Out of the 367 funds in the sample, 210 received grades of either A or B, considered as 
good for this study, and 64 funds received grades of either D or F, considered as bad. 
The remaining 93 received a grade of C, which can be interpreted as average. 
The study analyses the risk-adjusted performance of these funds graded by Morn-
ingstar, using the Carhart 4-factor model, both in the period before the release of the 
grades and thereafter. The reason for analysing both of these periods is the following: 
since the overall grade includes subjective elements, in particular, the rating for Board 
Quality, Manager Incentives and Corporate Culture, the grade given by Morningstar in 
August 2004 could be biased, awarding good performance in the period up to the rat-
ing moment and punishing bad performance. The study shows that funds receiving 
good grades outperformed funds with bad grades in a statistically significant manner, 
both in the period before, and in the period after, the release of the grades. Good 
funds outperformed bad funds by, on average, 23 basis points per month in the period 
before the release of the stewardship grades and by, on average, 10 basis points in the 
period thereafter. With an annualised difference of 1.2% (ex post) to 2.8% (ex ante), 
these results seem to indicate that fund governance has a highly economically signifi-
cant impact on performance. 
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Morningstar uses five variables to compute the stewardship grades: Regulatory Issues, 
Board Quality, Manager Incentives, Fees and Corporate Culture71. The measures for 
Board Quality and Fees have the most explanatory power for the funds’ 4-factor alpha. 
Constructing a grade out of just these two measures would have similar explanatory 
power as the overall stewardship grade, while the measures for Regulatory Issues, 
Manager Incentives and Corporate Culture do not add explanatory power. Daily fund 
flows in the period from the release of the grades on 24 August to 30 September 2004 
indicate that investors appear to trade on this new information, awarding good stew-
ardship and punishing poor stewardship. Investors apparently use the stewardship 
grades as a valuable source of fund information.  
Chou, Ng and Wang (2007): Fund governance and corporate governance 
Chou et al. (2007) examine the relationship between the quality of fund governance, 
using the Morningstar stewardship grade as proxy, and the quality of the corporate 
governance of the companies in which they invest, using the governance index (G-
index) of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and the Bebchuk E-index 
as proxies. The study also examines the proxy voting behaviour of funds. Since 31 Au-
gust 2003, the SEC requires mutual funds in the U.S. to disclose their proxy voting 
policies and procedures, as well as actual voting behaviour. Chou et al. (2007, p. 2) 
state:  
“The importance of proxy voting disclosure by mutual funds is to ensure that 
their fiduciary obligations are performed in the best interests of their share-
holders. Hence how mutual funds vote is particularly important, as their voting 
decisions can facilitate effective monitoring of corporate activities, thereby 
supporting shareholder activism.” 
The sample consists of 1,137 mutual funds that have both a Morningstar stewardship 
grade and portfolios consisting of stocks that are rated for corporate governance. Ana-
lysing data for 2004, the authors find that the average G and E-indices do not differ 
significantly for funds with different Morningstar stewardship grades. Since their re-
gression analysis also shows that a large majority of fund portfolios, regardless of their 
stewardship grade, do not have an overexposure to firms with either a good or poor 
governance index, it is surprising that the authors state in their concluding remarks 
that funds with good governance tilt their portfolios to companies with better corpo-
rate governance. This conclusion does not seem to be supported by the data pre-
sented. 
On the basis of the ISS Proxy Voting Analytics database, the authors analyse the 
proxy voting behaviour of the same sample of mutual funds in 2004. The 1,137 funds 
with Morningstar stewardship grades form only a subset of the total market, and only 
a part of these funds could be matched to the voting data. In order to increase the 
sample size, the family average stewardship grade of all rated funds in each fund fam-
ily is determined and assigned to all non-rated funds in the same family. With this 
approach, 58 fund families can be included in the sample. The analysis concerns 54 
corporate proposals, of which 32 are initiated by management and 22 by shareholders. 
                                                                
71 See section 3.2.3.  
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The proposals are divided into two groups: monitoring (consisting of the categories 
anti-takeover, board quality and director election) and incentives-related proposals 
(consisting of the categories executive incentive, employee incentive and director 
incentive). The funds’ voting behaviour is investigated within each group, in particular, 
whether the funds vote in line with management and/or with ISS recommendations. 
With regard to ISS recommendations, Chou et al. (2007, p. 21) state:  
“One of ISS’s commitments is to make recommendations for the benefits of 
their institutional clients, and hence their recommendations ought to be 
viewed as consistent with increasing shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, voting 
against ISS ’negative’ recommendations would imply that mutual funds place 
little or no emphasis on the governance issues of corporations whose stock 
they own.” 
The main conclusions of the study are that with monitoring-related proposals put for-
ward by either management or shareholders, funds with good governance (Morning-
star stewardship grade A or B) vote significantly less often with management, thereby 
following ISS’s negative recommendations, than funds with poor governance (grades D 
or F). With incentives-related proposals, there is no statistically significant different 
voting behaviour between well-governed and poorly-governed funds in situations 
where the ISS recommendation is not in line with management. Exceptions are pro-
posals in the Employee Incentives category, where funds with poor stewardship grades 
actually vote less often with management than funds with good grades. With a regres-
sion analysis, the study finds that funds with bad governance vote more in line with 
management than funds with good governance, which is supportive of the hypothesis 
that funds with good governance pay more attention to their shareholders rights and 
monitoring role. 
Qian (2011): Investor vigilance 
In the context of the late trading and market timing issues in the U.S. in 2003, Qian 
(2011) examines whether investors withdrawing or adding assets to a fund, in this 
study referred to as investor vigilance, is an effective monitoring mechanism. She ar-
gues that fund investors are heterogeneous in their vigilance and that different funds 
attract a different clientele. Funds with more vigilant investors have a strong positive 
performance-flow relationship or flow sensitivity, whereas for other funds, this rela-
tionship is weak or even negative. Flow sensitivity is estimated as the time-series re-
gression coefficients between flows and past performance, whereby flows in the fund 
industry as a whole and in the particular fund sector, are controlled for. The hypothesis 
is that a fund’s flow sensitivity influences its actions. Three variables are used as meas-
ures for such fund actions:  
• The amount of stale pricing72 as a proxy for whether there are arbitrage possibili-
ties. Funds can adopt fair-value-pricing methods to reduce the staleness of their 
NAVs and avoid the risk of arbitragers taking advantage.  
                                                                
72 A stale price is a NAV that does not reflect the most recent information, i.e., a current value of the under-
lying securities. Arbitragers can benefit from this discrepancy at the expense of the long-term shareholders 
in the fund. 
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• The scale of actual arbitrage activities, which is measured as the volatility of ab-
normal fund flows. These are the flows unrelated to past performance, industry-
wide flows, style-wide flows and fund-specific long-term flows.  
• Whether or not a fund is indicted for late trading or market timing.  
 
A multiple regression analysis is used to analyse the relationships between these 
measures for fiduciary failure and flow sensitivity. Several board variables, such as a 
unitary board dummy, board size, board independence (both a dummy for the chair 
position and the percentage of independent directors), gray ratio73 and board com-
pensation are taken into account. The ownership of the firm is captured with a dummy 
variable for whether or not the fund management company is a subsidiary of a large 
financial service group. Furthermore, there are control variables for the fund manage-
ment company’s charge record with the SEC and the fund family’s size and age. Finally, 
there are control variables for fund characteristics, such as size, age and fee level.  
The sample consists of 3,717 funds from 92 fund families in the U.S., of which 25 
families were implicated in the scandal and 269 specific funds have been accused of 
allowing market timing or late trading. The analyses were performed for the January 
2001-August 2003 period in which the abuses took place. The flow sensitivity of a fund 
is estimated in the prior three years. Some funds could not be included in the analysis 
because of specific missing data or because the funds were not active throughout the 
6-year period.  
The study finds that funds’ flow sensitivity to performance is persistent over time, 
which is consistent with funds having different clienteles with differing levels of vigi-
lance. Flow sensitivity is negatively related in a statistically significant manner to:  
• Stale pricing, which measures arbitrage potential. 
• Abnormal flows, which measures actual arbitrage. 
• Involvement in the late trading and market timing scandals. 
 
Funds with a negative flow sensitivity were 13% to 20% more likely to be involved in 
the scandals than funds with a positive flow sensitivity. Analysing board composition, 
structure and compensation, the study indicates that unitary boards are less likely to 
be indicted. The relationship of unitary boards with stale pricing and abnormal flows is 
not statistically significant. There is no indication that larger, less independent or gray-
er boards are less likely to be involved in scandals. In fact, the relationship between 
board independence and involvement in the scandals is positive. Funds with board 
members who are excessively compensated are more likely to be indicted, while funds 
with boards invested in the funds they oversee are less likely to be indicted. Financial 
conglomerate subsidiaries are also less likely to be involved in the scandal. Overall, the 
results suggest that the possibility for investors to vote with their feet is an effective 
monitoring mechanism. For funds with low or negative flow sensitivity, other mecha-
nisms, such as the governance exercised by the board, are more important.  
                                                                 
73 A board member is classified as gray when he is independent according to the SEC definition, but was 
associated with the fund management company in the past or is currently on the board of an affiliated firm.  
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Khorana, Tufano and Wedge (2007): Fund mergers 
Khorana et al. (2007) investigate board characteristics in relationship to fund mergers. 
They make the distinction between in-family mergers and across-family mergers, fo-
cusing on the latter. Whereas in-family mergers typically reflect an optimisation of the 
fund management company’s product range, and involve at least partly overlapping 
boards, across-family mergers have more far-reaching consequences. Such mergers 
tend to be value-enhancing for target fund shareholders, but are costly for the target 
fund directors, who lose their board seats and the associated compensation. Given this 
conflict of interest, Khorana et al. (2007) investigate whether boards with certain char-
acteristics take action more promptly. The authors recognise that, in addition to reme-
dying the underperformance of the target fund, across-family mergers can also be 
motivated by other considerations, such as optimising the product range and increas-
ing economies of scale. 
The sample studied consists of 470 in-family and 199 across-family mergers of 
U.S.-domiciled funds in the 1999–2001 period. Board data is available for 614 of the 
669 funds. The data from this sample confirms that independent board members of 
target funds typically lose compensation and board seats. With 54% of the across-
family mergers, none of the target fund’s independent directors serve on the board of 
any fund in either of the two fund families involved after the merger. This finding indi-
cates that it is clearly not in their personal interests to initiate or approve such merg-
ers. Target funds underperform in the period before the merger. Mergers lead to sub-
stantial improvements in performance, both measured on the basis of the objective-
adjusted returns and the CAPM alpha. After the merger, the performance matches the 
median performance of funds with the same investment objective. The expenses for 
the target fund shareholders also decline after the merger. 
The study estimates the probability of a merger as a function of fund characteris-
tics (performance, fund size, objective adjusted asset flows, objective adjusted ex-
pense ratio, fund age), fund family characteristics (fund family size and number of 
objectives covered by funds in the family) and board characteristics (board size, pro-
portion of independent directors, independent chair dummy, board compensation, 
number of outside directorships, board industry expertise, presence of retirement 
benefits and deferred compensation plans and director age). Mergers are more likely 
when the target fund’s performance is poor, the fund is small and young, and its costs 
are high. For fund size and costs, the higher likelihood of mergers is attributable to in-
family mergers. For fund age, it is statistically significant only for across-family merg-
ers. Families active in more investment objectives are more likely to implement in-
family mergers. The proportion of independent board members on the target fund has 
a statistically significant positive impact on the likelihood of an across-family merger. 
Fund boards that are fully independent seem to tolerate less underperformance be-
fore initiating a merger. For in-family mergers, the relationship for the proportion of 
independence board members is not statistically significant. For the independent chair 
dummy, none of the results is statistically significant, neither for in-family nor for 
across-family mergers. There is an inverse relationship between director compensation 
and the likelihood of an across-family merger. The results for the other board charac-
teristics are not statistically significant. 
E A R L I E R  E M P I R I C A L  R E S E A R C H  
 129 
3.4 Summary and conclusions 
Section 3.3 reviewed earlier empirical studies one by one. This section analyses the 
results of those studies in combination. In order to consider the consistency of the 
results, the analysis will be done by board characteristic and control variable. Thereaf-
ter, the consequences of a number of methodological issues that are inherent to this 
type of study will be addressed. Table 3.7 shows the main results of the empirical stud-
ies analysing the relationship between board characteristics and fund fees and per-
formance of open-end funds.  
Board independence 
With regard to the relationship between board independence – measured either as 
the proportion of independent directors or as a dummy variable for the chair position 
– and fees and performance, there is little consistency across the various studies. Tu-
fano and Sevick (1997) find that funds with a larger proportion of independent direc-
tors charge lower fees, but do not include the chair position in the analysis. The study 
investigates only costs in relationship to board characteristics, not perform-
ance. Meschke (2007) does not find a statistically significant relationship for the per-
centage of independent board members and fees for the entire period analysed 
(1995–2004); however, he does find that a higher percentage of independents is asso-
ciated with higher fees in the first and second part of the period analysed, but with 
lower fees in the third part of the period. Chair independence is associated with lower 
fees for the entire period. Surprisingly, Meschke (2007) finds that both measures of 
board independence are associated with lower performance. Ferris and Yan (2007b) 
find a statistically significant positive relationship between the percentage of inde-
pendents and fees, but only in the individual fund model specification, which implies 
that the significance might be overstated. Inconsistent and insignificant results are 
found with the other model specifications. For the percentage of independents and 
performance, the relationship is not statistically significant. For the chair position, 
none of the relationships is statistically significant. Kong and Tang (2008) find that a 
higher percentage of independence is related to higher fees and lower performance. 
Their results for the chair position are not statistically significant. Cremers et al. (2009) 
find no statistically significant relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and fees or performance. They do not include the chair position as a variable 
in their analysis. Ding and Wermers (2005) analyse fund performance, not costs, and 
find no statistically significant relationship with the percentage of independent direc-
tors.  
Analysing index funds, Adams et al. (2010) do not find a statistically significant re-
lationship for the percentage of independent board members and the chair position 
with fees or performance. They also include dummy variables for whether all directors 
are independent and for whether there is a sponsor executive on the board. Interest-
ingly, both of these variables seem to be negatively associated with fees and positively 
associated with performance. This finding suggests that insiders have a favourable 
impact on costs and performance, but also that boards with independents only are 
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associated with lower fees and better performance74. Analysing closed-end funds, 
Gemmill and Thomas (2006) find that boards with less outside influence are associated 
with higher costs, but they do not find a statistically significant relationship with the 
price discount or premium. Del Guercio et al. (2003) find that boards with a higher 
percentage of independent directors have lower costs and are more likely to approve a 
share repurchase programme when discounts are large. 
 
Other noteworthy empirical results for board independence are: 
• Qian (2011), Meschke (2007) and Ferris and Yan (2007b) find no evidence that 
boards with a higher percentage of independent directors or independent chairs 
are less likely to be involved in litigation for late trading or market timing. 
• Ding and Wermers (2005) find that boards with more outside directors are more 
likely to replace managers with poor performance, which has a positive effect on 
subsequent returns. 
• Khorana et al. (2007) find that boards with a higher proportion of independent 
directors tolerate less underperformance before engaging in across-family mergers, 
relative to other funds with the same investment objective. They are more likely to 
act and to act more quickly. 
 
An inherent weakness in all of the studies above is that independence is defined in a 
legal manner, on the basis of the existing regulations. More relevant for investors than 
this regulatory distinction between independent and dependent directors might be 
whether or not directors act independently. Unfortunately, an independent attitude is 
impossible to observe from the outside, which in reality, might drive differences in 
costs and performance.  
Span of control 
Most studies use span of control type variables in their regression analyses, such as 
board size (i.e., with how many directors responsibility is shared), board concentration 
(whether there is a unitary board overseeing all funds or a clustered board overseeing 
only part of the range) and the number of funds overseen (a high number of funds 
might lead to directors being too busy). 
The results for board size and board concentration are relatively consistent across 
the various studies. Kong and Tang (2008) and Adams et al. (2010) find that larger 
boards are associated with higher costs and lower performance. Tufano and Sevick 
(1997) and Cremers et al. (2009) find the same relationship for board size and costs, 
but do not investigate board size and performance. Ferris and Yan (2007b) find a posi-
tive relationship for board size and costs, but the result for performance is not statisti-
cally significant. Meschke (2007) does not find statistically significant results for board 
size and costs or performance.  
 
                                                                
74 Note that there is also a category of non-independent directors who are not officers of the fund manage-
ment company.  
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Table 3.7: Main results of earlier empirical studies analysing open-end funds1 
Study Tufano-
Sevick 
(1997) 
Meschke 
(2007) 
Ferris-Yan 
(2007a, 2007b, 
2009) 
Kong-Tang 
(2008) 
Cremers  
et al.  
(2009) 
Adams  
et al.  
(2010) 
Dependent variable Fees2 Fees2 Perf. Fees Perf. Fees Perf. Fees Perf. 9 Fees Perf. 
Sample            
Market U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
Selection 50 largest 
sponsors
91  
sponsors 
(random 
selection) 
448  
fund  
families7 
Funds with 
Morningstar 
Stewardship 
Grade 
Equity funds 
of 25 largest 
families 
Index  
funds 
Period 1992 1995-2004 2002 2003 2002-2004 1998-2007 
Number of funds 1,430 >2,2004 6,228 969 13410 148 
Governance variables            
Independent directors (%) 
- 100% independent (dummy) 
- sponsor executive (dummy) 
- 05 - 0 0 + - 0 0 
 
0 
- 
- 
0 
+/03 
+ 
Independent chair NA - - 0 0 0 0 NA NA 0 0 
Board size + 0 0 + 0 + - + NA +/03 - 
Director concentration - NA NA NA NA - 0 NA NA 0 0 
Unexplained compensation + + - +/03 0 NA NA NA NA 0 0 
Number of funds overseen NA NA NA +/03 0 NA NA NA NA 0 0 
Average tenure NA - 0 +/03 0 NA NA NA NA 0 0 
Fund ownership 
- Independent directors 
- Dependent directors 
NA  
- 
NA 
 
0 
NA 
 
0 
NA 
 
0 
NA 
 
- 
NA 
 
08 
NA 
 
0 
- 
 
+ 
+ 
0 0 
Control variables            
Fund size - - +/-6 - +/03 - - 0 NA - + 
Sponsor size 0/-3 - NA - 0 - - - NA 0 0 
Fund age + - - - 0 0 0 NA NA 0 0 
Past performance 0 + NA - + 0 0 NA NA NA NA 
1. Only statistically significant results (confidence level at least 5%) are shown as + or -. Results that are not 
statistically significant or inconsistent are shown as 0. NA (Not Applicable) is shown if a variable was not 
included as a variable in the particular study. 
In the Fees columns, the results are shown for the expense ratio, unless mentioned otherwise. In the Perf. 
columns, performance is shown using a risk-adjusted performance measure.  
2. Concerns Total Fees, including amortised front-end and back-end loads. 
3. Not statistically significant in all model specifications. 
4. 400 investment companies were randomly selected from 91 sponsors. The number of funds in the sample 
is not mentioned, but estimated on the basis of the number of fund years in the study (21,944) and the 10-
year period covered. 
5. Not statistically significant for the whole period, but positive for the periods 1995–1998 and 1999–2001 
and negative for the period 2002–2004. 
6. Hump-shaped relationship, meaning that after an initial positive relationship, the relationship becomes 
negative.  
7. All fund families out of a total of 531 for which board characteristics could be obtained. 
8. Measures ownership in fund family funds relative to director compensation. 
9. Not based on a multiple regression type analysis. 
10. 134 actively managed equity funds belonging to the top 25 equity mutual fund families in January 1996, 
which could be matched to governance data. 
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For closed-end funds in the U.K., Gemmill and Thomas (2006) also find that larger 
boards go hand-in-hand with higher costs. For U.S closed-end funds, Del Guercio et al. 
(2003) find that larger boards are associated with both higher costs and bigger dis-
counts from net asset value. The same study finds that larger boards are significantly 
more likely to make decisions that are not favourable to shareholders, such as recom-
mending against open-ending or liquidation. The only contradictory result is that of 
Ding and Wermers (2005), who find that funds with larger boards perform better. 
Furthermore, they find that larger boards are less tolerant of poor performance and 
are more likely to replace poor performing managers, which is good for subsequent 
performance. Overall, these results seem to indicate that larger boards are weaker 
monitors and suffer from less effective decision-making, possibly due to an increased 
risk of free riding.  
With regard to board concentration, Tufano and Sevick (1997) find that more con-
centration is associated with lower fees. Several other studies use a dummy variable to 
distinguish between unitary (100% concentration) and clustered boards (less than 
100% concentration). Kong and Tang (2008) find that unitary boards charge lower fees, 
but the result for performance is not statistically significant. Adams et al. (2010) find 
for index funds in some model specifications that unitary boards are associated with 
lower fees and higher performance, but this finding is not consistent across all model 
specifications. The results of Del Guercio et al. (2003) for unitary boards in a sample of 
U.S. closed-end funds are also inconsistent. Kong and Tang (2008) find that unitary 
boards are more effective in setting fee break-points, score better on Regulatory Issues 
and Corporate Culture (components of Morningstar stewardship grade) and are less 
likely to be indicted for late trading and/or market timing. The latter is consistent with 
Qian (2011). Although the results are not overwhelmingly convincing, unitary boards 
seem to be better for fund investors than less concentrated boards. 
Where included, the coefficients for the number of funds overseen are generally 
not statistically significant, either for costs or performance. However, Ferris and Yan 
(2007b) find a statistically significant positive relationship between the number of 
funds overseen by independent directors and costs in some of their model specifica-
tions. In the same study, this variable is also positively associated with the likelihood of 
being indicted for late trading and/or market timing. 
Compensation and ownership 
The various studies that include measures for director compensation and director 
ownership generally find that a higher investment by directors in the funds overseen is 
a positive factor for investors and that higher compensation is a negative factor.  
Tufano and Sevick (1997) pay significant attention to defining relative compensa-
tion in relationship to the number of funds and assets under management overseen. 
Their measure for unexplained compensation is also used by Meschke (2007) and Fer-
ris and Yan (2007b). These three studies all find that greater unexplained compensa-
tion is associated with higher costs, although in the case of Ferris and Yan (2007b), the 
relationship is not statistically significant in all model specifications. Meschke (2007) 
finds that higher unexplained compensation is associated with lower performance, but 
in the case of Ferris and Yan (2007b), that relationship is not statistically significant. 
Meschke (2007), Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Qian (2011) all find that higher relative 
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compensation is associated with a higher likelihood of being charged in the late trading 
and market timing scandal. Khorana et al. (2007) show that in across-family mergers, 
target fund directors are more likely to lose their seat and compensation and that 
when target fund directors have a higher compensation, across-family mergers are less 
likely. For U.S. closed-end funds, Del Guercio et al. (2003) find a positive relation be-
tween director compensation and fund expense ratio. However, for board decisions 
regarding restructurings, their results are mixed.  
For U.S mutual funds, data on director ownership is only available as of 2002. Dif-
ferent studies use different measures for director ownership and come to different 
results. Meschke (2007) finds that funds charge lower fees when a larger fraction of 
independent directors hold at least US$ 100,000 in the funds they oversee. For per-
formance, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Ferris and Yan (2007b) find that 
the percentage of independent directors not invested in the fund has no statistically 
significant relationship with costs in practically all model specifications and with vari-
ous cost definitions. For performance, the coefficient is also not statistically significant.  
Ferris and Yan (2009) find that the average equity ownership in the funds of inde-
pendent and especially interested directors is positively related to fund performance. 
They do not investigate the relationship to fees. Cremers et al. (2009) analyse average 
fund family and individual fund ownership by independent directors, as well as the 
average individual fund ownership by non-independent directors in relationship to 
fees and performance. They find that all these variables are positively related to per-
formance. The average ownership in individual fund shares by non-independent direc-
tors has a statistically negative relationship to fees.  
In order to measure the relative size of the director investment, Kong and Tang 
(2008) use the percentage of independent directors whose investment in the fund 
complex is greater than his compensation for serving as a director, or US$ 100,000, 
whichever is smaller. This variable has a statistically significant negative relationship 
with fees, but the relationship with performance is not statistically significant. For a 
sample of index funds, Adams et al. (2010) analyse the percentage of directors who 
have ownership in funds in the fund family and find no statistically significant relation-
ship with the funds’ expense ratio, return differential (return of fund minus return of 
index) or alpha. Furthermore, Meschke (2007) and Ferris and Yan (2007b) find no sta-
tistically significant relationship between their ownership variables and the likelihood 
of being indicted for late trading or market timing. 
Control variables and other variables 
Most studies discussed find statistically significant results for the relationship between 
fund size and fees, and also sometimes between fund family size and fees. This finding 
is consistent with the notion that economies of scale in the fund management business 
exist and are passed on to investors. Cremers et al. (2009) find that larger fund families 
charge lower fees, but their results for fund size are inconsistent. Depending on the 
model specification, the relationship between fund size and costs is either insignifi-
cantly negative or significantly positive. Kong and Tang (2008) find that large fund 
families set more effective breakpoints, but larger funds do not.  
The relationship between fund size and performance is less consistent across dif-
ferent studies. Ferris and Yan (2007b) find a positive and statistically significant rela-
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tionship in two out of four model specifications, but this finding is only based on one 
year of performance data. In Ferris and Yan (2009), the same authors report a negative 
relationship between fund performance and fund size based on analysing 13 years of 
performance data. Kong and Tang (2008) also find a statistically significant negative 
relationship, analysing only one year of performance data. The results of Meschke 
(2007) suggest that there is a hump-shaped relationship between fund size and per-
formance, whereby increasing size is positive for performance at first, but at some 
point the relationship turns negative. This is consistent with the existence of econo-
mies of scale, but also with diseconomies at some point, perhaps as a result of capacity 
constraints or liquidity issues. Both Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Ferris and Yan (2009) 
find that larger fund families perform better. Adams et al. (2010) – analysing index 
funds – and Kong and Tang (2008) do not find a statistically significant relationship. 
The results for fund age are not consistent. Tufano and Sevick (1997) find that old-
er funds charge higher fees. Meschke (2007) finds that older funds charge lower fees 
and that they perform worse. Ferris and Yan (2007b) also find that older funds have 
lower expense ratios, but do not find a statistically significant relationship between age 
and total fees (including part of the load) or between age and performance. Analysing 
fees and performance, Kong and Tang (2008) and Adams et al. (2010) find that the 
results for fund age are not statistically significant. 
Results vary also with regard to past performance. Tufano and Sevick (1997) find 
little to no evidence that fee differences are related to differences in past perform-
ance. However, Meschke (2007) finds that funds with better past performance charge 
higher fees, whereas Ferris and Yan (2007b and 2009) find that funds with better per-
formance charge lower fees. Kong and Tang (2008) find no statistically significant rela-
tionship between previous period raw returns and expense ratios, although there is a 
negative relationship with 12b-1 fees. Adams et al. (2010) do not include past per-
formance in their analysis.  
Ferris and Yan (2009) find that public fund management companies charge higher 
fees than private fund management companies and also underperform their private 
counterparts. 
Causality and endogeneity 
Although several of the studies discussed in this chapter find one or more statistically 
significant relationships between certain board characteristics on the one hand, and 
fund fees and performance on the other hand, these findings are not enough to con-
clude that fee levels and performance are caused by the board characteristics in ques-
tion. These studies merely show that there is an association between the variables in 
question, not necessarily causality. 
These empirical studies all suffer, to a certain extent, from what is often called the 
problem of endogeneity. One source of endogeneity could be omitted variables. In 
that case, board characteristics and fees and performance are driven by the same 
underlying determinants not included in the regression analysis. For example, it is 
possible that low fees are the result of a corporate culture at the fund management 
company that encourages behaving in the interest of shareholders. That same culture 
can be a stimulus to having more independent boards. The opposite can also happen. 
Fund management companies that want to charge high fees could install less inde-
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pendent boards. In that case as well, it is not the level of independence causing the 
high level of fees.  
In studies analysing board independence and fees or performance, reverse causal-
ity is generally not to be expected. Fees and performance do not result in an inde-
pendent chairman or higher percentage of independent directors on the board. How-
ever, low fees might, for example, be a reason for directors to invest more in the funds 
they oversee, resulting in higher director ownership. Ferris and Yan (2007b, p. 412) 
state in this context:  
“The presence of this sort of endogeneity, however, tends to produce statisti-
cally significant relations. For example, Tufano and Sevick (1997) argue that if 
funds that are more likely to seek higher fees also tend to select less effective 
boards, then one would observe a statistically significant relation between 
board structure and fees. Such a statistical relation, however, cannot be inter-
preted as causal. The fact that we fail to find a statistically significant relation 
between board independence and fund fees suggests that our results are not 
substantially plagued by this sort of endogeneity.” 
Power and significance 
Spatt (2006a) and Spatt (2006b) are studies by the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis 
(OEA). Although it is not stated explicitly, these studies were performed to support the 
SEC’s 2004 proposal to require at least 75% independent directors on any U.S. fund 
board and an independent chairman. Spatt (2006a) reviews several empirical studies 
on fund governance in relationship to fees, performance and compliance. In this study 
and the related study, Spatt (2006b), he especially pays attention to the question of 
why there is little consistent evidence that board independence is related to lower fees 
and higher returns. In the Executive Summary, Spatt (2006a, p. 1–2) states: 
“The lack of consistent evidence that board composition leads to better fund 
performance may be attributed to several factors.  
First, there is no sound structural model that enables researchers to isolate the 
effect of a given board decision on performance from all other factors that af-
fect performance. 
Second, inherent limitations to data and statistical tools as applied in the par-
ticular context may render it difficult for research to identify relations that exist 
and that may be economically significant. …  
Third, and finally, the nature of the conflicts of interest in mutual funds is such 
that there may not be a unique relation between governance and perform-
ance. That is, poor governance can at times be associated with higher returns 
through excessive, nontransparent risk taking by fund managers; although, 
with a proper risk-adjustment, fund performance could be lower.” 
The first of Spatt’s points is that there is no fundamental model that correctly de-
scribes the relationship between board characteristics and fees and performance. As a 
result, it is not certain whether studies have taken into account all relevant factors that 
determine fees and performance. This point is related to the omitted variables issue 
described under endogeneity.  
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The second point is that the data analysed could be so noisy that it is hard to isolate 
the impact of the board characteristics, even if it indeed exists, due to the possible lack 
of power of the statistical tests applied. The issue is that when performance is com-
pared across a broad cross-section of funds, the effect of governance, even if it is of 
economical significance, might remain statistically insignificant and therefore go unno-
ticed if performance is, to a larger extent, driven by random factors. This lack of power 
of a statistical test can be mitigated by increasing the number of observations. 
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Chapter 4 
Development of governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Mutual funds with independent boards can cause an earthquake, if directors are genu-
inely independent” 75 
                                                                
75 Quote from an anonymous senior manager of fund management company in KPMG International and 
CREATE, 2006, Towards enhanced business governance; Causes and consequences in global investment, p. 
29.  
C H A P T E R  4  
 138 
4.1 Introduction 
As far as could be determined, this dissertation is the first empirical study into the 
relationship between fund governance characteristics and fund costs and perform-
ance, performed on a sample of open-ended funds domiciled in Europe. Related earlier 
studies analysed samples of U.S. open-ended funds. Unlike in the U.S., there is no aca-
demic-quality fund database readily available in Europe that is comparable to the CRSP 
Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database. For U.S.-domiciled funds, this database 
contains, among other things, performance, cost and assets under management data 
of investment funds. There is also no central, publicly available source for governance 
data in Europe that is comparable to the Statements of Additional Information, which 
U.S. investment funds are required to file with the SEC, and which holds data on, for 
example, directors’ dependent or independent status, as well as their remuneration 
and investments in funds overseen.  
The lack of data sources for European-domiciled funds required much effort in the 
collection and processing of data so that it could be used for the analysis at hand. This 
effort also meant that the right balance had to be made between having a sample of 
sufficient size, in order to come to meaningful and ideally statistically significant re-
sults, and determining the appropriate number of funds so that it would be possible to 
look up data manually and perform manual checks on data quality.  
The funds selected for the analyses are all Luxembourg-domiciled UCITS. Section 
4.2 describes why and how funds in the sample were selected for the empirical study 
and how the required governance data was obtained. Section 4.3 defines the concept 
of independent directors for the purpose of this study and analyses the development 
of independence in the sample of Luxembourg UCITS. The same sample and definition 
will be used for the analyses presented in chapters 5 (relationship between govern-
ance characteristics and costs), 6 (relationship between governance characteristics and 
performance) and 7 (survey into the role of fund boards). Whereas individual board 
seats are the unit of analysis in section 4.3, the analysis in section 4.4 is performed at 
the fund board level of the umbrellas in the sample. Section 4.5 makes the comparison 
with the U.S. and splits the sample on the basis of the cultural background of the fund 
promoters. Section 4.6 presents the conclusions. 
4.2 Description of the population and sample 
4.2.1 Selection criteria 
The funds included in the sample for the empirical part of this dissertation are Luxem-
bourg-domiciled funds offered internationally, benefiting from the distribution possi-
bilities of the UCITS status. The study covers the 10-year period from 1 January 2000 to 
31 December 2009. Concretely, the sample of fund management companies, umbrel-
las, sub-funds and share classes for this study was selected based on the following 
eight criteria:  
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Criterion 1: Regulatory status – UCITS 
The sample for the empirical part of this dissertation includes funds with UCITS status 
only. Funds that are regulated as UCITS have distribution possibilities across the Euro-
pean Union, as well as in several markets in the rest of Europe, Asia and Latin America. 
Retail funds without UCITS status can generally be distributed only in the country of 
the fund domicile. The UCITS segment of the global fund market has gained impor-
tance in the last decade in terms of assets under management and market share76. 
Criterion 2: Domicile – Luxembourg 
Only Luxembourg-domiciled funds are included in the sample. Hence, the comparison 
in this study is between funds with different governance characteristics set up in the 
same domicile, within the same legal and regulatory framework, rather than between 
funds of different domiciles. Although UCITS can be established in any country of the 
European Economic Area, Luxembourg is the fund domicile that dominates the market 
segment of cross-border funds. Out of the 50 leading cross-border management 
groups at the end of 2009, as ranked and published by PwC (PwC, 2010; hereafter PwC 
top-50), 37 have Luxembourg as their primary fund domicile and another five have 
Luxembourg as either their second or third domicile.  
Criterion 3: Promoters – Cross-border players 
In order to have funds that are offered on a truly cross-border basis, fund promoters 
on the PwC top-50 leading cross-border fund promoters are selected. This ranking, 
which is based on the number of distribution countries on 31 December of the preced-
ing year, has been published annually since 2003. PwC published a top-20 in 2002. 
From 2003 to 2008, this publication provided the top-50, while in 2009 and 2010, a 
top-100 was published. In order to be selected for the sample, a fund promoter need-
ed to have been included in the top-50 of PwC’s ranking at least once in the period 
from 2003 to 2010. The number of countries in which the funds were offered in-
creased throughout the period of analysis. The fund promoters included on the PwC 
top-50 offered their Luxembourg funds in 8 (promoter ranked number 50) to 26 (num-
ber 1) countries at the end of December 2002. By the end of December 2009, that 
number had increased to between 17 and 48 individual countries. Note that this does 
not only include EU-countries, since UCITS are also distributed in several markets out-
side of the EU. 
Criterion 4: Umbrellas – Flagships 
Most Luxembourg funds are set up as sub-funds in an umbrella structure, sharing the 
same legal structure with other sub-funds. Practically all fund promoters in the sample 
have more than one such umbrella. In order to prevent double counting of fund pro-
moters by including more than one of their umbrellas, only the flagship umbrella of 
each of the fund promoters in the sample is selected. This flagship is the umbrella that 
includes the fund promoter’s core fund offering and is usually the umbrella with the 
largest number of funds and most assets under management. Some fund promoters 
                                                                
76 See sections 1.3 and 1.4 for statistics regarding the development of UCITS and sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 for 
regulatory aspects of UCITS and Luxembourg funds.  
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have more than one flagship umbrella, for example, because they use different um-
brellas for different asset classes. In that case, the umbrella with the promoter’s equity 
funds is selected77. Fund promoters that do not structure their funds as part of an 
umbrella, but as stand-alone funds, are not included in the sample78. 
In the period of analysis, there have been several acquisitions and mergers of fund 
promoters in the sample. If a fund promoter is acquired by or merges with a company 
not in the sample, the combined fund promoter and the associated umbrella are sim-
ply maintained in the sample. However, in the case where the promoter is acquired by 
or merges with a promoter already in the sample, only the umbrella that is the com-
bined promoter’s flagship umbrella after the integration between the two promoters is 
maintained in the sample79. The umbrella that is not chosen as flagship for the com-
bined firm is removed from the sample at the end of the financial year in which there 
is evidence of the integration at the umbrella level, e.g. by the appointment of board 
members from the acquiring company or by the appointment of a management com-
pany belonging to the acquiring group. Often this is followed by a full integration of the 
flagship umbrellas of the two groups at a later stage. 
Studies in which the performance of investment funds is analysed can suffer from 
survivorship bias. This is the case when a sample of funds selected to measure per-
formance in a certain period only includes funds that still existed at a point in time 
after the measurement period (the survivors). Such a sample excludes funds that ex-
isted in the measurement period, but have closed down in the meantime. Because 
poor performing funds are more likely to be liquidated or merged, a sample of surviv-
ing funds will be biased towards the better performing funds. In this study, survivor-
ship bias at the level of the fund promoters and umbrellas is avoided by not only se-
lecting umbrellas of promoters on the latest PwC top-50 and tracing them back in time. 
Promoters included in any of the earlier PwC top-50s are also included in the sample, 
even if those promoters were acquired and/or their umbrellas closed later80. The 
drawback to the approach of including fund promoters featured in any of the issues of 
the PwC top-50 in the whole period of analysis is that it implies a forward-looking bias. 
Promoters who are new entrants on the top-50 in one of the later years are already 
included in the sample in the preceding period. Excluding those fund promoters, how-
ever, would have the disadvantage that the sample size is reduced.  
                                                                
77 Examples of equity flagship umbrellas included in the sample are ING (L) Invest SICAV and UBS (Lux) Equity 
Fund FCP. The reason for selecting equity umbrellas is elaborated under criterion 6.  
78 There is one example of this among the fund management companies on the PwC top-50, namely Union 
Investment.  
79 An example is ABN AMRO Asset Management being acquired by Fortis Investments, with Fortis (L) Fund 
SICAV being selected as flagship umbrella for the combined firm. ABN AMRO Funds SICAV was therefore 
dropped from the sample.  
80 One fund promoter and umbrella, Credit Lyonnais Asset Management and their Lion Fortune SICAV, could 
not be included in the sample, despite being in the PwC top-50 of 2003. Crédit Lyonnais Asset Management 
merged with Crédit Agricole Asset Management on 1 July 2004. It was not possible to obtain the annual 
reports for Lion Fortune SICAV and therefore it was not possible to reconstruct its governance characteris-
tics. It should be noted, however, that the Lion Fortune SICAV would have been dropped from the sample 
already in 2004, on the basis of the Crédit Agricole flagship umbrella being selected as the flagship umbrella 
for the combined entity. Crédit Agricole Funds SICAV and Lion Fortune SICAV merged formally on 17 Decem-
ber 2004, after the merger proposal was published on 11 October 2004.  
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Criterion 5: Asset class – Equity 
Several of the umbrellas in the sample contain more than 50 funds in a variety of asset 
classes and fund sectors. At the fund level, the sample for this study is restricted to 
include actively-managed equity funds only, in order to keep the number of fund sec-
tors and funds to be analysed manageable and to compare funds that are indeed com-
parable. The primary reason for selecting only equity funds is because it allows the use 
of one model to determine the risk-adjusted performance of the funds, rather than 
having to work with various models for funds in different asset classes. This type of 
modelling is not the primary focus of the dissertation, but merely a requirement for 
chapter 6, in which fund performance is be analysed in relationship to governance 
characteristics. A secondary reason for selecting only funds in one asset class, e.g., 
equity, is because, as discussed in Criterion 4, several fund promoters have different 
flagship umbrellas for investments in different asset classes. In order to avoid double 
counting these in the sample, only the umbrellas for equity funds were selected in 
these cases. 
Criterion 6: Sectors – Global, Europe, U.S., Japan and Emerging Markets 
In order to further limit the number of funds in the sample, a selection of funds was 
made on the basis of the investment area or fund sector. The selected sectors are 
Global equity, Europe equity (split in Pan-European and Euroland equity), U.S. equity, 
Japan equity and Emerging Markets equity. Global equity, Pan-European equity and 
Euroland equity are the largest equity sectors within the equity asset class on the Eu-
ropean fund market. For many European-based fund investors, these funds form a 
core holding in their portfolios. U.S. equity and Japan equity are often used as regional 
building blocks for internationally diversified portfolios. Emerging Markets equity is 
also among the largest asset classes, but it is a more specialist area. Fund promoters 
usually price their products in this area higher than in the developed markets sectors81. 
The Asset Class and Investment Area of Lipper (former Fitzrovia) was used as a 
starting point for selecting funds for the sample based on fund sector. Lipper defines 
the Investment Area relatively broadly. Europe equity, for example, includes funds 
investing on a Pan-European basis, as well as funds investing in Euroland countries 
only. The funds that are in the Europe equity sector are divided into these two catego-
ries. Excluded from the sample altogether are funds that have a more narrow focus 
than their sector as whole, either in terms of market capitalisation, industry sectors or 
geographically. Examples are small cap and mid cap funds, as well as funds that only 
focus on certain selected countries (e.g., BRIC [Brazil, Russia, India and China] in the 
case of Emerging Markets equity) or funds that exclude certain countries or regions 
(e.g., Europe excluding U.K. in the case of Europe equity and EAFE [Europe, Australasia, 
Far East, i.e., excluding U.S. and Canada] in the case of Global equity). Balanced funds 
with a large allocation to equities that have the flexibility to allocate to fixed income 
are also excluded from the sample. The same applies to Theme and Sector funds that 
invest in equities globally, but only in certain industries. Lipper includes SRI funds (So-
                                                                
81 Promoters that are on the PwC top-50, but that do not offer any fund within the selected sectors, are 
excluded from the sample. For this reason, e.g., BlueBay (offering only fixed income funds) and East Capital 
Asset Management (only offering funds investing in Central and Eastern Europe) are excluded from the 
sample.  
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cially Responsible Investments) in a separate Investment Area, the Ethical/SR sector. 
This category of funds is not included in the sample. The fund promoters selected for 
the sample have funds in several or all of these fund sectors. By selecting these larger 
sectors and by excluding funds that have a more narrow focus than the sector as a 
whole, a sample is formed that is homogeneous with respect to the fund’s investment 
sectors, but that is still relatively large. 
Criterion 7: Funds – Selected from the Luxembourg Funds Encyclopaedia 
At the sub-fund level, survivorship bias was avoided by gathering data on funds in the 
umbrellas that existed at some point in the 2000-2009 period, even when they no 
longer exist today. The funds were selected from the annual publication, the Lipper 
Luxembourg Funds Encyclopaedia82. This publication includes all Luxembourg-
domiciled funds by fund promoter and umbrella, with net assets and cost data per 
share class of each fund. Because all issues of this publication in the 2000-2010 period 
were available for analysis, it was possible to ensure that all funds offered at any point 
in time in the period of analysis are indeed included in the sample, thus avoiding survi-
vorship bias. 
Criterion 8: Share classes – Retail 
Cost and performance data was collected for the standard retail share class of each 
fund in the sample, again for reasons of homogeneity. The reason for taking retail 
shares is because the agency conflict and the issue of information asymmetry can be 
expected to be larger for retail investors than for institutional investors. Therefore, the 
added value of the boards of directors is potentially larger in this market segment. In 
addition, only in the case of retail shares, it can be reasonably assumed that the stated 
fund costs are indeed paid by the investor. In the case of institutional shares, it is 
common that part of the management fees or other fees is repaid to the investor in 
the form of rebates. Therefore, it is not possible to establish from public sources what 
the investor actually pays. In the case of retail share classes, any rebate is generally 
paid to the distributor, not to the investor. 
Unfortunately, there is no market standard in Luxembourg with regard to the la-
belling of share classes. Retail share classes are offered as e.g., A-shares, C-shares 
(Classic) or P-shares (Private), depending on the fund promoter. The standard retail 
share class for each of the funds in the sample was therefore determined on the basis 
of a combination of the Lipper Funds Encyclopaedia, the fund prospectuses and the 
annual reports. In most cases, it was one share class type across all funds within the 
same umbrella and over time. In a few cases, there was a change in the standard retail 
share class during the research period. Details of how these situations were dealt with 
can be found in appendix 1, together with the standard retail share class used for each 
of the promoters and umbrellas in the sample. In the case of a fund having more than 
one currency retail share class, the share class in the base currency of the fund was 
selected. In the case where both Income (dividend paying) and Accumulation (dividend 
reinvested) shares were available, the latter was included in the sample. 
                                                                
82 Until 2007 called the Fitzrovia Luxembourg Funds Encyclopaedia.  
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4.2.2 Sample size 
In total, there are 48 different fund promoters and the same number of flagship um-
brellas included in the sample at some point in time. An overview is provided in ap-
pendix 1. Five of the 48 flagship umbrellas were launched in the course of the research 
period, whereas three umbrellas dropped from the sample due to merger activity. At 
the end of 2009, there were 45 umbrellas in the sample.  
Figure 4.1 shows the development of the sample size over time, both with (blue 
line) and without (red line) the forward-looking bias referred to in Criterion 4 in section 
4.2.1. The sample used to form the blue line includes any fund promoter that meets 
the domicile and fund sector criteria and that was included on the PwC top-50 in any 
year in the 2003-2010 period. The blue flags show the changes to the sample resulting 
from the launch of new Luxembourg umbrellas that met the criteria or from umbrellas 
dropping from the sample due to mergers and acquisitions. For the red line, the same 
criteria were used, except that promoters are only included as of the year they ap-
peared on the PwC top-50 for the first time. The red flags show the publication of the 
first PwC top-50 in 2003, as well as the new entrants in the top-50 in each year as of 
2004.  
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Figure 4.1: Development of the number of fund promoters in the sample 
Source: PwC (2002-2010) 
 
A list of all funds in the sample, organised by promoter, is provided in appendix 2. 
Table 4.1 shows the number of funds in the sample by fund sector, both at any point in 
the 2000-2009 period, and at the end of the research period. Also shown in that table 
is the Total Net Assets of the funds in the sample at the end of the research period.  
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Table 4.1: Number of funds and Total Net Assets in the sample by fund sector 
Number of funds Total Net Assets(TNA) Fund sector 
(all equity) Total 
(2000–2009) 
 
31-Dec-2009 
In EUR bn 
31-Dec-2009 
Global 
Pan-Europe 
Euroland 
U.S. 
Japan 
Emerging Markets 
Total 
133 
152 
52 
134 
75 
47 
593 
91 
108 
39 
93 
56 
40 
427 
27.8 
42.2 
15.8 
26.5 
5.9 
27.4 
145.7 
Source TNA data: Lipper FMI 
 
Figure 4.2 shows how the sample funds selected on the above criteria relate to the 
total population of European and Luxembourg funds. Both the number of funds and 
the Total Net Assets are provided per 31 December 2009, the final day of the research 
period.  
 
European Fund Market
42 domiciles
1,715 Fund Management Groups
35,044 funds
EUR 5,270 billion TNA
Sample Fund Management Companies
45 Fund Management Groups
5,182 funds
EUR 1,148 billion TNA
Sample Umbrellas
45 Fund Management Groups
1,786 funds
EUR 545.8 billion TNA
European Core Countries
12 domiciles
1,112 Fund Management Groups
27,938 funds
EUR 4,592 billion TNA
Luxembourg
498 Fund Management Groups
10,139 funds
EUR 1,643 billion TNA
Sample Funds
45 Fund Management Groups
427 funds
EUR 145.7 billion TNA
 
Figure 4.2: Sample within the total European fund market per 31 December 2009 
Source: Lipper FMI 
 
The total population of European funds, shown as the first level in the triangle, consists 
of 35,044 funds from 42 domiciles83 with almost EUR 5.3 trillion in Total Net Assets. 
                                                                
83 Lipper FMI considers some funds that are domiciled in offshore domiciles outside of Europe and distrib-
uted in Europe as European Market Funds. However, their number and assets under management are not a 
significant part of the total market. At the end of 2009, there were 471 funds domiciled in the Bahamas, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Mauritius and Netherlands Antilles, with Total Net Assets 
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These funds are offered by 1,715 different fund management groups84. The second 
level in the chart represents funds domiciled in any of the European core countries85. 
These twelve domiciles house 79.7% of the funds on the European market, holding 
87.1% of the Total Net Assets. On the third level, the chart shows that Luxembourg, 
which is the largest domicile in Europe, represents more than one-third of the fund 
market in the European core countries, both in terms of the number of funds (36.3%) 
and Total Net Assets (35.8%). These funds are offered by 498 different groups.  
On the fourth level, the chart zooms in on funds offered by the fund management 
groups in the sample. The 45 cross-border fund management groups in the sample at 
the end of 2009 (9.0% of the number of fund management groups in Luxembourg), 
managed 51.1% of the Luxembourg-domiciled funds and 69.9% of the Luxembourg 
Total Net Assets. This fact implies that the fund promoters selected for the sample are, 
on average, larger than the average promoter in Luxembourg (EUR 25.5 billion versus 
EUR 3.3 billion of Total Net Assets, on average), which is a logical consequence of se-
lecting promoters from the top-50 leading cross-border fund promoters. Their funds 
are also larger than the average Luxembourg-domiciled fund (EUR 221.5 million versus 
EUR 162.1 million), although this difference is not as striking.  
On the fifth level, the statistics are provided for the 45 flagship umbrellas that 
were in the sample at the end of 2009. Since boards of directors operate for the whole 
umbrella, all funds in a particular umbrella share the same board. With 1,786 funds 
and EUR 545.8 billion of Total Net Assets, these flagship umbrellas represent over one-
third (34.5%) of the number of funds and almost half (47.5%) of the Total Net Assets of 
the selected fund management groups. The funds in these flagship umbrellas are lar-
ger than the average fund managed out of Luxembourg by their respective fund man-
agement groups, in particular, EUR 305.6 million versus EUR 221.5 million.  
Finally, the sixth level represents the funds in the sample investing in one of the six 
selected sectors (Global, Pan-Europe, Euroland, U.S., Japan and Emerging Markets). 
These funds share the same boards with the other funds in the flagship umbrellas and 
are the ones that are used to analyse the relationship between governance character-
istics and costs and performance. As of the end of 2009, there are 427 funds in the 
sample, with a combined EUR 145.7 billion of Total Net Assets. The sample funds rep-
resent 26.7% of the Total Net Assets of the umbrellas under which they reside and 
23.9% of the number of sub-funds. With an average of EUR 341.3 million of Total Net 
Assets, these funds are approximately 12% larger than the average fund in the sample 
umbrellas. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows that there is a significant variation in the size of the umbrellas in the 
sample, both in terms of the number of sub-funds (top chart) and the Total Net Assets 
per umbrella (bottom chart). Whereas there are 19 umbrellas with less than EUR 5 
billion of Total Net Assets, the largest umbrella holds EUR 57.1 billion of assets. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
amounting to EUR 80.3 billion (1.5% of total), which were included by Lipper FMI in the European Fund 
Market.  
84 Lipper FMI refers to these as Master Groups.  
85 EU core countries are defined as those among the countries signing the Maastricht treaty in 1993, i.e., 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and the U.K.  
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terms of the number of sub-funds, the smallest umbrella includes three sub-funds, 
while the umbrella with the most sub-funds contains 151 individual sub-funds. 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of umbrellas in the sample (31 December 2009) 
The top chart shows the distribution by number of sub-funds in the umbrellas in the sample.  
The bottom chart shows the distribution by TNA of all sub-funds of the umbrellas in the sample.  
Source: Lipper FMI and fund annual reports 
 
Figure 4.4 (bottom chart) shows that there is also a significant variation in Total Net 
Assets per fund in the sample of funds. Out of the 427 funds in the sample at the end 
of 2009, 129 have less than EUR 50 million of Total Net Assets. A total of 37 funds are 
larger than EUR 1 billion, out of which one fund has more than EUR 5 billion of Total 
Net Assets. The top chart in figure 4.4 shows the number of sub-funds represented by 
each promoter in the sample, as of the end of the research period. This varies between 
1 and 23 sub-funds.  
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of funds in the sample as per 31 December 2009 
The top chart shows the distribution by number of sub-funds in the sample for each of the promoters.  
The bottom chart shows the distribution by TNA of the sub-funds in the sample.  
Source: Lipper FMI and fund annual reports 
4.3 Dependency status of board members 
Definitions 
Chapters 5 and 6 will analyse and compare the costs and performance of funds with 
different board characteristics. With respect to the governance characteristics, the 
main distinction made is whether an individual board member can be characterised as 
independent from the fund promoter and promoter group86 or whether he has certain 
ties with the fund promoter that make him dependent. Related empirical studies of 
U.S. mutual funds use the information provided in the Statements of Additional Infor-
                                                                
86 The term promoter group is used in the meaning of the larger financial group, for example bank or insur-
ance company, of which the fund promoter is part. 
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mation to categorise individual board members. This is a document that these funds 
are required to file with the SEC and is available to shareholders upon request. The 
document mentions for each of the board members whether they are independent or 
dependent, based on the definition of the 1940 Act87. Because fund boards in Luxem-
bourg are not required by law or regulation to have independent members, the Lux-
embourg regulator has not determined for each board member whether or not he 
qualifies as an independent director, nor is there a legal definition of independent 
versus dependent directors that can be used. It is therefore necessary, for the purpose 
of this empirical study, to define dependence and independence. The definition used 
in this dissertation follows the spirit of the OECD White Paper (OECD, 2005, p. 165): 
 “It is accepted that no employee of any company affiliated with the operator 
through ownership linkages or as a service provider is eligible to serve as an in-
dependent director.” 
At the same time, the definition must be practicable, i.e., it must be possible for the 
board members of the umbrellas in the sample to determine, on the basis of public 
sources, what is their dependency status according to the definition used. To do justice 
to Luxembourg market practice, a category of semi-independent board members is 
also distinguished. In Luxembourg, a less strict definition of independence is commonly 
used than in the U.S. In Luxembourg, a representative of the fund’s legal council or 
another service provider outside of the promoter group would normally be considered 
as an independent director. To capture this category of directors that are not employ-
ees of the promoter group, but still have a business link in addition to their role as 
director, a category of semi-independent board member is distinguished. Former em-
ployees are also included in this category. According to U.S. regulations, former em-
ployees are not disqualified for a position as independent board members on boards 
of their former employer’s funds. However, in their best practice recommendations, 
ICI recommends that promoters not consider former employees as independent. Qian 
(2011) refers to the category of former employee board members as gray directors. In 
this study, board members are categorised as follows: 
• Dependent board members are employees of the fund promoter or the promoter 
group88. 
• Independent board members do not have a current or previous employment tie 
with the fund promoter or the promoter group and are not currently employed by 
any of the service providers of the UCITS.  
• Semi-independent board members are either former employees of the fund pro-
moter or promoter group or are current employees of a service provider of the 
UCITS, provided that it is not part of the promoter group. 
 
This definition implies that in the case of a board member resigning or retiring as an 
employee of the fund promoter or promoter group, but staying on as a board member 
of the umbrella, that board member moves from the dependent to the semi-
                                                                
87 See section 2.2.2.  
88 There are three umbrellas in the sample that have a corporate director, which is part of the promoter 
group. These are considered as dependent board members.  
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independent category. An employee of a service provider of the umbrella who resigns 
or retires as an employee of that service provider, but stays on as a board member of 
the umbrella, immediately moves from the semi-independent to the independent 
category for the purpose of this study. 
For Luxembourg board members, data with regard to ownership in the fund pro-
moter or promoter group is not public. Therefore, such ownership ties are not included 
in the definition. The assumption is that, in practice, this does not materially weaken 
the definition, as it is expected that there will be few cases, if any, where a board 
member does have an ownership tie with the fund promoter or promoter group, but 
not an employment tie.  
In addition to the board of directors of the umbrella, the depositary also has an 
oversight role, based on the UCITS Directive89. A depositary is appointed at the level of 
the umbrella, as a result of which it is the same for all sub-funds in an umbrella. In this 
dissertation, a depositary is seen as dependent when it belongs to the promoter group 
and as independent when it does not. 
Data 
For the empirical part of this dissertation, a unique, proprietary fund governance data-
base was developed containing governance data of all the umbrellas in the sample, 
covering the period from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2009. For these umbrellas, 
the annual reports for each of the financial years ending in the 200090-2010 period 
were requested from the fund promoter. In the cases where the annual reports could 
not be obtained this way, other channels were used91, so that in the end, substantially 
all required annual reports were available for analysis.  
From these annual reports, the names of all directors on the boards of these um-
brellas were copied into the database, together with their title (their role or position 
outside of the board in question, often a role with the fund promoter) as included in 
the annual report. Also included in the database were the dates of appointment and 
resignation. From the title as provided in the annual reports, it was usually possible to 
establish to which of the three categories – dependent, independent or semi-
independent – the board member belongs. In the case where a board member was 
characterised as independent or with a role from which it could not be established 
immediately whether the person should be considered (semi-) independent, a follow-
up investigation was performed based on the fund’s prospectus or by means of an 
internet search. Ultimately, the dependency status of all board members could be 
established with absolute or almost absolute certainty.  
The date of appointment or resignation was, in most cases, mentioned in the an-
nual report for the year in which the change in board composition occurred. When this 
was not the case, follow-up research was performed in the official publication of the 
Luxembourg government “Mémorial; Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg; 
                                                                
89 See section 2.2.3 for details.  
90 Not all umbrellas have a financial year that is the same as the calendar year. Board data was gathered for 
each of the umbrellas as of the financial year ending in 2000.  
91 This included Morningstar and service providers of the umbrellas.  
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Recueil des Sociétés et Associations” (hereafter Mémorial)92. In most cases, if the date 
of appointment or resignation was not in the annual report, it could be obtained from 
this publication. In only a limited number of cases, this source did not provide the 
exact date. In these cases, it was assumed that an appointment took place on the first 
day of the umbrella’s financial year in which the board member is first included in the 
annual report. A resignation for which the exact date is not found in the annual report 
or in Mémorial is assumed to have taken place on the last day of the financial year in 
which the board member is last included93. Mémorial was also used to supplement 
data in the few cases in which individual annual reports could not be obtained. 
For most umbrella boards, the annual report named the chairman of the board. 
This information has also been captured in the database. The chairmen have been 
categorised as dependent, semi-independent or independent on the basis of the same 
definitions as used for other board members. Since some umbrellas have not assigned 
a chairman, either permanently or temporarily (sometimes there is a gap between the 
resignation of one chairman and the appointment of a new chairman), or have not 
indicated the chairman in the annual report, a fourth category is distinguished for the 
chair, which is none.  
The name of the depositary, the dates of appointment and replacement, and the 
status as either dependent or independent were also included in the proprietary fund 
governance database. In all cases, this information could be obtained from the annual 
reports. 
Development 
A first way of approaching independence of governance is by looking at individual 
board seats and whether they are held by persons who are dependent, independent or 
semi-independent. Figure 4.5 shows how board members of the umbrellas in the sam-
ple were divided over the three categories for the entire research period. Out of the 
911 board members in total (chairs and others combined), 755 (82.9%) are employees 
of the fund promoter or promoter group and are therefore classified as dependent. Of 
all board members, 100 (11.0%) are independent and 56 (6.1%) semi-independent. 
Among the chairs, the distribution is more skewed towards the dependent category. 
Out of the 141 chairmen in the sample in the research period, 89.4% are dependent, 
whereas 6.4% are independent and 4.3% are semi-independent. 
Figure 4.6 shows the development in the 2000-2009 period of the total number of 
board seats in the sample and how they were divided among the different categories 
of board members. The composition has been relatively stable in this period. At the 
beginning of 2000, there were 270 board seats taken by three independent chairmen 
and 36 other independent board members. At that moment, 20 board members were 
semi-independent. None held the position of chairman. The remaining board members 
were dependent, with 36 chairmen and 175 other dependent board members. Five 
years later, by 31 December 2004, the total number of board members in the umbrel-
                                                                
92 Funds are required to notify the CSSF, as well as the Companies Registrar, of any changes to the board of 
directors. The Companies Registrar publishes the change in Mémorial.  
93 In a handful of cases, a more exact estimate of the appointment or resignation date could be made, for 
example when it could be established from a publication in Mémorial that a person was still on the board on 
a date after the end of the financial year. 
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las in the sample had increased to 304. On that date, the number independent chair-
men had increased to five and that of other independent board members to 43. The 
semi-independent board members included two chairmen and 20 other board mem-
bers. The remaining seats were taken by 33 dependent chairmen and 201 other de-
pendent board members. By the end of the research period, the total number of board 
members had declined to 285 in total. There were still five independent chairmen, 
while the number of other independent board members had increased to 47. There 
was one semi-independent chairman and 19 other semi-independent board members. 
The 213 dependent board members included 34 chairmen and 179 others. 
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Figure 4.5: All board seats in sample by category 
Source: Proprietary Fund Governance Database 
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Figure 4.6: Development of individual board seats by category (total number) 
Source: Proprietary Fund Governance Database 
 
 
C H A P T E R  4  
 152 
When interpreting these figures, it should be noted that the number of umbrellas in 
the sample was not the same throughout the research period. There have been five 
new entrants since the beginning of 2000 and three umbrellas have dropped from the 
sample. As a result of these changes, there were 43 umbrellas included at the start, 46 
halfway through and 45 at the end of the research period. Whereas figure 4.6 is based 
on the total number of board seats in the sample at any time, figure 4.7 reflects the 
average number of board seats per umbrella. This chart shows that also the average 
number of board members per umbrella has been very stable through time, always 
hovering between 6.2 and 6.7. As a result of a number of large boards, the median was 
always lower, but stable as well, namely 5 or 6. Both at the end, and at the beginning, 
of the research period, the average number of board members, including the chair, 
stood at 6.3 board members. In this period, the average number of dependent board 
members decreased slightly from 4.9 to 4.7 members. The average number of semi-
independent board members also declined, from 0.5 to 0.4, whereas the number of 
independent board members increased from 0.9 to 1.2. 
Figure 4.8 is based on the same data, except there the division of board members 
over the different categories is shown on a relative basis. By definition, the division 
among board member categories expressed as a percentage of the total number of 
board seats is the same as when showing the same division for the average number of 
board seats per umbrella. In the 10-year period under review, the percentage of inde-
pendent board members increased from 14.4% to 18.2%. This increase was at the 
expense of both the percentage of semi-independent and dependent members. These 
categories declined from 7.4% to 7.0% and from 78.1% to 74.7% respectively. 
Based on figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8, it can be concluded that in the 2000-2009 pe-
riod, there has been an increase in the number and percentage of independent board 
members, but that the increase has been modest. The analysis results for the ap-
pointments and resignations per year support this conclusion. Table 4.2 tracks changes 
to the sample of board members throughout the research period. The top panel pro-
vides the changes due to umbrellas that were added to and removed from the sample. 
The middle panel shows the changes by calendar year due to the net effect of ap-
pointments and resignations of board members on boards in the sample. The bottom 
panel shows by calendar year the changes due to both of these factors combined. The 
three columns to the right concern the total number of board members, separated 
into dependent, independent and semi-independent categories. The columns to the 
left detail this further into the board members holding the position of chairman and 
the other board members.  
The net effect of the umbrellas being added to and removed from the sample is no 
change in the number of independent and semi-independent board members. The 
flagship umbrellas of Gartmore, Sparinvest, T Rowe Price and DWS added in 2000, 
2001 and 2002 resulted in the addition of dependent board members and only one 
semi-independent board member. Investec had two independent and two semi-
independent board members as well as four dependent board members when it was 
added in 2008. Activest, removed in 2007, had dependent board members only, but 
J.P. Morgan and ABN AMRO, removed in 2002 and 2008 respectively, both had inde-
pendent and semi-independent board members, in addition to dependent board 
members.  
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The appointments and resignations did result in an increase by 13 in the number of 
independent board members in the research period. The table shows that this devel-
opment has not been a straight and clear trend. There were several years in which the 
number of independent board members in the sample declined compared to the year 
before. The table confirms the earlier conclusion of the development towards more 
independent boards at a modest pace. 
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Figure 4.7: Development of average number of board seats by category (absolute number) 
Source: Proprietary Fund Governance Database 
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Figure 4.8: Development of board seats by category (percentage) 
Source: Proprietary Fund Governance Database 
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4.4 Dependency status of boards 
Definitions 
Whereas the individual board seats in the sample were analysed in section 4.3, this 
section takes the umbrellas in the sample as the unit of analysis. In the analysis of all 
board members, a subsequent independent board member on a board that already 
had one or more independents counts as much in the total as the first independent 
board member on a board that used to have none. For the functioning of the board, 
having some independent influence versus having none could matter more than the 
exact percentage of independent board members. Therefore, for a fund promoter and 
for the investors, the appointment of the first independent board member might be a 
more significant event than the appointment of each subsequent independent board 
member. The following types of boards are distinguished: 
• Independent boards have at least one independent member. 
• Semi-independent boards have at least one semi-independent member, but no 
independent members. 
• Dependent boards have dependent members only. 
Development 
In figure 4.9, the development is shown on an absolute basis and in figure 4.10, on a 
relative basis. Surprisingly, the charts show that the proportion of boards with de-
pendent members only has increased in the 2000-2009 period. At the beginning of the 
period, boards with dependent board members only were a minority (16 out of 43, or 
37.2%). Since January 2009, dependent boards are a majority in the sample (23 out of 
45, or 51.1% at the end of 2009). This development has been at the expense of boards 
that have independent members. The percentage of semi-independent boards de-
creased as well, in this case, after an initial increase.  
Table 4.3 provides further insight into the development of independence at the 
board level. The top panel provides the changes due to umbrellas being added to and 
removed from the sample. The net effect is an increase by two of the number of de-
pendent boards, an increase by one of the number of semi-independent boards and a 
decrease by one of the number of independent boards. The middle panel shows the 
changes by calendar year due to the net effect of appointments and resignations of 
board members on boards in the sample. Over the whole research period, the net 
effect is five more dependent boards and a decline in the number of independent and 
semi-independent boards by four and one, respectively. The bottom panel shows the 
changes by calendar year due to both of these factors combined.  
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Figure 4.9: Development of umbrellas by category (absolute number) 
Source: Proprietary Fund Governance Database 
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Figure 4.10: Development of umbrellas by category (percentage) 
Source: Proprietary Fund Governance Database 
 
The increase in boards with dependent board members only and decrease in boards 
with independent board members seems to contradict the observation in the previous 
section that the total number of independent board seats in the sample has increased. 
These deviating developments can be explained by an increase in the number of inde-
pendent board members on boards that have independent members.  
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Table 4.3: Development of the number of boards in the sample by category 
   Dependent Independent Semi-
independent
Total
Start research period 1-Jan-00 16 23 4 43
     37.2% 53.5% 9.3%
Gartmore (+) 2000  1 1
T Rowe Price (+) 2001 1   1
Sparinvest (+) 2001 1   1
DWS (+) 2002 1   1
J.P. Morgan (-) 2002  -1   -1
Activest (-) 2007 -1   -1
ABN AMRO (-) 2008  -1   -1
Changes due to 
umbrellas entering  
(+) and exiting (-) the 
sample 
Investec (+) 2008  1   1
    Total 2 -1 1 2
 2000 -1 -1 2 0
 2001 -1 -1 2 0
 2002 1 1 -2 0
 2003 0 -1 1 0
 2004 -1 1 0 0
 2005 2 -2 0 0
 2006 2 0 -2 0
 2007 0 1 -1 0
 2008 2 -1 -1 0
Changes due to 
appointments and 
resignations 
 2009 1 -1 0 0
    Total 5 -4 -1 0
 2000 -1 -1 3 1
 2001 1 -1 2 2
 2002 2 0 -2 0
 2003 0 -1 1 0
 2004 -1 1 0 0
 2005 2 -2 0 0
 2006 2 0 -2 0
 2007 -1 1 -1 -1
 2008 2 -1 -1 0
Sum 
 2009 1 -1 0 0
    Total 7 -5 0 2
End research period 31-Dec-09 23 18 4 45
      51.1% 40.0% 8.9%
Source: Proprietary Fund Governance Database 
4.5 Cultural differences 
Comparing Luxembourg and U.S. 
Figure 4.11 compares the independence of boards in Luxembourg and the U.S. For the 
U.S., the chart shows the percentage of fund ranges that have independent chairmen 
and those that have 75% or more of their board seats held by independent directors. 
For Luxembourg, a less strict definition of independence is used, combining the inde-
pendent and the semi-independent categories94. In addition to the threshold of 75%, 
                                                                
94 Note that the definition for independence used in this dissertation for the sample of Luxembourg umbrel-
las is not exactly the same as the definition used in the U.S.  
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lower thresholds of 50% and 33.3% were added to be able to make a meaningful com-
parison. 
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Figure 4.11: Development of board independence in the U.S. and Luxembourg 
Source: 
- Luxembourg funds: Proprietary Fund Governance Database.  
- U.S. funds: ICI (2011), which is based on a bi-annual survey done in the period from 1996 (with 5,191 funds 
participating) until 2010 (with 7,756 funds participating). 
 
In the U.S., the percentage of ranges with more than 75% independent directors has 
increased from 46% in 1996 to 91% in 2010. The percentage with independent chair-
men was 63% in 2010, whereas in 1996 only 22% of the fund ranges had an independ-
ent chairman or lead director95. The trend towards more independence in the U.S. 
reflects both the development of best practice and regulatory change. Notable exam-
ples are the 1999 ICI96 recommendations of a two-thirds independent majority and the 
independent lead director, and the 2001 regulations requiring funds benefitting from 
certain exemptive rules to have a majority of independent directors. On the basis of 
the 1940 Act, funds are required to have at least 40% independent directors. In 2004, 
the SEC intended to increase the minimum percentage of independent directors to 
75% and to require an independent chair, but this rule change did not hold up in court. 
Despite the fact that this higher minimum is not a legal or regulatory requirement, 
many fund ranges seemed to have followed it nevertheless, either as an implicit best 
practice or anticipating stricter regulations. 
For Luxembourg, there is only one umbrella in the sample (2%) since 2008 with 
more than 75% (semi-) independent board members. The percentage of umbrellas 
                                                                
95 Before 2004, ICI did not make the distinction between independent chairmen and independent lead 
directors (a director designated as a primus inter paris of the independent directors, not formally having the 
position of the chair), which is represented by the dotted part of the line. 
96 Please refer to section 2.3.1 for further details.  
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with more than one-third and more than half (semi-) independent board members has 
increased in the research period from 40% to 42% and from 16% to 22%, respectively. 
This finding reflects the development mentioned earlier in the section, in particular 
that while the percentage of boards with any (semi-) independent members has de-
creased, boards that have any (semi-) independent members have a higher percentage 
of (semi-) independent board members than earlier in the research period. After an 
initial increase from 7% to 17% at the end of 2001, the percentage of umbrellas with 
an independent chairman had dropped back to 13% by the end of 2009. 
Differences in Luxembourg 
Independent governance is much more part of the Anglo-Saxon culture and regulatory 
system than that of continental Europe. Table 4.4 explores whether the Anglo-Saxon 
promoters have exported the governance practices of their home markets to their 
Luxembourg fund range.  
 
Table 4.4: Governance characteristics by promoter origin (as per 31 December 2009) 
Origin of promoter Number 
of um-
brellas 
Number of 
umbrellas 
with (semi-) 
independent 
board  
members 
Number of 
umbrellas 
with (semi-) 
independent
majority 
Number of 
umbrellas 
with (semi-) 
independent 
chairman 
Development of 
percentage of (semi-) 
independent board 
members1 
     Increase Decrease 
All  45 22 (49%) 5 (11%) 6 (13%) 16 (36%) 9 (20%) 
Continental European  23 5 (22%) 1 (4%) 1 (1%) 3 (13%) 5 (22%) 
Anglo-Saxon 22 17 (77%) 4 (18%) 5 (5%) 13 (59%) 4 (18%) 
1. Compares the composition of the board of each umbrella at the end of the research period to  
the composition at the moment the umbrella entered the sample. 
 
The table shows that, indeed, the governance characteristics of boards are different 
depending on the origin of the fund promoter. Of the 22 Anglo-Saxon (U.S., U.K. and 
South-African) promoters, 17 have (semi-) independent board members on their 
boards, whereas of the 23 continental European promoters, only five have (semi-) 
independent board members. Of the Anglo-Saxon promoters, five have an independ-
ent chairman, while of the continental European promoters, only one has an inde-
pendent chairman. A (semi-) independent majority is more common among Anglo-
Saxon promoters as well. Out of the five boards that have a (semi-) independent ma-
jority, four are Anglo-Saxon and one is continental European.  
The final two columns show that mainly the Anglo-Saxon fund promoters have de-
veloped towards more independence. Comparing the percentage of (semi-) independ-
ent board members as per 31 December 2009 to that percentage at the moment a 
promoter entered the sample, 16 boards have increased this percentage and nine 
boards have decreased this percentage. This finding implies that for 20 boards, this 
percentage was unchanged. Among the Anglo-Saxon promoters, there were 13 where 
the percentage of (semi-) independent board members increased and four where it 
decreased. Among the continental European promoters, those with a decrease out-
numbered those with an increase. Figure 4.12 provides a further confirmation of this 
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development. The chart compares the development of the average percentage of 
(semi-) independent board members for the whole sample to the development of this 
percentage in the sub-samples of Anglo-Saxon and continental European promoters. 
Among the former group, the percentage has increased over the research period, 
whereas among the latter group, the percentage has decreased.  
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Figure 4.12: Development of the average percentage of (semi-) independent board members 
Source: Proprietary Fund Governance Database 
4.7 Conclusion 
For the empirical part of this dissertation, a sample was formed that consists of the 
Luxembourg flagship umbrellas of the main cross-border fund promoters in Europe. 
Luxembourg is, by far, the largest domicile for funds offered on a cross-border basis 
and represents a large part of the European fund market. Of the funds domiciled in the 
European core countries, Luxembourg represents more than one-third, both in terms 
of the number of funds offered and in terms of Total Net Assets. The sample includes 
all cross-border fund promoters that have a Luxembourg flagship umbrella and that 
were among the top-50 cross-border promoters in any of the years in the 2003–2010 
period. These flagship umbrellas have almost one-third of the Total Net Assets of Lux-
embourg as fund domicile, and almost half of the Total Net Assets of the promoters to 
which they belong. It should be noted that all funds under one umbrella have the same 
board, implying that all governance data gathered applies at this level. In order to 
empirically analyse relationships between governance characteristics on the one hand, 
and costs and performance on the other hand, funds were selected from some of the 
largest sectors within the equity asset classes, specifically Global equity, Pan-European 
equity, Euroland equity, U.S. equity, Japan equity and Emerging Markets equity.  
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Luxembourg as a fund domicile is the ideal testing ground for the relationship between 
fund governance and costs and performance. The market is unique in its width and 
depth, with a large number of promoters from different home countries operating in a 
single legal and regulatory environment and offering a wide variety of funds. This fact 
has the advantage that a relatively large, homogeneous sample of funds sharing the 
same legal and regulatory framework can be formed. Although independent directors 
are not mandatory in Luxembourg, independent directors are not exceptional. Of the 
45 cross-border promoters included in the sample at the end of 2009, almost half (22) 
had at least one independent or semi-independent member on the board of their 
flagship umbrella. Out of the 285 board seats as of that same date, 52 (18.2%) were 
qualified as independent and 20 (7.0%) as semi-independent.  
The question of whether umbrella boards have become more independent in the 
past decade has turned out to be less clear cut and the answer actually varies, depend-
ing on which definition is used for board independence. In the 2000-2009 period, there 
has been some polarisation visible in the sample of umbrellas: 
• The percentage of directors in the sample who are (semi-) independent increased 
from 21.9% at the beginning to 25.3% at the end of the research period. 
• The percentage of umbrellas with at least one (semi-) independent board member 
decreased in the same period from 62.8% to 48.9%. This finding indicates that 
there are more umbrellas that developed from having at least one (semi-) inde-
pendent member to having dependent members only than vice-versa.  
 
These seemingly contradictory developments can be explained by the fact that on 
boards with (semi-) independent board members, the proportion of these board mem-
ber categories increased. The Anglo-Saxon promoters are responsible for this devel-
opment. Among Anglo-Saxon promoters, it is more common to have boards with inde-
pendent board members than among continental European promoters. Furthermore, 
they have developed towards more independence in the last decade, whereas the 
opposite is true for the continental European promoters.  
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Chapter 5 
Governance and costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…the supposedly independent boards of directors should be asking tougher questions, 
such as why management fees aren’t being reduced as some funds mushroom in size. 
The problem is that most directors are afraid if they raise these issues they’ll be shown 
the door from these cushy jobs that often pay tens of thousands of dollars per year for 
very little work.”97 
                                                                
97 Eric Tyson, 1995, Mutual funds for dummies (IDG Books Worldwide, Foster City), p. 358.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the analysis of fund costs in relationship to governance char-
acteristics. The goal is to establish whether governance characteristics explain varia-
tion in annual recurring costs. The main question of this chapter is whether or not fund 
investors benefit from more independent governance in the form of lower costs. The 
results from earlier empirical are inconsistent. Using data of U.S. open-end funds in 
1992, Tufano and Sevick (1997) find evidence of a positive contribution of independent 
governance; funds with a larger proportion of independent directors charge lower 
fees. Similar results are found by Del Guercio et al. (2003) and Gemmill and Thomas 
(2006) for closed-end funds in the U.S. and the U.K., respectively.  
For a sample of index funds, Adams et al. (2010) do not find a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the percentage of independent board members or the posi-
tion of the chair and costs. Cremers et al. (2009) find no statistically relationship be-
tween the percentage of independent directors and costs for open-end funds in the 
2002-2004 period. Analysing data of U.S. open-end funds over a longer period (1995-
2004), Meschke (2007) also does not find a statistically significant relationship for the 
percentage of independent board members and costs for the whole period. However, 
splitting this period into three parts, he finds that, whereas a higher percentage of 
independents is associated with higher costs in the first and second part of the period, 
it is associated with lower costs in the third part. Chair independence is associated 
with lower costs both for the entire period and for the three sub-periods.  
Ferris and Yan (2007b) perform a similar analysis for data of open-end funds con-
cerning the year 2002, but fail to find that a higher percentage of independent direc-
tors or independent chairmen are associated with lower costs. They argue that this 
might be the case because in their sample of U.S. funds, there is little cross-sectional 
variation in the percentage of independent directors. In the U.S., most fund manage-
ment companies have a supermajority of independent directors and their funds, fol-
lowing ICI’s 1999 best practice recommendation of a two-third majority of independ-
ents. Already since the 1940 Act, U.S. funds are required to have at least 40% inde-
pendent directors on their boards. In Luxembourg, it is not mandatory to have inde-
pendent board members. In the sample of Luxembourg funds analysed in this chapter, 
that variation is larger, possibly leading to different results. In 2008, the final year of 
the cost analysis, approximately half of the promoters in the sample had dependent 
board members only on their fund boards, whereas the other half had at least one 
semi-independent or independent board member. In that year, the percentage of 
independent board members on the boards in the sample varied from 0% to 73.5%.  
Tufano and Sevick (1997), Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Cremers et al. (2009) find 
that for open-end funds, larger boards are associated with higher costs. Results consis-
tent with this finding are found for index funds by Adams et al. (2010) and for closed-
end funds by Del Guercio et al. (2003), as well as Gemmill and Thomas (2006). In the 
case of Meschke (2007), however, the results for the board size variable are not statis-
tically significant.  
Tufano and Sevick (1997), Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Meschke (2007) all find some 
evidence that boards with a higher compensation relative to the number of funds and 
assets overseen are associated with higher fund costs, consistent with the notion that 
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high compensation results in a financial dependency and lesser alignment with inves-
tor interests. Board members investing in the funds they oversee could improve the 
alignment of their interests with those of investors. Indeed, Meschke (2007) finds evi-
dence that higher investment in the funds overseen is related to lower costs, but in the 
case of Ferris and Yan (2007b), this relationship is not statistically significant. Cremers 
et al. (2009) find only for the category of non-independent directors that higher own-
ership is associated with lower fees. Their results for independent director ownership 
are not statistically significant. Tufano and Sevick (1997) could not include an owner-
ship variable in their analysis because for U.S mutual funds, data on directors’ owner-
ship is only available starting in 2002. Unfortunately, it is not possible to include either 
compensation or ownership variables in this study of Luxembourg UCITS. In Luxem-
bourg, it is not required to disclose information regarding directors’ compensation or 
investments in the funds they oversee.  
The study presented in this chapter uses the Total Expense Ratio (TER) and two of 
its components as cost measures at the fund level. As a robustness check, the analysis 
is repeated at the umbrella level, using the average Relative Cost Indicator (RCI). The 
RCI was developed specifically for this study as a measure for the overall pricing level 
of the funds in an umbrella. Section 5.2 provides details of the definitions for fund 
costs used in this chapter and lists the sources for the cost data used. Section 5.3 uses 
descriptive statistics to analyse the development of costs in the sample from 2000 until 
2008. Section 5.4 analyses the remuneration of fund board members, which can be 
seen as the direct costs of boards. Section 5.5 is dedicated to the multiple regression 
analysis at the fund level. First, the model and variables are described, then the sample 
is explored with descriptive statistics and the model is formalised. Subsequently, the 
results of various regression model specifications are provided. Section 5.6 deals with 
the issue of endogeneity. Section 5.7 is dedicated to an analysis similar to those in 
sections 5.5 and 5.6, but at the umbrella, rather than fund, level. Section 5.8 provides 
two robustness checks of the results found in section 5.5. Section 5.9 presents the 
conclusion. 
5.2 Cost definitions and data 
Management and Distribution Fee 
The first component of the TER distinguished in this study is the Sum of Management 
Fee and Distribution Fee. Management Fee is the fee for managing the fund portfolio, 
including any investment advisory expenses. The management fee represents the 
amount of wealth transferred from the fund investor to the fund promoter. It is, there-
fore, the primary part of the total expenses where conflicts of interest can be expected 
between the promoter and the investor. 
It should be noted that fund distributors are normally paid for their services in the 
form of a retrocession98. Retrocessions are paid from, and are therefore part of, the 
management fee paid by the investor. In the case where funds charge a separate, 
transparent Distribution Fee, this amount is added to the management fee for the 
                                                                
98 See section 1.6.  
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various analyses in this dissertation, in order to make a comparison between compa-
rable items. This practice is in line with Lipper (2009b, p. 18), which comments:  
“that outside the US it is not normal practice for the promoter to disclose the 
distribution fees that they pay to introducers (e.g. financial advisers or inter-
mediaries). Typically the promoter will rebate part of the management fee to 
introducers, but will negotiate this on a case by case basis. Distribution fees are 
not uniform, even within one fund. Nor are these payments in the public do-
main, not even to those invested in the fund. 
US promoters, however, have led moves towards transparency in this area by 
showing the distribution fee that is paid automatically to introducers sepa-
rately from the management fee, in respect of a specific fund/share class. 
This transparent type of fee is equivalent to a 12b-1 type fee on US-domiciled 
funds. Management fee comparisons need to include distribution fees in order 
to make like-with-like comparisons with funds that charge an untransparent 
distribution fee from the management fee. We therefore recommend wher-
ever ‘transparent’ distribution fees are paid that these are considered along-
side the management fee.” 
Other Costs 
The second component of the TER distinguished in this study is that of Other Costs, 
which includes costs for administration, consisting of valuations and accounting, as 
well as transfer agency and shareholder service, custody, including depositary and 
trustee, audit and other expenses. Other Costs is an area where conflicts of interest 
might be subtler than with management fees. Since the Other Costs category includes 
custody, fund accounting and transfer agency (functions that are often provided by 
companies of the promoter group), this category could still represent a wealth transfer 
from the investors in the fund to the promoter group. Other Costs typically include 
costs that could be considered quasi-marketing costs, such as country registrations and 
start-up costs for new funds. Furthermore, Other Costs include the annual subscription 
tax applicable for Luxembourg funds (taxe d’abonnement). For the share classes in the 
sample, i.e., retail shares of equity funds, the rate is five basis points per annum99. 
Total Expense Ratio 
The Total Expense Ratio (TER) is the total of all ongoing expenses, expressed as a per-
centage of the average net assets. The TER%i,T of fund i in period t can be calculated as 
follows: 
 
titititi OtherDistrMgtTER ,,,, %%%% ++=      (5.1) 
 
where: 
Mgt%i,t denotes the Management Fee percentage, as stated in the fund’s prospectus 
and annual accounts. 
 
                                                                
99 The “taxe d’abonnement” changed from 6 to 5 basis points as per 1 January 2002. 
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tititi DistrDistr ,,, Assets Net Avg% =      (5.2) 
 
tititi OtherOther ,,, Assets Net Avg% =      (5.3) 
 
Dist%i,t and Other%i,t denote the Distribution Fee percentage and Other Costs percent-
age, calculated using the Distribution Fee (Disti,t) and Other Costs amounts (Otheri,t) 
from the fund’s annual accounts and the Average Net Assets, as calculated according 
to Eq. (5.4).  
 
tititi MgtMgt ,,, %Assets Net Avg =      (5.4) 
 
With Eq. (5.4), the Management Fee amount (Mgti,t) from the fund’s annual accounts 
and the stated Management Fee percentage (Mgt%i,t) are used to calculate the fund’s 
average net assets100. 
 
There are several types of costs associated with investing in funds that are not in-
cluded in the TER: 
• Performance fees, which in a certain period may or may not be charged, depending 
on performance achieved. 
• Costs associated with transactions in the portfolio, such as brokerage commissions 
and stamp duties. 
• Entry and exit charges, often referred to as subscription and redemption charges or 
front-end and back-end loads. In a fund’s prospectus, a relatively high maximum 
subscription and redemption charge is usually set, within which each distributor 
can set the actual charge. These actual charges accrue to the distributor and differ 
significantly across channels (e.g., direct channel versus advisory channel), across 
distributors and across markets. Therefore, it is not possible to determine what 
subscription and redemption charges investors actually pay. In this dissertation, the 
focus is on the influence of the board of directors on costs. Although the directors, 
in theory, have influence on the maximum charges set in the prospectus, it is the 
distributor who determines the actual charges within this maximum. The impact of 
the entry and exit charges on the longer-term performance of the investor depends 
on the investor’s holding period in the fund. 
 
The TER as defined above is comparable to the expense ratio or annual operating ex-
penses used in U.S. fund studies and is substantially the same as the Ongoing Charges 
Figure as defined by CESR (2010), including101 and excluding102 the same categories of 
                                                                
100 This method to calculate a fund’s Average Net Assets follows the Lipper methodology (see Lipper Fitz-
rovia, 2007). For example, in the case that a fund has a management fee of 1.5% and the management fees 
charged in a financial statement for a one-year period is EUR 1.5 million, the average net assets over the 
accounting period are exactly EUR 100 million. This calculation method of the Average Net Assets has the 
advantage that it is not dependent on how frequently the NAV is calculated. 
101 CESR (2010, p. 4): “The following list is indicative but not exhaustive of the types of ongoing charge that, if 
they are deducted from the assets of a UCITS, shall be taken into account in the amount to be disclosed: 
(a) all payments to the following persons, including any person to whom they have delegated any function: 
- the management company of the UCITS 
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costs. The Ongoing Charges Figure is a mandatory element of the Key Investor Infor-
mation Document (KIID) under UCITS IV. In the remainder of this chapter, the TER is 
used as the primary cost measure, since it is the most comprehensive of the three 
measures used. Several analyses are also performed on the other two cost measures, 
the Sum of Management and Distribution Fees and the Other Costs. 
Relative Cost Indicator 
The pricing strategy, i.e., the setting of management fees and other fees, is often de-
termined by the fund promoter at umbrella or fund range level, not per individual 
fund. For this reason, the analysis of the relationship between governance characteris-
tics, which are also umbrella and not fund specific, and costs is done at the individual 
fund level, as well as at the umbrella level. The Relative Cost Indicator was developed 
for this purpose, as a measure for the overall level of fund costs in an umbrella, rela-
tive to competitors. The Relative Cost Indicator expresses the cost of a fund as the 
distance in standard deviations from the mean of the costs of funds in the same sector. 
The Relative Cost Indicator of a certain umbrella is the average of the RCI of all funds in 
the sample belonging to that umbrella.  
 
The Relative Cost Indicator for fund i in period t can be calculated as follows: 
 ( ) tststiti SDTERTERRCI ,,,, %%% −=       (5.5) 
 
where: 
TER%s,t is the average cost level of funds in the same sector 
SD%s,t is the standard deviation of costs of funds in the same sector 
                                                                                                                                                             
- directors of the UCITS if an investment company 
- the depositary 
- the custodian(s) 
- any investment adviser; 
(b) all payments to any person providing outsourced services to any of the above, including: 
- providers of valuation and fund accounting services 
- shareholder service providers, such as the transfer agent and broker dealers that are record owners of the 
UCITS’ shares and provide sub-accounting services to the beneficial owners of those shares; 
(c) registration fees, regulatory fees and similar charges; 
(d) audit fees; 
(e) payments to legal and professional advisers; 
(f) any costs of distribution.” 
102 CESR (2010, p. 4-5): “The following charges and payments shall not form part of the amount to be dis-
closed as ongoing charges in the KID:  
(a) entry / exit charges or commissions, or any other amount paid directly by the investor or deducted from 
a payment received from or due to the investor; 
(b) a performance-related fee payable to the management company or any investment adviser; 
(c) interest on borrowing; 
(d) payments to third parties to meet costs necessarily incurred in connection with the acquisition or dis-
posal of any asset for the UCITS’ portfolio, whether those costs are explicit (e.g. brokerage charges, taxes 
and linked charges) or implicit (e.g. costs of dealing in fixed interest securities, market impact costs); 
(e) payments incurred for the holding of financial derivative instruments (e.g. margin calls); 
(f) the value of goods or services received by the management company or any connected person in ex-
change for placing of dealing orders (soft commissions or any similar arrangement).“ 
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Relative Cost Indicator for umbrella u in period t is a measure for the relative cost level 
of funds in that umbrella and is calculated as follows: 
 
Relative Cost Indicator for umbrella u in period t: 
 

=
=
un
i
utitu nRCIRCI
1
,,        (5.6) 
 
where: 
nu = number of funds in umbrella u included in the sample 
 
Because funds with a performance fee might have a lower TER, the Relative Cost Indi-
cator is calculated excluding funds that had a performance fee schedule in place in the 
specific period. 
Data 
The data for fund costs was received from Lipper, the leading provider of investment 
fund fees and expenses data in Europe, specifically for the analysis in this dissertation. 
Using this data source, rather than collecting TER data from the fund promoters or 
calculating TERs using data from the funds’ annual reports, has three main advantages: 
• Lipper is independent from the promoter groups and is a source for cost data that 
is well accepted in the industry. 
• Lipper calculates the TERs and its components in a consistent manner through time 
and across fund promoters, which allows comparisons between funds of different 
fund promoters and at different moments in time. This would not be the case if the 
data were collected from the fund promoters, as these would likely use different 
definitions. Lipper does not rely on TERs gathered from the fund promoters. It cal-
culates TERs using data from the funds’ published financial statements and ac-
counts, using all fee and expense items. 
• Funds with multiple share classes do not usually disclose expenses at share class 
level in their financial statements. Lipper calculates expenses at share class level us-
ing additional data provided by the fund promoters, while still being able to recon-
cile the figures to the fund level expenses in the financial statements, thus ensuring 
accuracy. 
 
Cost data from Lipper always concerns a fund’s full financial year or the first half 
thereof. Only data for full financial years was used for this study. Lipper calculates cost 
data only if a fund in a certain financial year has been in existence for at least 90 days.  
There are several funds in the sample that changed sector during the research pe-
riod and, as a result, either entered into or dropped from the sample. An example is 
Axa World Funds-British Equities, which changed from a U.K. into a Pan-European 
equity fund (changing its name to Axa World Funds-Talents Europe), thus entering the 
sample. In such cases, the cost data for the financial year in which the change occurred 
was not included in the analysis because it would have contained data for the period in 
which the fund was included in a sector not included in the sample. 
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Not all financial years of the funds in the sample are the same. In fact, all month-ends 
are represented in the sample as end-dates of the funds’ financial years. Less than half 
of the umbrellas in the sample use the calendar year as their financial year. A disad-
vantage of comparing costs of funds with different financial years is that it could bring 
a timing bias into the results, in the case of an upward or downward trend of cost 
levels in the period of analysis. When comparing costs of funds in a period ending in a 
certain year, it might only seem that a fund with a financial year ending in December is 
more expensive than a fund with a January year-end, simply because a fee increase for 
the latter fund in the same calendar year is not yet included in the data. For this rea-
son, the cost data for all funds is recalculated to calendar years, by time-weighting the 
cost data of subsequent years103. A fund is included in the analysis for a certain calen-
dar year when there is at least 90 days of data for that year.  
For certain umbrellas, Lipper did not treat Distribution Fees consistently through 
time, in some years including Distribution Fees as part of Other Costs. This inconsis-
tency has been corrected, based on information regarding fund costs included in the 
fund umbrellas’ annual reports.  
There are two promoters that have a so-called All-In Fee. In those cases, the TER 
cannot be broken down into Management and Distribution Fees on the one hand, and 
Other Costs, on the other hand. These funds are only included in the sample for the 
analyses of TER data, not for analyses of its two components. 
5.3 Development of costs 
Figure 5.1 displays the development of fund costs in the sample in the 2000–2008 
research period. The chart shows the simple average of the Sum of Management and 
Distribution Fee, the Other Costs and the TER, distinguished separately for the six sec-
tors (Global equity, U.S. equity, Japan equity, Pan-European equity, Euroland equity 
and Emerging Markets equity). Excluded from the sample for the chart are funds that 
had a performance fee schedule in place in the specific calendar year. Funds that have 
a performance fee are a minority in the sample. Such funds might have different regu-
lar fees and could therefore distort the averages. Figures for 2009 are not included 
because at the time of analysis, no figures for the full year 2009 were available yet for 
the majority of funds.  
For all fund sectors in the sample, the mean of the Sum of Management and Dis-
tribution Fees has increased in the 2000-2008 period. For the developed markets sec-
tors, the average Management and Distribution Fee increased from below 1.4% for all 
sectors to around 1.5% in 2008. In 2008, the developed markets sector with the high-
est average Management and Distribution Fee was Japan equity, with an average of 
1.54%, and the lowest was Euroland equity, with an average of 1.49%. Whereas for the 
developed markets sectors, the average Sum of Management and Distribution Fees 
developed within a small margin from each other, the average Management and Dis-
                                                                
103 In the case where a fund has a March-end financial year and 0.25% of other costs in the first financial year 
and 0.30% of other costs in the second financial year, the other costs for the calendar year are estimated at 
90/365 * 0.25% + 275/365 * 0.30%.  
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tribution Fee for Emerging Markets equity was consistently higher. For the Emerging 
Markets sector, the average Management and Distribution Fee increased from 1.57% 
in 2000 to 1.69% in 2008. Except for Pan-European equity, all sectors saw a decrease of 
the Other Costs in the period from 2000 until 2008. Only in the case of Emerging Mar-
kets equity, the TER decreased. In all other sectors, TERs increased in the 2000-2008 
period. 
 
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
TER-Global
TER-EM
TER-US
TER-Japan
TER-Pan-Europe
TER-Euroland
Mgt+Distr-Global
Mgt+Distr-EM
Mgt+Distr-US
Mgt+Distr-Japan
Mgt+Distr-Pan-Europe
Mgt+Distr-Euroland
Other-Global
Other-EM
Other-US
Other-Japan
Other-Pan-Europe
Other-Euroland
 
Figure 5.1: Historical fee trend in sample 
Source: Lipper 
 
These developments are in line with Lipper (2008), a study into the development of 
European fund costs in the 1994-2007 period. Lipper (2008) finds that the Sum of 
Management and Distribution Fees for retail share classes of cross-border equity funds 
has increased steadily throughout the period mentioned, from approximately 1.3% to 
almost 1.6% on average. Unlike in the sample for this study, Lipper uses a sample of 
funds domiciled in Luxembourg and Ireland for the cross-border segment. Further-
more, the equity asset class is not broken down into sectors, as it is in this study.  
According to Lipper, two factors have contributed to the steady increase in Man-
agement Fees: the increase in Management Fees of existing funds and the launch of 
new funds with fees at or above the average fee level at the time. The latter is partly 
the result of new funds launched in more specialised and exotic funds sectors, for 
which higher Management Fees are charged. Fund promoters generally explain the 
increase in Management Fees by the rising cost of distribution (Lipper, 2008, p. 4-5). 
The same study finds that Management Fees are not lower for larger funds but TERs 
are. This finding indicates that economies of scale in the area of Other Costs are shared 
with investors of funds, not in the area of management fees.  
After an initial decline in the TER in the period until around 2000, despite the in-
crease in Management Fees, TERs have moved upwards again since then. This increase 
can be explained by the combination of a drop in fund assets, due to the fall of the 
equity markets, and the continued upward trend in Management Fees. Increasingly, 
fund promoters actively manage their TERs, for example by introducing TER caps, Fixed 
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Service Fees or All-In Fees104. Active TER management has contributed to the decline in 
the simple average TER in the final years of the research period (Lipper, 2008, p. 5). 
Table 5.1 provides further details of the average costs by sector in the sample used 
for this study for the years 2000 and 2008. It also provides the differences between the 
values for these two years and the t-values for the differences. When the difference is 
statistically significant at the level of 5%, it is highlighted in dark grey. For differences 
that are significant at the 10%-level, a lighter shade of grey is used. Please note that 
the number of observations for Management and Distribution Fee, as well as Other 
Costs on the one hand, and TERs on the other hand, are not equal. This discrepancy is 
caused by two fund promoters having an All-In fee structure. For these cases, only the 
TERs are included in the analysis, not its components. 
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of the average fund costs by sector in 2000 and in 2008 
Sector Mean TER%1 n1 Mean TER%2 n2 Delta1,2 t
Global 1.802% 50 1.876% 70 0.073% 1.54
Emerging Markets 2.133% 25 2.079% 31 -0.053% -0.58
US 1.711% 51 1.861% 92 0.151% 3.20
Japan 1.762% 40 1.866% 47 0.105% 1.59
Pan-Europe 1.680% 50 1.859% 88 0.178% 3.61
Euroland 1.658% 26 1.759% 31 0.100% 1.60
Sector 
Mean 
Mgt%+Distr%1 n1 Mean Mgt%+Distr%2 n2 Delta1,2 t
Global 1.383% 49 1.526% 67 0.143% 3.65
Emerging Markets 1.566% 25 1.686% 30 0.120% 1.85
US 1.399% 46 1.529% 89 0.130% 3.45
Japan 1.391% 37 1.537% 44 0.146% 2.85
Pan-Europe 1.330% 49 1.507% 84 0.177% 4.50
Euroland 1.324% 25 1.487% 24 0.163% 3.02
Sector Mean Other%1 n1 Mean Other%2 n2 Delta1,2 t
Global 0.425% 49 0.357% 67 -0.067% -1.91
Emerging Markets 0.567% 25 0.383% 30 -0.184% -2.97
US 0.349% 48 0.337% 89 -0.013% -0.41
Japan 0.394% 37 0.351% 44 -0.043% -0.95
Pan-Europe 0.352% 49 0.356% 84 0.004% 0.11
Euroland 0.350% 25 0.323% 24 -0.027% -0.75
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level 
Source: Lipper 
 
For the Sum of Management and Distribution Fee, the increase in the 2000–2008 pe-
riod is statistically significant at the 5%-level for all developed markets sectors. For 
Emerging Markets equity, it is significant at the 10%-level only. The decrease in Other 
Costs seen for all sectors is statistically significant at the 5%-level only in the case of 
Emerging Markets and is significant at the level of 10% for Global equity. For all devel-
oped market sectors, the increase in the Sum of Management and Distribution Fee 
                                                                
104 With Fixed Service Fees, the Other Costs are fixed in basis points of the assets, so that they do not fluctu-
ate with actual expenses or assets under management. In case of an All-In Fees, there is one basis point fee 
that covers management, distribution and other costs.  
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offsets the decrease in Other Costs, resulting in an increase in the TERs. For the U.S. 
equity and Pan-European equity sectors, the TER increase is statistically significant, in 
both cases at the level of 5%. Emerging Markets equity is the only sector where the 
decrease in Other Costs offsets the increase in the Management and Distribution Fee, 
resulting in a decrease in the TER. However, this decrease is not statistically significant. 
5.4 Direct costs of independent governance 
Before analysing the relationship between fund governance and fund costs in the sub-
sequent sections of this chapter, this section explores the direct costs of board mem-
bers. This is relevant because if the remuneration of board members is material in 
relationship to the funds’ assets, then these direct costs influence the TERs. In that 
case, the direct costs of board members could be such that they offset any benefit 
they might have for the investors in the form of setting lower fees or containing costs. 
In Luxembourg, it is not mandatory for funds to disclose in the annual report the 
remuneration for directors in their role on the umbrella’s board. However, some funds 
do disclose remuneration data voluntarily. The overview in table 5.2 was constructed 
on the basis of data included in annual reports. In all cases where board remuneration 
data was available, the fees were only paid to directors in the category of semi-
independent or independent directors. This finding is line with the outcome of a PwC 
survey among 31 board members of Luxembourg UCITS, the results of which are 
shown in figure 5.2. In general, directors who are employees of the promoter group 
(i.e., dependent board members) receive no remuneration or it is included in their 
salary. Lawyers who are board members usually charge their hourly fees rather than 
receiving regular board compensation (PwC, 2011, p. 8). As shown in figure 5.2, 39% of 
UCITS independent directors earn more than EUR 20,000, 31% earn between EUR 
10,000 and EUR 20,000 and 30% earn EUR 10,000 or less.  
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Figure 5.2: UCITS Board member remuneration  
Source: PwC (2011, p. 9) 
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Table 5.2 provides details about the remuneration of independent directors for the 
umbrellas in the sample that included the board remuneration in the annual reports. 
The directors on these boards earned more than in the survey, with the board mem-
bers of six out of seven umbrellas earning above EUR 20,000 in both the financial year 
ending 2008 and that ending in 2009. 
 
Table 5.2: Board member remuneration  
 Promoter Remuneration per (semi-) 
independent director 
(in EUR) 
Total director remunera-
tion for umbrella  
(in EUR) 
Total director remuneration 
for umbrella  
(in bp of average assets) 
  2008  2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 
BlackRock1 25,000 37,500 50,000 150,000 0.009 0.030 
Fidelity 45,078 44,000 270,470 264,000 0.044 0.058 
Goldman Sachs2 22,506 69,905 67,519 209,714 0.055 0.200 
Henderson 38,316 21,157 38,316 21,157 0.075 0.061 
JPMorgan 21,318 22,786 106,592 113,931 0.021 0.037 
Lloyds TSB 15,692 13,553 31,384 27,106 0.593 0.598 
Morgan Stanley 35,000 35,000 70,000 70,000 0.056 0.070 
Source: Annual reports (2008 and 2009) of the umbrellas in the sample. 
1. BlackRock annual reports mention that the director fees stated are net of tax. Tax rate (20% of gross 
amount) is added. In all other cases, the amounts stated in the Annual Reports are assumed to be gross 
amounts. 
2. In the case of Goldman Sachs, the independent board members serve on more than one SICAV with an 
agreed upon remuneration for their total package of activities. Costs are allocated to SICAVs based on the 
number of funds and assets under management. This explains significant jumps in remuneration for one 
SICAV from one year to the next. 
 
For none of the umbrellas in table 5.2 was the board remuneration more than one 
basis point of the Total Net Assets of the umbrella. Actually, for all but one of the um-
brellas was the total remuneration less than one-tenth of a basis point of the Total Net 
Assets of the umbrella. From this finding, combined with the PwC survey data (PwC, 
2011, p. 8), it can be concluded that the direct impact of the board member remunera-
tion on the total fund costs is not material in relationship to the assets managed. 
5.5 Multiple regression analysis – Individual fund level 
This section is dedicated to the multiple regression analysis at the level of the individ-
ual funds in the sample. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the relationship 
between fund costs as a dependent variable and the funds’ governance characteristics 
as explanatory variables, while correcting for possible other influences, for example 
that of affiliate distribution and fund size, with several control variables. 
Three different definitions of costs (C%i,t) at fund level are used as dependent vari-
ables. The primary measure for costs is the Total Expense Ratio (TER%). The analysis is 
also performed with the two components of the TER%: the Sum of Management and 
Distribution Fee (Mgt%+Distr%) and the Other Costs (Other%). These analyses serve as 
robustness checks and clarify which of the two TER components is the driving force 
behind the relationships found between the TER% and different explanatory variables. 
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Governance variables 
In the regression analysis, various governance characteristics are used as explanatory 
variables. Formal definitions of the governance variables are provided in table 5.3. The 
first governance variable is: 
• Size of the board of directors. This variable is measured as the average total num-
ber of board members in a calendar year. Larger boards may be less effective than 
smaller boards in monitoring and decision-making, potentially suffering from coor-
dination problems and a higher risk of free riding. 
 
The hypothesis being tested in this dissertation is that more independent boards are 
more effective from the viewpoint of the investor, in the sense that a higher degree of 
independence is associated with lower costs and/or better performance. Several 
measures of independence are used: 
• Percentage of independent board members. Independent board members are not 
tied to the fund promoter or any of its service providers as an employee or partner. 
The hypothesis being tested is that this category of directors should be the most ef-
fective in pursuing the interests of the investors because they should be the least 
affected by conflicts of interest and therefore, the most inclined to put the inter-
ests of the investors first. 
• Percentage of semi-independent board members. Semi-independent board mem-
bers are not employed by the fund promoter, but because they are either former 
employees of the promoter or employees of a service provider, they still have an 
economic link to and/or dependency on the fund promoter. When it matters, their 
loyalty might well be with the fund promoter, rather than with the investors. Nev-
ertheless, given that they are not employed by the fund promoter, there is no hier-
archical relationship with the management thereof, which can still result in a more 
independent position on the board than that of dependent board members. 
• Chair (dummy). Dummy variable taking the value of one when the position of 
chairman is held by an independent or semi-independent director for at least half 
of the period. The chairman can be the most influential board member, for exam-
ple, determining the meeting agendas and having the deciding vote when votes are 
tied between the other board members. Boards with a chairman who is not em-
ployed by the fund promoter might well be able to take a more independent stance 
towards the fund promoter, irrespective of the overall percentage of independent 
or semi-independent board members on the board. 
• Independence of the depositary (dummy). Dummy variable taking the value of one 
when the depositary does not belong to the promoter group for at least half of the 
period under analysis. In that case, the depository can be considered independent 
from the fund promoter. Based on the UCITS Directive and Luxembourg fund regu-
lations, the depositary has an oversight role. The depositary might be more effec-
tive in exercising its oversight function when it does not have an intra-group rela-
tionship with the fund promoter. In its function as custodian of the fund assets, the 
depositary is also a service provider to the fund. Having a service provider from the 
same group can give rise to additional conflicts of interest, in particular with regard 
to the pricing of these services. 
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Table 5.3: Definitions of governance variables (applying at the level of the umbrella u)  
Variable  Description Definition (source) 
tuT ,  Average total number of board members of 
umbrella u in calendar 
year t  
Average based on daily observations for the number of board members.  
(source: PFGD105) 
tuI ,%  Percentage of inde-pendent board mem-
bers of umbrella u in 
calendar year t 
 
tu,tu,tu, TII% =   
where: 
Iu,t is the average number of independent board members in calendar 
year t, based on daily observations.  
(source: PFGD) 
tuS ,%  Percentage of semi-independent board 
members of umbrella 
u in calendar year t 
 
tu,tu,tu, TSS% =  
where: 
Su,t is the average number of semi-independent board members in calen-
dar year t, based on daily observations.  
(source: PFGD) 
tuCH ,  
 
 
Independency status 
of the chair of the 
board of umbrella u in 
calendar year t 
(dummy) 
Dummy variable equals 1 when the chair is taken by either an independ-
ent or semi-independent board member for more than half the year. 
(source: PFGD) 
tuDEP ,  
 
Independency status 
of the depositary of 
umbrella u in calendar 
year t (dummy)  
Dummy variable equals 1 when the depositary is independent from the 
promoter, i.e., not belonging to the promoter group, for more than half 
the  year. 
(source: PFGD) 
tuTEN ,%3  Board tenure for umbrella u in calendar 
year t 
 
Tu,Tu,tu, TTEN3TEN3% =  
where: 
TEN3u,T is the number of board members with at least 3 years experience 
in the position on the board of umbrella u on the final day of calendar 
year t. Tu,T is total number of board members on the final day of calendar 
year t. 
(source: PFGD) 
tuLEG ,  Legal form of the umbrella (dummy) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if in calendar year t the umbrella is an FCP or 
equals 0 if it is an SICAV.  
(source: annual reports) 
 
In addition to board size and the various measures for independence, the board’s ten-
ure and the legal form of the umbrella are used as governance variables in the regres-
sion analysis: 
• Board tenure. This variable is a measure for board member experience. Board 
members with more experience could be more effective in their oversight role. 
However, independent board members might lose their ability to act independ-
ently from the fund promoter when their tenure is longer. Because board data was 
collected for the 2000–2009 period, it is not known on which exact date directors 
in the sample on 1 January 2000 were appointed. It could, for example, be one day 
before 1 January 2000 or 10 years prior. For this reason, it is not possible to calcu-
late the tenure for each director, nor the average tenure for each umbrella board. 
As an alternative, board tenure is measured on the final day of a calendar year as 
the percentage of board members with at least three years experience in their po-
                                                                
105 Proprietary Fund Governance Database.  
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sition on the board. This implies that, on the basis of the available data, this meas-
ure can be calculated as of 31 December 2002. 
• Legal form of the umbrella (dummy). The umbrellas in the sample either have the 
legal form of an SICAV or an FCP. In the case of an FCP, which is a contractual vehi-
cle, the fund promoter has stricter control over the umbrella. The board of the 
management company is, at the same time, the board of the umbrella. Therefore, 
the board of the umbrella does not form an additional layer of oversight. Addition-
ally, contrary to the SICAV, in the case of the FCP, there is no shareholders meeting 
where the investors can elect members of the board or vote on other matters af-
fecting the fund. This difference might imply that there is a greater risk of conflict 
of interest in the case of an FCP. A dummy variable of one is included in the regres-
sion analysis if the umbrella is an FCP. Only in one case during the research period 
was there a change in the legal form of a promoter’s umbrella in the sample. 
Control variables 
In addition to the governance characteristics as explanatory variables, several control 
variables are included in the regression analysis. These control variables potentially 
affect the dependent variable. The function of the control variables is to remove their 
impact on the dependent variable so that the relationship between the explanatory 
variables (in this case, the governance characteristics) and the dependent variables (in 
this case, various measures for costs) can be analysed without interference. Formal 
definitions of the control variables are provided in table 5.4. The first set of control 
variables relates to the fee structure of the fund. The two variables for this category 
are: 
• Performance Fee (dummy). Certain funds in the sample have a fee structure with a 
performance-related fee. Performance-related fees are not captured in the Total 
Expense Ratio. Because funds with a performance fee could have lower regular 
fees, a dummy variable is included in the analysis, distinguishing funds with and 
without performance fees. Whether or not a fund has a performance fee in place is 
determined on the basis of the fund prospectuses and annual reports. The dummy 
variable is one if a performance fee is in place for at least part of the period. 
• Fixed TER (dummy). Increasingly, funds domiciled in Luxembourg have a fixed TER 
in basis points, either as a result of a so-called All-In Fee or a Fixed Service Fee. An 
All-In Fee is in place when the fund has one basis point fee covering all ongoing ex-
penses. In the case of a Fixed Service Fee, the Management Fee and Other Costs 
are quoted separately, but both in basis points, still resulting in a fixed TER. The ad-
vantage for the investor of a fixed TER is that it is clear beforehand what will be the 
total level of costs in basis points. A disadvantage of such a fee structure is that it 
might result in higher costs for the investor. The fund promoter might build in a fee 
cushion as a risk premium and/or profit margin. Charging a risk premium is under-
standable because with a fixed TER, the promoter takes on the risks of increasing 
absolute costs and declining assets under management, resulting in higher relative 
costs. The fund prospectuses and annual reports were used to determine whether 
funds have a fixed TER fee structure. The dummy variable is one if a fixed TER is in 
place at least for part of the period. 
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Table 5.4: Definitions of control variables (applying at the level of the fund i, umbrella u or promoter p)  
Variable  Description Definition (source) 
tiPF ,  Performance Fee (dummy) 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if for fund i a performance fee is in place 
during (part of) calendar year t. 
(source: prospectuses and annual reports) 
tiFIX ,  Fixed TER  (dummy) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if for fund i a Fixed Service Fee or All-In Fee is 
in place during (part of) calendar year t. 
(source: prospectuses and annual reports) 
tiLTNA ,  Fund scale  LTNAi,t is the natural logarithm of the average Total Net Assets of fund i in calendar year t. The average is calculated based on monthly values 
obtained by taking the average of the Total Net Assets in the fund at 
the beginning and at the end of the month. All figures are in millions of 
Euros. The monthly data is available only from the end of 2001. For 
2001, fund scale is measured as the natural logarithm of the Total Net 
Assets at the end of December of that year. For 2000, the measure 
used is the natural logarithm of the Total Net Assets at the end of the 
financial year ending that year, as included in the fund’s annual report. 
(source: Lipper FMI from end of 2001; for 2000 annual reports) 
tuLTNA ,  Umbrella scale Natural logarithm of Total Net Assets of umbrella u in calendar year t, taken at the end of the financial year ending in year t. All figures are in 
millions of Euros. When the figure given in the annual report is in a 
different currency, it is transferred to Euros with the exchange rate on 
the same date. 
(source: annual reports) 
tpLTNA ,  Promoter scale  
Natural logarithm of Total Net Assets of the fund promoter p in funds in 
Europe at the end of calendar year t. All figures are in millions of Euros. 
This data is available from 2001. 
(source: Lipper FMI) 
tiEM ,  Emerging Markets sector  
(dummy) 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the fund sector of fund i in calendar year t is 
Emerging Markets equity and 0 if it is one of the developed markets 
(Global equity, Japan equity, North America equity, Pan-European 
equity and Euroland equity). The fund sector definition is based on 
Lipper (former Fitzrovia). 
(source: Lipper) 
tiLAGE ,  Fund age  
Natural logarithm of the age of fund i in years at the end of calendar 
year t. Age is calculated by subtracting the fund’s inception date from 
the research date t (end of calendar year t). 
(source: Lipper FMI)  
tpAD ,  Affiliated distribution  (dummy) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the promoter group has an affiliated distri-
bution network in Europe, either banking or insurance. 
(source: own research) 
 
The second set of control variables contains measures for scale. These measures cap-
ture possible economies of scale in the management of funds. There are three levels at 
which scale is measured for the analysis: 
• Fund level scale. Several costs are specific for each fund. When these costs do not 
vary with fund assets under management, the costs in basis points declines with in-
creasing assets. The variable included in the regression analysis is the natural loga-
rithm of the average total net assets of each fund for the year of analysis. 
• Umbrella level scale. All funds in the sample are part of a larger umbrella, together 
with other funds, forming one legal entity. Economies of scale could be driven by 
the size of the umbrella; for example, because service providers are generally ap-
pointed for the umbrella as a whole. More assets under management could then 
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imply more favourable deals with the service providers. Another advantage of an 
umbrella with more assets under management is that costs specific for the um-
brella, such as the printing costs for prospectuses and annual reports, can be 
spread across more assets, lowering the relative cost burden. The variable included 
in the regression analysis is the natural logarithm of the total net assets of the um-
brella for the year of analysis. 
• Promoter level scale. Economies of scale could also play a role at a higher level of 
aggregation than the fund or the umbrella, specifically, the fund promoter as a 
whole. Larger fund promoters can, for example, leverage their portfolio manage-
ment and research capabilities across a larger asset base. The measure used for the 
size of the fund promoter is the Total Net Assets of the promoter group in funds 
that are part of the European fund market. This measure is used because it is the 
best proxy for size available in a consistent way across promoters in the sample and 
over time. It should be noted that the data does not include assets under manage-
ment of the same groups in regions other than Europe, nor does it include assets 
under management in other forms of asset management than funds, most notably 
institutional mandates. The variable included in the regression analysis is the natu-
ral logarithm of the total net assets at the end of the year of analysis. 
 
The third category of control variables contains different product and promoter char-
acteristics. The three characteristics distinguished for the analysis are: 
• Emerging Markets sector (dummy). The cost level of funds in different fund sectors 
might be different. The analysis in section 5.3 showed that, in particular, costs for 
Emerging Markets equity are higher than the costs for developed markets funds. 
Thus, the distinction made here is between developed markets funds (funds invest-
ing in Global, Japan, North America, Pan-European or Euroland equity) and Emerg-
ing Markets equity. The fund sectors are based on the sector definition by Lipper 
Fitzrovia. The fund sector is captured in the analysis by assigning a dummy variable 
of one to funds investing in Emerging Markets equity. 
• Fund age. Fund costs increased in the 2000–2008 research period. This might be 
the result of fee increases of existing funds, but also of a fund promoter strategy to 
launch new funds at a fee level higher than the average. New funds might also have 
the burden of start-up costs. On the other hand, newly launched funds might be 
subsidised by the fund promoter in order to help create a favourable track record. 
The fund age is determined by subtracting the inception date from the research 
date (last day of the analysis year). The inception date is obtained from Lipper FMI. 
The variable included in the regression analysis is the natural logarithm of the fund 
age in years. 
• Affiliated distribution (dummy). Some of the promoters in the sample are part of 
larger financial groups, banks and/or insurance companies, with their own distribu-
tion networks in Europe. Fund promoters without an affiliated distribution network 
need to rely on direct and third party distribution106. An affiliated distribution net-
work could be associated with lower costs of distribution. Promoters with an affili-
ated distribution network could have a different pricing strategy for their funds. 
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The dummy variable takes the value of one when the promoter group has an affili-
ated distribution network in Europe. Whether of not a fund promoter belongs to a 
group with an affiliated distribution channel is determined based on own research. 
Variables not included 
The following variables were included in the regression analysis of one or more earlier 
studies, but are not included in this analysis:  
• Compensation and ownership. (Independent) boards members with a high com-
pensation could be more inclined to put the interest of the promoter first, rather 
than that of the investors. Board members investing in the funds they oversee 
could align the interests of board members and investors. It is not possible to in-
clude these variables in this analysis of Luxembourg funds because it is not required 
to disclose this information in this domicile.  
• Board concentration. Several studies include variables measuring directors’ span of 
oversight. A unitary board, where boards of the same composition oversee all 
funds in a fund management company’s range, could be more effective. All funds in 
the Luxembourg UCITS sample for this study are set up as sub-funds in an umbrella 
structure, where the umbrella is a single legal entity. The board of directors of such 
an umbrella oversees all sub-funds in that entity so that at least for that part of the 
fund management company’s product range, there is a unitary board by definition. 
The fund ranges of the promoters in the sample usually span across various legal 
entities in Luxembourg and other European fund domiciles. It was not feasible to 
collect governance data for these funds in order to determine the directors’ span of 
oversight on the fund ranges of the promoters in the sample.  
• Past performance. Some earlier studies of U.S. funds include a measure for past 
performance as a control variable in the regression analysis (e.g., Tufano and Se-
vick, 1997; Meschke, 2007; Ferris and Yan, 2007b), whereas others do not (e.g., 
Kong and Tang, 2008; Adams et al., 2009). A reason for including a past perform-
ance variable is that U.S. boards set management fees per fund annually and are 
expected to take past performance explicitly into account. The results for this vari-
able vary. Tufano and Sevick (1997) find little to no evidence that fee differences 
are related to differences in past performance, whereas Meschke (2007) finds a 
positive relationship and Ferris and Yan (2007b) find a negative relationship. Be-
cause fees tend to be relatively stable, the causality is likely running in reverse in 
the case of a negative relationship: Boards do not set higher fees because of poor 
performance, but funds perform poorly – net of fees – because of the burden of 
high fees. In Luxembourg, boards do not set management fees annually and there 
is no explicit instruction or expectation that past performance is to be considered 
when setting fees. Lipper (2009c) shows that for funds in Europe, for the majority 
of promoters, fees are set at company level, not at individual fund level, and do not 
take individual fund performance into account. For fund-year combinations in the 
sample of this study where TER data and previous one-year performance is avail-
able, the correlation between TER and sector-adjusted performance107 is -0.005. 
Because, economically, no influence of past performance on fee levels is expected 
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and in order to avoid reverse causality influencing the coefficients of the govern-
ance variables, no past performance variable is included in the regression analysis. 
Furthermore, a disadvantage of including a past performance variable would be 
that it reduces the sample size, excluding an interesting category of funds, specifi-
cally, young funds that have not yet built up the required track record.  
Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Table 5.5 provides descriptive statistics of the funds in the sample for each of the nine 
years in the 2000–2008 research period. Panel a is for funds investing in developed 
markets. Panel b shows the results for funds investing in emerging markets. Funds for 
which not all variables for the regression analysis were available in a calendar year 
have been left out of the sample for that specific year. For all dummy variables and for 
each year in the research period, the mean value (in percentage terms) and sum are 
provided. The mean can be interpreted as the percentage of funds in the sample, for 
which the dummy variable is one, i.e., funds complying with the specific characteristic. 
The sum is the total number of funds with that characteristic. For the regular variables, 
the table displays the mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation. 
The development of the mean of the TER, Sum of Management and Distribution 
Fee and Other Costs in table 5.5 confirms the trends described in section 5.3. Notewor-
thy is the significant difference between the minimum and the maximum observation 
for these cost measures. In some years, the minimum Other Costs are below zero. This 
can be the case when promoters subsidise the cost level of a fund. 
The mean number of board members fluctuated around seven. The lowest num-
ber of fund board members in the sample is three, the legal minimum. The largest 
board had, on average, 22.5 members in 2000. For the developed market funds, the 
mean percentage of independent board members at fund level has increased in the 
research period from 13.9% to 18.1%. The highest representation of independent 
board members on boards increased from 50.0% in 2000 to 73.5% in 2008. The mini-
mum was 0% throughout the research period.  
Of the percentage of semi-independent board members of developed market 
funds, the mean initially increased from 7.9% to 10.0%, but then fell back 7.3%. The 
percentage of funds in the sample with an independent chair increased both in the 
case of the developed and emerging markets funds. With regard to the percentage of 
funds with an independent depositary, the developments differed between the devel-
oped markets funds and the emerging markets funds, with a relative increase among 
the developed markets funds and a decrease among the emerging markets funds. 
There is also a deviating development with regard to the percentage of sub-funds of 
umbrellas with the legal form of an FCP, which is an increase for the developed mar-
kets funds and a decrease for the emerging markets funds. The experience of board 
members, measured as the percentage of board members with at least three years 
experience in their position on the board, increased in both subsets of the sample. The 
maximum of 100% and the minimum of 0% indicate that there are observations where 
all board members on a certain board have tenure of more than three years and ob-
servations where none of the board members has three-year tenure. 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of funds in the sample by calendar year 
Panel a: Funds investing in developed markets (EM=0) 
Variable Characteristic 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of funds Total 220 232 280 292 313 332 374 396 340
TER% Mean 172.5 179.5 185.0 185.7 183.8 183.4 184.2 184.1 187.0
(in basis points) Maximum 282.5 319.2 281.7 296.7 343.5 307.3 284.5 260.1 286.9
  Minimum 97.1 117.1 124.5 126.3 125.1 109.6 79.6 83.4 108.8
  Standard deviation 31.9 32.7 29.7 29.0 25.0 24.3 24.3 23.3 25.3
Mgt%+Distr% Mean 135.4 139.8 143.0 144.1 145.9 148.1 150.7 152.9 153.0
(in basis points) Maximum 192.0 192.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 220.0 220.0 230.0 230.0
  Minimum 54.3 100.0 100.0 90.0 100.0 65.7 48.8 60.0 83.9
  Standard deviation 24.0 21.4 20.4 19.7 19.3 19.7 20.9 20.7 20.6
Other% Mean 38.4 40.7 43.0 42.8 38.9 36.3 34.5 31.9 35.4
(in basis points) Maximum 182.5 169.2 137.4 146.7 158.5 123.9 159.5 105.9 130.1
  Minimum -25.7 7.4 5.8 8.3 1.0 8.0 8.4 -9.7 -15.2
  Standard deviation 24.7 24.3 21.7 21.1 17.2 15.7 17.3 14.2 15.5
T Mean 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.2
  Maximum 22.5 19.0 18.1 18.5 19.3 18.8 18.7 19.1 20.5
  Minimum 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
  Standard deviation 3.8 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3
I% Mean 13.9% 14.1% 15.0% 14.9% 15.3% 16.5% 15.4% 15.7% 18.1%
  Maximum 50.0% 53.9% 59.0% 50.0% 53.1% 57.1% 58.3% 58.3% 73.5%
  Minimum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation 16.4% 17.0% 17.7% 18.0% 18.3% 19.6% 20.3% 20.1% 19.7%
S% Mean 7.9% 9.3% 10.0% 9.3% 9.2% 9.3% 8.3% 8.6% 7.3%
  Maximum 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 40.0% 40.0% 38.1% 40.6% 40.0% 39.1%
  Minimum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation 12.2% 13.0% 14.4% 12.7% 12.4% 12.0% 11.3% 11.7% 10.2%
CH Mean 22.7% 28.9% 30.7% 37.3% 33.2% 30.7% 30.5% 27.3% 28.5%
  Total 50 67 86 109 104 102 114 108 97
DEP Mean 62.7% 55.6% 59.3% 59.6% 60.1% 56.3% 62.6% 63.9% 65.0%
  Total 138 129 166 174 188 187 234 253 221
TEN3% Mean   46.3% 48.9% 52.0% 56.1% 54.5% 56.8% 62.1%
  Maximum   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
  Minimum   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation   25.5% 25.6% 24.8% 24.3% 26.2% 23.9% 25.7%
LEG Mean 11.4% 14.2% 13.6% 15.1% 16.0% 16.3% 16.0% 15.2% 19.1%
  Total 25 33 38 44 50 54 60 60 65
PF Mean 4.1% 4.3% 4.6% 5.8% 7.7% 6.9% 7.2% 7.3% 10.3%
  Total 9 10 13 17 24 23 27 29 35
FIX Mean 7.7% 8.2% 12.1% 12.7% 15.7% 17.2% 20.1% 22.7% 32.1%
  Total 17 19 34 37 49 57 75 90 109
TNAi Mean 428.1 374.5 305.3 269.1 378.1 486.7 594.9 594.2 372.7
  Maximum 6,071.8 7,395.7 8,713.9 8,822.7 14,420.9 18,314.2 22,163.6 16,089.9 10,197.3
  Minimum 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.4 1.1
  Standard deviation 769.8 806.0 725.5 646.7 983.8 1,270.3 1,509.8 1,304.5 790.8
TNAu Mean 6,661.4 6,852.1 6,710.1 7,388.3 10,359.2 14,517.6 20,589.5 22,837.8 18,141.7
  Maximum 24,973.6 27,473.0 29,151.3 37,004.6 44,637.7 60,848.4 70,225.1 66,481.2 55,768.8
  Minimum 70.8 85.4 18.8 39.6 103.8 315.3 609.5 679.4 378.2
  Standard deviation 6,127.1 6,994.7 7,222.3 7,988.3 10,744.9 14,373.8 19,705.4 20,504.5 16,529.3
TNAp Mean  38,635.0 37,936.5 44,489.2 51,213.4 70,714.5 80,160.4 80,903.7 65,489.3
  Maximum  141,507.9 139,519.1 155,374.0 178,200.1 252,365.8 276,596.9 213,174.1 171,025.3
  Minimum  519.4 614.9 954.4 1,224.7 1,963.2 2,426.9 3,471.2 1,923.8
  Standard deviation  28,364.5 29,905.4 35,804.5 38,608.7 51,675.8 56,652.1 54,470.8 49,192.5
AGE Mean 5.2 5.8 5.9 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.4 7.7 8.3
  Maximum 38.5 39.5 40.5 41.5 42.5 43.5 37.0 38.0 39.0
  Minimum 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
  Standard deviation 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.7 6.2
AD Mean 60.5% 63.4% 62.9% 59.2% 59.1% 59.3% 51.9% 50.8% 46.5%
  Total 133 147 176 173 185 197 194 201 158
G O V E R N A N C E  A N D  C O S T S  
 183 
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of funds in the sample by calendar year 
Panel b: Funds investing in emerging markets (EM=1) 
Variable Characteristic 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of funds Total 25 26 28 27 28 30 33 34 34
TER% Mean 213.3 226.6 227.9 219.4 212.7 210.7 209.4 208.1 207.1
(in basis points) Maximum 281.1 319.5 323.3 279.7 263.7 257.9 256.5 266.4 290.0
  Minimum 131.0 130.7 129.8 143.5 157.8 157.2 170.5 165.9 167.9
  Standard deviation 40.5 50.9 49.2 40.0 31.4 27.0 24.5 26.7 28.0
Mgt%+Distr% Mean 156.6 162.0 159.0 159.7 162.6 165.7 167.5 169.5 167.9
(in basis points) Maximum 211.2 210.1 210.1 210.0 209.9 209.7 209.7 209.9 210.0
  Minimum 115.0 120.9 100.0 100.0 120.0 120.0 120.0 123.8 138.7
  Standard deviation 26.3 23.8 26.5 26.0 24.8 23.8 23.3 23.3 21.9
Other% Mean 56.7 64.6 68.9 59.7 49.1 44.0 40.9 37.7 38.2
(in basis points) Maximum 114.1 169.5 173.3 129.7 93.2 82.4 81.5 61.7 84.7
  Minimum -6.1 1.5 8.4 16.0 19.0 16.9 15.3 15.3 13.7
  Standard deviation 29.8 44.8 45.6 32.2 20.4 16.1 16.4 13.6 14.6
T Mean 7.4 6.9 6.8 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.0 6.8 7.5
  Maximum 22.5 13.9 13.7 18.5 19.3 18.8 18.7 19.1 20.5
  Minimum 3.0 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
  Standard deviation 3.8 2.3 2.4 3.6 3.7 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.5
I% Mean 9.6% 12.8% 16.0% 16.5% 15.1% 15.7% 15.0% 14.3% 15.8%
  Maximum 43.7% 53.9% 59.0% 50.0% 50.0% 52.3% 58.3% 58.3% 51.2%
  Minimum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation 15.2% 17.8% 18.1% 17.6% 18.1% 19.5% 19.8% 19.2% 18.0%
S% Mean 6.4% 6.8% 6.7% 7.7% 8.0% 7.0% 7.4% 7.9% 6.5%
  Maximum 32.5% 33.3% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 36.5% 40.6% 40.0% 28.6%
  Minimum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation 9.7% 10.4% 11.0% 11.2% 11.7% 10.5% 11.4% 11.9% 9.8%
CH Mean 20.0% 23.1% 28.6% 37.0% 28.6% 26.7% 27.3% 23.5% 29.4%
  Total 5 6 8 10 8 8 9 8 10
DEP Mean 72.0% 69.2% 67.9% 66.7% 60.7% 56.7% 60.6% 61.8% 64.7%
  Total 18 18 19 18 17 17 20 21 22
TEN3% Mean  47.2% 52.4% 55.4% 53.6% 52.7% 54.2% 55.4%
  Maximum  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 91.7% 100.0% 92.3% 100.0%
  Minimum  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation  28.2% 24.2% 21.7% 23.9% 25.7% 24.5% 26.8%
LEG Mean 16.0% 19.2% 17.9% 18.5% 21.4% 23.3% 15.2% 14.7% 14.7%
  Total 4 5 5 5 6 7 5 5 5
PF Mean 0.0% 3.8% 3.6% 7.4% 7.1% 3.3% 9.1% 11.8% 11.8%
  Total 0 1 1 2 2 1 3 4 4
FIX Mean 4.0% 3.8% 7.1% 7.4% 17.9% 20.0% 24.2% 26.5% 38.2%
  Total 1 1 2 2 5 6 8 9 13
TNAi Mean 175.9 162.6 152.6 164.1 303.5 438.0 645.8 801.8 695.1
  Maximum 642.0 717.0 774.1 761.9 1,320.8 1,876.7 3,262.7 4,985.8 3,930.3
  Minimum 6.2 4.3 1.1 4.9 7.7 10.8 3.7 12.3 6.2
  Standard deviation 193.5 190.5 190.4 208.2 334.3 457.0 731.2 958.4 804.0
TNAu Mean 6,390.1 6,537.0 6,266.4 7,289.1 10,320.9 13,810.9 19,764.5 23,242.1 15,924.5
  Maximum 24,973.6 27,473.0 29,151.3 37,004.6 44,637.7 60,848.4 70,225.1 66,481.2 55,768.8
  Minimum 108.6 215.3 271.3 379.5 657.8 2,239.3 2,349.5 2,536.2 1,336.6
  Standard deviation 6,333.8 7,380.2 7,391.9 8,211.1 10,652.7 13,799.7 19,218.1 20,105.0 14,566.2
TNAp Mean  34,387.3 30,846.5 38,871.9 52,075.7 68,931.3 79,368.8 78,355.5 69,261.1
  Maximum  75,163.9 75,560.5 130,037.0 178,200.1 252,365.8 276,596.9 213,174.1 171,025.3
  Minimum  6,067.1 1,544.4 5,248.6 7,063.3 2,464.5 2,426.9 3,471.2 2,638.2
  Standard deviation  20,907.7 20,508.6 28,518.5 40,221.7 57,508.4 62,338.7 56,262.5 55,239.0
AGE Mean 4.9 5.7 6.3 7.4 7.9 8.4 8.8 9.3 9.3
  Maximum 11.5 12.5 13.5 14.5 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0 18.0
  Minimum 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.8
  Standard deviation 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.7 5.6
AD Mean 60.0% 57.7% 57.1% 55.6% 60.7% 60.0% 54.5% 52.9% 55.9%
  Total 15 15 16 15 17 18 18 18 19
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The development of the two-fee structure related dummy variables shows that there 
has been a strong increase in both the use of performance fee schemes and the use of 
fixed TER schemes. Funds with performance fees were 4.1% of the development mar-
kets fund sample and 0.0% of the emerging markets sample in 2000. These percent-
ages had increased to 10.3% and 11.8% respectively by 2008. The percentage of funds 
with a fixed TER scheme increased from 7.7% to 32.1% among the developed markets 
funds and from 4.0% to 38.2% among the emerging markets funds. The percentage of 
funds of promoters with an affiliated distribution channels dropped in both the devel-
oped and the emerging markets funds samples. 
The statistics for scale show that for all three measures, there is a wide variation 
from small to large. The smallest funds are below EUR 1 million in size, while the larg-
est fund size observation is over EUR 22 billion in 2006. The smallest umbrella size 
observation is a mere EUR 18.8 million in 2002, whereas the largest is over EUR 70 
billion in 2006. For the promoters, the smallest observation is EUR 0.5 billion, the larg-
est is almost EUR 277 billion.  
For fund age, there is also significant variation in the sample. There are observa-
tions in the sample equal to 0.2 years, which follows from the selection criterion that a 
fund requires 90 days worth of data to be included in the sample. The oldest fund in 
the sample is the Mercury Selected Trust – Global Equity Fund, which was launched in 
1962. As a result of promoter acquisitions, the fund first became part of Merrill Lynch 
and then BlackRock. In 2006, the fund, then called Merrill Lynch International Invest-
ment Funds – Global Equity Diversified Fund, merged into Merrill Lynch International 
Investment Funds – Global Equity Core Fund (with Global Equity Fund as its new 
name). The disappearing fund dropped from the sample, which explains the drop in 
the maximum value for fund age in that year. 
 
In order to check whether there is collinearity across the variables, table 5.6 provides 
the correlation coefficients for the TER and all explanatory variables used in the re-
gression analysis. Data is used for the years 2002 to 2008. The year 2008 is the last 
year analysed, while the year 2002 is the first year for which all regression variables 
are available. Coefficients in excess of 0.333 or -0.333 are highlighted in grey, with 
those in excess of -0.5 and 0.5 in a darker shade.  
The TER and the percentage of independent board members are positively corre-
lated, but not very strongly. The correlation between TER and fund size, as well as 
between TER and affiliated distribution, is negative, while the correlation between the 
TER and the Emerging Markets dummy is positive. There are two correlation coeffi-
cients exceeding 0.5 or -0.5. There is a strong positive correlation between umbrella 
scale and promoter scale, and a strong negative correlation between affiliated distribu-
tion and the independence of the depository. Promoters that are part of banking 
groups with affiliated distribution also tend to have that banking group as the deposi-
tary for the funds. The correlation between the percentage of independent board 
members and the dummy for affiliated distribution is almost -0.5. This is consistent 
with the finding in chapter 4 that independent board members are more common 
among Anglo-Saxon promoters. At the same time, most Anglo-Saxon promoters are 
independent from any distribution channel, whereas continental European promoters 
are often part of banking or insurance groups, which also distribute investment funds. 
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The correlation between the dummy variables for the chair position and the affiliation 
of the distribution channel is negative, i.e., affiliated distribution goes hand-in-hand 
with dependent chairs. The correlation between the percentage of independent board 
members and tenure is approximately 0.4, and is the result of independent board 
members tending to stay on boards longer. The chair dummy is strongly positively 
correlated with the percentage of independent board members and, to a lesser de-
gree, the percentage of semi-independent board members. Funds that are part of 
larger umbrellas and belong to larger promoters tend to be overseen by larger boards. 
The umbrellas with an independent depositary tend to belong to smaller promoters. 
There is a strong positive correlation between fund size and fund age. 
Model 
The multiple regression analyses are performed with an individual fund model in this 
section, and a variation of the family-average model in section 5.7. With the individual 
fund model, each fund is treated as a separate and independent observation. This 
treatment is consistent with the fact that for each individual fund, the level of costs 
has been determined. In addition, some of the control variables are fund specific, such 
as fund size and fund age. On the other hand, the funds’ governance variables are 
identical across all funds in the same umbrella. The board sits at the level of the um-
brella in the case of an SICAV, and the management company in the case of an FCP. As 
a result, the board composition is exactly the same for all funds in an umbrella. Also, 
the control variables that are umbrella or fund promoter specific are identical for all 
those funds that are part of the same umbrella. 
The structure of the data is that of a typical panel dataset, consisting of repeated 
observations of certain variables for a number of individuals at different points in time. 
In this case, it concerns a sample of funds with observations for fund costs as depend-
ent variable and various explanatory variables for the 2000 to 2008 calendar years. 
One of the advantages of the analysis of such a panel dataset, as compared to data for 
one point in time, is that it leads to a larger number of observations, resulting in in-
creased precision in parameter estimation.  
For the analysis at fund level, two model variations are used. The first variation, re-
ferred to as Model I, allows for fixed effects per calendar year, not per fund or um-
brella, thereby focusing on cross-sectional variation. In the second variation, referred 
to as Model II, dummy variables per umbrella are added, thus focusing on variation 
within each umbrella. Because only one umbrella per promoter is included in the sam-
ple, it is equivalent to a dummy variable per promoter. In the case of Model II, vari-
ables are not included for the legal form of the umbrella and the promoter affiliation 
with a distribution channel. The reason is because normally, these variables do not 
vary in time for a given umbrella or promoter, except in exceptional circumstances. In 
fact, in the research period, both the legal form of an umbrella and the affiliation with 
a distributor changed only once. One umbrella changed from an FCP to an SICAV. The 
affiliation of one promoter changed when a promoter with affiliated distribution was 
acquired by a group without affiliated distribution. 
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With the individual fund model, the following equations are estimated: 
 
Model I (time fixed effects): 
 
titptiti
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  (5.7) 
 
Model II (time fixed effects and umbrella dummies): 
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where: 
C%i,t is the cost of fund i in period t, either measured as TER%, Mgt%+Distr% or Oth-
er%. 
ct is the constant per calendar year t. 
αu is the dummy variable per umbrella u. 
 
For the explanatory variables, refer to tables 5.3 (governance variables) and 5.4 (con-
trol variables). 
 
The two model variations are first estimated for the entire 2000-2008 research period, 
without the variables for board tenure (TEN3%) and promoter scale (LTNAp), because 
these two variables are not available for the whole period. This is referred to as Model 
Ia and Model IIa, respectively. The two variables are then added to the equation in 
what is referred to as Model Ib and Model IIb, limiting the analysis to the 2002-2008 
period.  
Because of correlation between several of the governance variables, the model is 
also estimated by adding governance variables one by one. These model specifications 
do not produce materially different results than those in table 5.7 and are therefore 
not reported.  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumes homoscedasticity and no serial correlation. 
In this panel dataset, funds may have different variances and the errors for the same 
fund in subsequent periods may be correlated, hence, violating the assumptions of OLS 
standard errors. Standard errors that are robust to this type of heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation were obtained using White’s robust covariance estimator with cross-
sectional clustering. Potential cross-sectional correlation, due to common time-specific 
shocks, is captured by the time fixed effects in the model specification. Using time 
fixed effects and a robust covariance estimator avoids the pitfall of underestimating 
standard errors, as described by Petersen (2009). 
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Table 5.7: Results analysis of fund costs and board characteristics (costs in basis points) 
TER% Model Ia (2000-2008) Model Ib (2002-2008) Model IIa (2000-2008) Model IIb (2002-2008) 
  Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
c 223.50 26.34 177.72 10.23     
T 1.65 11.92 1.39 6.04 0.41 0.51 0.24 0.39 
I% -4.65 -2.46 -8.33 -3.68 20.16 1.77 39.21 3.28 
S% 0.37 0.09 4.94 1.23 7.90 0.86 17.07 1.53 
CH 1.31 0.68 4.52 1.66 -7.91 -4.95 -9.07 -5.85 
DEP 4.19 2.74 6.59 2.79 1.55 1.22 1.54 0.90 
TEN3%    9.04 2.54   0.76 0.37 
LEG 7.46 3.17 6.00 2.37     
PF 13.65 5.20 13.62 9.89 14.13 9.77 14.33 10.41 
FIX -6.27 -2.47 -8.82 -4.95 10.96 4.79 8.50 3.36 
LTNAi -4.02 -10.32 -4.01 -8.16 -3.09 -6.16 -2.87 -5.44 
LTNAu -3.05 -5.40 -4.76 -7.68 -4.23 -2.64 -5.71 -7.82 
LTNAp    5.35 2.86   -2.28 -0.86 
EM 31.94 17.50 30.61 18.90 31.11 15.46 28.99 15.16 
LAGE 0.41 0.55 0.68 1.02 -0.73  -0.37 -0.60 
AD -16.43 -5.43 -16.03 -7.74     
Periods 9  7  9  7  
Funds 554  538  554  538  
Observations 3044  2541  3044  2541  
R2 0.277  0.280  0.559  0.565  
Adjusted R2 0.272  0.274  0.550  0.554  
                  
Mgt%+Distr%  Model Ia (2000-2008) Model Ib (2002-2008) Model IIa (2000-2008) Model IIb (2002-2008) 
  Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t  Coefficient t  
c 168.65 39.79 150.06 16.38     
T 0.64 5.53 0.53 4.04 0.05 0.10 -0.60 -1.39 
I% 5.92 2.76 5.94 1.89 -2.06 -0.34 9.13 3.08 
S% -11.68 -2.16 -13.08 -1.91 17.99 3.52 25.13 4.63 
CH 3.46 2.30 5.52 2.72 -2.89 -1.86 -3.11 -1.46 
DEP 6.97 5.45 6.82 5.15 1.56 2.68 -0.73 -0.54 
TEN3%    0.36 0.11   -3.04 -1.67 
LEG 14.12 6.72 12.36 4.96     
PF 4.35 1.00 6.62 2.18 10.09 6.83 10.67 7.33 
FIX 0.35 0.21 -1.62 -1.58 1.35 0.97 -0.46 -0.33 
LTNAi 0.21 0.98 0.09 0.46 0.59 4.19 0.64 4.07 
LTNAu -3.42 -6.65 -5.06 -4.33 -1.30 -1.07 -2.93 -2.65 
LTNAp    3.45 2.14   5.71 2.57 
EM 16.73 30.42 16.32 35.68 17.50 28.93 16.68 65.23 
LAGE -1.39 -2.32 -1.32 -2.06 -1.73 -5.67 -1.68 -5.42 
AD -3.96 -3.11 -4.64 -5.42     
Periods 9  7  9  7  
Funds 530  514  530  514  
Observations 2907  2425  2907  2425  
R2 0.213  0.198  0.604  0.598  
Adjusted R2 0.207  0.191  0.595  0.587  
         
Table continues on the next page       
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Other% Model Ia (2000-2008) Model Ib (2002-2008) Model IIa (2000-2008) Model IIb (2002-2008) 
  Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
c 65.83 6.30 42.34 3.31     
T 1.10 10.20 0.99 7.16 0.41 0.97 0.85 1.41 
I% -11.57 -7.44 -14.42 -8.33 23.22 3.16 30.46 2.42 
S% 11.06 1.70 16.50 2.28 -13.84 -1.27 -8.00 -0.79 
CH -2.65 -3.38 -1.77 -1.57 -5.77 -4.65 -6.06 -4.37 
DEP -3.98 -2.66 -1.49 -0.91 -0.03 -0.03 2.27 1.14 
TEN3%    8.02 3.66   3.48 1.81 
LEG -2.10 -1.18 -2.52 -1.36     
PF 8.99 4.31 6.91 3.43 3.92 3.36 3.59 3.60 
FIX -2.79 -1.57 -3.81 -2.39 9.88 7.13 9.12 4.07 
LTNAi -4.44 -10.97 -4.27 -8.77 -3.62 -7.89 -3.44 -6.88 
LTNAu -0.73 -0.91 -0.65 -0.90 -2.76 -4.11 -2.92 -3.60 
LTNAp    1.43 2.01   -7.68 -4.39 
EM 13.45 7.26 12.44 6.05 12.75 6.81 11.26 5.37 
LAGE 2.13 4.13 2.31 4.11 0.79 1.95 1.11 2.34 
AD -13.77 -6.02 -12.43 -4.96     
Periods 9  7  9  7  
Funds 530  514  530  514  
Observations 2907  2425  2907  2425  
R2 0.276  0.300  0.536   0.561  
Adjusted R2 0.271  0.294  0.526   0.549  
         
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
Results 
The results of the analysis are displayed in table 5.7. The first panel provides the re-
sults for the TER. The second and third panel show the results for the Sum of Man-
agement and Distribution Fees and Other Costs, respectively. For all variables, the 
table gives the value for the coefficient from the regression analysis and the value for 
the t-statistic. When a coefficient is statistically significant at the level of 10%, it is 
highlighted in light grey. For values that are significant at the 5% level, a darker shade 
of grey is used. The regression results referred to in the text below are those for the 
analysis of the 2002–2008 period (Models Ib and IIb), including the variables for board 
tenure and promoter scale, unless specifically mentioned otherwise. For Model II, the 
results for the constant and umbrella dummies are suppressed.  
 
In Model I, which focuses on cross-sectional variation, several of the governance vari-
ables are associated with the level of costs in a statistically significant manner. The 
primary interest in this dissertation is the relationship between the independence of 
board members and the level of costs. A higher percentage of independent directors is 
associated with a lower TER in a statistically significant manner. The economic signifi-
cance is modest. At fund level, the mean number of board members in the sample is 
7.0. Each additional independent board member, rather than a dependent board 
member, is associated with a TER approximately 1.2 basis points lower. The second 
and third panels of the table show that it is the Other Costs component of the TER that 
is responsible for the difference, not the Management and Distribution Fee. On the 
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contrary, the Management and Distribution Fee is higher for funds with more inde-
pendent boards.  
The result for the percentage of semi-independent board members is not statisti-
cally significant in either model Ia or Ib. The coefficient for the chair position is posi-
tive, but statistically significant only at the level of 10% in model Ib. In the case of both 
Model Ia and Ib, the coefficients for the Sum of Management and Distribution Fees on 
the one hand, and Other Costs on the other hand, have opposite signs, so that only a 
small net effect remains at TER level. Funds with an independent depositary have TERs 
almost 7 basis points higher. For this variable, the result is driven by the Sum of Man-
agement and Distribution Fee, not by the Other Costs. This is surprising, because the 
direct costs of the depositary are part of the Other Costs. A larger board is associated 
with higher costs. Each additional board member is associated with almost 1.4 basis 
points of additional TER. The Management and Distribution Fee, as well as the Other 
Costs, contribute to the difference. Funds with more experienced boards have higher 
TERs, which is driven by Other Costs. In line with the notion that FCPs have inferior 
governance as compared to SICAVs, FCPs have higher TERs. This is driven by Manage-
ment and Distribution Fees, not by Other Costs. 
Of the control variables, several of the coefficients are also statistically significant. 
Funds with performance fees have higher TERs, not lower as might be expected. This 
finding is the result of both higher Management and Distribution Fees and higher Oth-
er Costs. Funds with either a Fixed Service Fee or All-In Fee, resulting in a fixed TER, 
have a lower TER. For both the Management and Distribution Fees and Other Costs, 
the sign of the coefficient is negative, but only in the case of Other Costs is it statisti-
cally significant.  
All three measures for scale have statistically significant coefficients. Larger funds 
are associated with lower Other Costs and lower TERs by the same order of magnitude. 
Fund size is unrelated to the level of Management and Distribution Fees. Bigger um-
brellas are also associated with lower TERs. In this case, the Management and Distribu-
tion Fees coefficient, not that of Other Costs, is statistically significant negatively. Pro-
moters with more assets under management are associated with higher TERs. In this 
case, both the coefficient for Management and Distribution Fee and that for Other 
Costs are positive and statistically significant. This finding is not consistent with the 
notion of economies of scale at the promoter level being passed on to investors, and 
could be the result of larger promoters being able to command premium pricing. 
Funds investing in emerging markets have higher Management and Distribution 
Fees, as well as Other Costs, than funds investing in developed markets. The difference 
in TER is 31 basis points, to which both the Management and Distribution Fee and the 
Other Costs contribute approximately half. Funds with promoters with an affiliated 
distribution channel have TERs lower by 16 basis points, due to lower Management 
and Distribution Fees, as well as lower Other Costs. The relationship between fund age 
and TER is not statistically significant. In this case, the negative relationship for Man-
agement and Distribution fee and the positive relationship for Other Costs cancel out 
at the level of the TER.  
 
The analyses of the development of governance in chapter 4 showed two main trends. 
On the one hand, the percentage of independent board members has increased on 
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boards that have independent members. On the other hand, there have been more 
umbrellas that developed from having independent members to having none than vice 
versa. Model II focuses on the variation of the governance and other variables within 
umbrellas.  
The result for the coefficient for the percentage of independent board members is 
positive, and economically and statistically significant, with both the Management and 
Distribution Fees and the Other Costs contributing. This finding implies that in cases 
where funds had an increase in the percentage of independent board members, this 
increase did not coincide with a lowering of their TERs. Taking the average board size 
of 7.0 as a starting point, an increase by one independent board member is associated 
with an increase in TER by 5.6 basis points. This strong positive relationship makes it 
unlikely that the negative association between the percentage of independent board 
members and the level of TER found in the cross-sectional analysis of Model I is a 
causal relationship. The level of the dummy variables per umbrella (αu) is not positively 
correlated to the percentage of independent board members of the umbrellas. In the 
case of Model IIb for the TER as dependent variable, the correlation between the 
dummy variables per umbrella and the average percentage of independent board 
members in the 2002-2008 period is -0.012. 
The sign of the coefficient for the chair position is opposite to what was found in 
the cross-sectional analysis. The introduction of an independent chairman to the board 
is associated with a lowering of the TER. The coefficients for the number of board 
members, the percentage of semi-independent board members, the position of the 
depositary and the tenure are not statistically significant. 
Different than the outcome of the cross-sectional analysis of Model I, funds that 
introduced a fixed TER have increased their TER, driven by higher Other Costs. The 
result for performance fees, however, is consistent with Model I. Funds that have in-
troduced a performance fee have increased their TER excluding performance fees, 
with both the Management and Distribution Fee and the Other Costs contributing.  
The result for the dummy for funds in the Emerging Markets sector is consistent 
with Model I. These funds have a TER that is approximately 30 basis points higher than 
funds in the sample investing in developed markets. The results for fund and umbrella 
scale are also consistent with Model I. For both, increased scale is associated with 
lower TERs. In the case of fund scale, this finding is driven only by Other Costs. In fact, 
larger funds have slightly higher Management and Distribution Fees. In the case of 
umbrella scale, the Management and Distribution Fee, as well as the Other Costs, con-
tribute to the lower TER.  
The relationship between TER and promoter scale is not statistically significant in 
Model II. There is a significant positive relationship for Management and Distribution 
fee and a significant negative relationship for Other Costs. This finding is evidence of 
economies of scale in the areas covered by Other Costs, such as fund administration 
and custody, being passed on to investors. That the part of the TER that includes the 
compensation for the fund management company, the Management and Distribution 
fee, is higher for larger promoters, could be a reflection of these players’ ability to 
command premium pricing for their services.  
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5.6 Endogeneity 
In section 5.5, the outcome of the cross-sectional analyses was that a higher percent-
age of independent board members is associated with a lower level of TER. However, 
the analysis focusing on the variability within umbrellas led to opposite conclusions, 
raising doubts as to whether board independence is driving costs down. Earlier studies 
into the relationship between fund costs and governance characteristics, such as Tu-
fano and Sevick (1997) and Ferris and Yan (2007b), have noted that board structure 
might be endogenous. Both costs and board structure might be driven by one or more 
of the same underlying variables. For example, it could be the case that fund promot-
ers aiming to set higher fees for the funds in their offering, tend to select less effective 
boards for their funds. Ferris and Yan (2007b) follow an instrumental approach to ad-
dress the issue of endogeneity. As instrumental variables, they use fund family age, 
number of district investment objectives for each fund family, turnover of assets held 
by the fund, portfolio manager tenure, whether the fund management company is 
public or private, and fund ownership by insider and independent directors (Ferris and 
Yan, 2007b, p. 413). On the basis of this analysis, they conclude that their results are 
not plagued by endogeneity. Because most of these variables are not available for 
Luxembourg-domiciled funds, a different approach is followed here. 
In order to address the possibility that promoter characteristics drive board char-
acteristics and fund costs, an external assessment of the quality of the fund promoter 
is used. At the end of 2008, Morningstar launched the Morningstar Qualitative Ratings. 
For these fund ratings, Morningstar evaluates funds based on five aspects that it be-
lieves to be predictive of future performance: People, Parent, Process, Performance 
and Price. Morningstar describes the Parent score as follows (Morningstar, 2009, p. 3):  
“Morningstar believes the quality of the investment firm can have a meaningful 
impact on a fund’s long-term chances for success. In analysing the fund com-
pany parent, analysts consider ownership structure, compensation schemes, 
and managerial stability. Analysts also assess the firm’s culture, preferring 
those that treat fund shareholders as partners and emphasise the investment 
process over profits.” 
Morningstar publishes the overall score for funds, not its five components. However, 
Morningstar was so kind as to provide their Parent scores for the purpose of this dis-
sertation. Morningstar does not take into account fund costs in determining the Parent 
Score, since Price is a separate element of the overall Morningstar Qualitative Rating. 
Additionally, Morningstar confirmed that for setting the Parent score, the composition 
of a promoter’s fund boards is not taken into account. This makes this variable a useful 
measure to check whether the promoter is simultaneously driving fund costs and gov-
ernance characteristics behind the scenes. 
 
First, the correlation coefficient is calculated between the Morningstar Parent score 
and the percentage of independent board members. Since it is only -0.019, the quality 
of the parent, as assessed by Morningstar, seems unrelated to the percentage of inde-
pendent board members. As a next step, the Parent score of 1 to 5 (5 being the best) is 
added as a variable to the regression analysis. The reason for including this score is 
G O V E R N A N C E  A N D  C O S T S  
 193 
that a possible relationship found with the regression analyses between governance 
characteristics and costs can, in reality, be driven by the parent, the fund promoter. A 
promoter carefully managing conflicts of interest, with the interests of the investor as 
primary driver, might have lower costs. Such a firm can also be expected to favour 
more independent boards. By including the Parent score in the regression analysis, the 
two relationships can be analysed simultaneously. Since the Morningstar Qualitative 
Rating was introduced at the end of 2008, the ratings have been given in the 2008–
2010 period, based on the firms’ manner of operation in the prior period. For that 
reason, the score is only be used for analysing 2008 costs, the last year for which suffi-
cient fund costs data is available. Although Morningstar determined several of the 
Parent scores after 2008, these scores are relatively stable through time. Therefore, it 
is still worthwhile to perform the analysis using this additional variable. It should be 
noted that Morningstar did not rate all promoters in the sample in this period. 
The results are presented in table 5.8. In the first two columns, the results are pre-
sented for all funds in the sample, without the Morningstar parent score. These are the 
results for the 2002–2008 period as presented in section 5.5, as well as the results for 
2008 only. The third column presents the results of the same model, but on the sub-
sample of funds for which a Morningstar Parent Score is available. That is the case for 
31 out of the 38 promoters for which cost data is available in 2008. Out of the seven 
promoters without a Morningstar Parent Score, there are only two continental Euro-
pean players, while three are not affiliated with a distribution channel. The fourth 
column contains the results of the regression with the extended model, including the 
coefficient for the Morningstar Parent Score (Mst). The sample is the same as for the 
third column, which are the funds for which a Morningstar Parent Score is available.  
The results for 2008 for the whole sample are largely consistent with those for the 
entire research period, although several of the coefficients are economically larger 
than those for the 2002–2008 period. More independent boards are associated with 
lower TERs, whereas larger boards, more experienced boards and independent deposi-
taries are associated with higher TERs. As was the case for the entire research period, 
the result for the percentage of semi-independent board members is not statistically 
significant. The coefficient for the chair is again positive, but at a higher level of statis-
tical significance. The result for the dummy for the legal form of the umbrella is no 
longer statistically significant. 
When the sample is restricted to those funds for which a Morningstar Parent Score 
is available, there are a number of striking differences. The coefficient for the percent-
age of independent board members changes sign from negative to positive and is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient for the percentage of semi-independent board 
members also changes sign, in this case from positive to negative, and is marginally 
significant. The coefficients for the number of board members, the position of the 
chair and the depositary become smaller and lose their significance. For the control 
variables, there are no noteworthy changes in the coefficients. 
When the variable for the Morningstar Parent Score (Mst) is added, noteworthy 
changes occur again. The coefficient for the percentage of semi-independent board 
members becomes more negative, still statistically significant. The coefficient for the 
percentage of independent board members becomes more positive and statistically 
significant. The coefficient for the Morningstar variable is positive and statistically 
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significant. This is noteworthy because it implies that funds of promoters with a higher 
parent score have higher costs, rather than lower. This result for the Morningstar vari-
able is inconsistent with the possibility that inferior promoters, as measured with the 
Morningstar Parent Score, charge higher fees. From this finding, combined with the 
low negative correlation between the Morningstar Parent Score and the percentage of 
independent board members on the board, it can be concluded that the relationship 
between board characteristics and cost levels is unlikely to be driven by the endoge-
nous factor of the quality of the promoter. 
 
Table 5.8: Fund costs and board characteristics (TER in basis points) 
TER% 
Model Ib (2002-2008) 
Full sample 
 
Model Ib (2008) 
Full sample  
 
Model Ib (2008)  
Promoters with 
Morningstar rating 
Model Ib (2008) 
Model with Morning-
star variable 
  Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
c 177.72 10.23 119.03 6.22 112.07 5.43 113.95 5.84 
T 1.39 6.04 1.19 2.36 0.75 1.43 0.71 1.32 
I% -8.33 -3.68 -15.93 -2.08 11.25 0.92 31.51 2.24 
S% 4.94 1.23 7.76 0.56 -29.88 -1.79 -31.92 -1.92 
CH 4.52 1.66 10.56 3.73 4.95 1.45 2.04 0.57 
DEP 6.59 2.79 13.80 3.40 4.97 1.10 -2.20 -0.44 
TEN3% 9.04 2.54 17.27 2.76 4.65 0.66 -8.95 -1.01 
LEG 6.00 2.37 1.59 0.50 -5.81 -1.21 -3.20 -0.67 
PF 13.62 9.89 18.67 4.41 19.52 4.25 18.83 4.19 
FIX -8.82 -4.95 -8.69 -2.70 -8.58 -2.71 -7.66 -2.38 
LTNAi -4.01 -8.16 -3.42 -3.83 -2.72 -2.92 -2.82 -3.13 
LTNAu -4.76 -7.68 -8.87 -5.04 -8.13 -4.16 -10.46 -4.72 
LTNAp 5.35 2.86 13.25 5.29 14.78 5.79 15.44 5.88 
EM 30.61 18.90 25.39 4.91 23.61 4.24 24.93 4.42 
LAGE 0.68 1.02 2.26 1.49 0.54 0.36 0.46 0.32 
AD -16.03 -7.74 -16.44 -3.45 -21.12 -4.24 -23.65 -4.66 
Mst       7.27 3.08 
Periods 7  1  1  1  
Funds 538  374  331  331  
Observations 2541  374  331  331  
R2 0.280  0.332  0.376  0.393  
Adjusted R2 0.274  0.304  0.347  0.362  
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
5.7 Multiple regression analysis – Umbrella level 
In this section, the multiple regression analysis is performed at the umbrella level, 
rather than fund level. For the analysis at umbrella level, the average RCI of the um-
brellas in the sample is used as a measure for the umbrellas’ cost level. To calculate 
the RCI, funds with a performance-related fee schedule are left out of the sample. 
Fund size is aggregated at umbrella level, by taking the natural logarithm of the aver-
age total net assets of the funds included in the sample in a specific year (LATNAi). 
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Other explanatory and control variables included are umbrella-specific and therefore 
do not require any adjustment. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.9 provides descriptive statistics of the umbrellas in the sample for each of the 
nine years in the 2000–2008 research period. Whereas table 5.5 describes the sample 
at fund level, table 5.9 provides similar statistics at umbrella level. For dummy vari-
ables, the mean value (in percentage terms) and sum for each calendar year are pro-
vided. For the other variables, the mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation 
for each calendar year are tabled. 
 
Table 5.9: Descriptive statistics of umbrellas in the sample by calendar year 
Variable Characteristic 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of umbrellasTotal   43 41 43 43 43 43 43 43 37
RCIu Mean   0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Maximum   2.1 1.9 2.0 2.0 3.1 2.7 1.6 1.9 2.0
  Minimum   -1.6 -1.6 -1.9 -1.9 -1.9 -1.8 -2.1 -1.4 -1.4
  Standard deviation 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
T Mean   6.3 6.6 6.7 6.3 6.4 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8
  Maximum   22.5 19.0 18.1 18.5 19.3 18.8 18.7 19.1 20.5
  Minimum   3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
  Standard deviation 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.3
I% Mean   14.0% 13.5% 13.6% 13.1% 14.0% 14.7% 14.3% 14.4% 16.1%
  Maximum   50.0% 53.9% 59.0% 50.0% 53.1% 57.1% 58.3% 58.3% 73.5%
  Minimum   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation 15.8% 16.6% 17.1% 17.1% 17.8% 19.4% 19.6% 19.1% 19.7%
S% Mean   8.3% 9.5% 9.3% 8.3% 8.2% 8.4% 7.3% 7.4% 7.1%
  Maximum   50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 40.0% 40.0% 38.1% 40.6% 40.0% 39.1%
  Minimum   0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation 12.0% 12.6% 12.7% 11.6% 11.4% 11.2% 10.3% 10.9% 10.5%
CH Mean   18.6% 24.4% 25.6% 30.2% 27.9% 25.6% 27.9% 23.3% 24.3%
  Total   8 10 11 13 12 11 12 10 9
DEP Mean   67.4% 63.4% 65.1% 67.4% 67.4% 62.8% 67.4% 67.4% 67.6%
  Total   29 26 28 29 29 27 29 29 25
TEN3% Mean     46.7% 46.4% 52.6% 54.8% 54.0% 55.6% 59.1%
  Maximum     100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
  Minimum     0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
  Standard deviation   28.2% 28.2% 26.9% 26.3% 26.7% 24.7% 27.2%
LEG Mean   16.3% 17.1% 16.3% 16.3% 16.3% 16.3% 14.0% 14.0% 16.2%
  Total   7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6
FIX Mean   9.3% 7.3% 9.3% 9.3% 14.0% 16.3% 18.6% 20.9% 29.7%
  Total   4 3 4 4 6 7 8 9 11
ATNAi Mean   392.7 366.3 282.9 225.5 304.3 391.4 478.4 498.6 335.3
  Maximum   1,630.0 1,572.2 1,480.6 1,260.8 1,821.7 2,170.1 2,460.1 2,269.1 1,253.6
  Minimum   2.5 19.2 6.6 14.0 17.0 22.9 49.1 49.6 46.5
  Standard deviation 418.7 407.7 318.4 247.2 336.1 417.2 502.8 475.4 279.8
TNAu Mean   5,373.8 5,644.3 5,184.6 5,562.6 7,605.7 10,516.3 14,904.0 16,648.8 13,029.9
  Maximum   24,973.6 27,473.0 29,151.3 37,004.6 44,637.7 60,848.4 70,225.1 66,481.2 55,768.8
  Minimum   70.8 85.4 18.8 39.6 103.8 315.3 682.0 679.4 378.2
  Standard deviation 5,828.0 6,685.2 6,539.7 7,183.5 9,436.0 12,546.7 17,318.8 18,086.6 14,464.8
TNAp Mean    34,010.6 33,199.0 39,360.9 44,726.8 62,010.9 71,993.0 73,529.1 56,539.2
  Maximum    141,507.9 139,519.1 155,374.0 178,200.1 252,365.8 276,596.9 213,174.1171,025.3
  Minimum    519.4 614.9 954.4 1,224.7 1,963.2 2,426.9 3,471.2 1,923.8
  Standard deviation  28,857.3 30,935.7 37,328.4 40,878.9 55,250.9 60,233.9 57,294.6 46,967.4
AD Mean   60.5% 63.4% 62.8% 60.5% 60.5% 62.8% 58.1% 58.1% 56.8%
  Total   26 26 27 26 26 27 25 25 21
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The mean RCIu is always zero or close to zero. It should be remembered that the RCI is 
calculated by fund as the distance in standard deviations of the cost level of a fund 
from the mean cost level of funds in the same sector. The mean RCI of all funds in the 
sample is therefore zero by definition. The mean RCIu of the umbrellas in the sample 
can deviate from zero since the RCI per umbrella is calculated as the mean of the RCIs 
of funds belonging to that umbrella. The number of funds per umbrella differs. 
The mean number of board members fluctuated between six and seven. As seen in 
table 5.5, the minimum number of board members is three, the legal minimum, 
whereas the largest board had, on average, 22.5 members in 2000. The mean percent-
age of independent board members has increased in the research period from 14.0% 
to 16.1%. The mean percentage of semi-independent board members dropped from 
8.3% to 7.1%. The percentage of umbrellas in the sample with an independent or semi-
independent chair increased, whereas the percentage of umbrellas with an independ-
ent depositary was stable. In line with the observation at fund level, the experience of 
board members has increased. 
The percentage of fixed TER schemes increased from 9.3% to 29.7% of the umbrel-
las. The percentage of promoter umbrellas with an affiliated distribution channel 
dropped from 60.5% to 56.8%. The statistics for the measures for scale at umbrella 
level confirm the observation at fund level, that there is a wide variation from small to 
large. In each calendar year, there was an umbrella with an average fund size of below 
EUR 50 million, whereas the umbrellas with the highest average fund size had funds 
with, on average, in excess of EUR 1 billion of assets. It should be noted that this ob-
servation concerns funds included in the sample, i.e., funds investing in one of the six 
sectors selected, not all funds in the umbrellas in the sample. There is also a large 
variation in scale at umbrella and promoter levels. 
 
Table 5.10 is the correlation matrix for the variables at umbrella level for the years 
2002-2008. Coefficients between 0.333 and 0.5 or -0.333 and -0.5 are shaded in light 
grey, while those in excess of -0.5 and 0.5 are shaded in a darker grey. 
The correlation coefficients at umbrella level are largely consistent with those at 
fund level as reported in table 5.6. The percentage of independent board members is 
positively correlated with the board tenure and the chair dummy, which is one when 
the position of chairman is held by a semi-independent or independent person. There 
is a strong positive correlation between the three different measures for scale. 
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RCI Model 
A disadvantage of the individual fund model is that all funds are treated as independ-
ent observations. Because funds in the same umbrella share the same governance 
characteristics, this treatment is not really the case. The drawback of the individual 
fund model is that standard errors for variables that are the same across funds in the 
sample are likely to be underestimated, and that the statistical significance of these 
variables could be overstated. To avoid this issue, the analysis is also performed with 
the average Relative Cost Indicator per umbrella. This regression model can be seen as 
a variation on the family-average model used by e.g., Ferris and Yan (2007b). The aver-
age RCI is a measure that summarises the relative cost level of all funds in the same 
umbrella, included in the sample, in one figure. As a result, each umbrella is repre-
sented in the analysis only once each calendar year, ensuring that the observations are 
independent. While this approach analyses fund promoter characteristics at the 
proper level and clearly avoids the pitfalls of the individual fund model of overstating 
statistical significance, the price is that valuable variation at the fund level is not used 
and thus, coefficients are estimated inefficiently. 
 
The following equations are estimated: 
 
RCI Model I (time fixed effects): 
 
tu,tp,12
tp,11tu,10ti,9ti,8tu,7
tu,6tu,5tu,4tu,3tu,2tu,1ttu,
εAD
LTNALTNALATNAFIXLEG
TEN3%DEPCHS%I%TcRCI
++
+++++
++++++=
β
βββββ
ββββββ
 (5.9) 
 
RCI Model II (time fixed effects and umbrella dummies): 
 
tu,tp,11tu,10ti,9ti,8
tu,6tu,5tu,4tu,3tu,2tu,1uttu,
εLTNALTNALTNAFIX
TEN3%DEPCHS%I%TcRCI
+++++
+++++++=
ββββ
ββββββα  (5.10) 
Results 
The results of the analyses at umbrella level are displayed in table 5.11. When inter-
preting the results, it should be noted that the cost level of an umbrella in the RCI 
model is measured in standard deviations from the sample mean, whereas in the indi-
vidual fund model, the dependent variables are in basis points. In order to better un-
derstand the economic significance of the results and compare them to the individual 
fund model results, the coefficients are multiplied by the average standard deviation of 
the TERs in basis points. This product of coefficient and standard deviation is shown in 
the column indicated with bp. 
The results of Model Ib at umbrella level are largely consistent with those at indi-
vidual fund level in section 5.5. Boards with a higher percentage of independent direc-
tors have a lower TER. The economic significance is practically the same as in the indi-
vidual fund model. Given the average board size of 7.0, each additional independent 
board member is associated with approximately 1.3 basis points lower TER. At individ-
ual fund level, this outcome was 1.2 basis points. As in the individual fund model, the 
G O V E R N A N C E  A N D  C O S T S  
 199 
coefficient of the dummy variable for the chair position is positive. In this case, the 
coefficient is somewhat higher and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for the 
percentage of semi-independent board members is positive, but significant only at the 
level of 10%. Umbrellas with larger boards, as well as those with more experienced 
boards and an independent depositary, have higher TERs. Umbrellas with the legal 
form of an FCP also have higher TERs. 
The results for the control variables are very similar to those found for the individ-
ual fund model. Larger funds and funds in larger umbrellas have lower TERs. The coef-
ficient for promoter assets is statistically significant positive. This indicates that funds 
of larger promoters have higher costs. Umbrellas of promoters with an affiliated distri-
bution channel and those using a fixed TER fee structure have lower TERs. It should be 
remembered that the RCI is calculated without funds in the sample that charge per-
formance fees. Therefore, there is no performance fee dummy included in the RCI 
model. Because the RCI is calculated in standard deviations from the respective sector 
means, no Emerging Markets sector dummy needed to be included either. 
The results for Model IIb at umbrella level deviate more from those at the individ-
ual fund level. The reason for this difference is that by having a dependent variable at 
umbrella level and dummy variables per umbrella, practically all variability is captured 
in the dummy variables. This results in a high R-squared, but less meaningful results for 
the explanatory variables. The statistically significant coefficients found do point in the 
same direction as for specification II of the individual fund model. 
 
Table 5.11: Relative Cost Indicator per umbrella and board characteristics 
RCI RCI Model Ib (2002-2008) RCI Model IIb (2002-2008) 
  Coefficient t bp Coefficient t bp 
c -0.52 -0.98 -13.5    
T 0.06 5.99 1.5 0.01 0.44 0.3 
I% -0.34 -3.65 -8.8 0.85 1.86 22.1 
S% 0.46 1.67 12.1 0.98 2.02 25.4 
CH 0.30 3.07 7.9 -0.41 -3.38 -10.8 
DEP 0.33 2.78 8.7 0.08 0.85 2.0 
TEN3% 0.43 3.06 11.1 0.05 0.67 1.2 
LEG 0.32 2.92 8.4    
FIX -0.44 -7.51 -11.6 -0.07 -0.88 -1.8 
LATNAi -0.12 -4.28 -3.1 -0.04 -0.71 -1.2 
LTNAu -0.20 -6.11 -5.2 -0.26 -4.37 -6.8 
LTNAp 0.21 3.59 5.6 0.01 0.13 0.3 
AD -0.44 -5.13 -11.5    
Periods 7   7   
Funds 44   44   
Observations 295   295   
R2 0.215   0.822   
Adjusted R2 0.164   0.778   
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
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5.8 Robustness checks 
This section presents two robustness checks of the results found in section 5.5. The 
first robustness check defines independence in an alternative way. The second check 
splits the sample by origin of the promoter and performs the regressions analyses in 
the two sub-samples. 
Independence as a dummy variable 
In section 5.5, three variables for the independence of the board were included in the 
regression analysis: the percentage of independent board members, the percentage of 
semi-independent board members and a dummy variable for the position of the chair. 
One could argue that in determining how effective boards operate for the interest of 
investors, it might matter more whether there is representation on the board from 
someone not employed by the promoter than the level of representation by non-
employees. To capture this effect, the analyses of section 5.5 are repeated in this sec-
tion, replacing the three variables for board independence by just one dummy variable 
for Board Independence (BI), indicating whether there is any board member on the 
board of an umbrella who is either independent or semi-independent. This is identical 
to the definition for dependent boards versus independent and semi-independent 
boards in section 4.4.  
The results of the analysis are shown in table 5.12. For this robustness test, only 
the results for the TER are presented and only for the 2002–2008 period, when data 
for all variables was available. The top panel shows the results according to Model I, 
the cross-sectional approach. The bottom panel provides the results for Model II, 
which is the model with dummy variables for the different umbrellas. For easy refer-
ence, the results for the original model specification for the same period are also dis-
played. 
 
The results for Model I in the original specification and with the dummy variable for 
board independence are highly consistent. In the alternative model specification, there 
is a negative and marginally significant relationship between the board independence 
dummy variable (BI) and the TER. Funds with boards that have some influence from 
outsiders have a TER 2 basis points lower. In the original model specification, the coef-
ficients were much larger, but with a negative sign for the percentage of board inde-
pendence and a positive sign for both the percentage of semi-independent board 
members and the chair position. The results for the other governance variables and 
the control variables are substantially the same as in the original model specification. 
The explanatory power of the alternative specification, where three variables are re-
placed by one, is practically the same as under the original specification. 
Comparing results for the two specifications of Model II, the result for the board 
independence dummy variable is noteworthy. Because of the inclusion of dummy 
variables per umbrella in Model II, the robustness check with the dummy variable for 
independence picks up on situations where this variable changed, either from a fully 
dependent board to one with at least one semi-independent or independent board 
member or vice versa. The economically small and statistically insignificant coefficient 
shows that in those situations, such a change did not coincide with a change in fund 
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TER levels. As was the case for Model I, the results for the other variables and the ex-
planatory power of this alternative model specification and the original specification 
are substantially the same. 
 
Table 5.12: Results analysis of fund costs and board characteristics with alternative independence definition 
– Board Independence dummy variable for funds with at least one (semi-) independent board member 
TER% 
Model Ib (2002-2008)  
Orginal model specification 
Model Ib (2002-2008)  
Board Independence dummy 
  Coefficient t Coefficient t 
c 177.72 10.23 182.50 12.51 
T 1.39 6.04 1.22 7.45 
I% / BI -8.33 -3.68 -2.06 -1.85 
S% 4.94 1.23   
CH 4.52 1.66   
DEP 6.59 2.79 6.11 2.56 
TEN3% 9.04 2.54 7.22 1.74 
LEG 6.00 2.37 5.13 2.51 
PF 13.62 9.89 13.49 8.90 
FIX -8.82 -4.95 -7.92 -4.76 
LTNAi -4.01 -8.16 -4.02 -8.69 
LTNAu -4.76 -7.68 -4.20 -7.74 
LTNAp 5.35 2.86 4.89 3.01 
EM 30.61 18.90 30.41 18.66 
LAGE 0.68 1.02 0.73 1.01 
AD -16.03 -7.74 -17.04 -10.51 
Periods 7  7  
Funds 538  538  
Observations 2541  2541  
R2 0.280  0.276  
Adjusted R2 0.274  0.271  
TER% 
Model IIb (2002-2008)  
Original model specification 
Model IIb (2002-2008)  
Board Independence dummy 
  Coefficient t Coefficient t 
T 0.24 0.39 0.23 0.59 
I% / BI 39.21 3.28 1.18 0.51 
S% 17.07 1.53   
CH -9.07 -5.85   
DEP 1.54 0.90 2.67 2.78 
TEN3% 0.76 0.37 1.19 0.53 
PF 14.33 10.41 14.74 11.01 
FIX 8.50 3.36 8.35 4.18 
LTNAi -2.87 -5.44 -2.83 -5.50 
LTNAu -5.71 -7.82 -6.28 -7.44 
LTNAp -2.28 -0.86 -2.99 -1.21 
EM 28.99 15.16 28.95 15.16 
LAGE -0.37 -0.60 -0.37 -0.61 
Periods 7  7  
Funds 538  538  
Observations 2541  2541  
R2 0.565  0.560  
Adjusted R2 0.554  0.549  
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
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Sample split by promoter origin 
In chapter 4, it was concluded that independent board members on fund boards are 
more common for promoters of Anglo-Saxon origin than for continental European 
promoters. In order to rule out that the origin of the promoter is driving the results for 
the percentage of independent board members, the following robustness check was 
performed. The regression analysis was repeated for two sub-samples separately, 
specifically, the funds of Anglo-Saxon promoters and the funds of continental Euro-
pean promoters. 
The results of the analysis for the TER as dependent variable on data for the 2002-
2008 period are shown in table 5.13. The top panel shows the results according to 
Model I and the bottom panel provides the results for Model II. The results for the full 
sample of funds are shown as well, next to the results for the two sub-samples by 
promoter origin. 
 
When comparing the results for the whole sample with those for the two sub-samples 
according to the promoter origin, noteworthy differences occur. Of the results for 
Model I, the cross-sectional model specification, the most surprising result concerns 
the percentage of independent board members. Whereas in the whole sample the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant, it is positive in the Anglo-Saxon sub-
sample and negative in the continental European sub-sample, but not statistically 
significant in either of the two. 
Consistent with the results for the whole sample is that larger boards, independ-
ent depositaries and funds set up as FCPs are associated with higher TERs, even though 
the relationship between board size and TER in the sub-sample for Anglo-Saxon pro-
moters is significant only at the level of 10%. The relationship between board tenure 
and TER is positive in both sub-samples, but significant only in the Anglo-Saxon sub-
sample. The coefficient for the chair position is not statistically significant in either sub-
sample. The relationship between the percentage of semi-independent board mem-
bers and the TER is significantly positive in the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample. 
For the control variables, the results for the two sub-samples based on promoter 
origin support the results for the sample as a whole. The sign of each of the coeffi-
cients is the same in the whole sample as in the two sub-samples, and the level of 
economical and statistical significance is comparable. In both sub-samples, affiliated 
distribution is associated with a lower TER. In the continental European sub-sample the 
difference is 21 basis points, in the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample 6 basis points. Only in the 
case of the Fixed TER dummy variable, is the coefficient not statistically significant in 
one of the two sub-samples, specifically that for Anglo-Saxon promoters.  
With Model II, analysing variation within the umbrellas, the results for the control 
variables in the sub-samples are consistent with the results for the sample as a whole. 
The most striking difference again for the two sub-samples is the result for the per-
centage of independent board members. The positive and significant relationship be-
tween this percentage and the TER in the sample as a whole consists, in fact, of a nega-
tive and significant relationship in the continental European sub-sample and a strongly 
positive and significant relationship in the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample. This result raises 
further doubts with regard to the existence of any causal relationship between inde-
pendent governance and the level of the TER. 
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Table 5.13: Results analysis of fund costs and board characteristics for sub-samples – Full sample, funds of 
continental European promoters and funds of Anglo-Saxon promoters 
TER% Model Ib (2002-2008)  
Full sample 
Model Ib (2002-2008)  
Continental European 
Model Ib (2002-2008)  
Anglo-Saxon 
  Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
c 177.72 10.23 180.43 14.03 164.72 7.31 
T 1.39 6.04 1.47 5.29 0.66 1.94 
I% -8.33 -3.68 -15.35 -1.38 3.13 0.63 
S% 4.94 1.23 1.71 0.25 18.46 2.60 
CH 4.52 1.66 1.62 0.27 4.68 1.65 
DEP 6.59 2.79 4.48 2.25 16.73 2.78 
TEN3% 9.04 2.54 7.93 1.06 11.14 2.42 
LEG 6.00 2.37 5.23 1.98 8.55 1.73 
PF 13.62 9.89 11.69 2.54 14.74 4.70 
FIX -8.82 -4.95 -10.02 -3.03 -5.05 -1.22 
LTNAi -4.01 -8.16 -4.07 -6.61 -3.56 -7.05 
LTNAu -4.76 -7.68 -3.37 -3.75 -6.38 -4.51 
LTNAp 5.35 2.86 4.69 4.76 7.04 2.40 
EM 30.61 18.90 36.06 20.35 23.91 11.38 
LAGE 0.68 1.02 0.05 0.03 -0.26 -0.39 
AD -16.03 -7.74 -21.43 -3.18 -6.04 -2.34 
Periods 7  7  7  
Funds 538  282  256  
Observations 2541  1264  1277  
R2 0.280  0.225  0.303  
Adjusted R2 0.274  0.212  0.291  
TER% Model IIb (2002-2008) 
Full sample 
Model IIb (2002-2008) 
Continental European 
Model IIb (2002-2008) 
Anglo-Saxon 
  Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
T 0.24 0.39 -1.59 -1.28 2.51 1.79 
I% 39.21 3.28 -19.15 -2.60 53.09 3.29 
S% 17.07 1.53 5.09 0.59 41.51 1.95 
CH -9.07 -5.85 2.26 0.58 -18.57 -4.77 
DEP 1.54 0.90 4.04 1.07 4.70 0.87 
TEN3% 0.76 0.37 -0.79 -0.29 3.92 1.05 
PF 14.33 10.41 14.85 5.63 10.86 6.27 
FIX 8.50 3.36 5.43 2.08 9.78 3.79 
LTNAi -2.87 -5.44 -2.32 -2.74 -3.22 -8.29 
LTNAu -5.71 -7.82 -4.39 -3.11 -6.51 -5.48 
LTNAp -2.28 -0.86 -2.98 -0.64 -0.52 -0.26 
EM 28.99 15.16 33.60 16.81 24.96 11.31 
LAGE -0.37 -0.60 -0.78 -1.22 -0.21 -0.29 
AD       
Periods 7  7  7  
Funds 538  282  256  
Observations 2541  1264  1277  
R2 0.565  0.539  0.563  
Adjusted R2 0.554  0.523  0.549  
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
 
What could be driving these results? Figure 5.3 provides clarification by means of a 
snail trail for the two sub-samples. This chart plots the average TER of funds investing 
in developed markets against the average percentage of independent board members 
in each of the calendar years in the research period, separately for the continental 
European and the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample. As was shown in section 5.3, TERs in-
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creased in the research period. The upward development is visible in both sub-
samples, although TERs in the continental European sub-sample are lower than in the 
Anglo-Saxon sub-sample. The chart also reflects the conclusion in chapter 4 that the 
governance of Anglo-Saxon promoter umbrellas became more independent in the 
research period, whereas more umbrellas among continental European promoters 
developed from having some independence to being fully dependent than vice versa. 
This finding implies that among Anglo-Saxon promoters, the increasing TERs coincided 
with increasing board independence, whereas among continental European promot-
ers, increasing TERs coincided with decreasing independence. In the results for Model 
II, this finding is expressed as a negative coefficient in the continental European sub-
sample and a positive coefficient in the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample. These results are not 
supportive for the existence of any causal relationship between board independence 
and the level of the TER. 
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Figure 5.3: Development of fund costs and independence in the two sub-samples 
Sub-sample of funds investing in developed markets, without a performance fee schedule.  
5.9 Conclusions 
In the period from 2000 until 2008, average Management and Distribution Fees in-
creased for all sectors in the sample. In the same period, average Other Costs de-
creased. In the case of the Emerging Markets sector, the net effect of the increase of 
average Management and Distribution Fee and the decrease of average Other Costs 
was a decrease of the TER. For all developed market sectors, the decrease of average 
Other Costs did not offset the increase of the average Management and Distribution 
Fees, resulting in an increase of the TER.  
Mesche (2007), Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Kong and Tang (2008) are examples of 
studies finding a statistically significant negative relationship between fund size, as 
well as fund family size and costs. The results of the various regression analyses pre-
sented in this chapter were consistent with that finding, at least for the measures for 
fund size and umbrella size. Larger funds have lower TERs, driven by Other Costs. 
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Funds in larger umbrellas have lower TERs, driven by a combination of lower Manage-
ment and Distribution Fees and lower Other Costs. There is evidence of the scale of the 
promoter being positively related to the TER, in particular its Management and Distri-
bution fees component. This finding can be explained by larger promoters being able 
to command premium pricing for their funds.  
 
The main question in this chapter was whether or not fund investors benefit from 
independent governance in the form of lower costs. The results from earlier empirical 
studies are inconsistent. Tufano and Sevick (1997) find evidence consistent with inde-
pendent governance contributing to lower costs for open-end funds. Del Guercio et al. 
(2003) and Gemmill and Thomas (2006) come to similar results for closed-end funds. 
These results, however, are not confirmed by Meschke (2007), Ferris and Yan (2007b), 
Cremers et al. (2009) and Adams et al. (2010). An interesting aspect of this Luxem-
bourg fund study is that there is greater variation in the level of board independence. 
In the U.S., funds are required to have more than 40% independent board members 
and most have more than two-thirds, whereas in Luxembourg, there is no requirement 
to have independent board members. In 2008, the percentage of independent board 
members for funds in the sample ranged between 0% and 73.5%.  
The study failed to find consistent evidence that independent governance contrib-
utes to lower costs. With a cross-sectional analysis at individual fund level, it was 
shown that the percentage of independent board members was associated with lower 
TERs, due to lower Other Costs. The economic significance of the coefficient was mod-
est. A fund with a fully independent board would have an approximately 8 basis points 
lower TER than a fund with a fully dependent board. However, not in line with the 
hypothesis that independent governance drives costs down, was the positive relation-
ship between the percentage of independence and the Management and Distribution 
fee, as well as the positive relationship between the chair position and the TER. Using 
the average Relative Cost Indicator as the measure for costs at the umbrella level, 
these results were confirmed, finding a negative relationship between TER and the 
percentage of independent board members and a positive relationship between the 
TER and the chair position. In a model specification in which the three variables for 
board independence (percentage of independent board members, percentage of semi-
independent board members and dummy variable for the chair position) were re-
placed by one dummy variable indicating whether there is any representation on a 
certain board by someone who is not employed by the promoter or promoter group, 
there was a negative relationship between the TER and this Board Independence 
dummy. 
Inconsistent results were found when the sample was split based on the promoter 
origin into a continental European and an Anglo-Saxon sub-sample. The results for the 
level of board independence and the chair position were not statistically significant in 
the two sub-samples, with opposite signs in the two sub-samples for the coefficient of 
the variable for the percentage of board independence.  
Results not supportive of the hypothesis that independent governance leads to 
lower costs were also found with the model specification in which dummy variables 
per umbrella were added, thus focusing on variation within umbrellas. Analysing the 
whole sample with this methodology, a positive, and economically and statistically 
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significant, relationship was found between the percentage of independent board 
members and the TER. This finding implied that umbrella boards where the percentage 
of independent board members increased, also had an increase of TERs, not a de-
crease. When the total sample was split into two sub-samples based on promoter 
origin, it turned out that the relationship between the percentage of independence 
and the TER differed in both sub-samples. There was a negative and significant rela-
tionship in the continental European sub-sample, and a strongly positive and signifi-
cant relationship in the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample. 
These results are consistent with two developments happening in parallel, specifi-
cally, the increase of TERs on the one hand and, on the other hand, deviating devel-
opments with regard to independent governance in the sub-samples of continental 
European and Anglo-Saxon promoters. The level of independent governance is higher 
in the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample and increased during the research period. Independent 
governance is less common on boards of continental European promoter umbrellas 
and has decreased during the research period. Whereas increasing TERs coincided with 
increasing independence in the one sub-sample, they coincided with decreasing inde-
pendence in the other. These results are not supportive of the existence of any causal 
relationship between board independence and the TER level. 
Governance characteristics of a fund are related to the promoter’s country of ori-
gin. The higher average TER of Anglo-Saxon promoter funds over those of continental 
European promoters seems to be driven by whether or not the promoter has an affili-
ated distribution channel within the group. Continental European promoters have in 
most cases, but not all, an affiliated distribution channel within their banking or insur-
ance group, whereas Anglo-Saxon promoters are, more often than not, independent 
from any distribution channel. In both the continental European and the Anglo-Saxon 
sub-samples, affiliated distribution is associated with statistically significantly lower 
TERs. With the individual fund model, the difference was estimated at 16 basis points. 
Fund and umbrella scale, as well as the distribution model of the promoter, seem to be 
more important drivers for fund TER levels than the composition of the board. 
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Chapter 6 
Governance and performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principle #6: “As long as you’re picking a fund, you might as well pick a good one”.108 
                                                                
108 One of 25 investor principles of Peter Lynch, star manager of the Fidelity Magellan Fund in the period 
1977–1990, published in: Peter Lynch with John Rothchild, 1993, Beating the Street (Simon & Schuster, New 
York), p. 59.  
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6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, investment performance is used as a measure for the effectiveness of 
fund boards. Ultimately, performance is what investors are after when they invest in a 
fund. Performance is also where all possible agency costs converge. In the end, the 
costs of any conflict of interest will be at the expense of the performance achieved by 
the fund. Independent board members should be the most effective category of board 
members in pursuing the interests of the investors; they are the least hampered by 
conflicts of interest and most inclined to prioritise the investors’ interests. The hy-
pothesis being tested in this chapter is that funds with more independent boards have 
better investment performance than funds with less independent boards. The rele-
vance for investors is whether governance characteristics should be taken into account 
as a selection criterion when one wants to pick a good fund. 
A disadvantage of analysing fund performance is that due to the volatility of the 
equity markets, fund returns have a low signal-to-noise ratio. This might make it diffi-
cult to attribute differences in returns to the added value of the board. 
This study is most related to Meschke (2007), Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Kong and 
Tang (2008). These studies of U.S.-domiciled funds analyse the relationship between 
fund performance and board independence, measured as the percentage of inde-
pendent board members and with a dummy variable for the chair position. Their re-
sults do not support the hypothesis that independent governance contributes posi-
tively to performance. Analysing ten years of performance data, Meschke (2007) finds 
that both these measures for board independence are associated with lower perform-
ance. On the basis of one year of performance data, Kong and Tang (2008) also find 
that a higher percentage of independence is related to lower performance, whereas 
the relationship for the chair position is not statistically significant. Ferris and Yan 
(2007b) find no statistically significant relationship for either measure of board inde-
pendence. Analysing the performance of long/short portfolios of funds selected on the 
basis of governance criteria, Cremers et al. (2009) find that a higher proportion of 
independent directors is not associated with a significantly higher or lower perform-
ance. However, they find that fund ownership by both independent and dependent 
directors is associated with better performance.  
There are several studies more supportive of the hypothesis that independent 
governance contributes positively to performance. Wellman and Zhou (2007) find that 
funds with a good stewardship grade from Morningstar perform better than funds 
with a poor stewardship grade. Out of the five components of the overall grade, Board 
Quality and Fees have most explanatory power. It should be noted that a good quality 
board, as assessed by Morningstar, does not equal a highly independent board. Al-
though the level of independence is taken into account, Morningstar also appreciates 
board members investing in the funds they oversee, and dislikes board members over-
seeing too many funds. Ding and Werners (2005) conclude that boards with more 
outside directors are more likely to replace managers with poor performance, which 
has a positive effect on subsequent performance. Khorana et al. (2007) find that more 
independent boards tolerate less underperformance before engaging in across-family 
mergers. Analysing closed-end funds, Del Guercio et al. (2003) find that boards with a 
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higher portion of independent members are more likely to approve a share repurchase 
programme when discounts are large.  
The results for the relationship between board size and performance are also not 
consistent across the various studies. The results of Kong and Tang (2008) and Adams 
et al. (2010) support the hypothesis that larger boards are less effective in their deci-
sion-making, finding that larger boards are associated with lower performance. For 
closed-end funds, Del Guercio et al. (2003) find that larger boards are associated with 
bigger discounts and are more likely to make decisions against the interest of share-
holders. Contradictory results come from Ding and Wermers (2005), who find that 
funds with larger boards perform better and are less tolerant of poor performance 
before replacing poorly performing managers. In the case of Ferris and Yan (2007b) 
and Meschke (2007), the relationship is not statistically significant.  
This study adds to the existing literature by analysing funds in a different market 
and regulatory environment, specifically, Luxembourg-domiciled funds distributed on a 
cross-border basis. In the U.S., the variation of the percentage of independent board 
members is relatively low and is always above the regulatory minimum of 40%, where-
as in this sample of Luxembourg funds, it varies between zero and 80.0%. Ten years of 
performance data and governance data is available for the analysis.  
Two performance measures are used to compare the performance across the 
sample of funds. The first consists of a practitioner and consumer view on fund per-
formance. In this case, the return of a fund is compared to the average return of funds 
in the same sector. It is a simple and intuitive peer group comparison, where the re-
turn of a fund is corrected for that of similar funds available to investors at the same 
moment in time. The second measure is a risk-adjusted fund return, which provides a 
more academic view on fund performance. Risk-adjusted performance is determined 
as the alpha from the Carhart 4-factor model and is used as the primary measure for 
excess return in this study. The definitions of excess return and the sources of the data 
used are elaborated in section 6.2.  
Section 6.3 analyses the performance of funds in the sample in the research pe-
riod, using descriptive statistics. Section 6.4 is dedicated to a multiple regression analy-
sis at fund level, analysing performance data for periods of one year. The two sections 
thereafter provide robustness checks of the results found in section 6.4, analysing 
performance at umbrella level in section 6.5 and analysing performance over a longer 
period in section 6.6. Section 6.7 provides the conclusions for this chapter. 
6.2 Performance definitions and data 
Excess return measures 
In order to be able to compare the investment performance of funds across different 
sectors, two measures are used for a fund’s excess return. The first measure is the 
fund’s sector-adjusted return, which is the return of a fund in a certain period, relative 
to the average return of funds in the same sector. Since, in practice, investors compare 
the results achieved to that of available alternatives, this measure for the relative per-
formance of a fund is intuitive and practical . The Average Sector-Adjusted Return of a 
fund can be seen as the return in excess of the return of an equally weighted portfolio 
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of all funds in the same sector, rebalanced monthly. By adjusting fund returns for the 
returns of funds in the same sector, the excess returns found can be compared across 
sectors. The monthly Average Sector-Adjusted Return (hereafter also referred to as 
ASAR) for fund i over period t is calculated as follows: 
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where: 
ri,t is the return of fund i in month t. 
rj,t is the return of fund j, belonging to the same sector as fund i, in month t. 
mt is the number of funds within the given sector in month t. 
 
The second measure used to compare the return of funds is more sophisticated in that 
it takes into account fund risk. The risk-adjusted performance measure used is the 
alpha from the Carhart 4-factor model, in this dissertation also referred to as the Car-
hart alpha or 4-factor alpha (hereafter also CFFA). It corrects the return of a fund for 
the return of a market portfolio and for the return on three simple strategies, specifi-
cally, investing in small capitalisation stocks, investing in value stocks and investing in 
momentum stocks. The Carhart model (see Carhart, 1997) is an empirical extension of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model and builds on work by Fama and French (1993). The 
Carhart model reads as follows: 
 
tittittittittiti
e
ti ePR1YRpHMLhSMBsRMRFbr ,,,,,,, +++++= α  Tt ,...,2,1=  (6.2) 
 
where: 
e
tir ,  is the return of fund i in month t in excess of the risk-free rate. 
αi,t  is the monthly Carhart alpha of fund i in period t, for the purpose of this disserta-
tion interpreted as a measure of excess return. 
RMRFt is the return in excess of the risk-free rate on a value-weighted market proxy in 
month t. 
SMBt, HMLt and PR1YRt are a size, a book-to-market and a momentum factor, respec-
tively. 
 
These three factors can be seen as the returns on a zero-investment portfolio, long in 
one type of securities and short in another type. In the case of SMB, which stands for 
small minus big, it is long in small capitalisation and short in large capitalisation stocks. 
In the case of HML, high minus low book-to-market ratio stocks, it is long in value and 
short in growth stocks. The momentum factor (PR1YR) is a portfolio investing long in 
the past year’s winners and short in past year’s losing stocks. Carhart (1997, p. 61) 
writes the following about the interpretation of his model:  
“The 4-factor model is consistent with a model of market equilibrium with four 
risk factors. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as a performance attribution 
model, where the coefficients and premia on the factor-mimicking portfolios 
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indicate the proportion of the mean return attributable to four elementary 
strategies: high versus low beta stocks, large versus small market capitalization 
stocks, value versus growth stocks, and one-year return momentum versus 
contrarian stocks. I employ the model to “explain” returns, and leave risk in-
terpretation to the reader.” 
Factor construction and data 
The sample of umbrellas and funds is the same as for the analysis of governance and 
costs in chapter 5. Monthly total returns for these funds were taken from Morningstar 
Direct. However, for the limited number of funds in the sample for which fund returns 
were not available from Morningstar Direct, these have been provided by Lipper. For 
the sectors Global, U.S. and Emerging Markets equity, the return currency is U.S. dol-
lars (US$). The returns for the sectors Pan-European and Euroland equity are in Euros 
(EUR), while for Japan equity, the returns are in Japanese Yen (JPY).  
Several academic studies evaluating the performance of U.S.-based funds with the 
Fama-French 3-factor or the Carhart 4-factor model, such as Barber et al. (2005) and 
Bello (2007), use the factor returns for the U.S. stock market constructed using data 
from the CRSP database and made available by Dr. Kenneth French109. For this study of 
Luxembourg funds, in addition to funds investing in U.S. equity, performance of funds 
investing in the sectors Global equity, Japan equity, Pan-European equity, Euroland 
equity and Emerging Markets equity needs to be evaluated. This requirement implies 
that for applying the Carhart model, factors need to be constructed that reflect the 
investment opportunity set available to these funds in the sample.  
To construct the factors for the 4-factor model, indices were used from MSCI110 for 
each of the six sectors in the sample: MSCI World NR, MSCI USA NR, MSCI Europe NR, 
MSCI EMU NR, MSCI Japan NR and MSCI Emerging Markets NR. These MSCI total re-
turn indices are available for the entire 2000-2009 research period. The MSCI World 
index is a stock market index consisting of over 6,000 equities from 24 developed 
countries. This market capitalisation weighted index has been calculated since 1969 
and is commonly used as benchmark by investment funds investing globally in devel-
oped markets. The MSCI country indices for the U.S., Japan and 16 European countries 
are among the constituents of the MSCI World index. The 16 developed European 
countries together form the MSCI Europe index. The MSCI EMU is formed by the 
eleven of these countries that are part of the European Economic and Monetary Un-
ion. The MSCI Emerging Markets Index is a market capitalisation index that consists of 
21 emerging market country indices.  
The abbreviation NR stands for net returns, indicating that the returns are calcu-
lated with dividend reinvested, after subtracting withholding tax. This approach gives a 
better proxy for the actual tax status of Luxembourg funds than the gross dividends 
reinvested benchmarks that are also available from MSCI. The reason is that for most 
investment markets, a Luxembourg-domiciled fund cannot reclaim withholding tax on 
                                                                
109 See website http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
110 Formerly known as Morgan Stanley Capital International.  
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dividends111. The monthly returns of these indices for each of the sectors are used for 
the market proxy RMRFt of the Carhart 4-factor model. The risk free rates used for 
US$, EUR and JPY, respectively, are 3-month U.S. Treasury Bills, 1-month Euro Libor 
and 1-month Japanese Yen Libor.  
For all six MSCI indices used, sub-indices are available for growth and value stocks, 
allowing the construction of the HML factors. The value and growth indices are con-
structed using a style definition with eight fundamental data points for each security. 
Based on this data, the various broad indices are split into a value and growth index, 
each with one-half of the market capitalisation. For each of the fund sectors, MSCI 
small cap indices are also available. These small cap indices are constructed from small 
capitalisation companies from the same markets, which are not included in the broad 
indices. For each sector, HML is the return of the value minus the growth version of 
the index. SMB is calculated as the return of the small cap index minus the return of 
the broad market index. Monthly returns for the various MSCI indices, as well as the 
risk-free rates, were obtained from Morningstar Direct. 
Momentum factors are not readily available from MSCI and are calculated follow-
ing Carhart (1997). For each of the six broad MSCI indices mentioned above, the re-
turns of the index constituents are calculated over the past 11 months, lagged one 
month, and then sorted. An equally weighted portfolio is formed with the 30% best 
performers and the 30% worst performers. The momentum factor is the return of the 
best performer portfolio in the subsequent month, minus the return of the worst per-
former portfolio. The list of index constituents is updated annually as of the end of the 
year. MSCI provided these annual lists of index constituents upon request. The returns 
for the index constituents were obtained from Morningstar Direct.  
The factor returns for each of the six fund sectors thus calculated are used to esti-
mate equation 6.2. The factor loadings b, s, h and p and the Carhart 4-factor alpha of 
individual funds and fund portfolios were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions. The method of constructing factors from market indices is unconven-
tional, but allows the use of one approach for all fund sectors analysed in this study for 
the whole research period. Furthermore, Cremers, Petajisto and Zitzewitz (2010) show 
that a factor model whereby market indices are used to construct the factors is appro-
priate, and is preferred over commonly used factor models in performance evaluation 
applications.  
In order to check how the factors calculated with the MSCI indices compare to the 
traditional factors used in the Carhart model, correlations were calculated between 
the factors constructed for this study for the U.S. equity sector for the 2000-2009 pe-
riod and those available on French’s website. The correlation between the factors for 
the excess market return is 0.977 and that for the risk-free rate 0.986. The correlations 
for the size and momentum factors are 0.887 and 0.927, respectively. It is not unex-
pected that with 0.747, the correlation for the valuation factor is the lowest of the 
factors, because distinguishing value and growth companies is more subjective than 
distinguishing large and small capitalisation companies. From these high correlations, it 
can be concluded that the factors used are similar to those of Dr. Kenneth French.  
                                                                
111 There are some markets for which withholding tax can be reclaimed, such as for e.g., the German market. 
As a result, the withholding tax situation of the funds in the sample might be marginally better than what is 
assumed with the various NR indices.  
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6.3 Fund performance in the research period 
Performance compared to market indices 
Figure 6.1 compares the average performance of the funds in the sample to the broad 
market indices of MSCI. The solid lines represent the performance of the funds in the 
sample. For each sector and for each month, the simple average performance is de-
termined for all active funds. These return series can be seen as those of equally 
weighted portfolios of all active funds, rebalanced monthly. The return series are used 
to create a series of values, with December 1999 set at 100, in the chart indicated as 
Fund Portfolio (FP). The Market Indices (MI) are shown as dotted lines. 
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Figure 6.1: Performance of fund portfolios in the sample by fund sector and market indices  
(December 1999=100) 
 
During the research period, investors were confronted with two bear market periods. 
All six market indices had negative returns in the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, as a re-
sult of the market correction that followed the technology bubble. In 2008, the mar-
kets suffered significant losses following the financial crisis. Despite recovery in the 
2003-2006 period and in 2009, the Emerging Markets sector was the only sector with a 
positive return over the entire research period.  
Table 6.1 provides the fund portfolio returns by sector for each calendar year and 
for the entire period, and compares these to the respective market indices. In all sec-
tors, the fund portfolio underperformed the market index over the entire research 
period. The fund portfolio returns are net of ongoing costs, whereas the returns of the 
market indices do not include costs. The average TER for Pan-European, Euroland, 
Global and U.S. equity was 1.82%, 1.76%, 1.86% and 1.80%, respectively. For these 
sectors, the underperformance of the fund portfolio of the relevant market indices was 
less than the TER, implying that gross of these costs, the funds outperformed the mar-
ket indices. The average TER for the Emerging Markets and Japan equity sectors 
amounted to 2.15% and 1.84%, respectively. The fund portfolios for these sectors 
underperformed the market indices by more than the average TER. 
C H A P T E R  6  
 214 
 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
1:
 R
et
ur
ns
 o
f e
qu
al
ly
-w
ei
gh
te
d 
fu
nd
 p
or
tf
ol
io
 o
f a
ll 
ac
tiv
e 
fu
nd
s,
 re
ba
la
nc
ed
 m
on
th
ly
, c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 m
ar
ke
t i
nd
ic
es
 fo
r t
he
 sa
m
e 
se
ct
or
s 
Fu
nd
 se
ct
or
 P
er
io
d 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
00
-2
00
9 
(a
nn
ua
lis
ed
) 
EM
 
Fu
nd
 P
or
tf
ol
io
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-3
3.
20
 
-5
.9
4 
-5
.6
6 
53
.1
1 
22
.5
2 
33
.5
8 
30
.5
9 
36
.9
5 
-5
4.
73
 
72
.3
0 
7.
56
 
  
M
ar
ke
t I
nd
ex
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-3
0.
83
 
-2
.6
1 
-6
.1
7 
55
.8
2 
25
.5
5 
34
.0
0 
32
.1
7 
39
.3
9 
-5
3.
33
 
78
.5
1 
9.
78
 
  
Ar
ith
m
et
ic
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 (i
n 
%
) 
-2
.3
7 
-3
.3
2 
0.
51
 
-2
.7
1 
-3
.0
3 
-0
.4
1 
-1
.5
8 
-2
.4
4 
-1
.4
0 
-6
.2
1 
-2
.2
3 
  
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f f
un
ds
 
22
.6
 
25
.9
 
28
.7
 
29
.4
 
28
.3
 
29
.8
 
31
.7
 
35
.3
 
39
.1
 
39
.5
 
31
.0
 
Gl
ob
al
 
Fu
nd
 P
or
tf
ol
io
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-1
3.
52
 
-2
0.
14
 
-2
2.
45
 
30
.3
1 
12
.4
3 
10
.0
2 
20
.2
6 
10
.1
3 
-4
4.
17
 
32
.9
4 
-1
.6
3 
  
M
ar
ke
t I
nd
ex
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-1
3.
18
 
-1
6.
82
 
-1
9.
89
 
33
.1
1 
14
.7
2 
9.
49
 
20
.0
7 
9.
04
 
-4
0.
71
 
29
.9
9 
-0
.2
4 
  
Ar
ith
m
et
ic
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 (i
n 
%
) 
-0
.3
4 
-3
.3
2 
-2
.5
6 
-2
.8
0 
-2
.2
9 
0.
54
 
0.
19
 
1.
10
 
-3
.4
6 
2.
95
 
-1
.3
8 
  
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f f
un
ds
 
49
.7
 
61
.0
 
69
.6
 
72
.6
 
67
.9
 
73
.7
 
82
.5
 
91
.3
 
91
.8
 
90
.8
 
75
.1
 
U
S 
Fu
nd
 P
or
tf
ol
io
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-8
.2
9 
-1
4.
63
 
-2
4.
95
 
26
.4
7 
9.
14
 
4.
94
 
11
.0
9 
5.
50
 
-3
9.
42
 
30
.5
4 
-2
.3
4 
  
M
ar
ke
t I
nd
ex
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-1
2.
84
 
-1
2.
39
 
-2
3.
09
 
28
.4
1 
10
.1
4 
5.
14
 
14
.6
7 
5.
44
 
-3
7.
57
 
26
.2
5 
-1
.8
2 
  
Ar
ith
m
et
ic
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 (i
n 
%
) 
4.
56
 
-2
.2
3 
-1
.8
6 
-1
.9
4 
-0
.9
9 
-0
.2
0 
-3
.5
9 
0.
06
 
-1
.8
5 
4.
29
 
-0
.5
2 
  
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f f
un
ds
 
50
.1
 
59
.5
 
76
.5
 
86
.4
 
90
.7
 
95
.3
 
10
2.
6 
10
4.
5 
10
3.
7 
97
.1
 
86
.6
 
Eu
ro
la
nd
 
Fu
nd
 P
or
tf
ol
io
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
0.
24
 
-1
8.
78
 
-3
3.
18
 
18
.3
2 
11
.1
2 
24
.5
8 
19
.1
8 
4.
78
 
-4
4.
05
 
25
.7
4 
-2
.4
2 
  
M
ar
ke
t I
nd
ex
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-2
.5
5 
-1
8.
29
 
-3
3.
77
 
19
.1
0 
12
.6
7 
25
.3
8 
21
.9
2 
7.
82
 
-4
4.
85
 
27
.3
2 
-1
.9
8 
  
Ar
ith
m
et
ic
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 (i
n 
%
) 
2.
79
 
-0
.4
9 
0.
58
 
-0
.7
7 
-1
.5
5 
-0
.8
0 
-2
.7
4 
-3
.0
5 
0.
80
 
-1
.5
8 
-0
.4
4 
  
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f f
un
ds
 
50
.2
 
59
.9
 
65
.5
 
74
.6
 
81
.8
 
94
.8
 
10
5.
7 
11
7.
4 
12
4.
0 
11
4.
7 
88
.9
 
Pa
n-
Eu
ro
pe
 
Fu
nd
 P
or
tf
ol
io
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-1
.5
4 
-1
7.
58
 
-3
1.
17
 
13
.4
2 
10
.1
2 
25
.7
0 
18
.7
1 
0.
10
 
-4
4.
86
 
31
.0
4 
-2
.8
0 
  
M
ar
ke
t I
nd
ex
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-2
.2
0 
-1
5.
54
 
-3
0.
74
 
15
.2
6 
12
.1
8 
26
.0
9 
19
.6
1 
2.
69
 
-4
3.
65
 
31
.6
0 
-1
.6
2 
  
Ar
ith
m
et
ic
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 (i
n 
%
) 
0.
66
 
-2
.0
4 
-0
.4
3 
-1
.8
4 
-2
.0
5 
-0
.3
8 
-0
.9
0 
-2
.6
0 
-1
.2
1 
-0
.5
6 
-1
.1
8 
  
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f f
un
ds
 
25
.6
 
26
.9
 
28
.4
 
28
.3
 
28
.6
 
31
.9
 
32
.7
 
33
.3
 
38
.7
 
40
.1
 
31
.5
 
Ja
pa
n 
Fu
nd
 P
or
tf
ol
io
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-2
5.
61
 
-2
0.
21
 
-1
9.
90
 
18
.8
2 
8.
59
 
44
.1
5 
0.
52
 
-1
3.
71
 
-4
4.
26
 
8.
56
 
-7
.3
9 
  
M
ar
ke
t I
nd
ex
 (r
et
ur
n 
in
 %
) 
-1
9.
85
 
-1
8.
98
 
-1
8.
76
 
22
.7
4 
10
.7
8 
44
.5
8 
7.
26
 
-1
0.
21
 
-4
2.
56
 
9.
12
 
-4
.5
8 
  
Ar
ith
m
et
ic
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 (i
n 
%
) 
-5
.7
6 
-1
.2
3 
-1
.1
4 
-3
.9
1 
-2
.1
9 
-0
.4
3 
-6
.7
4 
-3
.5
0 
-1
.7
0 
-0
.5
6 
-2
.8
1 
  
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f f
un
ds
 
38
.7
 
45
.3
 
46
.6
 
46
.8
 
47
.5
 
49
.8
 
57
.5
 
61
.9
 
61
.3
 
57
.9
 
51
.3
 
 
G O V E R N A N C E  A N D  P E R F O R M A N C E  
 215 
As a next step, for the fund portfolios for each sector, the alpha (α) and coefficients b, 
s, h and p were estimated using the Carhart 4-factor model (see formula 6.2) for the 
entire 2000-2009 period. This approach is similar to the performance analysis using a 
1-factor model of Grinold and Kahn (1992, p. 10) and as applied by Carhart (1997, p. 
62-65) with his 4-factor model. The results are provided in table 6.2. For each sector, 
the alpha (α) and coefficients b, s, h and p are provided along with their t-values. When 
a coefficient is statistically significant at the level of 10%, it is highlighted in light grey. 
For coefficients that are significant at the 5%-level, a darker shade of grey is used.  
 
Table 6.2: Monthly alpha and coefficients b, s, h and p estimated with the Carhart model (2000–2009) 
Fund sector α t b t s t h t p t R2 
EM -0.17 -2.69 0.99 112.71 -0.01 -0.21 -0.03 -0.96 0.02 1.93 0.992 
Global -0.14 -2.55 1.02 75.49 0.13 6.46 -0.11 -4.76 0.01 0.90 0.987 
U.S.  -0.10 -1.37 0.98 50.47 0.12 6.93 -0.11 -4.69 0.00 0.15 0.974 
Euroland -0.15 -2.83 0.95 90.03 0.10 5.24 0.04 2.18 0.00 0.17 0.990 
Pan-Europe -0.18 -3.37 0.99 73.55 0.18 9.23 -0.07 -2.66 0.02 1.40 0.987 
Japan -0.21 -3.51 0.98 82.27 0.07 4.02 -0.10 -5.14 -0.02 -2.06 0.986 
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
 
For all sectors, the beta (b) for the relationship of the fund portfolios with their respec-
tive market return is close to one. The t-values are high, but of the same order of mag-
nitude as those of Carhart (1997, p. 64) in a similar analysis. Except for Emerging Mar-
kets equity, the coefficients for the SML factor are statistically significant positively, 
indicating that the fund portfolios were exposed to small capitalisation stocks. The 
Emerging Markets fund portfolio had a positive exposure to momentum stocks, signifi-
cant at the level of 10%, while the Japan portfolio had a negative exposure to momen-
tum, significant at the level of 5%. For the other sectors, the coefficient p for momen-
tum is not statistically significant. The factor loadings for the HML factor are statisti-
cally significant negatively in four out of six fund sectors, indicating that these portfo-
lios were exposed to growth stocks. In the case of the Euroland equity sector, the HML 
factor loading was statistically significant positively, while for the Emerging Markets 
sector, it was not statistically significant. The resulting alphas were negative for all 
sectors, with t-statistics well below two in five out of six sectors, indicating statistically 
significant underperformance for the funds as a group. Only in the case of the U.S. 
equity sector was the underperformance not statistically significant. 
Performance of subsets of the sample 
In order to have a first impression of whether board independence contributes posi-
tively to fund performance, the fund portfolios are split into two parts for each of the 
sectors. The first part are fund portfolios consisting of funds of umbrellas with at least 
one independent or semi-independent board member, while the second part are fund 
portfolios of funds that are part of umbrellas with dependent board members only. 
The former are referred to as (semi-) independent fund portfolios, the latter as de-
pendent fund portfolios. A fund is included in the (semi-) independent fund portfolio 
when, for at least part of the month, it has a (semi-) independent board member. For 
each of the sectors, equally weighted fund portfolios are formed for the two subsets of 
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funds. In addition to long portfolios of funds in (semi-) independent umbrellas and 
funds in dependent umbrellas, a long/short zero investment portfolio is formed con-
sisting of a long portfolio of funds in (semi-) independent umbrellas and a short portfo-
lio of funds in dependent umbrellas. The performance of these portfolios is evaluated 
using the Carhart 4-factor model. This methodology is similar to what Grinold and 
Kahn’s (1992, p. 4–11) refer to as information analysis, where information is first used 
to form portfolios and then the performance of those portfolios is analysed and evalu-
ated. Cremers et al. (2009) apply the same methodology using the Carhart 4-factor 
model to compare the performance of fund portfolios of funds with a high versus a low 
director ownership.  
The results are provided in tables 6.3 and 6.4. Table 6.3 shows that in all sectors 
except Emerging Markets, the portfolio of funds with (semi-) independent governance 
outperformed the portfolio of funds with dependent governance. The maximum re-
turn difference occurred in the Global equity sector, resulting in an annualised per-
formance of 1.84% of the long/short portfolio.  
 
Table 6.3: Annualised returns and standard deviations for fund portfolios by sector over the 2000–2009 
period. For each sector, the returns and standard deviations of four fund portfolios are provided, specifically, 
portfolios consisting of all funds, funds belonging to (semi-) independent umbrellas (I), funds belonging to 
dependent umbrellas (D) and a long/short portfolio, long in funds with independent governance and short in 
funds without (I/D Long/Short). 
Fund sector Fund Portfolio Return Standard deviation 
    2000-2009 2000-2009 
    annualised (in %) annualised (in %) 
EM All funds 7.56 24.64 
  (Semi-) independent (I) 7.48 24.33 
  Dependent (D) 7.57 25.08 
  I/D Long/Short -0.30 2.18 
Global All funds -1.63 17.14 
  (Semi-) independent (I) -0.97 16.87 
  Dependent (D) -2.94 17.75 
  I/D Long/Short 1.84 2.06 
U.S. All funds -2.34 16.43 
  (Semi-) independent (I) -2.07 16.44 
  Dependent (D) -2.95 16.47 
  I/D Long/Short 0.89 1.87 
Euroland All funds -2.42 18.74 
  (Semi-) independent (I) -1.67 18.43 
  Dependent (D) -3.31 19.23 
  I/D Long/Short 1.51 2.56 
Pan-Europe All funds -2.80 16.88 
  (Semi-) independent (I) -2.38 16.81 
  Dependent (D) -3.70 17.02 
  I/D Long/Short 1.31 1.66 
Japan All funds -7.39 18.06 
  (Semi-) independent (I) -7.32 18.10 
  Dependent (D) -7.48 18.09 
  I/D Long/Short 0.15 2.22 
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Table 6.4 provides an overview of the results of the performance evaluation with the 
Carhart 4-factor model. For all six sectors, the alpha of the portfolio long in funds with 
(semi-) independent governance and short in funds with dependent governance was 
positive. However, only in the case of the Global equity sector did it differ from zero in 
a statistically significant manner. With 10 basis points per month, the level of alpha is 
also economically significant.  
Noteworthy is that for all sectors, the beta with market index of the long/short 
portfolio was negative and statistically significant. This finding indicates that the funds 
with (semi-) independent governance had a lower risk profile, as measured by their 
beta, than funds with dependent governance. The beta ranged from minus 0.02 in the 
case of U.S. and Pan-European equity to minus 0.05 in the case of Global equity. The 
differences in factor loadings for the other factors between (semi-) independent and 
dependent fund portfolios are not consistent across fund sectors. In Emerging Markets 
equity, the long/short portfolio’s SML factor loading is statistically significant nega-
tively, whereas in U.S. equity, Euroland equity and Pan-European equity, it is statisti-
cally significant positively. For the HML factor loading of long/short portfolios, the 
outcome is statistically significant positively for two sectors and statistically significant 
negatively for two sectors. Only in the case of the long/short portfolio for Japan equity 
did the PR1YR factor have a statistically significant coefficient.  
 
Table 6.4: Monthly alpha and coefficients b, s, h and p estimated with the Carhart 4-factor model over the 
2000–2009 period for fund portfolios by sector, split into sub-samples based on governance characteristics. 
Fund sector Fund portfolio α t b t s t h t p t R2 
EM (Semi-) independent (I) -0.16 -2.37 0.97 103.37 -0.02 -0.83 -0.05 -1.33 0.01 1.32 0.990 
 Dependent (D) -0.18 -2.63 1.01 101.11 0.02 0.66 -0.01 -0.27 0.02 2.43 0.990 
 I/D Long/Short 0.03 0.50 -0.03 -4.40 -0.05 -1.83 -0.04 -1.25 -0.01 -1.51 0.169 
Global (Semi-) independent (I) -0.11 -1.89 1.01 73.10 0.13 6.44 -0.07 -2.95 0.01 0.97 0.986 
 Dependent (D) -0.21 -3.22 1.05 66.13 0.13 5.46 -0.19 -7.07 0.01 0.75 0.983 
 I/D Long/Short 0.10 2.27 -0.05 -4.12 0.00 0.16 0.12 6.48 0.00 0.13 0.397 
U.S. (Semi-) independent (I) -0.08 -1.03 0.97 45.42 0.13 6.90 -0.13 -4.87 0.00 0.10 0.969 
 Dependent (D) -0.13 -2.03 1.00 56.89 0.09 5.74 -0.08 -3.52 0.01 0.57 0.979 
 I/D Long/Short 0.05 1.12 -0.02 -1.94 0.04 3.91 -0.05 -3.52 0.00 -0.64 0.216 
Euroland (Semi-) independent (I) -0.15 -2.25 0.93 70.00 0.17 7.14 0.07 2.76 0.00 0.17 0.984 
 Dependent (D) -0.15 -3.09 0.97 96.22 0.03 1.45 0.02 1.08 0.00 0.17 0.991 
 I/D Long/Short 0.01 0.13 -0.05 -4.38 0.14 7.63 0.05 2.45 0.00 0.04 0.477 
Pan-Europe (Semi-) independent (I) -0.16 -2.85 0.98 68.56 0.22 10.17 -0.07 -2.64 0.02 1.56 0.985 
 Dependent (D) -0.22 -3.97 1.00 70.90 0.12 5.86 -0.06 -2.15 0.01 1.02 0.986 
 I/D Long/Short 0.06 1.55 -0.02 -1.72 0.09 6.46 -0.01 -0.78 0.01 0.82 0.295 
Japan (Semi-) independent (I) -0.18 -2.71 0.97 72.07 0.08 3.74 -0.14 -6.14 -0.03 -2.54 0.982 
 Dependent (D) -0.26 -4.32 1.00 84.94 0.07 3.73 -0.04 -1.87 -0.01 -0.56 0.986 
 I/D Long/Short 0.07 1.45 -0.03 -3.14 0.01 0.64 -0.10 -6.09 -0.02 -2.77 0.347 
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
 
In chapter 5, analysing the cost level of funds, the explanatory power of the variable 
for affiliated distribution turned out to be higher than that of the various variables for 
the independence of governance. In addition, it was shown that the correlation be-
tween independent governance and affiliated distribution is highly negative. For this 
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reason, the analysis above is repeated for the sub-samples of funds of promoters with 
affiliated distribution and those of promoters without. 
For each of the sectors, equally weighted fund portfolios are formed of the two 
sub-samples of funds: promoters with and without affiliated distribution. In addition, a 
long/short portfolio is formed, investing long in affiliated distribution funds and short 
in non-affiliated distribution funds. Table 6.5 provides the annualised returns and 
standard deviations of these portfolios over the 2000-2009 period. In all sectors, the 
funds of promoters without affiliated distribution outperformed the funds of promot-
ers with affiliated distribution. This is surprising, because in chapter 5, it was shown 
that affiliated distribution was associated with lower costs112. This finding implies that 
the funds of promoters who are independent from any distribution channel, compen-
sated for the higher cost level charged and outperformed net of costs.  
 
Table 6.5: Annualised returns and standard deviations for fund portfolios by sector over the 2000–2009 
period. For each sector, the returns and standard deviations of four fund portfolios are provided, specifically, 
portfolios consisting of all funds, funds of promoters with affiliated distribution channel (A), funds of pro-
moters without an affiliated distribution channel (NA) and a long/short portfolio, long in funds with affiliated 
distribution and short in funds without (A/NA Long/Short). 
Fund sector Fund Portfolio Return Standard deviation 
    2000-2009 2000-2009 
    annualised (in %) annualised (in %) 
EM All funds 7.56 24.64 
  Affiliated distribution (A) 7.35 24.83 
  Non-affiliated distribution (NA) 7.84 24.42 
  A/NA Long/Short -0.35 2.08 
Global All funds -1.63 17.14 
  Affiliated distribution (A) -2.95 17.65 
  Non-affiliated distribution (NA) 0.10 16.62 
  A/NA Long/Short -2.90 2.63 
U.S. All funds -2.34 16.43 
  Affiliated distribution (A) -2.60 16.27 
  Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -2.16 16.78 
  A/NA Long/Short -0.56 2.27 
Euroland All funds -2.42 18.74 
  Affiliated distribution (A) -2.99 18.94 
  Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -0.76 18.42 
  A/NA Long/Short -2.21 3.71 
Pan-Europe All funds -2.80 16.88 
  Affiliated distribution (A) -3.79 17.00 
  Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -1.32 16.81 
  A/NA Long/Short -2.49 1.97 
Japan All funds -7.39 18.06 
  Affiliated distribution (A) -7.84 17.98 
  Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -6.75 18.26 
  A/NA Long/Short -1.23 2.26 
 
 
                                                                
112 Approximately 16 basis points lower TER.  
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In table 6.6, the performance of these fund portfolios is analysed and evaluated using 
the Carhart 4-factor model. For all six sectors, the alpha of the portfolio long in funds 
with affiliated distribution and short in funds without was negative, ranging from mi-
nus 5 basis points per month in the case of the U.S. equity sector, to minus 16 basis 
points per month for Global equity. In four out of six cases, the alphas were statistically 
significant, although in one case only at the 10% level. Note that this finding does not 
imply that the long-only portfolios of the funds of promoters without affiliated distri-
bution outperformed their market index. For all sectors, the alphas of both the affili-
ated distribution sub-sample and the non-affiliate distribution sub-sample were nega-
tive.  
The factor loadings for the portfolios long in funds of promoters with affiliated dis-
tribution and short in funds of promoters without affiliated distribution, show no con-
sistency across fund sectors. The factor loadings of these long/short portfolios for the 
HML factor, for example, are statistically significant positively in three cases, statisti-
cally significant negatively in one case and insignificant in two cases. Also for the three 
other factors, no consistent picture emerges.  
In section 6.4, the performance of funds will be analysed using a multiple regres-
sion analysis, thereby allowing analysis of the relationship between performance and 
governance, distribution and other characteristics simultaneously. 
 
Table 6.6: Monthly alpha and coefficients b. s. h and p. estimated with the Carhart 4-factor model over the 
2000–2009 period for fund portfolios by sector, split into sub-samples based on distribution characteristics. 
Fund sector Fund portfolio α t b t s t h t p t R2 
EM Affiliated distribution (A) -0.20 -3.13 1.00108.86 0.02 0.76 0.00 -0.10 0.02 2.72 0.991
 Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -0.11 -1.65 0.97 98.35 -0.05 -1.45 -0.07 -1.88 0.01 0.62 0.989
 A/NA Long/Short -0.09 -1.69 0.03 3.55 0.07 2.93 0.06 2.41 0.02 2.58 0.204
Global Affiliated distribution (A) -0.21 -3.56 1.04 71.06 0.12 5.48 -0.19 -7.67 0.00 -0.32 0.986
 Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -0.05 -0.81 1.00 64.13 0.15 6.42 0.00 -0.01 0.02 1.84 0.982
 A/NA Long/Short -0.16 -3.00 0.04 3.18 -0.03 -1.50 -0.19 -8.52 -0.03 -2.54 0.480
U.S. Affiliated distribution (A) -0.13 -2.14 0.98 60.81 0.10 7.51 -0.07 -3.58 0.00 0.03 0.982
 Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -0.08 -0.82 0.99 39.57 0.13 6.16 -0.16 -5.11 0.00 0.13 0.959
 A/NA Long/Short -0.05 -0.95 -0.01 -0.47 -0.03 -2.22 0.09 4.73 0.00 -0.19 0.225
Euroland Affiliated distribution (A) -0.17 -3.21 0.94 90.17 0.05 2.41 0.04 2.06 -0.02 -1.53 0.991
 Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -0.08 -0.97 0.95 53.39 0.24 7.61 0.06 1.73 0.05 3.09 0.971
 A/NA Long/Short -0.08 -0.97 -0.01 -0.38 -0.20 -6.57 -0.02 -0.55 -0.07 -4.23 0.361
Pan-Europe Affiliated distribution (A) -0.24 -4.47 1.00 74.09 0.14 7.10 -0.07 -2.77 0.01 0.84 0.987
 Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -0.09 -1.43 0.98 60.54 0.25 10.28 -0.06 -2.06 0.03 1.87 0.981
 A/NA Long/Short -0.15 -3.12 0.02 1.44 -0.10 -5.98 -0.01 -0.34 -0.02 -1.60 0.264
Japan Affiliated distribution (A) -0.27 -4.66 0.98 86.98 0.05 3.11 -0.07 -3.66 -0.02 -1.69 0.987
 Non-affiliated distribution (NA) -0.13 -1.77 0.97 65.57 0.11 4.57 -0.15 -6.10 -0.03 -2.48 0.979
 A/NA Long/Short -0.13 -2.44 0.01 1.12 -0.05 -3.00 0.08 4.52 0.01 1.63 0.245
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
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Average Sector-Adjusted Return and Carhart 4-factor alpha 
In the multiple regression analysis of section 6.4, two measures for a fund’s excess 
return are used, the Average Sector-Adjusted Return (ASAR) and the Carhart alpha 
(CFFA), both defined in section 6.2. These two measures are calculated for all funds in 
the sample for each calendar year in the 2000–2009 research period, as well as for the 
three-year periods 2000–2002, 2003–2005 and 2006–2008. 
A disadvantage of using the Carhart alpha as a dependent variable in the regres-
sion analysis is that this measure is estimated and, as a result, uncertain. This two-step 
approach could lead to underestimated standard errors in the regression analysis. For 
this reason, the analysis is also performed with the Average Sector-Adjusted Return as 
the dependent variable. This performance measure is observable and therefore does 
not have the same drawback. Because Carhart alpha is a more sophisticated, risk-
adjusted measure, it is used as the primary measure in this study. The Average Sector-
Adjusted Return is used a the secondary measure, at the same time providing a ro-
bustness check of the results found on the basis of the Carhart alpha. In first instance, 
the multiple regression is used to analyse whether differences in governance charac-
teristics explain the variation in excess return over one-year periods. Subsequently, the 
three-year data analysis is used as a robustness check for the results found on the 
basis of the one-year performance data. These results are presented in section 6.6. 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 plot the monthly Average Sector-Adjusted Return (ASAR) on 
the x-axis against the risk-adjusted fund return (CFFA) on the y-axis. While figure 6.2 is 
based on 3,377 calendar year observations, figure 6.3 is based on 812 observations for 
fund performance over three three-year intervals. 
Figure 6.2: Monthly Average Sector-Adjusted Return (ASAR) and monthly Carhart alpha (CFFA) per calendar 
year (2000–2009) of funds in the sample. 
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Figure 6.3: Monthly Average Sector-Adjusted Return (ASAR) and monthly Carhart alpha (CFFA) per three-
year interval (2000–2002, 2003–2005, 2006–2008) of funds in the sample. 
 
Using the one-year intervals, the monthly ASAR is -0.008%, on average, while the aver-
age CFFA is -0.156%. This difference is likely the result of fund costs, which are part of 
the correction in the case of the ASAR calculation, since the performance of a fund is 
corrected for the average performance of funds in the same sector, which is also after 
costs. The CFFA calculation is different because it is calculated using market indices, 
excluding costs. The average CFFA of -1.87% on an annual basis is of the same order of 
magnitude as the average TER of the funds in the sample, which range from 1.76% for 
the Euroland fund sector to 2.15% for Emerging Markets, which is a further indication 
that the difference is cost-related. When analysing the three-year intervals, the results 
are similar, which are -0.024% for the monthly ASAR and -0.157% for the CFFA. 
Outliers for the average sector-adjusted returns are slightly larger than those de-
termined with the Carhart 4-factor model. This finding is likely an indication that large 
deviations of fund returns compared to the sector average result from higher risk-
taking, i.e., higher exposure to the factors of the Carhart model. On a one-year basis, 
the outliers are larger than on a three-year basis, indicating that over longer periods, 
the excess returns average out.  
The two measures for excess return are correlated highly positively, but by no 
means perfectly. Using calendar year data, the correlation between the two measures 
is 0.422, while on the basis of three-year data, it is much higher at 0.700. 
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6.4 Multiple regression analysis – Individual fund level 
This section is dedicated to the multiple regression analysis at the individual fund level. 
Two performance measures are used as dependent variables: the Carhart alpha and 
the Average Sector-Adjusted Return. The purpose of this analysis is to establish 
whether the funds’ governance characteristics explain differences in fund perform-
ance. 
Governance and control variables 
The seven governance characteristics that are used as explanatory variables are identi-
cal to those used in chapter 5: 
• Size of the board of directors (T) 
• Percentage of independent board members (I%) 
• Percentage of semi-independent board members (S%) 
• Chair dummy (CH) 
• Depositary dummy (DEP) 
• Board tenure (TEN%) 
• Legal form dummy (LEG) 
 
The control variables of the cost analysis of chapter 5 are also used for the analysis of 
performance: 
• Performance Fee dummy (PF) 
• Fixed TER dummy (FIX) 
• Log of Fund level scale (LTNAi) 
• Log of Umbrella level scale (LTNAu) 
• Log of Promoter level scale (LTNAp) 
• Emerging Markets sector dummy (EM) 
• Log of Fund age (LAGE) 
• Affiliated distribution dummy (AD) 
 
The formal definitions of the governance variables and control variables, as well as the 
sources of the data, are provided in tables 5.3 and 5.4. One control variable is added, 
which is the TER% as defined in chapter 5 (see formula 5.1) as a measure for the ongo-
ing expenses of a fund. In the regression analysis, the TER per month (TERM) is used, 
defined as the TER% from chapter 5 divided by 12. The reason for using the monthly 
TER is that both performance measures are also on a monthly basis. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Table 6.7 provides descriptive statistics of the funds in the sample for each of the ten 
years in the 2000–2009 research period. The mean value and sum are given for dummy 
variables, which can be interpreted as the percentage and the total number of funds in 
the sample that complied with the specific characteristic in that year. For the regular 
variables, the mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation are provided. 
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Although the sample of funds and umbrellas is the same as that used for the analysis 
of costs in chapter 5, there are still small differences with the descriptive statistics 
provided in that chapter. The reason is that one of the conditions for a fund to be in-
cluded in the cost analysis was that at least 90 days of cost data was available for a 
specific calendar year. For the performance analysis, the condition is that performance 
data is available for the full calendar year. This leads to small differences in the sample 
of funds in each of the calendar years in the research period. Furthermore, 2009 is 
included in the performance analysis, whereas it was not included in the cost analysis. 
The reason is that performance data for 2009 was available at the moment of analysis, 
while cost data was not yet available for a large enough sample.  
 
The number of funds in the sample more than doubled during the research period, 
from 200 to 420 funds. The values of the maximum and minimum sector-adjusted 
returns in the different years show that there is a large difference each year between 
the performance of the most successful fund in that specific year and the least success-
ful fund. The largest outperformance achieved versus the sector average in any of the 
calendar years in the research period was in 2008. In that year, the fund World Express 
Funds I – US Dynamic Equities outperformed the average US equity fund by 3.9 per-
centage points on average per month. The largest underperformance in a calendar 
year was by 4.1 percentage points on average per month, achieved in that same year 
by Fortis L Fund – OBAM Equity World. 
The development of the governance and control variables is largely the same as 
seen in chapter 5. The mean number of board members was stable at approximately 
seven in each of the years in the research period. Both the mean and the maximum 
percentage of independent board members increased. In 2009, the representation of 
independent board members was 18.4% on average and maximum 80.0%, compared 
to an average of 15.0% and a maximum of 50.0% in 2000. Of the percentage of semi-
independent board members, both the mean and the maximum declined. The per-
centage of boards with an independent or semi-independent chair, as well as the 
board tenure, measured as the percentage of board members serving for at least three 
years, increased. The percentage of funds that are part of an FCP increased as well, 
while the percentage of funds with an independent depositary recovered at the end of 
the research period, after an initial decline. 
Both the use of fixed TER schemes and performance fees increased. The size of the 
average fund fluctuated with the development of market valuations and investors’ 
willingness to invest in equity funds. The size of the average umbrella and of the aver-
age promoter grew considerably in the research period. As noted in chapter 5, for all 
three measures for scale, there is a significant variation from small to large in each 
year of the research period. The proportion of Emerging Markets funds in the sample 
declined slightly, while the proportion of funds of promoters with affiliated distribution 
declined more strongly. The minimum fund age is one year, resulting from the fact that 
it is measured at the end of the year and that a full year of performance data is re-
quired to be included in the sample for a specific year.
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Table 6.8 provides the correlation coefficients for the excess returns measured as 
ASAR and CFFA, as well as the explanatory and control variables used in the regression 
analysis. Correlation coefficients with an absolute value between 0.333 and 0.5 are 
shaded in light grey, while those in excess of 0.5 are shaded in a darker grey. 
The correlation between the measures for excess return and the different explana-
tory and control variables is below 0.1 in all cases. As was the case in chapter 5 with 
the dataset used for the analysis of costs, there are two correlation coefficients with 
an absolute value higher than 0.5. Umbrella scale and promoter scale are strongly 
positively correlated, while there is a strong negative correlation between affiliated 
distribution and the independence of the depository. Highly negatively correlated as 
well, but below 0.5, are the percentage of independent board members and the dum-
my variable for affiliated distribution. The percentage of independent board members 
is strongly positively correlated with the chair dummy and with the variable for the 
board tenure. The chair dummy is negatively correlated with the affiliated distribution 
dummy, which indicates that affiliated distribution goes together with dependent 
chairs. Both umbrella scale and promoter scale are strongly positively correlated with 
the size of the board. Fund size and fund age are positively correlated as well. Larger 
promoters tend to have affiliated distribution in the group, use affiliated depositaries 
and apply fixed TER fee schedules.  
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Model 
The structure of the data is similar to that analysed in chapter 5. For the funds in the 
sample, there are repeated observations for the excess return as dependent variables 
and various explanatory and control variables for the 2000 to 2009 calendar years. As 
in chapter 5, two model variations are used, Models I and II. Both models allow for 
fixed effects per calendar year. In Model II, dummy variables per umbrella are added. 
As a result, Model I focuses on cross-sectional variation, whereas Model II focuses on 
variation within umbrellas. The dummy variable for the legal form of the umbrella and 
the dummy variable for the affiliation of the promoter with a distribution channel are 
not included in Model II. These variables normally do not vary within an umbrella or 
promoter. The following equations are estimated: 
 
Model I (time fixed effects): 
 
tititptiti
tptutitititu
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  (6.3) 
 
Model II (time fixed effects and umbrella dummies): 
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 (6.4) 
 
where: 
ER%i,t is the excess return of fund i in period t, either measured as Average Sector-
Adjusted Return (ASAR) or as the Carhart 4-factor alpha (CFFA) 
ct is the constant per calendar year t. 
αu is the dummy variable per umbrella u. 
For the independent variables, refer to tables 5.3 (governance variables) and 5.4 (con-
trol variables). 
 
The two model variations are first estimated for the entire 2000-2009 research period, 
without the variables for the board tenure (TEN3%), promoter scale (LTNAp) and TER 
per month (TERM). The tenure is not available for 2000 and 2001, promoter scale is 
not available for 2000 and the TER is not available for 2009. As a result, when board 
tenure and promoter scale are added in Model Ib and Model IIb, the analysis is limited 
to the 2002-2009 period. In Model Ic and IIc, the TER is added as control variable, fur-
ther reducing the research period to 2002-2008. In addition, the number of observa-
tions in the 2002-2008 period is reduced because the TER is not available for all fund-
calendar year combinations for which return data is available.  
As recommended by Petersen (2009) and as in the analysis of costs in the previous 
chapter, standard errors are adjusted for within-cluster correlation in order to have 
robust variance estimates. This adjustment avoids underestimating the standard errors 
and overstating the statistical significance of the coefficients. 
G O V E R N A N C E  A N D  P E R F O R M A N C E  
 229 
Results 
The results of the regression analyses are presented in table 6.9. The top panel shows 
the results for the risk-adjusted fund return (CFFA). The bottom panel provides the 
results for the sector-adjusted return (ASAR). The three columns to the left provide the 
results for Model Ia, Ib and Ic, respectively, while the three columns to the right show 
the results for Model IIa, IIb and IIc, respectively. For all variables, the table shows the 
value for the coefficient from the regression analysis and the value for the t-statistic. 
Coefficients that are statistically significant at the level of 10% are shaded in light grey, 
while those statistically significant at the level of 5% are shaded in a darker grey. For 
Model II, the results for the constant and umbrella dummies are suppressed. 
In model variations Ia and Ib, a higher percentage of independent directors is as-
sociated with a higher excess return when measured as the return adjusted for the 
sector return (ASAR). The coefficients are economically significant, but only statistically 
significant at the level of 10%. At fund level, the mean number of board members in 
the sample is 7.0. Each additional independent board member, instead of a dependent 
board member, is associated with a performance approximately 24 to 27 basis points 
better per annum. When the TER is added to the equation in Model Ic and, as a conse-
quence, 2009 is dropped from the research period, the coefficient for I% continues to 
be positive, but loses it statistical significance. When measuring excess return as Car-
hart’s alpha (CFFA), the coefficients are positive, but smaller, and marginally significant 
only in Model Ib. The coefficients for the dummy variable for the chair position are not 
statistically significant.  
The results for the percentage of independent board members with Model II, 
which focuses on the variation of variables within umbrellas and promoters, provide at 
most weak support for those of Model I. Model II picks up on boards where the per-
centage of independent board members varied through the research period and analy-
ses whether this is associated with different levels of performance. With the excess 
return measured as the Average Sector-Adjusted Return, the coefficients are negative, 
contrary to Model I, but statistically significant only in Model variation IIa.  
With Carhart alpha as the dependent variable, there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between excess return and the percentage of independent 
board members, but only in Model variation IIc. An explanation for the different sign of 
the coefficient in the analyses of the sector-adjusted and the risk-adjusted return could 
be a lower level of risk of the funds that have independent board members. This would 
be consistent with the result presented in table 6.4, which is that funds with depend-
ent boards have a higher risk profile than funds with a (semi-) independent board, as 
measured by their beta from the Carhart model. This is detailed in section 6.6, where 
three-year data is analysed. As in Model I, the coefficients for the chair position are not 
statistically significant.  
In Model I, the coefficient for the percentage of semi-independent board members 
is always negative, but is statistically significant only when excess return is measured 
as Carhart’s alpha. In Model II, the sign of the coefficients for the percentage of semi-
independent board members is also negative, but it is statistically significant only in 
two of the three model specifications with excess returns measured on a risk-adjusted 
basis (CFFA), once at the 10% level and once at the 5% level. 
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In Model II, the relationship between CFFA and the position of the depositary is also 
negative, indicating that when funds change to an independent depositary, they per-
form worse on a risk-adjusted basis. In the cross-sectional analysis of Model I, none of 
the coefficients for the position of the depositary was statistically significant. The re-
sults for the other governance variables are not statistically significant in any of the 
specifications of Model I, and not in more than one out of six specifications of Model II. 
 
The most consistent results are those for fund age and the dummy variable for affili-
ated distribution. Older funds perform worse, measured with both measures for ex-
cess return. This result is consistent with that of Meschke (2007), analysing funds in 
the U.S. The average fund in this sample is 7.7 years old. A fund 3 years younger, for 
example, would perform 24 basis points (risk-adjusted) to 44 basis points (versus sec-
tor average) better per annum. With Model II, which focuses on the variation of vari-
ables within each umbrella and promoter, similar results are found. 
Funds of promoters with affiliated distribution perform worse than their counter-
parts of promoters independent from a distribution channel. The return difference, net 
of fees, is 1.0 (risk-adjusted) to 1.2 percentage point (sector-adjusted) per annum. This 
is consistent with the results of section 6.3, where in each of the six sectors analysed, 
funds of promoters with affiliated distribution as a group underperformed funds of 
promoters without. Note that this is despite the fact that on average funds of promot-
ers with affiliated distribution charge lower fees. The performance differences of 
funds, depending on whether the promoter is affiliated with a distribution channel, are 
more pronounced than the results of Frye (2001). She found that bank-managed bond 
funds underperformed funds of non-banks on an unadjusted basis, but that on a risk-
adjusted basis the differences were not statistically significant. 
 
The relationship between fund size and excess returns determined with the Carhart 4-
factor model is not statistically significant in either Model I or II. Fund size is positively 
related to excess return measured versus the sector average in a statistically significant 
manner in Models Ia, Ib and IIa. When the TER is added in Model Ic, the coefficient 
continues to be positive, but loses its statistical significance. This could well be because 
without the TER variable in the equation, fund size serves as a proxy for lower Other 
Costs. In Model II, the scale of the umbrella is negatively related to fund performance, 
in particular with excess return measured versus the sector average. With risk-adjusted 
performance as dependent variable, the result is not statistically significant in Model 
variation IIc and only marginally significant in IIa. The coefficients for promoter scale 
are not statistically significant. 
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Table 6.9: Results analysis of excess returns at fund level and governance characteristics (excess return in 
percentage points per month) 
CFFA 
Model Ia  
(2000-2009) 
Model Ib  
(2002-2009) 
Model Ic  
(2002-2008) 
Model IIa  
(2000-2009) 
Model IIb  
(2002-2009) 
Model IIc  
(2002-2008) 
  Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t 
c -0.15 -1.51 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.77        
T 0.00 -1.22 -0.01 -1.43 -0.01 -1.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.52 -0.01 -1.04 
I% 0.03 0.99 0.06 1.68 0.05 1.51 -0.07 -0.51 0.11 0.77 0.35 2.25 
S% -0.14 -1.96 -0.18 -2.60 -0.23 -2.43 -0.32 -2.10 -0.25 -1.31 -0.33 -1.96 
CH 0.01 0.20 -0.03 -1.54 -0.03 -1.41 -0.02 -0.95 -0.02 -0.51 -0.03 -0.52 
DEP 0.00 -0.26 -0.01 -0.62 -0.01 -0.64 -0.05 -0.62 -0.19 -3.31 -0.16 -2.40 
TEN3%    -0.02 -0.82 -0.02 -0.66    0.04 1.84 0.04 1.02 
LEG -0.03 -0.68 -0.04 -0.78 -0.06 -0.86        
PF -0.05 -1.47 -0.02 -0.70 -0.02 -0.76 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.39 -0.02 -0.40 
FIX 0.04 1.80 0.07 3.41 0.09 3.13 0.04 1.68 0.07 2.13 0.05 1.63 
LTNAi 0.01 1.30 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.44 
LTNAu 0.01 0.88 0.02 1.03 0.02 0.81 -0.05 -1.93 -0.06 -2.63 -0.04 -1.11 
LTNAp    -0.01 -0.84 -0.01 -0.27    -0.03 -1.08 -0.03 -0.85 
EM 0.07 1.21 0.05 0.71 0.06 1.00 0.07 1.13 0.05 0.70 0.06 0.91 
LAGE -0.04 -2.34 -0.03 -1.86 -0.04 -1.96 -0.03 -1.59 -0.03 -1.69 -0.03 -1.95 
AD -0.07 -3.40 -0.07 -2.46 -0.08 -3.05       
TERM    0.08 0.18    0.05 0.09 
Periods 10  8  7  10   8  7  
Funds 562  554  505  562   554  505  
Observations 3331  2891  2354   3331   2891  2354  
R2 0.056  0.045  0.057   0.079   0.073   0.089   
Adjusted R2 0.050  0.038   0.048   0.060   0.051   0.064   
ASAR 
Model Ia  
(2000-2009) 
Model Ib  
(2002-2009) 
Model Ic  
(2002-2008) 
Model IIa  
(2000-2009) 
Model IIb  
(2002-2009) 
Model IIc  
(2002-2008) 
  Coefficient  t Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t Coefficient  t  Coefficient  t 
c 0.11 1.07 0.13 1.96 0.00 0.01        
T 0.00 0.45 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.33 0.02 1.94 0.02 1.58 0.01 0.79 
I% 0.14 1.72 0.16 1.87 0.17 1.32 -0.53 -2.12 -0.24 -1.03 -0.44 -1.48 
S% -0.05 -0.62 -0.09 -1.25 -0.09 -0.96 -0.20 -1.20 -0.05 -0.32 -0.02 -0.08 
CH 0.02 0.47 -0.02 -0.63 -0.02 -0.56 -0.04 -0.88 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.77 
DEP 0.02 0.97 0.01 0.44 0.04 1.39 0.04 0.83 -0.03 -0.53 -0.03 -0.39 
TEN3%    -0.07 -1.20 -0.05 -0.91    -0.09 -1.25 -0.08 -0.81 
LEG -0.04 -1.05 -0.07 -1.53 -0.07 -1.32        
PF -0.04 -0.67 0.00 -0.10 -0.04 -1.04 0.03 0.47 0.05 0.71 0.01 0.24 
FIX 0.04 1.19 0.05 1.18 0.06 0.98 0.05 0.82 0.08 1.41 0.09 1.32 
LTNAi 0.02 2.00 0.02 1.77 0.02 1.28 0.02 1.93 0.02 1.62 0.02 1.04 
LTNAu -0.02 -1.15 -0.01 -0.62 -0.03 -1.59 -0.08 -3.54 -0.07 -2.35 -0.11 -3.54 
LTNAp    0.01 0.25 0.03 0.84    -0.04 -1.42 -0.03 -0.70 
EM 0.02 2.37 0.01 1.42 0.02 1.47 0.01 1.30 0.01 0.67 0.03 1.42 
LAGE -0.06 -2.89 -0.07 -3.06 -0.07 -3.22 -0.05 -1.86 -0.07 -2.32 -0.07 -2.63 
AD -0.09 -3.05 -0.09 -2.59 -0.10 -4.47        
TERM    -0.05 -0.08    -0.61 -0.84 
Periods 10   8   7  10  8   7  
Funds 562   554   505   562  554   505   
Observations 3331   2891   2354   3331   2891   2354   
R2 0.024   0.025   0.033   0.056   0.050   0.068   
Adjusted R2 0.017   0.018   0.024   0.036   0.028   0.041   
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
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The coefficients for the TER are not statistically significant in any of the model specifi-
cations, either for excess returns measured versus the sector average or determined 
with the Carhart model. This is surprising, because table 6.1 showed that the under-
performance of the funds in the sample as a group was of the same order of magni-
tude as their TER. Funds with a fixed TER fee schedule have a superior Carhart alpha of 
over 1 percentage point per annum in Model 1c, but when the excess return is calcu-
lated versus the sector average, the results are not statistically significant. In Model II, 
the coefficient for the fixed TER is statistically significant in two model variations, both 
with the risk-adjusted performance as dependent variable, but not when the TER is 
included as variable in the analysis. The coefficients for the performance fee dummy 
and other control variables are not statistically significant. 
6.5 Multiple regression analysis – Umbrella level 
A disadvantage of the analysis at individual fund level in section 6.4 is that the individ-
ual funds are treated as independent observations, which, although several control 
variables are fund-specific, is not really the case. All governance characteristics, as well 
as several control variables, are the same for all funds in a specific umbrella. In addi-
tion, the number of funds with which each umbrella is represented in the sample var-
ies. To avoid this issue, and as robustness check for the results at fund level in section 
6.4, the multiple regression analysis in this section is performed at the level of the 
umbrellas in the sample. In this way, each umbrella is represented in the sample only 
once in each year. As a measure for excess return at umbrella level, the simple average 
of the excess returns of all funds included in a particular umbrella is calculated. Fund 
size is aggregated at umbrella level by taking the natural logarithm of the average total 
net assets (LATNAi) of the funds included in the sample in a specific year. No perform-
ance fee dummy is included in the analysis at umbrella level, because it is a fund-
specific variable. All governance variables, as well as the other control variables, are 
umbrella-specific and therefore, do not require any recalculation. The results are pro-
vided in table 6.10. 
 
The results of the analysis at umbrella level are similar to those at fund level. The rela-
tionship between excess return and the percentage of independent directors is not 
statistically significant in the model specifications of Model I. In Model II, there is a 
positive relationship between excess return measured on a risk-adjusted basis and the 
percentage of independent directors, but a negative relationship when excess return is 
measured versus the sector average. The results for the dummy for the chair position 
are not statistically significant in any model specification.  
The relationship of the affiliated distribution dummy with excess return found at 
fund level is confirmed at umbrella level. Funds of promoters with affiliated distribu-
tion perform worse than funds without. 
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Table 6.10: Results analysis of excess returns at umbrella level and governance characteristics (excess return 
in percentage points per month) 
CFFA 
Model Ia 
(2000-2009) 
Model Ib 
(2002-2009) 
Model Ic 
(2002-2008) 
Model IIa 
(2000-2009) 
Model IIb 
(2002-2009) 
Model IIc 
(2002-2008) 
  Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t 
c -0.13 -0.81 0.13 0.73 0.06 0.24        
T 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.38 0.00 -0.87 0.00 0.40 0.01 0.50 -0.02 -1.68 
I% -0.01 -0.16 -0.01 -0.21 -0.03 -0.59 0.20 0.74 0.60 2.38 1.02 3.08 
S% -0.14 -1.29 -0.19 -1.58 -0.28 -1.91 -0.16 -0.81 0.11 0.37 0.01 0.02 
CH 0.01 0.42 -0.02 -0.96 -0.03 -1.16 -0.06 -1.25 -0.05 -0.91 -0.08 -0.74 
DEP 0.00 0.23 -0.02 -1.11 -0.02 -0.95 0.01 0.11 -0.16 -1.97 -0.11 -1.14 
TEN3%    -0.03 -0.78 -0.03 -0.78    -0.02 -0.40 -0.02 -0.39 
LEG 0.02 0.30 -0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.38        
FIX 0.03 0.92 0.08 2.44 0.10 2.32 0.05 1.28 0.09 1.90 0.06 1.63 
LATNAi 0.02 1.15 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.40 -0.04 -1.82 -0.03 -0.91 -0.03 -1.09 
LTNAu -0.01 -0.56 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.41 -0.03 -0.70 -0.05 -1.15 -0.05 -0.76 
LTNAp    -0.03 -1.75 -0.03 -1.58    -0.03 -0.86 -0.05 -1.38 
AD -0.10 -2.56 -0.11 -2.35 -0.11 -2.26      
TERM  0.69 0.88   -1.05 -0.71 
Periods 10 8 7 10 8 7 
Promoters 48 47 46 48 47 46 
Observations 445 360 306 445 360 306 
R2 0.190 0.182 0.205 0.315 0.325 0.370 
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.136  0.152 0.200 0.182 0.209 
ASAR 
Model Ia 
(2000-2009) 
Model Ib 
(2002-2009) 
Model Ic 
(2002-2008) 
Model IIa 
(2000-2009) 
Model IIb 
(2002-2009) 
Model IIc 
(2002-2008) 
  Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t 
C 0.22 1.58 0.38 1.37 0.27 0.71       
T 0.01 1.59 0.01 1.04 0.01 1.16 0.04 3.28 0.03 1.94 0.01 0.59 
I% 0.04 0.55 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.52 -1.63 -0.16 -0.56 -0.19 -0.38 
S% -0.11 -1.21 -0.15 -1.16 -0.13 -0.91 -0.37 -1.67 -0.23 -0.88 -0.19 -0.48 
CH 0.05 1.26 0.00 0.09 -0.02 -0.45 -0.03 -0.59 0.01 0.20 -0.03 -0.70 
DEP 0.05 2.18 0.03 0.87 0.05 1.45 0.12 2.00 0.02 0.24 0.03 0.27 
TEN3%    -0.06 -0.87 -0.06 -0.70    -0.11 -1.40 -0.11 -0.88 
LEG 0.02 0.40 -0.02 -0.46 -0.03 -0.56        
FIX 0.05 1.22 0.07 1.38 0.07 1.14 0.11 1.86 0.13 2.09 0.11 1.75 
LATNAi -0.01 -0.45 -0.02 -1.18 0.00 -0.13 -0.10 -4.63 -0.09 -3.37 -0.07 -1.44 
LTNAu -0.03 -1.22 -0.01 -0.45 -0.03 -1.52 -0.04 -1.32 -0.06 -1.66 -0.10 -2.18 
LTNAp    -0.01 -0.60 0.00 -0.12    -0.07 -1.37 -0.06 -0.68 
AD -0.11 -2.89 -0.12 -2.79 -0.12 -3.06     
TERM  0.63 1.01  -1.44 -1.43 
Periods 10 8    7 10 8 7  
Promoters 48 47   46 48 47 46  
Observations 445 360  306 445 360 306  
R2 0.077 0.081 0.107 0.292 0.309 0.401  
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.029 0.048 0.173 0.162 0.248 
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
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6.6 Multiple regression analysis – Three-year excess returns 
In this section, the relationship is analysed between three-year excess returns of funds 
in the sample and their governance characteristics. This analysis is done as a further 
robustness check for the results presented in section 6.4, where one-year excess re-
turns were used. Boards might require more time than a one-year period to prove 
their added value for investors. In addition, using monthly returns, a 12-month period 
is short to estimate the Carhart model. 
The monthly Average Sector-Adjusted Return and the Carhart alphas are calcu-
lated for three three-year intervals: 2000–2002, 2003–2005 and 2006–2008. In addi-
tion, the regression analyses are performed with the beta from the Carhart model (bi 
in formula 6.2) as the dependent variable. The purpose of this analysis is to determine 
whether or not differences in governance characteristics are associated with differ-
ences is risk levels, as measured by the Carhart beta. 
The sample includes funds that were active throughout the entire three-year pe-
riod. In addition, the sample includes funds that either entered the sample during the 
three-year interval or were terminated before the end of the period, as long as at least 
12 months of returns are available. The reason for including this second group is to 
avoid survivorship bias. This bias is introduced by using longer periods to calculate 
excess returns. Funds that were closed before the end of the specific period, possibly 
because of disappointing performance, would not be included in the analysis. The 
regression analysis is performed both with, and without a dummy variable, indicating 
whether a fund drops from the sample before the end of a three-year period. This 
dummy variable captures if these non-surviving funds perform worse that their surviv-
ing counterparts. 
 
The governance and control variables for the three-year intervals are determined in 
the following way: 
• For the number of board members, the percentage of independent board mem-
bers, as well as the percentage of semi-independent board members, the averages 
are calculated for the months in which the fund was active. 
• When the chair was held by an independent or semi-independent board member 
for more than half the period in which the fund was active, the chair is character-
ised as (semi-) independent. Similarly, the depositary is characterised as independ-
ent when that was the case for more than half the period. 
• The measure for the board tenure is calculated on the last day of the three-year 
period in question as the percentage of board members with at least three years of 
experience in the position on the board of the umbrella. 
• For the scale measures at the fund, umbrella and promoter levels, the averages are 
taken of the calendar year values of the calendar years in which the fund was ac-
tive. The variables included in the regression analysis are the natural logarithm of 
the averages. Because the promoter level scale is not available for the year 2000, 
the value for the period 2000–2002 is determined taking the average of the years 
2001 and 2002. 
• For the Total Expense Ratio (TER), the average is taken of the calendar year values 
of the calendar years in which the fund was active. Including the TER in the regres-
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sion analysis reduces the sample size because TER data was not available for all 
funds for all calendar years the fund was active. For this reason, the regression 
analyses are performed both without (Model specifications Ia, Ib, as well as IIa and 
IIb) and with the TER as control variable (Model specifications Ic and IIc). 
• Fund age is determined on the last day of the last full month in which the fund was 
active during the three-year period analysed. 
• When funds had a performance fee in place for the whole or part of the period in 
question, the Performance Fee dummy variable takes the value of one. Similarly, 
when funds had a fixed TER fee schedule in place for at least part of the period, the 
Fixed TER dummy takes the value of one. 
• The dummy variables for the Legal form of the umbrella, the Emerging Markets 
sector and Affiliated distribution are determined as in chapter 5. These characteris-
tics normally do not change, and as a result, these variables are constant during the 
whole research period. Exceptions are one change of Legal form dummy and one 
change of the Affiliated distribution dummy that occurred in the research period. 
The change of legal form concerns the Pictet umbrella, which happened on 1 Janu-
ary 2006, the starting date of the last three-year period analysed. Before this date, 
the Pictet umbrella was an FCP, thereafter it is an SICAV. The one change of the af-
filiation with a distribution channel was a result of the acquisition of Citigroup Asset 
Management by Legg Mason on 1 December 2005. In the periods 2000–2002 and 
2003–2005, the Citigroup funds are categorised as funds of a promoter with affili-
ated distribution. Thereafter, these funds became part of the Legg Mason offering, 
which is treated as a promoter without affiliated distribution. 
 
Table 6.11 shows the results of the regression analysis using three-year performance 
intervals. 
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Table 6.11: Results analysis of excess returns at fund level over three-year intervals and board characteristics 
(excess return annualised in percentage points) 
CFFA 
Model Ia 
(2000-2008) 
Model Ib 
(2002-2008) 
Model Ic 
(2002-2008) 
Model IIa 
(2000-2008) 
Model IIb 
(2000-2008) 
Model IIc 
(2000-2008) 
 Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t 
c 0.12 1.63 0.12 1.60 0.05 0.35        
T 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.26 
I% 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.98 -0.39 -12.72 -0.39 -20.88 -0.44 -11.26 
S% -0.10 -0.96 -0.09 -0.96 -0.02 -0.15 -0.08 -1.53 -0.07 -1.95 -0.10 -1.07 
CH 0.04 1.46 0.03 1.40 0.03 1.56 -0.01 -0.36 -0.01 -0.32 0.00 -0.03 
DEP 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.60 -0.03 -0.43 -0.03 -0.43 -0.04 -0.49 
TEN3% -0.02 -0.56 -0.02 -0.57 -0.02 -0.46 -0.03 -0.60 -0.03 -0.60 -0.04 -0.92 
LEG -0.01 -0.22 -0.02 -0.24 -0.01 -0.20        
PF -0.07 -1.62 -0.07 -1.61 -0.05 -1.69 -0.04 -0.55 -0.04 -0.56 0.01 0.18 
FIX 0.10 2.80 0.10 2.96 0.09 2.86 0.09 4.86 0.09 11.45 0.12 6.10 
LTNAi 0.03 2.21 0.03 2.12 0.03 1.97 0.03 2.06 0.03 1.98 0.02 1.84 
LTNAu 0.00 -0.54 0.00 -0.39 -0.01 -1.29 -0.01 -0.17 -0.01 -0.17 0.00 0.04 
LTNAp -0.02 -3.31 -0.02 -3.53 -0.01 -1.15 0.01 0.43 0.01 0.42 0.05 1.47 
EM 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.27 0.03 1.57 0.01 0.37 0.01 0.37 0.06 2.55 
LAGE -0.07 -3.93 -0.07 -3.91 -0.07 -3.96 -0.06 -2.33 -0.06 -2.36 -0.06 -2.40 
AD -0.08 -2.11 -0.08 -2.00 -0.08 -3.17        
Closed  -0.04 -2.60 -0.02 -1.37   -0.03 -0.55 -0.03 -0.80 
TERM   -0.38 -0.58  -1.54 -2.14 
Periods 3 3 3 3 3 3
Funds 484 484 464 484 484 464
Observations 1009 1009 954 1009 1009 954
R2 0.094 0.094 0.087 0.166 0.166 0.168
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.078 0.069 0.113 0.113 0.110
 
ASAR 
Model Ia 
(2000-2008) 
Model Ib 
(2000-2008) 
Model Ic 
(2000-2008) 
Model IIa 
(2000-2008) 
Model IIb 
(2000-2008) 
Model IIc 
(2000-2008) 
  Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t 
c 0.28 1.59 0.29 1.63 0.15 0.58        
T 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.43 0.01 0.80 0.03 1.32 0.03 1.36 0.03 1.72 
I% 0.16 2.61 0.17 2.83 0.22 3.96 -0.75 -2.18 -0.77 -2.18 -0.65 -1.48 
S% -0.11 -1.08 -0.11 -1.00 0.01 0.15 -0.32 -6.75 -0.35 -5.12 -0.33 -1.97 
CH 0.02 0.52 0.01 0.42 0.01 0.32 -0.11 -0.95 -0.11 -0.96 -0.14 -1.62 
DEP 0.03 1.03 0.02 0.94 0.04 1.51 0.03 0.43 0.03 0.45 0.02 0.33 
TEN3% 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.23 -0.03 -2.15 -0.02 -0.36 -0.02 -0.35 -0.07 -1.66 
LEG -0.04 -0.46 -0.04 -0.48 -0.04 -0.48        
PF -0.06 -0.86 -0.06 -0.87 -0.04 -0.78 -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 -0.11 0.07 0.61 
FIX 0.10 1.40 0.10 1.43 0.10 1.36 0.07 3.26 0.05 1.56 0.08 3.95 
LTNAi 0.04 2.01 0.04 1.98 0.04 1.94 0.04 1.85 0.04 1.85 0.04 1.69 
LTNAu -0.03 -2.11 -0.03 -1.99 -0.03 -3.37 -0.08 -3.43 -0.08 -3.51 -0.07 -2.75 
LTNAp 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.19 0.01 0.26 -0.03 -0.84 -0.03 -0.82 0.00 -0.03 
EM 0.03 2.14 0.03 2.06 0.04 1.33 0.03 2.14 0.03 2.19 0.08 1.72 
LAGE -0.10 -10.46 -0.10 -10.40 -0.11 -7.70 -0.10 -18.94 -0.10 -20.77 -0.10 -19.82 
AD -0.12 -3.13 -0.11 -3.13 -0.11 -4.82      
Closed    -0.03 -0.59 0.03 0.62  0.09 1.06 0.20 2.70 
TERM    -0.09 -0.16  -1.37 -1.50 
Periods 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Funds 484 484 464 484 484 464 
Observations 1009 1009 954 1009 1009 954 
R2 0.078 0.079 0.083 0.174 0.175 0.183 
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.062 0.064 0.122 0.122 0.126 
  
Table continues on the next page.  
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BETA 
Model Ia 
(2000-2008) 
Model Ib 
(2002-2008) 
Model Ic 
(2002-2008) 
Model IIa 
(2000-2008) 
Model IIb 
(2002-2008) 
Model IIc 
(2002-2008) 
  Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t Coefficient  t 
c 1.01 9.91 1.01 9.50 1.11 7.51        
T 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.49 0.00 -0.81 0.00 -0.73 0.00 -0.76 
I% -0.01 -0.51 0.00 -0.14 -0.02 -0.77 0.27 6.30 0.28 7.06 0.24 3.84 
S% -0.01 -0.60 0.00 0.12 0.00 -0.21 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.26 
CH -0.04 -4.83 -0.04 -8.08 -0.04 -10.43 -0.02 -1.41 -0.02 -1.34 -0.02 -1.33 
DEP 0.00 -1.38 0.00 -1.25 -0.01 -0.84 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.88 
TEN3% -0.01 -0.51 -0.01 -0.64 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -1.01 -0.02 -1.25 -0.02 -1.19 
LEG 0.01 0.87 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.83        
PF 0.02 1.36 0.02 1.29 0.02 1.53 0.03 1.47 0.02 1.38 0.03 1.36 
FIX 0.02 1.37 0.03 1.47 0.03 1.23 0.04 2.03 0.05 2.70 0.05 2.73 
LTNAi -0.01 -1.61 -0.01 -1.98 -0.01 -2.32 -0.01 -1.66 -0.01 -1.76 -0.01 -1.83 
LTNAu 0.01 2.31 0.01 3.54 0.01 3.49 0.02 6.98 0.03 8.84 0.03 10.24 
LTNAp -0.01 -0.77 -0.01 -0.82 -0.01 -0.84 -0.03 -3.09 -0.03 -2.84 -0.02 -1.44 
EM -0.02 -2.19 -0.02 -2.16 -0.01 -1.18 -0.02 -2.50 -0.02 -2.59 -0.02 -1.27 
LAGE 0.01 2.14 0.01 2.43 0.01 1.84 0.02 5.29 0.02 5.66 0.02 5.18 
AD -0.01 -2.67 -0.01 -0.86 -0.01 -1.86       
Closed  -0.08 -7.12 -0.10 -10.34   -0.08 -4.41 -0.09 -4.72 
TERM   -0.40 -1.60  -0.21 -0.71 
Periods 3 3 3 3 3 3
Funds 484 484 464 484 484 464
Observations 1009 1009 954 1009 1009 954
R2 0.035 0.043 0.051 0.155 0.160 0.163
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.025 0.032 0.101 0.106 0.105
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
 
The relationship between the dummy variable for the chair position and excess return 
is not statistically significant in any of the model specifications. A higher percentage of 
independent directors is associated with higher sector-adjusted returns in all specifica-
tions of Model 1. This finding is in line with the outcome of the analysis of one-year 
performance data, although the statistical significance is higher. The economic signifi-
cance of the coefficients is similar to the analysis of one-year performance. Each addi-
tional independent board member, instead of a dependent board member, given an 
average board size of 7.0, is associated with a better performance by approximately   
28 to 38 basis points per annum.  
When measuring excess return as Carhart’s alpha (CFFA), the primary performance 
measure in this study, the coefficients are close to zero and not statistically significant. 
This finding is also in line with the outcome of the analysis of one-year data. The re-
sults of Model II, which focuses on the variation of variables within each umbrella and 
promoter, do not support the conclusion that more independence leads to better 
performance, measured either on a sector-adjusted or on a risk-adjusted basis. Both 
when measuring excess return versus the sector average and when correcting for risk 
with the Carhart model, the coefficients are significantly negative in all variations of 
Model II. This finding indicates that, for promoters in the sample, when the percentage 
of independence on their boards increased, performance deteriorated, rather than 
improved.  
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This difference in results for sector-adjusted (ASAR) and risk-adjusted (CFFA) excess 
returns in the cross-sectional approach, leads to the question whether or not this is the 
result of differences in the level of risk taken. This explanation does not seem to be the 
case, because when using Carhart beta as dependent variable, the coefficients for the 
percentage of independent directors are close to zero and not statistically significant. A 
surprising result is the statistically significant relationship between the chair position 
and the Carhart beta. Funds with a semi-independent or independent chair have a 
beta that is 4 basis points lower. In Model II, the relationship is also negative, but not 
statistically significant. The relationship between Carhart beta and the percentage of 
independent board members is statistically significant in Model II, but negative and not 
significant in Model I. All in all, these results are not sufficiently consistent to support 
the result of the information analysis approach in section 6.3 (table 6.4) that funds 
with more independent governance have a lower risk profile, measured by the funds’ 
Carhart beta. 
Unlike the analysis using one-year performance intervals, the results for the per-
centage of semi-independent board members are never statistically significant in the 
cross-sectional analyses of Model I. In Model II, there is a negative relationship be-
tween the percentage of semi-independent board members and sector-adjusted ex-
cess returns. For the other governance variables, including the board size, the coeffi-
cients are not statistically significant. For the number of board members, this finding is 
in line with the statistically insignificant results for this variable found by Ferris and Yan 
(2007b) and Meschke (2007) for the U.S. It contradicts the results of Kong and Tang 
(2008) and Adams et al. (2010), who find that larger boards are associated with lower 
performance, possibly as a result of larger teams being less effective in their decision 
making.  
 
As in section 6.4, where one-year performance was analysed, the most consistent 
results are found for the control variables for affiliated distribution and fund age. 
Funds of promoters with affiliated distribution underperform their counterparts that 
are independent from a distribution channel. The results are statistically significant 
both when sector-adjusted, and when risk-adjusted returns are used as dependent 
variables. The level of underperformance in economic terms is 1.3 to 1.4 percentage 
point per annum when measured versus the fund sector average, and 0.9 to 1.0 per-
centage point when measured based on the Carhart model. The variable for affiliated 
distribution is not included in Model II, because it does not vary at the umbrella or 
promoter level. 
Younger funds outperform their older counterparts in a statistically and economi-
cally significant manner. In 2008, the average fund in the sample was 8.6 years old. A 
fund three years younger would perform approximately 34 basis points per annum 
better on a risk-adjusted basis, and approximately 54 basis points per annum better on 
a sector-adjusted basis. Older funds have a higher risk profile, as measured as the 
Carhart beta. With Model II, consistent results for fund age are found. 
Fund scale is positively related to both measures of excess return in both Model I 
and II. This finding is consistent with the existence of economies of scale at fund level 
and is in line with the results by Meschke (2007). The Carhart beta of larger funds is 
lower. Umbrella scale is related negatively with excess return measured versus the 
G O V E R N A N C E  A N D  P E R F O R M A N C E  
 239 
sector average in both Model I and II. When measured as the alpha from the Carhart 
model, the coefficients are not statistically significant. In two model specifications the 
relationship between promoter scale and Carhart alpha is negative. This finding seems 
to indicate that fund level scale is a more significant driver of economies of scale than 
scale at the umbrella or promoter level. This result contradicts that of Ferris and Yan 
(2009), who find that fund performance for U.S. funds in the 1992-2004 period is in-
versely related to fund size, but positively related to the size of the fund family.  
When analysing one-year performance intervals, the coefficients for the TER were 
not statistically significant, whereas there is slightly more evidence when analysing 
three-year performance data that higher TERs are associated with lower performance. 
In all four model specifications in which the TER is included, the coefficient for the TER 
is negative. In one of these four, the relationship is statistically significant. It might well 
be the case that one-year performance data is too noisy to pick up the negative impact 
of costs and that it requires longer-term data for the negative relationship between 
performance and costs to become statistically significant. A fixed TER fee schedule is 
positively associated with excess returns in a statistically significant manner in most 
model specifications. The results for a performance fee schedule are not statistically 
significant. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient for the dummy variable indicating whether a fund was 
closed before the end of the three-year period is not consistently negative. One would 
expect that funds underperforming their peers would be the ones to be closed by 
means of a liquidation or merger into another fund. The results do not support this 
expectation. The closed funds do have a Carhart beta that is lower. The difference of 
0.08 to 0.10 is economically and statistically significant. This finding could be explained 
by these funds converting their portfolios from equities to cash in the period before 
their closure, resulting in a lower beta. 
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter focused on the relationship between investment performance and gov-
ernance characteristics. Arguably, performance is what investors are after when in-
vesting in an investment fund. The main question of this chapter was whether or not 
funds with more independent governance have superior performance compared to 
their counterparts without independent governance. If that were the case, investors 
would be wise to take governance characteristics into consideration when selecting 
funds. 
Two methodologies were used to evaluate whether independent governance con-
tributes positively to the performance of funds. The first methodology, information 
analysis, forms fund portfolios by sector, one of funds in (semi-) independent umbrel-
las, one of funds in dependent umbrellas and a long/short portfolio. The performance 
of these portfolios is then analysed and evaluated using the Carhart 4-factor model. In 
five of six sectors, the portfolio of funds with (semi-) independent governance outper-
formed the portfolio of funds with dependent governance. However, only in the case 
of one sector, the portfolio which invests long in funds with (semi-) independent gov-
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ernance and short in funds with dependent governance, was the Carhart alpha positive 
in a statistically significant manner. 
The second methodology is a multiple regression analysis, using two measures of 
excess return as dependent variables. The primary measure is the alpha from the Car-
hart 4-factor model, while the Average Sector-Adjusted Return is used a secondary 
measure. The regression model has various governance variables as explanatory vari-
ables, while several other fund, umbrella and promoter characteristics are included as 
control variables. The regression analyses were performed at individual fund level, 
both for one-year and three-year performance intervals, and at umbrella level.  
On the whole, the results of the regression analyses do not support the hypothesis 
that independent governance contributes positively to fund performance. The rela-
tionship between Carhart alpha and the percentage of independent board members 
was not statistically significant at the level of at least 5% in any of the model specifica-
tions that focus on cross-sectional variation. In model specifications that focus on vari-
ation of performance and governance characteristics within umbrellas, the relationship 
between Carhart alpha and the percentage of independent board members was incon-
sistent, with a statistically significant positive coefficient in one of the model specifica-
tions for the analysis of one-year returns and statistically significant negative coeffi-
cients for three-year intervals in all model specifications.  
With the Average Sector-Adjusted Return as dependent variable, several of the 
coefficients were statistically significantly positive in the cross-sectional analysis, in 
particular when analysing three-year performance intervals. However, this positive 
relationship was not confirmed in the model that focuses on within umbrella variation, 
where all coefficients were negative, often in a statistically significant manner. The 
relationship between the dummy variable for the chair position and the excess returns 
measures is not statistically significant in any model specification. These inconsistent 
and statistically insignificant results for the relationship between board independence 
and performance are in line with Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Cremers et al. (2009). 
They are not consistent with the statistically significant negative relationship found by 
Kong and Tang (2008) for the percentage of independent board members and by 
Meschke (2007) for both the percentage of independent board members and the posi-
tion of the chair.  
The result of Kong and Tang (2008) and Adams et al. (2010) that excess return is 
negatively related to board size, possibly due to larger boards being less effective in 
decision making and potentially suffering from an increased risk of free riding, is not 
confirmed in this study. The results were statistically insignificant in most model speci-
fications, in line with earlier results of Ferris and Yan (2007b) and Meschke (2007) for 
the U.S. 
 
Stronger and more consistent than the relationship between excess return and gov-
ernance characteristics was the relationship between excess return and the dummy 
variable for affiliated distribution. Funds of promoters that are independent from a 
distribution channel perform better than funds of promoters with affiliated distribu-
tion. The return difference, net of fees, ranges between 1.0 and 1.2 percentage points 
(risk-adjusted) or between 1.2 and 1.4 percentage point (sector-adjusted) per annum. 
The results of the regression analysis are consistent with those found with the infor-
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mation analysis methodology, where the performance was analysed and compared 
between fund portfolios of promoters with and without affiliated distribution. It 
should be noted, however, that these fund portfolios of promoters without affiliated 
distribution did not outperform their market indices on a risk-adjusted basis.  
In all six fund sectors included in the sample, the average fund underperformed 
the market index in the 2000-2009 research period. The level of underperformance 
was of the same order of magnitude as the funds’ level of costs, measured by the Total 
Expense Ratio. In the regression analysis, no statistically significant negative relation-
ship was found between the excess returns over a one-year period and the level of the 
TER. There was weak evidence of a negative relationship when using three-year data. It 
could be because performance data is noisy and TER differences between funds are 
relatively small, that longer-term data would be required to find a stronger statistically 
significant negative relationship. The performance difference between the two groups 
of promoters, those affiliated with distribution and those not affiliated, is not caused 
by cost differences. On the contrary, the analysis of chapter 5 showed that the TERs of 
funds of promoters with affiliated distribution are actually lower. This finding means 
that gross of fees, the performance difference is even larger.  
The finding of superior performance of independent promoters is in line with, but 
more pronounced than, the results of Frye (2001). She finds that raw returns of bank-
managed bond funds in the U.S. are lower than those of non-bank funds. However, the 
bank funds have a lower risk profile and the risk-adjusted performance of bank-
managed funds does not differ from non-bank funds in a statistically significant man-
ner. In non-academic work, Lipper (2011a) finds that in performance rankings of Euro-
pean funds, funds belonging to larger financial groups tended to be overrepresented in 
the middle performance quintiles and those of independent firms to be overrepre-
sented in the top and bottom quintiles. This finding is also an indication of lower risk-
taking by fund management companies that are part of larger financial groups. This 
lower risk-appetite could be the result of banks and other financial groups serving a 
different, more risk-averse clientele, but it could also be the result of these groups 
distributing their products on the basis of marketing, cross-selling and the groups’ 
general reputation, rather than on the basis of good performance. The implications of 
underperformance could be greater for these financial groups since it could jeopardise 
a much broader, profitable client relationship.  
A lower risk-profile of funds of promoters with affiliated distribution is not found 
in this study in the form of a lower exposure to the factors of the Carhart 4-factor 
model. It could be that bank-managed funds are overrepresented in the category of 
funds that Cremers and Petajisto (2009) refer to as closet indexers. The portfolios of 
these funds deviate little from the index and therefore they have a low active share 
and a low tracking error. They find that these closet indexers have no skill and under-
perform because of the burden of costs, whereas funds with a high active share do 
display some skill. Comparing the active share of funds of promoters with affiliated 
distribution and funds without, would be an interesting area for future academic re-
search. It would require portfolio holdings data for the funds in the sample, which is 
not available at this stage.  
Another explanation for the underperformance of funds related to groups with af-
filiated distribution could be that independent firms are a better place to work, finan-
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cially or culturally. This environment would allow these firms to recruit and retain the 
best portfolio managers, research analysts and other staff, giving them a competitive 
advantage over firms with affiliated distribution. This explanation is similar to the one 
put forward in studies of hedge funds (e.g., Cici et al., 2009 and Nohel et al., 2010) for 
why talented fund managers prefer to work for hedge funds rather than for regular 
investment funds.  
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Chapter 7 
Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Independent board members do not add value. It is just a hype of no-longer employed 
professionals of the financial industry who want to supplement their pension.” 113 
                                                                
113 Quote from board member of Luxembourg UCITS umbrella in a telephone interview with the author of 
this dissertation (2011).  
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of a survey among board members of 
Luxembourg UCITS umbrellas. The sample for the survey is the same as that described 
in chapter 4 and used for the quantitative analyses of chapters 5 and 6. The goal of the 
survey is to explore the role of fund boards in general, and specifically, whether they 
influence the level of costs and investment performance of the funds they oversee. 
Together with the relationships between fund governance and costs and performance 
estimated quantitatively, this survey is to provide insight into whether and how fund 
boards add value for investors.  
In the U.S., independent board members on fund boards are mandatory. Because 
the level of fees is seen as the primary conflict of interest in the fund management 
industry, negotiating fees with the investment advisor is a clearly defined task of these 
independent board members of U.S.-domiciled funds. With regard to investment per-
formance, the role of the board is less clearly defined. Meschke (2007, p. 16-17) ex-
pects the influence of boards on performance to be mostly through negotiating fees. 
Ding and Wermers (2006) find that fund managers performing poorly are more likely 
to get replaced by boards with a higher percentage of independent board members. 
Others, such as Tufano and Sevick (1997, p. 329) and Freeman and Brown (2001, p. 
617), comment that boards have the right to fire the fund’s advisor, but that in prac-
tice, this right is seldom exercised.  
In Luxembourg, independent board members are not mandatory and there is no 
clear direction given to board members by regulators, or on the basis of the ALFI Code 
(ALFI, 2009), as to what their role is with regard to fund costs. The analyses in chapters 
5 and 6 for Luxembourg UCITS did not provide convincing evidence that having more 
independent boards makes a difference for investors in the form of lower costs or 
better performance. This chapter investigates how board members prioritise different 
aspects of their role. In addition to providing the results for the whole sample of par-
ticipants in the survey, where relevant, the results will be split between those of de-
pendent and (semi-) independent boards or dependent and (semi-) independent board 
members114.  
7.2 Sample and method 
Sampling procedure 
The sample for the survey is the same as that used for the quantitative analyses in 
chapters 5 and 6, as described in chapter 4. This sample consists of a total of 48 fund 
umbrellas that existed for part or the entire 2000-2009 research period. These umbrel-
las have the common characteristic that they are the flagship umbrellas of leading 
cross-border fund promoters. Furthermore, all umbrellas in the sample are Luxem-
bourg-domiciled and have UCITS status. When two promoters in the sample have 
merged, only the umbrella that is the combined promoter’s flagship umbrella after the 
merger is maintained in the sample. This procedure is followed in order to make sure 
                                                                
114 For definitions of these categories, please refer to sections 4.3 and 4.4.  
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that each promoter is represented in the sample with one umbrella only and thus not 
counted twice. As a result of this approach, three umbrellas dropped from the sample 
during the 2000-2009 research period115. Another four umbrellas dropped from the 
sample in the period from the end of 2009 to 2011 when the survey took place116. 
Thus, the final sample for the survey consisted of 41 umbrellas.  
The aim was to subject one board member of each of these 41 umbrellas117 to the 
survey. Individual board members and other representatives of all promoters were 
approached directly and indirectly with the request for one member of their fund 
board to participate118. In the end, all promoters were prepared to contribute to the 
survey, so that 41 individual board members of the same number of umbrellas partici-
pated.  
It is common for board members to act in that role for several funds. Board mem-
bers were always asked to take part in the survey with a specific umbrella in the sam-
ple in mind. Two persons interviewed sit on boards of two different umbrellas in the 
sample. In these cases, they were asked to answer the questions for one of the two 
umbrellas and two other board members participated in the survey for the other um-
brellas.  
Method 
For the survey, a questionnaire was developed consisting of 41 questions. This ques-
tionnaire, along with the results of all multiple-choice answers, is included as appendix 
3. The questions addressed the boards’ manner of operation, such as how often regu-
lar board meetings are held. These questions are quite objective. The questionnaire 
also included more subjective questions where the opinions of the persons inter-
viewed were sought.  
Participants in the survey answered these questions in interviews, most of which 
took place by telephone. In this way, the interviewer could ask for further clarification 
of the answer or about the motivation of the interviewee for certain actions or views. 
All participants received the questionnaire by e-mail before the interview. The inter-
views took place in the period between 21 June 2011 and 22 September 2011. In one 
case, no interview took place, but the answers were submitted in a written format. The 
participants were promised anonymity. Therefore, it is not possible to trace answers 
from the results presented back to the participating persons or umbrellas .  
Dependency status and tenure 
The boards of the 41 umbrellas included in the sample for the interviews can be split 
into 19 dependent boards (46.3%), 17 independent boards (41.5%) and 5 semi-
                                                                
115 See section 4.2.2.  
116 Promoters that dropped from the sample after 31 December 2009 were Credit Suisse (fund management 
activities were acquired by Aberdeen), Fortis (acquired by BNP Paribas), Gartmore (acquired by Henderson) 
and Société Générale (asset management activities merged with those of Crédit Agricole to form Amundi).  
117 In the case of UCITS umbrellas with the legal status of an SICAV, it concerns board members of that entity. 
In the case of UCITS FCPs, it concerns board members of the management company of the fund. 
118 The Directors’ Office, Ernst & Young, Fund-X, the Luxembourg School of Finance and PwC were essential 
in making introductions and asking their contacts to participate in the survey. 
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independent boards (12.2%)119. Table 7.1 shows that the group interviewed formed a 
good reflection of the total sample of board members with regard to their split across 
the three categories of board members. There is a slight overrepresentation of de-
pendent board members and an underrepresentation of independent and semi-
independent board members.  
 
Table 7.1: Comparison of the dependency status of interviewed board members to the full sample 
 Interviewees (June-September 2011)  Full sample 
 Category of boards   (31-Dec-2009) 
Category of  
board members 
 
Dependent 
 
Independent
Semi-
independent
 
Total 
 
% 
 
Total 
 
% 
Dependent 19 11 4 34 82.9 213 74.4 
Independent N.A. 6 N.A. 6 14.6 52 18.2 
Semi-independent N.A. 0 1 1 2.4 20 7.0 
Total 19 17 5 41 100.0 285 100.0 
 
Of the 41 persons interviewed, 21 were based in Luxembourg. The others were based 
in other European countries (17), the U.S. (2) and Asia (1). Eight persons interviewed 
acted as chairman of the board. Together, this group of board members has more than 
250 years of experience on these specific boards, while several board members indi-
cated that they had served on other fund boards before joining the one for which they 
were being interviewed. Mean and median tenure on the boards for which they were 
interviewed were 6.3 years and 5.8 years, respectively. There was a substantial varia-
tion in the tenure of the individuals interviewed, ranging from less than three months 
to more than 20 years.  
As is shown in table 7.2, it is common that board members of the umbrellas in the 
sample also sit on other fund boards of the same promoter. Such was the case for 34 
of the 41 board members interviewed and applies to both dependent and (semi-) in-
dependent board members. Of the seven (semi-) independent board members, all but 
two sit on fund boards of more than one promoter. This is a reflection of the fact that 
several of these persons act in this capacity as a profession, and therefore strive to 
have several such mandates. Of the 34 dependent board members, nine sit on boards 
of other promoters as well. Two of these board members indicated that this resulted 
from the fact that there was, or had been, a relationship with the other promoter in 
the promoter group. In some of the other cases, it was because the promoter group of 
the interviewee acted as a service provider for other promoters and the interviewee 
sat on those boards in a servicing capacity.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
119 As discussed in chapter 4, at the end of 2009, there was a majority of promoters in the sample with 
dependent boards (51.1%). At the time of the interviews, dependent boards were a minority, due to the fact 
that the four promoters dropping from the sample due to merger activity were three promoters with de-
pendent boards and one promoter with an independent board.  
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Table 7.2: Other board seats 
Category of  
board members 
 On other board(s) of 
 funds same promoter 
On board(s) funds of  
other promoter(s) 
 Total Number % Number % 
Dependent 34 29 85.3% 9 26.5% 
(Semi-) independent 7 5 71.4% 5 71.4% 
Total 41 34 82.9% 14 34.1% 
Compensation and fund investments 
This survey confirms the finding of the PwC fund governance survey (PwC, 2011, p. 9) 
that employees of the promoter normally do not receive a compensation for their role 
as board member on an umbrella fund of the promoter. Of the 34 dependent board 
members interviewed, only one received financial compensation other than the regu-
lar salary, in that case, between EUR 5,000 and 10,000. The one semi-independent 
board member interviewed, an employee of a service provider to the fund, indicated 
that he did not receive additional financial compensation for this board role. All six 
independent board members interviewed received financial compensation for their 
role: between EUR 10,000 and 20,000 (one case), between EUR 20,000 and 30,000 
(one case) or above EUR 30,000 (four cases). It should be noted that four of the six 
independent board members were also board members for other funds of the pro-
moter, for which they are also remunerated.  
Eighteen of the 41 board members (43.9%) agreed with the statement that in-
vestments by board members in the funds overseen align their interests with those of 
the investors. Several added that although they agreed with the concept in theory, it 
should not matter for the behaviour of board members in practice. Only a minority of 
16 of the board members interviewed (39.0%) were currently invested in the funds of 
the relevant umbrella. Of those not investing, six said they were planning to invest in 
the future. Several board members said they do not invest and will not invest in the 
future, because they felt that it could potentially put them in a conflict of interest situ-
ation and they preferred to avoid any doubt. This could, for example, be the case when 
the liquidation or merger of a fund would be considered by the board. For other inter-
viewees, the reasons for not investing were of a practical nature. Several mentioned 
cumbersome compliance and pre-clearance procedures, either at the promoter or at 
another organisation where they have directorships. The two U.S.-based board mem-
bers interviewed mentioned the tax and regulatory issues related to U.S. persons in-
vesting in non-U.S. funds as the reason not to invest.  
7.3 Independence of the board 
Board categories 
The sample of 41 boards for the interviews consists of 19 dependent boards and 17 
independent boards. Dependent boards have board members only of the promoter or 
the promoter group. Independent boards have at least one independent board mem-
ber. Furthermore, there were 5 semi-independent boards in the sample, with at least 
one member of the board being a former employee of the promoter or promoter 
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group (one case) or being employed by a service provider to the fund, outside of the 
promoter group (four cases).  
Reasons against having independent board members 
The primary reason given by interviewees representing dependent and semi-
independent boards for these promoters’ decisions not to have independent board 
members was that it is not a legal or regulatory requirement under UCITS or Luxem-
bourg regulations. In several interviews, the board members referred to the informal 
CSSF policy of preferring the majority of the board seats to be taken by representatives 
of the promoter, which meant that the promoters did not sense any pressure from the 
side of the regulator to have independent board members on their fund boards. Sev-
eral interviewees mentioned that no pressure was felt from within the promoter, or 
from clients either, to opt for fund boards with independent board members. Without 
such pressure, higher convenience and efficiency were reasons for not having inde-
pendent board members. Greater agility in decision-making was also mentioned in 
several interviews as a reason to have a dependent board. The difficulty of finding the 
right people for the role of independent board members in some cases contributed to 
sticking to a model with dependent board members only. 
Several interviewees representing a dependent board said the question whether 
or not to have independent board members had been a topic of discussion in the man-
agement of the promoter. In two cases, the board member interviewed said that one 
or more independent board members would be added to the board in question in the 
near future, to add expertise and because it is seen as a trend in the industry. In four 
other cases, interviewees of dependent umbrellas said that the appointment of inde-
pendent board members was currently being discussed and considered. Another inter-
viewee said the promoter had decided not to have independent board members after 
weighing the added value against the inconvenience. In yet another interview, the 
board member indicated that a discussion about advantages and disadvantages had 
taken place within the management of the promoter, resulting in the decision not to 
have independent board members. This decision was made primarily because the 
promoter in question saw the funds as the products of the promoter. With this prem-
ise, a purely internal board having control of the funds was seen as more appropriate.  
Several interviewees representing dependent boards doubted whether independ-
ent board members would add any value. With the right mixture of internal board 
members, adding external board members was not required from an experience or 
competency perspective. Several interviewees said that because the promoter’s repu-
tation is at stake at all times, it cannot take any risks, irrespective of the composition of 
the board. Others questioned the independence of board members who are employ-
ees of service providers to the funds, the category in this study labelled as semi-
independent. The loyalty of board members in this category was possibly with the 
promoter and there could be a financial dependency on the promoter and a client-
provider relationship also playing a role.  
An interviewee who sat on the board with a former employee, also qualified in this 
study as semi-independent board members, said that this individual had the advantage 
of knowing the promoter’s organisation very well on the one hand, while being able to 
take sufficient distance on the other hand. One dependent interviewee on a semi-
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independent board mentioned that his organisation would likely move to a fully de-
pendent board in the near future. In that case, the one semi-independent board mem-
ber was seen as not adding sufficient value, focusing too much on compliance aspects 
and without an active role in portfolio management or commercial issues.  
Some interviewees were critical of the role of individuals making it a profession to 
function as independent board members, as they were said to be hired by the pro-
moter in reality. Therefore, they would not be able to position themselves as truly 
independent towards the promoter. One interviewee said that these rented directors 
would only add costs. Furthermore, the comment was that often such board members 
have so many mandates that they cannot dedicate sufficient time and energy to each 
board. Finally, interviewees commented that being on boards of competing fund rang-
es and promoters puts these board members in a conflict of interest situation.  
Reasons for having independent board members 
The primary reason for having independent board members on a fund board is that it 
is seen as good practice. Independent oversight is perceived as adding value by provid-
ing proper checks and balances. Interviewees commented that this better governance 
is important, especially in situations of conflicts of interest and when having to make 
tough decisions. In this respect, independent board members contribute to protecting 
the interest of investors. Furthermore, several interviewees mentioned that they ap-
preciated the different, external perspective that independent board members can 
bring to the table. Some suggested that independent board members were better able 
to challenge existing views of different business lines within the promoter and that the 
opinions of independent professionals allowed them to make better decisions.  
In several cases, the independent board members were expected to add a certain 
specific expertise and knowledge, sometimes to compliment that of internal resources, 
and they were especially selected for that purpose. Several mentioned a mixture of 
dependent and independent board members as the ideal model, where there is a bal-
ance of views, but no independent control.  
A number of interviewees said that independent board members were also on the 
board for reputational reasons and to increase credibility, one of them comparing it to 
an insurance policy. Other board members mentioned that independent board mem-
bers were beneficial when the fund management company and the funds were under-
going due diligence by prospective investors or their consultants and said it was in-
creasingly a point of attention in Requests for Proposal. Two interviewees mentioned 
that having independent board members was a requirement on the basis of company 
policy, in particular, the firms’ corporate governance code.  
International consistency 
Several interviewees mentioned consistency across fund ranges in different fund do-
miciles in the group as a reason for either having or not having independent board 
members. In the case of U.S. promoters, it often meant having independent board 
members for their Luxembourg funds, as is required in their home market. In the case 
of some of the continental European promoters, from domiciles where independent 
board members are not common market practice, it resulted in an approach across the 
different ranges of having dependent boards. This finding confirms the result of chap-
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ter 4, where the country of origin of the promoter seemed to be a driver for the choice 
of whether or not to have independent board members.  
Fund governance models 
How the board was positioned vis-à-vis the promoter, differed for the various umbrel-
las in the sample. From the interviews, three general models can be identified:  
• Integrated model. This model is seen with dependent boards. There is a significant 
overlap between the management of the promoter and the directors of the fund 
board. The fund board functions as an extension of the management of the pro-
moter. Several functions are outsourced to departments or business lines within 
the promoter. Often, the managers thereof are members of the fund board. In this 
model, the board’s role as an additional layer of oversight is limited.  
• Different hat model. This model is seen with dependent boards, as well as inde-
pendent and semi-independent boards with a (semi-) independent minority. The 
board has a distinct role versus the management of the promoter and operates at a 
certain distance, even when all board members are employees of the promoter 
group. The fund board feels that they are positioned as quite independent from the 
promoter, providing an additional layer of oversight and taking the interests of the 
investors as the basis for its decisions. Often, the separate and distinct position is 
amplified by having some (semi-) independent board members or by having repre-
sentatives on the board from areas of the promoter group involved in the distribu-
tion of the funds, such as private banking, who represent the interests of the inves-
tors. In several cases, the interviewees said that significant attention had been 
given to putting state-of-the-art processes and procedures in place so that the 
board can play a relatively independent role. One weakness of the model is that 
there is often a hierarchical relationship between the board members who are em-
ployees of the promoter and the management of the promoter, so that when it 
matters, it is questionable whether the board is able to prioritise the interest of in-
vestors over the interest of the promoter.  
• Independent model. In this model, semi-independent and independent board 
members are a majority on the board. With a majority of outsiders, the board 
should be able to claim an independent role. Nevertheless, even with a majority of 
independent board members, there is still a strong influence from the promoter, 
for example, because the board depends on the promoter for information. Fur-
thermore, when the promoter selects the independent board members, their add-
ed value as watchdogs for investors might be questionable. In a number of cases, it 
was clear from the interviews that at least part of the reason for opting for this 
model was the positive image that independent governance has towards the out-
side world.  
 
In practice, these three models are seen in a relatively pure form, but there are inter-
mediate forms as well, having characteristics of more than one of the three models. 
 
Sixteen interviewees agreed or strongly agreed, whereas 21 disagreed or strongly dis-
agreed, with the function of the board to ratify decisions made elsewhere in the pro-
moter group. The remaining four board members were neutral. The ratifying mode is a 
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typical way of operating under the integrated model described above. All board mem-
bers agreeing to the statement were dependent, in most cases sitting on dependent 
boards. Several of them stressed that they did not see it as a bad thing. The ratification 
by the fund board was simply the final step in a well-defined process. One board 
member said that although decisions were usually ratified, there was always a quality 
check by the board and often with a right to veto. Several said that they were involved 
personally in the preparation of the proposals to the board within the promoter’s or-
ganisation.  
Only 11 board members agreed or strongly agreed to the statement that the style 
of the board can be described as one of management by exception. One of the inter-
viewees who agreed with this statement said that it was only after a general frame-
work and additional procedures had been put in place by the board. Of the interview-
ees who disagreed, several said that they dealt with the whole spectrum of the fund 
management business. Most board members interviewed, 36 of 41, qualify the board 
on which they sit as a watchdog on behalf of the fund investors. Four interviewees 
were neutral. One board member disagreed with this qualification for the board on 
which he sits, saying that he agreed with the concept, but that the board in question 
was not, in reality, able to play such a role vis-à-vis the promoter.  
Added value of independent board members 
Only seven interviewees, all dependent board members, agreed with the statement 
that independent board members are less effective, since they lack knowledge of the 
fund promoter and the funds. Seven interviewees were neutral on this question and 
one did not know. One of the disagreeing interviewees said that independent board 
members bring something else to the table and that it is the collective effectiveness of 
the board that matters.  
The answers to the next four questions shed some light on how the interviewees 
see independent board members adding value. Asked whether having independent 
board members increases the discipline of the promoter towards a board, e.g., in 
terms of reporting to the board and the submission of proposals, 31 agreed or strongly 
agreed, whereas eight disagreed or strongly disagreed. One board member was neu-
tral and one said he did not know. There were 28 interviewees who agreed or strongly 
agreed that having independent board members increases the effectiveness of a board 
in dealing with conflicts of interest between the promoter and fund investors. The 
remaining interviewees either disagreed or strongly disagreed (seven) or said they 
were neutral or did not know (six). Similar results were obtained regarding the state-
ment that having independent board members contributes positively to protecting the 
interests of fund investors, with 27 agreeing or strongly agreeing, five disagreeing or 
strongly disagreeing and nine neutral or do not know. Fewer (20) believed that having 
independent board members increases the quality of decision-making of a board. On 
this statement, nine disagreed or strongly disagreed and 12 interviewees were neutral 
or did not know.  
A change of legislation requiring boards of UCITS funds to have independent board 
members was favoured by slightly less than half (18) of the interviewees. The remain-
ing interviewees either disagreed or strongly disagreed (12) or were neutral (11). Six 
interviewees would go as far as requiring boards of UCITS funds to have a majority of 
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independent board members. Several interviewees said that they were in favour of the 
concept of independent board members on fund boards, but that there is already 
more than enough fund regulation.  
7.4 Board activities and priorities 
Frequency of meetings and reports 
A large majority of boards, 26 out of 41, hold their regular board meetings four times 
per annum. Twelve boards have their regular meetings less often: once (one board), 
twice (nine), two-and-a-half (one) or three times (one) per annum on average. Three 
boards have their meetings six times per annum. General practice is that boards have 
ad hoc meetings as well, in order to deal with certain issues or make specific decisions, 
sometimes in light of market circumstances. The circulation of written resolutions for 
approval, for example, for prospectus updates, is also a common practice. Most boards 
have risk management, investment restrictions breaches, compliance and investment 
performance reports as standard agenda items for each or most of their regular meet-
ings. The results are less uniform for conflicts of interest as an agenda item. Whereas 
some boards have this on their agenda for every meeting, other boards only deal with 
this on an ad hoc basis when a concrete conflict of interest has to be dealt with. Sev-
eral interviewees said that conflicts of interest would have a more prominent place on 
the board’s agenda in the future, as a result of requirements under UCITS IV.  
Fees and performance 
Most board members, 34 out of 41, said that the board in question had benchmarked 
management fee levels to competitors and/or market averages in the past two years. 
Twenty-six interviewees said that their board had initiated upward or downward 
changes in the level of management fees charged by one or more sub-funds in the past 
two years. In all but four of these cases, fee benchmarking was mentioned as a reason 
for initiating changes. Further reasons indicated by the interviewees for initiating 
changes were the comparison of fees to that of other products in the promoter's range 
(16 times), fees in relationship to performance achieved (four times), fees in relation-
ship to potential performance (four times) and an increase of assets under manage-
ment, leading to economies of scale (two times). A lowering of or cap on management 
fees to support performance in difficult market circumstances was mentioned in sev-
eral interviews. Other reasons given for initiating fee changes were the alignment of 
fees with a fund range acquired by the promoter. Increasing revenues for the pro-
moter was also mentioned as a reason for fee changes in several interviews. One 
board member interviewed said that the board had initiated upwards changes to the 
fee of a sub-fund because of strong outperformance and capacity constraints of the 
investment strategy. 
Except for four board members on dependent boards and one on an independent 
board, all interviewees said that, in the past two years, their board had challenged the 
promoter with regard to the investment performance achieved on one or more sub-
funds. Not only poor performance was mentioned as a reason for asking questions. In 
several interviews, unusually good performance was mentioned as a reason to investi-
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gate and even challenge as well. The question as to whether the board has initiated 
changes in the past two years to the way one or more sub-funds were being managed 
was answered positively by 23 of the interviewees. The reasons for either challenging 
the promoter or initiating changes to the management of sub-funds were continued 
underperformance (33 interviewees), volatility of the returns (six) and staff changes in 
the portfolio management team (seven). A reduction in the risk profile of the fund was 
mentioned three times. A repositioning of the fund in order to adjust to changing cli-
ent demand was mentioned twice.  
For several dependent boards that operate according the integrated model with 
the promoter, it was hard to distinguish the role of the board with regard to fees and 
performance and the role of board members as managers within the promoter’s or-
ganisation. For example, one board member indicated that fee benchmarking was a 
role entrusted to the product development department of the promoter and that the 
head of that department was a member of the board.  
In most cases, the investment management of the sub-funds in the umbrellas in 
the sample is entrusted to parties in the promoter group, although there are also sev-
eral examples of external investment managers or advisors. Most board members 
indicated that they have, and can have, little or no influence on performance. When 
funds underperform, they can ask questions, put issues on the agenda, discuss and 
challenge, but several interviewees felt that their influence on performance remains 
indirect at best. Investment performance is seen mainly as the responsibility of the 
promoter and it is felt that the expertise of investing in a certain asset class is concen-
trated there. Therefore, any changes to the way funds were managed usually origi-
nated there. Furthermore, several board members indicated that although on occasion 
hard discussions with regard to performance and the way funds were managed had 
taken place, firing the promoter as investment manager and hiring an external man-
ager was simply not an option. There was only one board member who said that in-
vestment performance was the board’s number one focus area, explaining that focus  
by pointing at performance as the primary interest of investors.  
Practically all interviewees agreed or strongly agreed that it is the responsibility of 
the board to make sure that all costs and all risks are presented transparently to inves-
tors. Many added that the board has little to do with this day-to-day activity in prac-
tice, as it is performed elsewhere in the promoter’s organisation or by a service pro-
vider. It was also the reason why there were some neutral votes on these two ques-
tions.  
 
The next four hypotheses with regard to fees and performance aimed to further clarify 
the balance between board responsibilities and promoter responsibilities. Only two 
interviewees agreed that as long as the fund portfolio is compliant with restrictions 
imposed on the basis of regulations or the prospectus, investment performance is not 
a concern of the board. Practically all believed that the board’s responsibility goes 
much further than that. A large majority (32) believed that it is the responsibility of the 
board to take action against continued poor performance. There were 24 interviewees 
who agreed that it is the responsibility of the board to make sure that fund investors 
pay a fair level of management fees for the services they receive. One interviewee 
added that a competitive fee was perhaps a better term to describe how he sees his 
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responsibility as board member with respect to fees. On the other hand, there were 
four interviewees who disagreed with the statement and 13 who were neutral. Most 
of these interviewees agreed with the next statement that the level of management 
and other fees is a commercial decision of the fund promoter, not a board issue. A 
total of 15 interviewees agreed to this statement. Several others said that in their case, 
the promoter was leading in the area of fee setting, but that there was also a responsi-
bility of the board. Others said that as long as fees were not greatly out-of-line with 
the market, the board would not get involved. Several interviewees commented that 
when performance is good, costs are secondary or do not matter.  
Board priorities 
There were three questions in the survey which asked board members to weight dif-
ferent aspects of the role of the board according to their relative importance. Whereas 
several of the other questions merely give insight into whether the board is involved in 
a certain aspect of the management and operations of the funds, the goal of these 
questions was to prioritise different aspects of the fund’s governance by the board. For 
each of these three questions, interviewees were asked to divide a total of 100 points 
over five aspects of their role. Therefore, a score of 20 points can be seen as neutral or 
the benchmark weight.  
The answers to these questions are presented graphically in figures 7.1, 7.2 and 
7.3 by means of a box plot120. The mean and median, as well as the number of obser-
vations below 20 and above 20, are provided in tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5. A Student t-test 
(two-sided) is used to test whether the mean differs from 20 in a statistically significant 
manner. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-sided) is used to test whether the number 
of observations above 20 differs from those below 20 in a statistically significant man-
ner.  
 
When board members were asked to rate their primary functions, setting performance 
targets and ensuring that the performance achieved is presented correctly and trans-
parently to investors did not score highly. For setting performance targets, all individ-
ual scores except one were 20 or lower. The mean of 8.2 differed from the benchmark 
score of 20 in a statistically significant manner. The number of scores below 20 also 
differed from the number of scores above 20 in a statistically significant manner. Inter-
viewees were of the opinion that this is primarily a promoter role, not a board func-
tion. For the presentation of performance, the whole interquartile range (IQR) was 
situated below the benchmark score of 20 points and the mean differed from 20 in a 
statistically significant manner. Although the correct and transparent presentation of 
performance was generally seen as important, it is too operational for the board to 
focus its attention on.  
 
                                                                
120 The boxes display the interquartile range (IQR), the observations from the 25th to the 75th percentile. A 
line is drawn across the box at the median. The horizontal line at the bottom shows the minimum observa-
tion or minimum observation above the lower fence (when there are outliers). Similarly, the horizontal line 
at the top shows the maximum observation or maximum observation below the upper fence (when there 
are outliers). The lower fence is 1.5 times IQR below the 25th percentile, whereas the upper fence is 1.5 
times IQR above the 75th percentile. Outliers, displayed as dots, are the observations beyond the fences.  
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Figure 7.1: Box plot representation of the answers to question 10: When thinking about the primary func-
tions of the board, please rate the following functions according to their relative importance. 
 
Table 7.3: Question 10: When thinking about the primary functions of the board, please rate the following 
functions according to their relative importance.  
Answers Mean t Median Number 
<20 
Number 
>20 
p1 
a. Setting performance targets 8.2 -9.60 5.0 33 1 0.0000 
b. Appropriate risk management framework 32.3 5.14 30.0 1 32 0.0000 
c. Coherence of investments with prospectus 19.7 -0.24 20.0 16 14 0.8555 
d. Monitoring of investment performance 22.8 1.57 20.0 12 18 0.8998 
e. Presentation of investment performance 17.0 -2.40 20.0 18 9 0.1221 
1. p-value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-sided).  
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
 
Ensuring that an appropriate risk management framework is implemented and func-
tioning received the highest score. In this case, the whole IQR lay well above 20 points. 
The mean of 32.3 is statistically significantly greater than 20. All interviewees but one 
scored this at 20 or higher, with two outliers above 70, so that the number of scores 
below and above 20 also differed in a statistically significant manner. For the two re-
maining functions, verifying the coherence of the investments with the prospectus and 
monitoring the investment performance achieved, the median scores were exactly 20 
points and the means did not differ from 20 in a statistically significant manner.  
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Figure 7.2: Box plot representation of the answers to question 11: When thinking about the fiduciary role 
of the board, please rate the following aspects according to their relative importance.  
 
Table 7.4: Question 11: When thinking about the fiduciary role of the board, please rate the following as-
pects according to their relative importance.  
Answers Mean t Median Number 
<20 
Number 
>20 
p1 
a. Fair and consistent treatment of investors 29.2 5.73 30.0 1 29 0.0000 
b. Pricing of the funds (NAV) 20.8 0.67 20.0 11 16 0.4421 
c. Level of fees and costs 17.6 -2.86 20.0 19 6 0.0146 
d. Consistency literature and reality 16.7 -2.85 20.0 19 7 0.0290 
e. Good performance for investors 15.6 -3.02 15.0 24 6 0.0007 
1. p-value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-sided).  
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
 
When interviewees were asked to rate different aspects of boards’ fiduciary role, en-
suring fair and consistent treatment of investors received the highest scores for rela-
tive importance. All individual scores but one were 20 or higher, with a statistically 
significant mean of 29.2. The number of scores above benchmark was significantly 
higher than the number of scores below. The mean for ensuring fair pricing of the 
funds (NAV) did not differ from the benchmark score of 20 in a statistically significant 
manner. The means for ensuring a fair level of fees and costs, for ensuring consistency 
between fund prospectus/sales literature and reality, and for ensuring good perform-
ance for investors were all statistically significantly lower than 20. Only for ensuring 
good performance for investors was the median also below 20. 
 
S U R V E Y  
 257 
a.
 C
re
at
in
g 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
fo
r o
ut
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
b.
 C
on
tro
llin
g 
an
d 
m
iti
ga
tin
g 
ris
k
c.
 A
vo
id
in
g 
co
nf
lic
ts
 
of
 in
te
re
st
d.
 P
ro
vi
di
ng
 q
ua
lit
y 
co
nt
ro
l
e.
 P
ro
vi
di
ng
 c
os
t 
co
nt
ro
l
 
Figure 7.3: Box plot representation of the answers to question 12: When thinking about how the board 
adds value for the investors, please rate the following aspects according to their relative importance.  
 
Table 7.5: Question 12: When thinking about how the board adds value for the investors, please rate the 
following aspects according to their relative importance.  
Answers Mean t Median Number 
<20 
Number 
>20 
p1 
a. Creating conditions for outperformance 11.6 -4.96 10.0 32 5 0.0000 
b. Controlling and mitigating risk 27.7 5.97 25.0 3 32 0.0000 
c. Avoiding conflicts of interest 21.4 0.92 20.0 13 18 0.4731 
d. Providing quality control 21.6 1.37 20.0 12 19 0.2810 
e. Providing cost control 17.7 -2.17 15.0 21 11 0.1102 
1. p-value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-sided).  
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
 
When asked to rate how the board adds value for the investors, the highest average 
score was given to controlling and mitigating risk. The mean of 27.7 is significantly 
higher than the benchmark. For this answer, the whole IQR lay above the benchmark 
score of 20 and the number of scores above 20 was significantly higher than the num-
ber of scores below 20. Creating the conditions for the funds to outperform had the 
lowest average score and an IQR below 20, although there was one outlier of 50. Both 
tests indicated that the results for this aspect were below benchmark in a statistically 
significant manner.  
Providing cost control had a median score of 15. The mean of 17.7 was signifi-
cantly lower than 20. The results for providing quality control and avoiding conflicts of 
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interest were not statistically significant. For avoiding conflicts of interest, there was a 
wide dispersion of scores given, ranging from 0 to 50 points out of 100.  
 
Based on the three questions in which board members were asked to prioritise differ-
ent aspects of their role, figure 7.4 provides a graphical box plot representation of the 
relative priorities given to five aspects: fund performance, risk management, fund 
costs, compliance with laws and regulations and other121. In this case, zero is the 
benchmark score. A score higher than zero implies that above benchmark priority is 
given to the particular aspect. A score of below zero indicates below benchmark prior-
ity. In figure 7.4, the green line depicts the average scores of interviewees representing 
(semi-) independent boards, whereas the red line is the average score of interviewees 
on dependent boards. Summary statistics are provided in table 7.6. A Student-t test 
(two-sided) is used to test whether the mean differs from 0 in a statistically significant 
manner, while the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-sided) is used to test whether the 
number of observations above zero differs from those below zero in a statistically 
significant manner. 
Risk management had the highest priority, with a statistically significant mean of 
20.0. Only two interviewees gave this category a score below benchmark. Compliance 
is the category with the second highest score. In this case, the mean of 7.0 is also sta-
tistically significant. Twenty-two interviewees gave this an above benchmark priority.  
Performance received the lowest priority. The mean of -21.7 is different from zero 
in a statistically significant manner. Although one board member interviewed priori-
tised performance above all else, most others have scores of zero or lower. Boards ask 
questions about investment performance and occasionally challenge, but otherwise 
felt they have little influence on performance. Most saw performance as the preroga-
tive of the promoter and the investment manager. The ultimate sanction, firing the 
investment manager, is not an option. When asked whether the board had initiated 
changes to the way one or more sub-funds are being managed, one interviewee said 
that the board did not look to exercise that level of influence. This summarises well 
how the majority of boards look at their role with respect to investment performance. 
This result is in line with existing literature concerning the U.S. market, where the in-
fluence of boards on performance is seen as indirect.  
For costs, the mean was -4.7 and also statistically significant. That the majority of 
boards do not prioritise costs and also see fund costs as the prerogative of the pro-
moter, stands in bigger contrast to the U.S., where boards are required to have inde-
pendent boards members, and negotiating the management fee (advisory fee) is one 
                                                                
121 The scores of individual interviewees are calculated as is shown below, whereby letters a through e 
represent the scores given for the different answers for each of the five aspects. In the case of equal priority 
given to all aspects, the score on each is zero. A priority above zero for one aspect requires a score below 
zero for one or more other aspects.  
Category  Question 10  Question 11  Question 12 
Performance = a-20 + d-20 + e-20  + a-20 
Risk = b-20 +  + b-20 
Costs =  + c-20 + e-20 
Compliance = c-20 + a-20 + d-20 + c-20 
Other = e-20 + b-20 + d-20 
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of their primary tasks. Arguably, the primary conflict of interest in the fund manage-
ment industry exists between the fund investor and the fund management company in 
the area of fees. The fund management company is remunerated for its services via a 
management fee, which is taken from the assets of the funds and therefore, at the 
expense of the performance of the investor. In the U.S. regulatory environment, fund 
boards are given an important task in mitigating this conflict by negotiating fees on 
behalf of investors.  
 
 
Figure 7.4: Box plot representation of the priorities of the boards in the sample. The green line depicts the
average scores of board members on (semi-) independent boards. The red line depicts the average score of 
board members on dependent boards. 
 
Table 7.6: Priorities of the boards in the sample.  
Category Mean t Median Number 
<0 
Number 
>0 
p1 
Performance -21.7 -5.00 -25.0 34 5 0.0000 
Risk 20.0 6.65 15.0 2 35 0.0000 
Costs -4.7 -3.19 -5.0 25 10 0.0083 
Compliance 7.0 2.52 5.0 10 22 0.0501 
Other -0.6 -0.24 0.0 14 20 0.3915 
1. p-value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test (two-sided).  
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 7.7 explores whether there are differences between dependent boards and 
(semi-) independent boards in how they prioritise fund performance, risk manage-
ment, fund costs, compliance and other aspects. The table displays the mean for these 
five categories for dependent boards and (semi-) independent boards, as well as the 
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difference between the two means. A Student t-test is used to test the significance of 
the difference.  
There is no statistically significant difference in how (semi-) independent boards 
prioritise their role with regard to costs. Only in the case of risk is the difference statis-
tically significant, but only at the level of 10%. However, it should be noted that for 
both dependent and (semi-) independent boards, the mean for risk is higher than zero 
in a statistically significant manner. This finding implies that both types of boards pri-
oritised this aspect of their role. From these results, it cannot be concluded that there 
is a difference between dependent and (semi-) independent boards in which aspects of 
their role they prioritise.  
 
Table 7.7: Priorities of the (semi-) independent and dependent boards 
Category Mean (semi-) independent 
(ni,s=22) 
Mean dependent 
(nd=19) 
Difference t 
Performance -23.7 -19.5 -4.2 -0.48 
Risk 25.3 13.8 11.5 1.98 
Costs -3.7 -5.7 2.1 0.69 
Compliance -5.0 9.3 -4.3 -0.77 
Other 2.9 2.1 -5.0 -1.07 
 Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10% level. 
7.5 Conclusions 
Unlike the U.S., Luxembourg has no requirement for fund boards to have independent 
board members. Nevertheless, many funds in Luxembourg have voluntarily appointed 
independent board members. Based on 41 interviews with board members on 41 dif-
ferent, Luxembourg-domiciled UCITS of the same number of promoters, three general 
fund governance models can be identified: the integrated model, the different hat 
model and the independent model. In the integrated model, the board consists of 
dependent board members only. It is hard to draw a line where the responsibility of 
the promoter ends and that of the board begins. In fact, the fund board is part of the 
internal processes of the promoter and not an additional layer of oversight. The differ-
ent hat model is seen with both dependent and (semi-) independent boards. In this 
case, the board has a distinct, separate position from the promoter in order to provide 
an additional layer of oversight. The effectiveness from the viewpoint of investors can 
be hampered by the hierarchical relationship between board members and the man-
agement of the promoter. In the independent model, there is a majority of (semi-) 
independent board members, but when the promoter selects independent board 
members and controls the information, it may still be questionable whether the board 
can exercise an independent position vis-à-vis that promoter. As a result, there can be 
doubts in all three models whether the board can act independently from the pro-
moter.  
Whichever model is in place, the majority of fund boards in the sample prioritise 
risk management and compliance aspects of their role. Lower priority is given to in-
vestment performance and cost aspects. With respect to investment performance, this 
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is in line with the U.S., where the influence of boards on investment performance is 
seen as indirect. With respect to costs, this deviates from the U.S. approach, where the 
area of fees is seen as the primary conflict of interest between investors and fund 
management companies, and where independent board members are assigned with 
negotiating fees on behalf of investors. A large majority of board members on Luxem-
bourg UCITS interviewed as part of this study did qualify the board on which they sit as 
a watchdog on behalf of fund investors. However, the true test for whether they add 
value for investors might be whether they only bark or also bite when the interest of 
investors is at stake.  
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Chapter 8 
Summary and conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“And I will only caution you to be careful. Funds whose directors forget whom they 
represent won’t be long for the business. I don’t expect fund directors to run day-to-day 
operations. But I do expect them to remember whom they serve -- fund shareholders. 
And I expect fund directors to be tireless in the pursuit of shareholder interests.” 122 
                                                                
122 SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in his speech to the Investment Company Institute in Washington DC on 15 
May 1998 (see Levitt, 1998).  
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8.1 Introduction 
Investment funds help investors to achieve their financial goals, in particular by provid-
ing professional portfolio management and risk diversification. In terms of growth of 
assets under management, the investment fund industry has been a great success. At 
the end of 2009, an estimated EUR 15.9 trillion of assets was entrusted to investment 
funds worldwide. However, there have also been abuses of the trust of investors, as 
well as criticism about the fund industry. Conflicts of interest, caused by the agency 
problem between those entrusting assets to a fund and those managing the assets, are 
at the root of the problem. The investor is interested in a maximum risk-adjusted re-
turn, after costs. For a large part, fund costs consist of the management fee that the 
fund management company receives for managing the assets. Higher fees are in the 
interest of the fund management company, but go at the expense of the investor’s 
return.  
The interests of the investor and the fund management company are not com-
pletely opposing. Firms charging excessive fees or performing poorly will likely see a 
decrease in their assets under management and thus, revenues, as a result of investors 
selecting funds of other firms. This market force helps to align the interests of fund 
investors and fund management companies. There is, indeed, empirical evidence of a 
positive relationship between fund performance and fund flows, but this relationship is 
convex, implying that fund management companies benefit more from strong per-
formance than they are punished for poor performance. This relationship encourages 
various types of behaviour that could be beneficial for the fund management company 
or the fund manager, but are not in the interest of the investors. Examples of such 
behaviour evidenced by empirical research are fund tournament (funds changing the 
risk profile of the fund during a calendar year, depending on how they rank in per-
formance rankings year-to-date), leaning for the tape (fund managers trying to inflate 
their year-end Net Asset Value by aggressively purchasing stocks they already hold) 
and favouritism (fund management company strategies whereby certain funds in the 
fund family benefit at the expense of others). Regulators, market forces and fund gov-
ernance function as monitoring forces, aimed at mitigating conflicts of interest and 
protecting investors. This dissertation focuses on the added value of fund governance 
by fund boards.  
8.2 Historical development 
First investment fund 
Conflicts of interest have played a role throughout the history of investment funds. 
The first investment fund in history, “Eendragt maakt Magt”, launched in Amsterdam 
in 1774, already applied the principle of separation of duties, which is still an important 
governance principle today. Portfolio management and administrative activities were 
separated and performed by different persons in order to avoid churning in the funds' 
portfolio. The securities were stored in an iron chest with three different locks. Accord-
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ing to an extended four-eyes principle, the fund's two directors and the notary each 
had one of the keys.  
U.S. open-end funds 
The launch of the first open-end fund and the mass marketing of funds both date from 
the U.S. in the 1920s. An advantage of open-end funds is that investors can always 
redeem their fund investment at a price based on the Net Asset Value. When investors 
do not like the results of the fund in which they are invested, they can sell their in-
vestment and effectively fire the management company. However, the market crash of 
1929 made it clear that many funds on the U.S. market were plagued by poor design 
and conflicts of interest. Negative experiences in this period led to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. This act, aimed at improving investor protection, relies heavily 
on independent directors on fund boards to limit conflicts of interest. One of the roles 
of the independent directors is to negotiate annually, on behalf of fund investors, the 
advisory fee with the fund management company.  
Luxembourg UCITS 
After World War II, open-end funds also became the dominant fund structure in Euro-
pe. Initially, the fund industry was organised and regulated along national lines. Pan-
European legislation for open-end investment funds dates from 1985. The UCITS Direc-
tive, adopted in that year, aimed to harmonise EU national laws for investment funds, 
including rules to enhance investor protection, and to create a single market for in-
vestment funds. Under this directive, funds domiciled in one EU country and operating 
within the UCITS rules can be distributed across the EU. Several other countries also 
accept UCITS in their domestic markets. The concept of UCITS has been a commercial 
success. Although UCITS can be domiciled in any EU country, the UCITS market is do-
minated by Luxembourg as fund domicile.  
Europe, in general, and Luxembourg, in specific, rely on a different mixture of 
regulations, market forces and governance compared to the U.S. to mitigate conflicts 
of interest and protect fund investors. The UCITS Directive and Luxembourg laws and 
regulations do not require independent board members on fund boards. There is the 
general principle of fiduciary duty on the part of the management company towards 
fund investors. The management company is to act honestly and fairly in conducting its 
business activities in the best interests of the UCITS it manages. The Luxembourg regu-
lator relies on the extra-legal concept of the promoter, the organisation that initiates 
the fund and controls its operations. In the case where there are any issues with a 
fund, the Luxembourg regulator can, and does, turn to this promoter. Furthermore, 
the reputation of the promoter is at stake at all times. The risk of losing assets under 
management, and therefore revenues, is a market force that should deter promoters 
from abusing the trust of investors and from prioritising their short-term interests 
above the interests of investors.  
As is the case in several other jurisdictions, the association of the Luxembourg 
fund industry, ALFI, has published a code of conduct (ALFI, 2009). This ALFI Code of 
Conduct for Luxembourg Investment Funds focuses primarily on the role of fund 
boards. It prescribes boards to act independently, but does not require board mem-
bers to be independent according to a legal or regulatory definition. Furthermore, the 
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ALFI Code gives little to no guidance to boards with regard to what is expected of 
board members in the area of costs and performance. Although it is not required on 
the basis of regulations or recommended on the basis of the ALFI Code, many funds in 
Luxembourg have nevertheless appointed independent board members.  
8.3 Research question and empirical results 
Existing literature 
The market timing and late trading scandals of 2003 represented an impulse for aca-
demics to investigate the effectiveness of fund governance in the U.S. As a result, the-
re are several studies for the U.S. market that investigate the relationship between 
governance characteristics and the extent to which funds operate for the benefit of 
investors. Based on this research, there is no consistent evidence that funds with more 
independent boards are less likely to be involved in scandals or that they charge lower 
fees and achieve better investment performance. A disadvantage of U.S. data analyses 
is that the percentage of independent board members is always above the legal mini-
mum of 40% and usually compliant with the ICI best practice recommendation of at 
least two-thirds (ICI, 1999), so that the variation in this governance variable is limited.  
Central research question 
This dissertation focuses on Luxembourg UCITS. The research question investigated is 
whether or not boards with independent board members are more effective for inves-
tors, leading to lower costs and/or better investment performance. Performance is 
taken as a measure for effectiveness because it is what investors want when investing 
in an investment fund. It is also the most comprehensive measure because ultimately, 
the cost of any conflict of interest is booked against the performance of a fund. Costs 
are also a relevant measure because the influence of boards on costs is expected to be 
more direct than on performance. Management fees are a wealth transfer from the 
investor to the fund management company and therefore, the primary area where 
their interests conflict. Furthermore, earlier research has shown that there is a nega-
tive relationship between costs and performance123.  
The research question is relevant from at least two perspectives: from a regulatory 
perspective and from a fund selection perspective. When funds with independent 
boards would achieve better results for investors, but market forces are somehow 
unable to enforce such governance best practice across the industry, there would be a 
role for lawmakers and regulators to impose independent governance. Furthermore, in 
that case, investors should take governance criteria into account when selecting a 
suitable fund for investment.  
Substantially all existing academic research on investment fund governance con-
cerns the situation in the U.S. This study contributes to the literature in Finance, in 
general, and that on investment fund governance, in specific, by analysing a sample of 
Luxembourg-domiciled UCITS. Luxembourg UCITS operate within a different legal and 
regulatory framework and are an investment fund type that is of high economic impor-
                                                                
123 See for example Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995) and Carhart (1997). 
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tance, but has received little academic attention to date. An interesting aspect of the 
Luxembourg UCITS sample used is that there is greater cross-sectional variation in the 
percentage of independent board members. In contrast to earlier published studies 
and working papers, this study combines a regression-type methodology with a survey 
that was conducted among board members of the funds in the sample.   
Definition of dependent and independent governance 
In Luxembourg, fund boards are not required to have independent board members. 
Nevertheless, many promoters have voluntarily chosen to have independent board 
members on their fund boards. Unlike the U.S., individual board members in Luxem-
bourg have not been categorised as either dependent or independent, based on a legal 
or regulatory definition. In order to analyse whether independent board members are 
more effective for investors, it was necessary to define dependence versus independ-
ence in a way that allowed the categorisation of the board members of umbrellas in 
the sample on the basis of publicly available information.  
For the purpose of this study, board members of an umbrella who are not cur-
rently employed by the fund promoter, the promoter group or any of the umbrella’s 
service providers, and who are not previously employed by the promoter or promoter 
group, are considered independent board members. This category of board members 
is the one whose interests should conflict the least with those of investors. Board 
members who are employees of the fund promoter or the promoter group are consid-
ered dependent board members. When it matters, it is questionable whether these 
board members, who earn a living working for the promoter or promoter group, are 
able to prioritise the interests of the investors above those of the promoter. A category 
of semi-independent board members is also distinguished. Such board members are 
either former employees of the fund promoter or promoter group, or are current em-
ployees of a service provider, as long as it is not part of the promoter group. Although 
these board members are not employed by the promoter or promoter group, the loy-
alty of board members in this category could, nevertheless, be with the promoter, due 
to their former employment, their provider-client relationship or otherwise.  
In this dissertation, three types of boards are distinguished. Dependent boards 
have dependent members only. Independent boards have at least one independent 
member. Semi-independent boards have at least one semi-independent member, but 
no independent members. 
Development of governance in Luxembourg 
For the empirical analysis, a sample was constructed of Luxembourg flagship umbrella 
funds with UCITS status of 48 leading cross-border promoters. In the 2000-2009 re-
search period, the percentage of umbrella funds with at least one (semi-) independent 
board member decreased from over 60% to just below 50%. More umbrella funds 
developed from having at least one (semi-) independent member to having dependent 
members only than vice-versa. Counting the board seats on the umbrella boards rather 
than the number of umbrella funds, the proportion of board members in the sample 
who are (semi-) independent increased from almost 22% to over 25% in the same 
period. This apparent contradiction is explained by the fact that it is more common 
among Anglo-Saxon promoters to have boards with independent board members than 
C H A P T E R  8  
 268 
among continental European promoters. The Anglo-Saxon promoters, as a sub-group, 
have on average increased the level of independence of their fund boards in the re-
search period, which is not the case for continental European promoters.  
Not only the governance structure of the umbrella fund, but also the distribution 
method of the funds offered is related to the country of origin of the fund promoter. In 
continental Europe, fund promoters are typically part of larger financial groups, such 
as banks or insurance companies. At least for part of their business, these promoters 
rely on the distribution of their funds through the affiliated bank or insurance distribu-
tion channel. Anglo-Saxon fund promoters tend to be independent from any distribu-
tion channel. As a result, there is a negative correlation between the percentage of 
independent board members and having an affiliated distribution channel. It should be 
noted that there are several exceptions to this rule, so that the correlation is not per-
fectly negative. In the sample, there are Anglo-Saxon promoters with affiliated distri-
bution and continental European promoters without, as well as Anglo-Saxon promot-
ers with dependent boards and continental European promoters with (semi-) inde-
pendent boards.  
Sample at sub-fund and share class level 
To be able to analyse the relationship between governance characteristics, specifically 
the level of independence of boards, and costs and performance, a selection was made 
of the sub-funds that are part of the umbrella funds in the sample. The specific sub-
funds analysed were those that invest in one of six fund sectors: Global equity, 
Pan-European equity, Euroland equity, U.S. equity, Japan equity and Emerging Markets 
equity. Survivorship bias was avoided by selecting funds investing in these sectors from 
the Lipper Luxembourg Funds Encyclopaedia for each of the years 2000-2010. This 
resulted in a sample of 593 funds. For consistency reasons and because agency con-
flicts and information asymmetry can be expected to be larger for retail investors than 
for institutional investors, the cost and performance data collected and analysed con-
cerned the standard retail share class of each of the sub-funds in the sample. 
Governance and costs 
During the research period, the average of the Management and Distribution Fees of 
funds in the sample increased, while average Other Costs decreased. In the case of the 
Emerging Markets sector, the decrease of Other Costs offset the increase of Manage-
ment and Distribution Fees, resulting in a decrease in the average Total Expense Ratio 
(TER). For all other sectors in the sample, the decrease of Other Costs was insufficient 
to offset the increase of the Management and Distribution Fees, so that average TERs 
increased for these sectors.  
The available data is a typical panel dataset, with repeated observations through 
time for variables concerning the funds in the sample. With a multiple regression 
analysis, the relationship was analysed between the level of fund costs and the funds’ 
governance characteristics, controlling for various other promoter, umbrella and fund 
variables. The analysis did not provide consistent evidence that independent govern-
ance contributes to lower costs. The outcome of the cross-sectional analyses at indi-
vidual fund level was that the percentage of independent board members was associ-
ated with lower TERs, due to lower Other Costs. However, economically, the effect was 
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small. More importantly, opposite results were found with the model specification that 
focuses on variation within umbrellas. The positive and economically and statistically 
significant coefficient for the percentage of independent board members for this 
model variation indicates that when the percentage of independent board members 
on boards increased, it coincided with an increase in fund costs, rather than a de-
crease.  
In one of the robustness checks, the sample was split into sub-samples of funds of 
continental European and Anglo-Saxon promoters. The coefficients for the level of 
board independence were not statistically significant and had opposite signs in these 
two sub-samples. These results are inconsistent with boards having a causal affect on 
costs, but can be explained by two developments happening independently at the 
same time: the increase of fund costs, irrespective of the country of origin of the pro-
moter, combined with deviating developments with regard to governance characteris-
tics in the sub-samples of continental European and Anglo-Saxon promoters. The level 
of independence of boards is higher in the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample and increased in 
the research period. Independent governance is less common on boards of umbrella 
funds of continental European promoters and has decreased in the research period. 
Increasing costs, while coinciding with increasing independence in the one sub-sample, 
coincided with decreasing independence in the other.  
Governance and performance 
During the research period, investors were confronted with two bear market periods. 
Of the six fund sectors analysed, the Emerging Markets sector was the only sector with 
a positive return over the entire research period. In all sectors, the fund portfolio of all 
funds in the sample underperformed the market index.  
Two performance measures were used to compare the performance across the 
sample of funds: the Average Sector-Adjusted Return and the Carhart alpha. With the 
Average Sector-Adjusted Return, the fund return is compared to the average return of 
funds in the same sector. It can be labelled a practitioner’s or consumer’s view on fund 
performance. An academic view on performance is provided by the alpha from the 
Carhart 4-factor model. It can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted performance measure 
and is used as the primary measure for fund performance in this study. The structure 
of the data and the methodology used were similar to that used for the analysis of the 
relationship between governance and costs. The panel dataset consisted of perform-
ance data, governance variables and control variables for various subsequent periods 
in the 2000-2009 research period. The relationship between the funds’ performance 
and governance characteristics was estimated with a multiple regression analysis.  
The result was that there is no consistent evidence that independence governance 
contributes positively to investment performance. The relationship between the 
Carhart alpha and the percentage of independent board members was not statistically 
significant at the level of at least 5% in any of the model specifications that focus on 
cross-sectional variation. In model specifications that focus on variation of perform-
ance and governance characteristics within umbrella funds, the relationship between 
this performance measure and the percentage of independent board members was 
inconsistent, with positive coefficients for the analysis of one-year performance inter-
vals and negative coefficients for three-year performance intervals.  
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Affiliated distribution 
Both for the level of costs and fund performance, whether or not the promoter had 
affiliated distribution in the group seems to be a more important driver than the com-
position of the fund board. Affiliated distribution is associated with statistically signifi-
cantly lower TERs. However, despite higher costs, funds of promoters that are inde-
pendent from a distribution channel perform better than funds of promoters with 
affiliated distribution. On a risk-adjusted basis, the return difference, net of fees, is in 
excess of one percentage point per annum. These results were found both with the 
multiple regression analyses and an information analysis, whereby fund portfolios 
were formed based on governance and distribution criteria and the performance of 
these portfolios was evaluated.  
Economies of scale 
The regression analyses controlled for scale at three levels: the sub-fund, the umbrella 
and the promoter. With regard to costs, the results of the various analyses were con-
sistent with the existence of economies of scale, at least at the level of the fund and 
the umbrella. Larger funds have lower TERs, driven by Other Costs. Funds in larger 
umbrellas have lower TERs, driven by a combination of lower Management and Distri-
bution Fees and lower Other Costs. Promoter scale is positively related to TERs, due to 
the Management and Distribution fee component, possibly because larger promoters 
are able to command premium pricing for their funds. When analysing investment 
performance, there was evidence of fund scale being positively related to fund per-
formance, in particular using three-year performance intervals.  
Survey 
To gain further insight into the role of Luxembourg UCITS boards, in particular how 
they influence cost and performance, a survey was conducted among members of 
these boards. The sample for the survey is the same as that used for the quantitative 
analyses, which was 48 promoters, and the same number of flagship umbrella funds 
that existed for the entire, or part of the, 2000-2009 research period. Due to merger 
activity, the number of promoters in the sample was 45 at the end of 2009, and had 
dropped to 41 by the time the survey was conducted in 2011. One board member from 
each of the 41 umbrella funds in the final sample was interviewed on the basis of a 
questionnaire consisting of 41 questions.  
Based on these interviews, three general fund governance models could be identi-
fied: the integrated model, the different hat model and the independent model. In the 
integrated model, the board consists of dependent board members only and can be 
characterised more as being part of the internal processes of the promoter than as an 
additional layer of oversight. In the different hat model, seen with both dependent and 
(semi-) independent boards, there is a distinct, separate position for the board vis-à-vis 
the promoter. In the independent model, there is a majority of (semi-) independent 
board members. In the latter two models, the effectiveness from the viewpoint of 
investors might be hampered, for example, by the hierarchical relationship between 
the board members and the management of the promoter and by the promoter con-
trolling the information received by and the selection process of independent board 
members.  
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In absence of a legal or regulatory requirement, the primary reason given by inter-
viewees representing dependent and semi-independent boards for the promoters’ 
decision not to have independent board members was higher convenience and effi-
ciency. For promoters of umbrellas with independent boards, the main reason for that 
choice was that it is seen as good practice. These promoters perceived independent 
oversight adding value by providing proper checks and balances. Commercial consid-
erations played a role as well.  
The survey did provide a further explanation for the lack of evidence for a relation-
ship between governance characteristics and costs and performance found on the 
basis of the quantitative analyses. Irrespective of the board type, with or without 
(semi-) independent board members, the majority of fund boards in the sample priori-
tised risk management and compliance aspects of their role. Lower priority was given 
to investment performance and costs. Both performance and costs were seen as pri-
marily, although not exclusively, the prerogative of the promoter.  
8.4 Recommendations 
Fund governance 
In general, Luxembourg boards do see themselves as watchdogs on behalf of investors. 
However, they put surprisingly little focus on fees, the primary conflict of interest be-
tween the promoter and the investor. Board members do benchmark fee levels to 
competitors and market averages, but mainly check whether fees are not clearly out of 
line. Most leave the monitoring of fees to market forces, arguing that if a fee is un-
competitive, the fund will not sell. Thus, the area of costs is one where boards can 
claim a bigger role and add more value for investors. The negative relationship found 
in this study between fund size and TER is driven by the Other Cost component, not by 
the Management and Distribution Fees. Fee breakpoints, which allow economies of 
scale in the management of funds to be shared with investors and which are a com-
mon feature of the U.S. market, could be introduced in Luxembourg as well. Further-
more, industry codes should provide clearer direction on what role board members are 
expected to play in controlling costs.  
This study found evidence of promoter characteristics being a more important 
driver for fund results than board characteristics. The promoter concept is a stong one, 
directly related to market forces as a mitigating factor for conflicts of interest. With the 
promoter’s reputation on the line at all times, and as a consequence its assets under 
management and revenues, abusing the trust of investors is unlikely to be a value 
maximising strategy for any significant promoter. Independent oversight at promoter 
level could also be more effective and add more value for investors than independent 
oversight at umbrella fund level. Effectively, independent oversight at promoter level 
would be in line with recommendations for the U.S. fund market, both from the U.S. 
industry association and several academic studies124, to have unitary boards. In that 
case, the same persons oversee all funds in a fund family. Such boards could be more 
effective in controlling costs and in avoiding family strategies, where one fund benefits 
                                                                
124 See ICI (1999), Kong and Tang (2008) and Qian (2011).  
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from behaviour of the fund management company at the expense of other funds. 
Independent oversight at a level higher than the fund or umbrella would also be con-
sistent with the recommendation of the Winter Committee in the Netherlands to re-
quire an independent supervisory board at the management company level125. 
Fund regulation 
This study of investment fund governance did not reveal a negative relationship be-
tween board independence and costs. This result is therefore supportive of recent 
legislative initiatives of the European Commission that do not focus on board inde-
pendence, but aim to give market forces more chance in mitigating conflicts of interest 
between fund management companies and investors, specifically in the area of costs.  
Firstly, there is the Key Investor Information Document (KIID), a new requirement 
under UCITS IV. This two-page document is to help retail investors make informed 
investment decisions. The standard definition of the Ongoing Charges, similar to the 
TER definition used in this dissertation, is an important step forward in achieving com-
parability and transparency of fund costs. This enhanced disclosure can help market 
forces in doing their monitoring work.  
Secondly, there are proposals for MiFID II that also aim to enhance market forces’ 
monitoring role. As part of this legislation, the European Commission proposes to pro-
hibit rebates when funds are distributed in the context of independent advice and 
portfolio management. The implication is that in this segment, distributors can no 
longer be remunerated with the rebates that fund management companies now pay 
from their management and distribution fees. These distributors are to receive their 
compensation directly from their customers. This is intended to remove the conflict of 
interest that currently exists between the investor and his advisor. In the conflict of 
interest between the investor and the management company, the advisor changes 
sides, from that of the management company (both interested in high fees) to the side 
of the investors (interested in low fees). These different market dynamics might result 
in more price competition and lower average management fees.  
Future research 
Luxembourg is the second fund domicile globally, but underresearched by academics 
compared to the U.S. An important step forward would be having academic quality 
data readily available, comparable to the CRSP database for U.S. funds. Academic re-
search of Luxembourg funds and initiatives to improve data quality should be encour-
aged and supported by the Luxembourg fund industry.  
Using cost and performance data of Luxembourg funds to evaluate the effective-
ness of governance, this study did not provide sufficient evidence of the added value 
of independent board members to recommend that lawmakers and regulators make 
independent board members mandatory, or to recommend investors and fund selec-
tors to give governance criteria a significant weight in their selection process. It should 
be noted, however, that by analysing costs and performance over longer periods, one, 
in effect, analyses funds under business-as-usual circumstances. It could be the case 
                                                                
125 See AFM (2004b). This recommendation was not incorporated into Dutch law for fear of being out of line 
with the rest of Europe. 
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that the added value of independent oversight can be found in unusual situations, such 
as for example, under extreme market circumstances, when new funds are launched 
or when existing funds are restructured, merged or liquidated. Future research could 
investigate the added value of independent boards in such situations. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that by analysing the funds of the main cross-border promoters, the 
sample is biased to the larger players with well-known brands. These promoters have a 
large asset base and a big reputation at stake, which in itself might be sufficient to 
deter them from abusing the trust of investors, leaving little room for fund boards to 
add value. Analysing the added value of fund boards of smaller promoters is also an 
area for future research.  
Where relevant, the results of this study of Luxembourg UCITS were compared to 
the findings of existing literature for the U.S. fund market. An area for future research 
could be a more comprehensive cross-border comparison of fund regulations, fund 
governance practices and results achieved for investors. For example, the legislation 
and regulation of different fund domiciles places different responsibilities on the pro-
moter, the fund board, the depositary and the auditor. Based on such a study, more 
insight can be obtained into what the optimal mixture is for market forces, regulations 
and fund governance to achieve optimal results for investors, and which forms of regu-
lations and governance best serve the interests of investors.  
As a side effect, this study found economically and statistically more significant re-
sults based on differences between funds regarding promoter attributes than regard-
ing governance characterises. Based on the rather crude distinction between funds of 
promoters with and without affiliated distribution, significant fee and performance 
differences were found. This result also justifies further research. For example, it re-
mained unclear what behaviour or which promoter characteristics explain superior 
performance. It could be related to employing superior portfolio managers or to serv-
ing a different clientele with different needs. Follow-up research, analysing the compo-
sition of fund portfolios, could explore whether affiliated distribution is associated with 
portfolios with lower active shares, charging active fees, but deviating little from the 
benchmark. The differences between funds of independent fund managers and man-
agers affiliated with a distribution channel has received little attention in U.S. research, 
possibly because fund distribution through banks is less common in the U.S. It is a 
relevant distinction of the European market and a promising area for future research.  
Despite the commercial success of investment funds in general, and UCITS in spe-
cific, there are also challenges for the future. Two of these are directly related to the 
topic of this thesis: investment performance and costs. In order to remain a product of 
choice, investment funds need to deliver investment performance to investors effi-
ciently. In line with earlier research, the sample of actively managed funds analysed in 
this dissertation did not, on average, outperform market indices after costs. During 
much of its history, this fact might have mattered less, as the added value of actively 
managed funds also lay in providing market access and diversification. However, 
nowadays, index funds and passively managed Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) are also 
available126, providing market access and diversification more cheaply, and making 
                                                                
126 The first index fund in history was launched in the U.S. in 1975. ETFs have been available in the U.S. since 
1993 and in Europe since 1999. Since then, assets under management and the variation of indices available 
with index funds and ETFs have increased significantly.  
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these products a formidable competitor for actively managed investment funds. Due 
to continuous trading on the stock exchange, ETFs allow investors to place bets on 
markets at any moment in the day. In the competition with ETFs, active managers 
should not strive to become more like ETFs. Whereas ETFs might be an ideal vehicle for 
market timers, active funds should position themselves for long-term investors, invest-
ing for their long-term financial needs, such as for ensuring the required financial 
means for the years after retirement. That type of investor does not require daily li-
quidity, let alone liquidity at any moment in the day. Given that there is an opportunity 
cost associated with this liquidity, for example, as a result of a cash buffer held by the 
fund to meet possible redemptions, additional trading costs in the portfolio resulting 
from in- and outflows, and not being able to reap the premium from being invested in 
less liquid securities, the long-term investor is likely better off with less liquid funds127. 
Possibilities to innovate exist in areas such as asset allocation, fee setting and facilitat-
ing subscriptions and redemptions, both in the accumulation and the decumulation 
phase. Academics and practitioners should pay more attention to and join forces in the 
area of optimally structuring funds to meet the longer-term goals of investors. 
                                                                
127 A similar train of thought was developed in the PwC Paper (PwC, 2009).  
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Sample: Promoters and umbrellas 
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Appendix 2 
Sample: Sub-funds 
 
A P P E N D I X  2  
 286 
A P P E N D I X  2  
 287 
 
Nr1 Umbrella Sub-fund name ISIN Fund sector Start date2 End date3 TNA4 
1 Aberdeen Global SICAV American Equity Fund LU0000623727 US 1-Jan-2000 15-Aug-2001  
1 Aberdeen Global SICAV American Equities Fund LU0011963831 US 15-Aug-2001 31-Dec-2009 179 
1 Aberdeen Global SICAV Japanese Equity Fund LU0011963674 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 55 
1 Aberdeen Global SICAV World Equity Fund LU0094547139 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,141 
1 Aberdeen Global SICAV European Equity Fund LU0094541447 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 41 
1 Aberdeen Global SICAV Emerging Markets Equity Fund LU0132412106 Emerging Markets 15-Aug-2001 31-Dec-2009 2,255 
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV US Equity Growth LU0050697696 US 1-Jan-2000 24-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Europe Equity Fund LU0053334230 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 17-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Japan Equity Fund LU0053335716 Japan 1-Jan-2000 17-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Global Emerging Markets Equity Fund LU0076583623 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 17-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Global Equity Fund LU0085493038 Global 1-Jan-2000 17-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Euro Equity Fund LU0085494275 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 28-Jul-2006  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Europe Equity Growth Fund LU0108997023 Pan-Europe 9-Jun-2000 24-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Behavioural Finance Japan LU0120309322 Japan 7-Mar-2001 27-Oct-2006  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Global Leader LU0139009905 Global 29-Apr-2002 25-May-2007  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Global Equity Value LU0156099409 Global 16-Dec-2002 30-May-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV US Equity Value LU0156099821 US 16-Dec-2002 24-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Europe Equity Dynamic LU0198425174 Pan-Europe 30-Sep-2004 23-May-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV High Dividend Equity LU0218000072 Global 16-May-2005 24-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Europe Opportunities LU0198605239 Pan-Europe 1-Dec-2004 24-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV US Opportunities LU0198605585 US 1-Dec-2004 24-Nov-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Europe Equity Revival LU0217999712 Pan-Europe 14-Jun-2005 23-May-2008  
2 ABN AMRO Funds SICAV Europe High Dividend Equity LU0231957126 Pan-Europe 2-Nov-2005 17-Nov-2008  
3 Activest Lux Global Portfolio SICAV European Equity LU0012134580 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2006  
3 Activest Lux Global Portfolio SICAV Global Equity LU0012133772 Global 1-Jan-2000 18-Aug-2003  
3 Activest Lux Global Portfolio SICAV JapaneseEquity LU0012131990 Japan 1-Jan-2000 22-Feb-2008  
3 Activest Lux Global Portfolio SICAV AmericanEquity LU0012132881 US 1-Jan-2000 22-Feb-2008  
4 ACMBernstein FCP Emerging Markets Growth Portfolio LU0040709171 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,048 
4 ACMBernstein FCP American Growth Portfolio LU0079474960 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 167 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Global Growth Trends Portfolio LU0057025933 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 990 
4 ACMBernstein FCP European Growth Portfolio LU0095325956 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 36 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Global Value Portfolio (USD) LU0124673897 Global 31-May-2006 31-Dec-2009 572 
4 ACMBernstein FCP American Value Portfolio LU0124676726 US 31-May-2006 31-Dec-2009 38 
4 ACMBernstein FCP European Value Portfolio LU0124675678 Pan-Europe 31-May-2006 31-Dec-2009 150 
4 ACMBernstein FCP American Equity Blend Portfolio LU0175139749 US 15-Sep-2003 31-Dec-2009 10 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Global Equity Blend Portfolio LU0175139822 Global 1-Sep-2003 31-Dec-2009 1,430 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Japan Strategic Value Portfolio LU0239027880 Japan 15-Dec-2005 31-Dec-2009 302 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Global Growth Trends Portfolio (Euro) LU0247867574 Global 2-May-2006 31-Dec-2009 17 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Global Equity Blend Portfolio (Euro) LU0247868895 Global 2-May-2006 31-Dec-2009 132 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Global Value Portfolio (Euro) LU0247866097 Global 2-May-2006 31-Dec-2009 11 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Japan Equity Blend Portfolio LU0256899500 Japan 8-Jun-2006 31-Dec-2009 1 
4 ACMBernstein FCP Japan Growth Portfolio LU0256900100 Japan 8-Jun-2006 31-Dec-2009 2 
4 ACMBernstein FCP European Equity Blend Portfolio LU0256902494 Pan-Europe 8-Jun-2006 6-May-2009  
4 ACMBernstein FCP European Strategic Value Portfolio LU0290387835 Pan-Europe 29-Mar-2007 31-Dec-2009 49 
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV Global Equity Fund LU0101241155 Global 1-Jan-2000 16-May-2003  
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV RCM Global Equity LU0101244092 Global 13-Jun-2000 31-Dec-2009 70 
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV EURO Equity Fund LU0101265410 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 16-May-2003  
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV Pan-European Equity Fund LU0101262409 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 21-Sep-2007  
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV North American Equity Fund LU0101269677 US 1-Jan-2000 28-Sep-2007  
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV Global Emerging Markets Equity Fund LU0101259017 Emerging Markets 11-Jan-2000 16-May-2003  
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV Japanese Equity Fund LU0101279809 Japan 1-Jan-2000 16-May-2003  
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV dit-Top Selection Europa LU0178455605 Pan-Europe 6-Jan-2004 12-Dec-2008  
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV RCM Euroland Equity Growth LU0256840447 Euroland 16-Oct-2006 31-Dec-2009 129 
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV RCM Europe Equity Growth LU0256839274 Pan-Europe 16-Oct-2006 31-Dec-2009 274 
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV RCM Best Styles EU LU0178439310 Euroland 4-Jun-2007 31-Dec-2009 98 
5 Allianz Global Investors Fund SICAV RCM US Equity Systematic LU0256863811 US 15-Feb-2008 31-Dec-2009 96 
6 Threadneedle (Lux) SICAV World Equities LU0061474960 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 34 
6 Threadneedle (Lux) SICAV US Equities LU0061475181 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 174 
6 Threadneedle (Lux) SICAV Pan European Equities LU0061476155 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 29 
6 Threadneedle (Lux) SICAV Japanese Equities LU0096370878 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 6 
6 Threadneedle (Lux) SICAV American Select LU0112528004 US 28-Jul-2000 31-Dec-2009 5 
6 Threadneedle (Lux) SICAV Global Emerging Market Equities LU0143863198 Emerging Markets 2-Apr-2002 31-Dec-2009 4 
6 Threadneedle (Lux) SICAV European Quantitative Equities LU0292882163 Pan-Europe 30-Mar-2007 31-Dec-2009 24 
6 Threadneedle (Lux) SICAV US Dynamic Equities Portfolio LU0292889416 US 18-May-2007 28-Oct-2009  
7 Aviva Investors SICAV American Equity Fund LU0010019148 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 79 
7 Aviva Investors SICAV Emerging Markets Equity Fund LU0047882062 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,582 
7 Aviva Investors SICAV Japanese Equity Fund LU0010019734 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 31 
7 Aviva Investors SICAV Global Equity Fund LU0010019494 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 24 
7 Aviva Investors SICAV Global Themes Equity Fund LU0121215049 Global 27-Nov-2000 10-Sep-2004  
7 Aviva Investors SICAV Pan European Equity Fund LU0156415258 Pan-Europe 13-Sep-2004 31-Dec-2009 122 
7 Aviva Investors SICAV Global Equity Income Fund LU0367991881 Global 30-Sep-2008 31-Dec-2009 26 
7 Aviva Investors SICAV Pan European Equity Focus LU0370309295 Pan-Europe 19-Aug-2008 31-Dec-2009 12 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Euro Relative Value LU0073680463 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,466 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Global Equities LU0073689688 Global 1-Jan-2000 12-Feb-2004  
A P P E N D I X  2  
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Nr1 Umbrella Sub-fund name ISIN Fund sector Start date2 End date3 TNA4 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Japanese Equities LU0073676438 Japan 1-Jan-2000 12-Feb-2004  
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Europe Talents LU0184621331 Pan-Europe 18-Apr-2006 25-Nov-2009  
8 Axa World Funds SICAV North American Equities LU0073672288 US 1-Jan-2000 12-Feb-2004  
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Emerging Markets Equities LU0109084185 Emerging Markets 3-Apr-2000 12-Feb-2004  
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington European Opportunities LU0125727601 Pan-Europe 9-Mar-2001 31-Dec-2009 14 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Talents LU0189847683 Global 30-Apr-2004 31-Dec-2009 223 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Emerging Markets Talents LU0227146197 Emerging Markets 31-Jul-2009 31-Dec-2009 131 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Europe Dividend LU0271204314 Pan-Europe 27-Oct-2006 31-Dec-2009 77 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Japan LU0266015097 Japan 22-Sep-2006 31-Dec-2009 5 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Emerging Markets LU0327690045 Emerging Markets 27-Nov-2007 31-Dec-2009 82 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Eurozone LU0389656892 Euroland 23-Jan-2009 31-Dec-2009 867 
8 Axa World Funds SICAV Framlington Europe LU0389655811 Pan-Europe 23-Jan-2009 31-Dec-2009 176 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Equity Fund LU0224106525 Global 22-Jul-2005 31-Dec-2009 167 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV European Fund LU0011846440 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 2,372 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Equity Diversified Fund LU0011895819 Global 1-Jan-2000 2-Oct-2006  
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Japan Fund LU0249409425 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 25 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Equity Diversified Fund LU0006049638 US 1-Jan-2000 29-Oct-2004  
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Emerging Markets Fund LU0047713382 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 775 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV US Focused Value Fund LU0063938889 US 1-Feb-2002 9-Oct-2009  
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV European Value Fund LU0072462186 Pan-Europe 1-Feb-2002 31-Dec-2009 280 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV US Basic Value Fund LU0072461881 US 1-Feb-2002 31-Dec-2009 1,433 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Value Fund LU0079007752 Global 1-Feb-2002 16-May-2003  
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Euro-Markets Fund LU0093502762 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,937 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV US Growth Fund LU0097036916 US 1-Feb-2002 31-Dec-2009 138 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Sectors Fund (USD) LU0117766807 Global 1-Feb-2002 19-May-2003  
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Sectors Fund (Euro) LU0117765312 Global 1-Feb-2002 19-May-2003  
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV European Growth Fund LU0154234636 Pan-Europe 14-Oct-2002 31-Dec-2009 153 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV US Flexible Equity Fund LU0154236417 US 31-Oct-2002 31-Dec-2009 1,554 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Japan Value Fund LU0212924517 Japan 28-Feb-2005 31-Dec-2009 152 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Focus Fund LU0214324237 Global 25-May-2005 14-Mar-2008  
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV European Focus Fund LU0229084990 Pan-Europe 14-Oct-2005 31-Dec-2009 339 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Dynamic Equity Fund LU0238689110 Global 28-Feb-2006 31-Dec-2009 502 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV Global Enhanced Equity Yield Fund LU0265550359 Global 13-Oct-2006 31-Dec-2009 194 
9 BlackRock Global Funds SICAV European Enhanced Equity Yield Fund LU0314014704 Pan-Europe 12-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 17 
10 Parvest SICAV Europe LU0012182043 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 10-Aug-2006  
10 Parvest SICAV Japan LU0012181748 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 232 
10 Parvest SICAV USA LU0012181318 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,024 
10 Parvest SICAV Euro Equities LU0075937325 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 387 
10 Parvest SICAV Europe Opportunities LU0099624685 Pan-Europe 23-Aug-2002 12-Mar-2009  
10 Parvest SICAV Emerging Markets LU0111484845 Emerging Markets 29-Sep-2000 22-Aug-2003  
10 Parvest SICAV Japan Equities LU0111500806 Japan 29-Sep-2000 22-Aug-2003  
10 Parvest SICAV North America LU0111513700 US 1-Jan-2000 22-Aug-2003  
10 Parvest SICAV Europe Growth LU0111518840 Pan-Europe 20-Sep-2003 31-Dec-2009 236 
10 Parvest SICAV Global Equities LU0111524491 Global 1-Jan-2000 23-Aug-2003 43 
10 Parvest SICAV World Sectors LU0111534615 Global 29-Sep-2000 11-Dec-2003  
10 Parvest SICAV World Special Situations LU0111543872 Global 1-Jan-2000 22-Aug-2003  
10 Parvest SICAV Europe Dividend LU0111491469 Pan-Europe 16-Oct-2000 31-Dec-2009 734 
10 Parvest SICAV Emerging Markets LU0154243033 Emerging Markets 3-Feb-2003 31-Dec-2009 264 
10 Parvest SICAV Europe Value LU0177332227 Pan-Europe 2-Oct-2003 31-Dec-2009 417 
10 Parvest SICAV US Value LU0206728387 US 15-Dec-2004 31-Dec-2009 290 
10 Parvest SICAV Europe Alpha LU0221142986 Pan-Europe 7-Jun-2005 31-Dec-2009 750 
10 Parvest SICAV Greater Europe LU0347710062 Pan-Europe 9-Apr-2008 15-May-2009  
10 Parvest SICAV Next Generation LU0283576725 Emerging Markets 27-May-2009 31-Dec-2009 52 
11 Capital International Fund SICAV Global Equity LU0114999021 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 985 
11 Capital International Fund SICAV US Growth And Income Fund LU0157028936 US 30-Oct-2002 31-Dec-2009 70 
11 Capital International Fund SICAV European Growth And Income Fund LU0157028266 Pan-Europe 30-Oct-2002 31-Dec-2009 93 
11 Capital International Fund SICAV European Equity Fund LU0115035270 Pan-Europe 6-Sep-2002 31-Dec-2009 149 
11 Capital International Fund SICAV US Equity LU0174799204 US 7-Nov-2003 12-Jun-2009  
11 Capital International Fund SICAV Euro Zone Equity Fund  LU0193722351 Euroland 30-Jul-2004 13-Mar-2009  
11 Capital International Fund SICAV Japan Equity LU0235150082 Japan 20-Apr-2006 31-Dec-2009 23 
11 Capital International Fund SICAV Global Growth And Income Fund LU0342049003 Global 31-Jan-2008 31-Dec-2009 56 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Emerging Markets LU0119095825 Emerging Markets 1-Jul-2000 31-Dec-2009 453 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Europe Sector Selection LU0119104163 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 17-Dec-2004  
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Euro Quant LU0119126729 Euroland 1-Jul-2000 31-Dec-2009 86 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Europe Equities LU0119128261 Pan-Europe 1-Nov-2003 25-Apr-2008  
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Global Equities LU0119137254 Global 1-Jul-2000 31-Dec-2009 73 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Japan Growth LU0119147303 Japan 1-Jul-2000 15-May-2009  
12 CAAM Funds SICAV US Innovative Companies LU0119157286 US 1-Jul-2000 31-Dec-2009 29 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV US Opportunities LU0119180189 US 6-Apr-2001 31-Dec-2009 34 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Europe LU0119102209 Pan-Europe 6-Apr-2001 1-Nov-2003  
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Europe Equity Research LU0141255744 Pan-Europe 2-Jan-2002 1-Feb-2004  
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Japan Value LU0248702192 Japan 15-Jun-2006 31-Dec-2009 30 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV CGEMS World LU0297161969 Global 19-Apr-2007 31-Dec-2009 28 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Emerging Internal Demand LU0319685854 Emerging Markets 16-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 67 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV GEMS Europe LU0319686589 Pan-Europe 15-Nov-2007 31-Dec-2009 54 
12 CAAM Funds SICAV Emerging World LU0347592197 Emerging Markets 4-Mar-2008 31-Dec-2009 20 
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13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP Emerging Markets LU0046379920 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 144 
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP European Blue Chips LU0055729916 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 328 
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP Japan Megatrend LU0055734247 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 99 
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP USA LU0055732977 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 205 
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP Global Value LU0129338272 Global 8-Jun-2001 31-Dec-2009 124 
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP Style Invest Europe LU0168302833 Pan-Europe 23-May-2003 31-Dec-2009 11 
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP Dividend Europe LU0168301355 Pan-Europe 23-Jun-2003 31-Dec-2009 203 
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP European Growth LU0187730584 Pan-Europe 30-Mar-2004 28-Sep-2006  
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP USA Growth LU0187731988 US 30-Mar-2004 27-Sep-2006  
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP USA Value LU0187731129 US 30-Mar-2004 31-Dec-2009 87 
13 Credit Suisse Equity Fund (Lux) FCP European Alphamax LU0220215247 Pan-Europe 27-Jun-2005 9-May-2008  
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV USA LU0064108128 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 169 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV Japan LU0064109019 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 56 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV Euro Performers LU0078775441 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 3-Nov-2003  
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV 21st Century LU0082272682 Global 1-Jan-2000 14-Mar-2008  
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV Euro 50 LU0012091087 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 299 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV Emerging Markets LU0056052961 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 221 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV Europe LU0027144939 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 782 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV Europe Growth LU0097188857 Pan-Europe 15-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 16 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV World LU0104623557 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 24 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV Europe Value LU0133356484 Pan-Europe 12-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 12 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV EMU LU0317020898 Euroland 15-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 76 
14 Dexia Equities L SICAV Europe High Dividend LU0304859712 Pan-Europe 20-Jul-2007 31-Dec-2009 153 
15 DWS Invest SICAV Global Equities LU0145633003 Global 3-Jun-2002 31-Dec-2009 254 
15 DWS Invest SICAV European Equities LU0145634076 Pan-Europe 3-Jun-2002 31-Dec-2009 729 
15 DWS Invest SICAV US Equities LU0145635552 US 3-Jun-2002 31-Dec-2009 72 
15 DWS Invest SICAV Top Europe LU0145644893 Pan-Europe 3-Jun-2002 31-Dec-2009 108 
15 DWS Invest SICAV Top 50 World LU0145649348 Global 3-Jun-2002 31-Dec-2007  
15 DWS Invest SICAV Japanese Equities LU0145651088 Japan 3-Jun-2002 31-Dec-2009 37 
15 DWS Invest SICAV European Dividend Plus LU0195137939 Pan-Europe 30-Aug-2004 31-Dec-2009 427 
15 DWS Invest SICAV Global Value LU0273155423 Global 20-Nov-2006 31-Dec-2009 36 
15 DWS Invest SICAV European Select LU0298653451 Pan-Europe 14-May-2007 31-Dec-2009 2 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV Emerging Markets Fund LU0048575426 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 2,350 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV European Growth Fund LU0048578792 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 8,232 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV International Fund LU0048584097 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,049 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV Japan Fund LU0048585144 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 627 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV World Fund LU0069449576 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 532 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV American Growth Fund LU0077335932 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 201 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV European Aggressive Fund LU0083291335 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 930 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV Euro Blue Chip Fund LU0088814487 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 672 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV European Larger Companies Fund LU0119124278 Pan-Europe 16-Sep-2002 31-Dec-2009 213 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV Global Focus Fund LU0157215616 Global 14-Jan-2003 31-Dec-2009 70 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV Japan Advantage LU0161332480 Japan 30-Jan-2003 31-Dec-2009 375 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV American Diversified Fund LU0187122535 US 1-Mar-2004 31-Dec-2009 73 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV European Fund LU0238202427 Pan-Europe 12-Dec-2005 31-Dec-2009 169 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV Japan Dividend Growth LU0238203664 Japan 9-Dec-2005 19-Sep-2009  
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV Global Sector Fund LU0267387255 Global 30-Oct-2006 31-Dec-2009 124 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV America Fund LU0048573561 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 996 
16 Fidelity Funds SICAV European Special Situations Fund LU0329678766 Pan-Europe 21-Jan-2008 31-Dec-2009 90 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Europe LU0010012721 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,068 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity World LU0072778490 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 218 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Euro Job LU0082276915 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 15-Mar-2002  
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity World Emerging LU0081707118 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 628 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Best Selection World LU0086352696 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 41 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Best Selection EURO LU0090548479 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 179 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity EURO LU0087045034 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 525 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Best Selection USA LU0092590669 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 131 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Market Selection World LU0094229605 Global 1-Jan-2000 12-Feb-2007  
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Europe Opportunities LU0103372834 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 3-Nov-2003  
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Factor 1-3 Euro LU0108384792 Euroland 17-Feb-2000 12-Feb-2007  
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Multinational World LU0109012780 Global 1-Apr-2000 3-Nov-2003  
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity High Yield EURO LU0109013911 Euroland 17-Apr-2000 31-Oct-2002  
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Japan LU0116160622 Japan 14-Nov-2000 31-Dec-2009 232 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity USA LU0116160465 US 2-Nov-2001 31-Dec-2009 861 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV OBAM Equity World LU0185157681 Global 27-Feb-2004 31-Dec-2009 855 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Best Select Europe LU0191755619 Pan-Europe 14-May-2004 31-Dec-2009 100 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Best Selection Japan LU0194602230 Japan 15-Jun-2004 31-Dec-2009 43 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity High Dividend Europe LU0317292893 Pan-Europe 8-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 136 
17 Fortis L Fund SICAV Equity Growth Europe LU0375761581 Pan-Europe 28-Aug-2008 31-Dec-2009 348 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton Global (Euro) Fund LU0029873410 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 569 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton Emerging Markets Fund LU0029874905 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 929 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton European Fund LU0029868097 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 173 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton Global Fund LU0029864427 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 849 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Mutual Beacon Fund LU0070302665 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 875 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton Japan Fund LU0078278065 Japan 1-Jan-2000 21-Nov-2008  
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton Developed Markets Fund LU0078278495 Global 1-Jan-2000 19-Sep-2003  
A P P E N D I X  2  
 290 
Nr1 Umbrella Sub-fund name ISIN Fund sector Start date2 End date3 TNA4 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton Euroland Fund LU0093666013 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 153 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin US Equity Fund LU0098860363 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 371 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin U.S. Opportunities Fund LU0109391861 US 3-Apr-2000 31-Dec-2009 537 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Mutual European Fund LU0109981661 Pan-Europe 3-Apr-2000 31-Dec-2009 2,611 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton Growth (Euro) Fund LU0114760746 Global 9-Aug-2000 31-Dec-2009 4,472 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Templeton Japan Fund LU0116920520 Japan 1-Sep-2000 31-Dec-2009 72 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Flex Cap Growlh Fund LU0122612681 US 9-Sep-2002 19-Sep-2003  
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin European Growth Fund LU0122612848 Pan-Europe 29-Dec-2000 31-Dec-2009 148 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Global Growth Fund LU0122613069 Global 29-Dec-2000 31-Dec-2009 38 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Templeton Global Growth & Value Fund LU0152903588 Global 9-Sep-2002 31-Dec-2009 60 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin U.S. Growth Fund LU0170466246 US 29-Aug-2003 31-Jul-2009  
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton US Value Fund LU0170478092 US 29-Aug-2003 31-Dec-2009 16 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Mutual Global Discovery Fund LU0211331839 Global 25-Oct-2005 31-Dec-2009 652 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Templeton Global Equity Strategies Fund LU0358320173 Global 15-May-2008 31-Dec-2009 43 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin U.S. Focus Fund LU0352131121 US 15-May-2008 31-Dec-2009 7 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Mutual Euroland Fund LU0390138278 Euroland 14-Oct-2008 31-Dec-2009 11 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin World Perspectives Fund LU0390134368 Global 14-Oct-2008 31-Dec-2009 23 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Templeton Frontier Markets Fund LU0390136736 Emerging Markets 14-Oct-2008 31-Dec-2009 30 
18 Franklin Templeton Investment Funds SICAV Franklin Euroland Core Fund LU0390138864 Euroland 28-Nov-2008 31-Dec-2009 22 
19 Gartmore SICAV Emerging Markets Fund LU0113993801 Emerging Markets 29-Sep-2000 31-Dec-2009 337 
19 Gartmore SICAV Japanese Fund LU0113993637 Japan 29-Sep-2000 31-Dec-2009 20 
19 Gartmore SICAV Pan European Fund LU0113992829 Pan-Europe 29-Sep-2000 31-Dec-2009 19 
19 Gartmore SICAV US Fund LU0135927563 US 5-Oct-2001 24-Feb-2006  
19 Gartmore SICAV Global Focus Fund LU0200075835 Global 29-Oct-2004 31-Dec-2009 569 
19 Gartmore SICAV US Opportunities Fund LU0200077534 US 29-Oct-2004 31-Dec-2009 35 
19 Gartmore SICAV Eurobloc LU0200085719 Euroland 24-Mar-2005 19-May-2009  
19 Gartmore SICAV Pan European Focus Fund LU0200071925 Pan-Europe 24-Mar-2005 16-Apr-2007  
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Europe Core Equity Portfolio LU0102219945 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 670 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Europe Portfolio LU0068894848 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 56 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Global Emerging Markets Equity Portfolio LU0083344555 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 403 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Global Equity Portfolio LU0040769829 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 38 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Japan Portfolio LU0065003666 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 148 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV US Core Equity Portfolio LU0065004045 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 155 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV US Growth Equity Portfolio LU0102220448 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 52 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Global Core Equity Portfolio LU0203365449 Global 14-Oct-2004 31-Dec-2009 411 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Japan Core Equity Portfolio LU0234585197 Japan 8-Dec-2005 31-Dec-2009 80 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Euro Concentrated Equity Portfolio LU0183077824 Pan-Europe 30-Dec-2003 31-Dec-2009 7 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV US Equity Portfolio LU0234587482 US 3-Feb-2006 31-Dec-2009 239 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV US Premier Equity Portfolio LU0234582681 US 2-Feb-2006 24-Apr-2009  
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV US Value Equity Portfolio LU0234588530 US 1-Feb-2006 31-Dec-2009 17 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Europe CoreSM Flex Portfolio LU0245154439 Pan-Europe 31-Aug-2006 31-Dec-2009 103 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Japan Core Flex Portfolio LU0280972711 Japan 27-Feb-2007 31-Dec-2009 128 
20 Goldman Sachs Funds SICAV Sustain Portfolio LU0377750707 US 16-Sep-2008 31-Dec-2009 32 
21 Henderson Horizon Fund SICAV Global Emerging Markets LU0012096391 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 6-Feb-2004  
21 Henderson Horizon Fund SICAV Japanese Equity Fund LU0011889929 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 30 
21 Henderson Horizon Fund SICAV American Equity Fund LU0138820294 US 19-Nov-2001 31-Dec-2009 239 
21 Henderson Horizon Fund SICAV Global Opportunities Fund LU0138809214 Global 29-Nov-2001 31-Dec-2009 10 
21 Henderson Horizon Fund SICAV Pan European Equity Fund LU0138821268 Pan-Europe 19-Nov-2001 31-Dec-2009 1,400 
21 Henderson Horizon Fund SICAV Pan European Equity Dividend Fund LU0197673881 Pan-Europe 1-Sep-2004 31-Dec-2009 12 
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV Global Equity LU0039216626 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 76 
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV Global Emerging Markets Equity LU0164872284 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 205 
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV Euroland Equity Opportunities LU0082769513 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 9-Jun-2005  
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV US Equity Opportunities LU0082769273 US 1-Jan-2000 9-Jun-2005  
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV Japanese Equity Opportunities LU0082769786 Japan 1-Jan-2000 4-Mar-2003  
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV Japanese Equity LU0164882085 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 57 
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV European Equity LU0164906959 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 122 
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV US  Equity LU0164902453 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 155 
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV Euroland Equity LU0165074666 Euroland 1-Apr-2003 31-Dec-2009 1,117 
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV European Equity High Dividend LU0196699473 Pan-Europe 15-Sep-2004 11-Dec-2009  
22 HSBC Global Investment Funds SICAV Emerging Wealth LU0309123817 Emerging Markets 7-Dec-2007 31-Dec-2009 25 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV World LU0119219730 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 100 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Europe LU0047442768 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 20-Dec-2001  
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Euro LU0074274415 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 20-Dec-2001  
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV European New Offerings LU0119205515 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 5-Sep-2008  
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV European Sector Allocation LU0119205788 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 84 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Top 30 Euro LU0119218096 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 11-Apr-2003  
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Euro High Dividend LU0127786431 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,167 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Top 30 World LU0119255452 Global 12-Jun-2000 17-Apr-2003  
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Japan LU0082087783 Japan 17-Dec-2001 31-Dec-2009 95 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Emerging Markets LU0104531511 Emerging Markets 10-Dec-2001 31-Dec-2009 335 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV EMU Equity LU0095527585 Euroland 20-Dec-2001 31-Dec-2009 229 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV European Equity LU0082087510 Pan-Europe 20-Dec-2001 31-Dec-2009 205 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV US Enhanced Core LU0082087940 US 17-Dec-2001 31-Dec-2009 140 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Global High Dividend LU0146257711 Global 15-May-2002 31-Dec-2009 717 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Europe High Dividend LU0205350837 Pan-Europe 1-Dec-2004 31-Dec-2009 499 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Europe Growth Fund LU0199060350 Pan-Europe 15-Nov-2004 31-Dec-2009 57 
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23 ING (L) Invest SICAV US Opportunistic Equity LU0242141330 US 10-Feb-2006 31-Dec-2009 54 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Invest Global Opportunities LU0250158358 Global 30-Aug-2006 31-Dec-2009 307 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV US Growth LU0272290692 US 22-Jan-2007 31-Dec-2009 59 
23 ING (L) Invest SICAV Europe Opportunities LU0262017568 Pan-Europe 4-Aug-2006 31-Dec-2009 35 
24 Invesco GT SICAV Pan European Equity Fund LU0028118809 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 397 
24 Invesco GT SICAV Worldwide Dynamic Theme Fund LU0028119955 Global 1-Jan-2000 1-Oct-2004  
24 Invesco GT SICAV Nippon Select Equity Fund LU0028119369 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 94 
24 Invesco GT SICAV US Growth Equity Fund LU0075112648 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 10 
24 Invesco GT SICAV Pan European Structured Equity Fund LU0119750205 Pan-Europe 28-Jun-2002 31-Dec-2009 255 
24 Invesco GT SICAV Global Value Equity Fund LU0123347535 Global 1-Feb-2001 2-Nov-2007  
24 Invesco GT SICAV US Structured Equity Fund LU0149503202 US 28-Jun-2002 31-Dec-2009 110 
24 Invesco GT SICAV European Growth Equity Fund LU0194779913 Pan-Europe 30-Jun-2004 31-Dec-2009 81 
24 Invesco GT SICAV US Basic Value Equity LU0205506602 US 3-Dec-2004 17-Aug-2007  
24 Invesco GT SICAV Global Equity LU0228065305 Global 29-Aug-2005 17-Aug-2007  
24 Invesco GT SICAV Pan European Equity Income Fund LU0267986122 Pan-Europe 31-Oct-2006 31-Dec-2009 4 
24 Invesco GT SICAV Global Structured Equity Fund LU0267984937 Global 11-Dec-2006 31-Dec-2009 19 
24 Invesco GT SICAV Global Growth Equity Fund LU0275063054 Global 14-Dec-2006 31-Dec-2009 5 
25 Investec Global Strategy Fund SICAV Global Equity Fund LU0345769128 Global 1-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 296 
25 Investec Global Strategy Fund SICAV American Equity Fund LU0345774391 US 1-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 129 
25 Investec Global Strategy Fund SICAV Japan Equity Fund LU0345776503 Japan 1-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 49 
25 Investec Global Strategy Fund SICAV Global Strategic Equity Fund LU0345770308 Global 1-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 1,059 
25 Investec Global Strategy Fund SICAV Global Growth Fund LU0345772007 Global 1-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 28 
25 Investec Global Strategy Fund SICAV Global Dynamic Fund LU0345772692 Global 1-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 195 
25 Investec Global Strategy Fund SICAV Pan European Equity Fund LU0345778202 Pan-Europe 1-Jul-2008 30-Oct-2009  
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Emerging Markets Equity Fund LU0053685615 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 4,634 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV America Equity Fund LU0053666078 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 277 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Euroland Equity Fund LU0089640097 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 784 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Europe Equity Fund LU0053685029 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 523 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Global Equity Fund (USD) LU0089639750 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 203 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Global Equity Fund (EUR) LU0053695507 Global 1-Jan-2000 17-Jul-2008  
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Japan Equity Fund LU0053696224 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 220 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV America Large Cap Fund LU0096059323 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 58 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Europe Strategic Growth Fund LU0107398538 Pan-Europe 14-Feb-2000 31-Dec-2009 385 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Europe Strategic Value Fund LU0107398884 Pan-Europe 14-Feb-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,717 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV US Strategic Growth Fund LU0119063898 US 13-Oct-2000 31-Dec-2009 51 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV US Value Fund LU0119066131 US 20-Oct-2000 31-Dec-2009 465 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Europe Dynamic Fund LU0119062650 Pan-Europe 8-Dec-2000 31-Dec-2009 341 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Global Dynamic Fund LU0119067295 Global 8-Dec-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,018 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Global Focus Fund LU0168341575 Global 23-May-2003 31-Dec-2009 733 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV US Dynamic Fund LU0169523114 US 18-Jul-2003 31-Dec-2009 818 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Japan Alpha Plus Fund LU0169521175 Japan 11-Aug-2004 31-Dec-2009 5 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV JEurope Dynamic Mega Cap LU0229245161 Pan-Europe 19-Sep-2005 31-Dec-2009 229 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Japan Dynamic Fund LU0232672849 Japan 1-Feb-2006 31-Dec-2009 4 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Emerging Markets Alpha Plus Fund LU0258923134 Emerging Markets 30-Aug-2006 31-Dec-2009 189 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Euroland Select Equity Fund LU0308871747 Euroland 24-Jul-2007 31-Dec-2009 28 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Highbridge Europe STEEP Fund LU0325073012 Pan-Europe 7-Feb-2008 31-Dec-2009 235 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV Highbridge US STEEP Fund LU0325074259 US 16-May-2008 31-Dec-2009 459 
26 JPMorgan Funds SICAV US Growth Alpha Plus Fund LU0384297106 US 4-Sep-2008 31-Dec-2009 32 
27 J.P. Morgan Investment Fund SICAV US Equity LU0070214290 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2001  
27 J.P. Morgan Investment Fund SICAV Japan Equity LU0070214613 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2001  
27 J.P. Morgan Investment Fund SICAV Europe Equity LU0070215420 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2001  
27 J.P. Morgan Investment Fund SICAV Global Equity LU0070217475 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2001  
27 J.P. Morgan Investment Fund SICAV Global 50 Equity LU0088298020 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2001  
27 J.P. Morgan Investment Fund SICAV Disciplined US Equity LU0099261355 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2001  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Europe Stock Fund LU0026740844 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 136 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Japan Stock Fund LU0044849320 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 147 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV US Leading Stock Fund LU0026741222 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 72 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Europe Growth Stock Fund LU0066471896 Pan-Europe 1-Feb-2006 31-Dec-2009 57 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Europe Leading Stock Fund LU0088383137 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 110 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Global Fund LU0026742386 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 61 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Euroland Value Stock Fund LU0100915437 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 97 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Global Emerging Markets Stock Fund LU0107858044 Emerging Markets 1-Feb-2006 31-Dec-2009 63 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV US Stock Fund LU0107854050 US 28-Apr-2000 18-Mar-2009  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Special US Stock Fund LU0113100019 US 31-Oct-2000 29-Aug-2003  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Special Japan Stock Fund LU0113101413 Japan 31-Oct-2000 29-Aug-2003  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Europe Megatrend Stock Fund LU0122456618 Pan-Europe 31-Dec-2000 30-May-2003  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Japan Navigator Stock Fund LU0124940338 Japan 31-May-2001 2-Aug-2004  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV US Value Stock Fund LU0135056835 US 30-Apr-2002 31-Dec-2009 55 
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Global Opportunities Stock Fund LU0152405980 Global 9-Aug-2002 25-Jun-2009  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Europe Value Stock Fund LU0190726223 Pan-Europe 30-Jul-2004 25-Jun-2009  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV US Growth Stock Fund LU0214925314 US 31-Mar-2005 15-Jun-2007  
28 Julius Baer Multistock SICAV Global Contrarian Stock Fund LU0241732246 Global 31-Jan-2006 31-Dec-2009 80 
29 KBC Equity Fund (L) SICAV America LU0051497468 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 30 
29 KBC Equity Fund (L) SICAV Japan LU0051497039 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 18 
29 KBC Equity Fund (L) SICAV Europe LU0048669088 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 73 
29 KBC Equity Fund (L) SICAV Global Top 100 LU0108230219 Global 1-Jan-2000 16-Feb-2006  
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30 Legg Mason Global Funds FCP (Luxembourg) Japan Equity Fund LU0012051966 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 14 
30 Legg Mason Global Funds FCP (Luxembourg) US Fundamental Value Fund LU0012051883 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 33 
30 Legg Mason Global Funds FCP (Luxembourg) US Large Cap Growth Fund LU0055929417 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 5 
30 Legg Mason Global Funds FCP (Luxembourg) Gobal Equity Fund LU0105129059 Global 4-May-2001 31-Dec-2009 20 
30 Legg Mason Global Funds FCP (Luxembourg) US Aggressive Growth Fund LU0122426116 US 31-Jan-2001 31-Dec-2009 17 
30 Legg Mason Global Funds FCP (Luxembourg) US Growth and Value Fund LU0122422552 US 31-Jan-2001 31-Dec-2009 12 
30 Legg Mason Global Funds FCP (Luxembourg) Emerging Markets Equity Fund LU0105191448 Emerging Markets 4-May-2001 31-Dec-2009 720 
30 Legg Mason Global Funds FCP (Luxembourg) Pan-Europe Equity Fund LU0105175169 Pan-Europe 7-May-2001 31-Dec-2009 72 
31 Lloyds TSB International Portfolio SICAV Euro Equity Fund LU0035880763 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 95 
31 Lloyds TSB International Portfolio SICAV Japan Equity Fund LU0035884591 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 11 
31 Lloyds TSB International Portfolio SICAV North America Equity Fund LU0035881811 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 78 
31 Lloyds TSB International Portfolio SICAV World Equity Fund LU0035883197 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 15 
32 LODH Invest SICAV  US Expertise Fund LU0049412173 US 1-Jan-2000 19-Sep-2007  
32 LODH Invest SICAV Europe LU0049412769 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 209 
32 LODH Invest SICAV Japan Expertise Fund LU0049414898 Japan 1-Jan-2000 21-Sep-2007  
32 LODH Invest SICAV World Equities Fund LU0083362458 Global 1-Jan-2000 8-Sep-2005  
32 LODH Invest SICAV Selective Global Equity LU0304893141 Global 23-Nov-2007 31-Dec-2009 195 
32 LODH Invest SICAV Systematic Europe Equity LU0208428739 Pan-Europe 20-Jan-2005 31-Dec-2009 26 
32 LODH Invest SICAV Alto US Equity Fund LU0302537104 US 25-Jun-2007 28-Feb-2009  
32 LODH Invest SICAV Baron US Growth LU0293409511 US 3-May-2007 31-Dec-2009 114 
32 LODH Invest SICAV Brandes European Value Fund LU0293445580 Pan-Europe 4-May-2007 24-Apr-2009  
32 LODH Invest SICAV  Lotsoff US Core Fund LU0293408976 US 4-May-2007 24-Apr-2009  
32 LODH Invest SICAV LSV US Value Fund LU0293406681 US 4-May-2007 24-Apr-2009  
32 LODH Invest SICAV Pzena Global Value LU0293410014 Global 4-May-2007 31-Dec-2009 23 
32 LODH Invest SICAV William Blair Global Growth LU0293411335 Global 18-Jun-2007 31-Dec-2009 33 
32 LODH Invest SICAV Global Emerging Markets LU0293415914 Emerging Markets 19-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 87 
32 LODH Invest SICAV Alpha Japan LU0372982396 Japan 23-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 117 
33 Martin Currie Global Funds SICAV Japan Fund LU0094044905 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 38 
33 Martin Currie Global Funds SICAV International Growth Fund LU0174483585 Global 13-Oct-2003 1-Jan-2006  
33 Martin Currie Global Funds SICAV Pan-European Alpha Fund LU0174484120 Pan-Europe 20-Oct-2003 31-Dec-2009 1 
33 Martin Currie Global Funds SICAV Pan-European Opportunities Fund LU0185060844 Pan-Europe 19-Feb-2007 31-Dec-2009 19 
33 Martin Currie Global Funds SICAV North American Fund LU0174482694 US 9-Jun-2008 31-Dec-2009 88 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV U.S. Equity Fund LU0035364164 US 1-Jan-2000 12-Sep-2002  
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV European Equity Fund LU0094557526 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 533 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV European Growth Fund LU0125946151 Pan-Europe 1-Oct-2002 31-Dec-2009 10 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV European Value Fund LU0125951151 Pan-Europe 1-Oct-2002 31-Dec-2009 314 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV Global Equity Fund LU0094560744 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 449 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV Global Growth Fund LU0219441572 Global 26-Sep-2005 31-Dec-2009 67 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV Research International Fund LU0219441143 Global 26-Sep-2005 31-Dec-2009 358 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV US Equity LU0219439162 US 26-Sep-2005 30-Apr-2007  
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV US Research Fund LU0071155989 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 159 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV US Large Cap Growth Fund LU0094555157 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 304 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV US Value Fund LU0125979160 US 1-Feb-2002 31-Dec-2009 364 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV Emerging Markets Equity Fund LU0219444832 Emerging Markets 31-Aug-2006 31-Dec-2009 42 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV Global Value Fund LU0219445052 Global 31-Jul-2007 31-Dec-2009 4 
34 MFS Meridian Funds SICAV Japan Equity Fund LU0219444758 Japan 31-Jul-2007 31-Dec-2009 6 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Emerging Markets Equity LU0073229840 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 739 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Global Value Equity LU0073230772 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 236 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV European Equity Fund LU0073234501 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 123 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV US Equity Growth LU0073232471 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 279 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Japanese Value Equity LU0073251851 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 556 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV US Value Equity LU0073233446 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 223 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV European Equity Growth Fund LU0094310637 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 8-Oct-2004  
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Competitive Edge ''Best Ideas'' LU0101847035 Global 1-Jan-2000 30-Mar-2004  
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Eurozone Equity Opportunities LU0109967165 Euroland 31-Mar-2000 31-Dec-2009 59 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Global Systematic Equity Fund LU0113397276 Global 1-Jul-2000 21-Apr-2008  
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Japanese Equity Growth Fund LU0109966357 Japan 1-Jul-2000 3-Apr-2009  
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV US Equity Fund LU0137773577 US 3-Dec-2001 3-Apr-2009  
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV American Franchise LU0225737302 US 1-Dec-2005 31-Dec-2009 126 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV European Systematic Equity Fund LU0225742567 Pan-Europe 1-Dec-2005 21-Apr-2008  
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Japanese Equity Advantage LU0248597030 Japan 31-May-2006 31-Dec-2009 48 
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV Global Equity Growth Fund LU0257819291 Global 31-Jul-2006 3-Apr-2009  
35 Morgan Stanley Investment Funds SICAV European Equity Opportunities Fund LU0276178166 Pan-Europe 21-Dec-2006 20-Mar-2009  
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Natixis Europe Large Cap LU0066549592 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 47 
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Global Emerging Markets LU0084288835 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 18-Nov-2008  
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Japanese Equities LU0095825252 Japan 1-Jan-2000 7-Apr-2008  
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Harris Associates Global Value Fund LU0130103400 Global 4-Jul-2001 31-Dec-2009 214 
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Oakmark US Large Cap Value LU0130102774 US 22-Jun-2001 31-Dec-2009 57 
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Natixis Oakmark US Value Opportunities Fund  LU0130102261 US 1-Jan-2002 31-Jan-2008  
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Loomis Sayles US Large Cap Value LU0130099376 US 4-Jul-2001 31-Dec-2009 22 
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Loomis Sayles US Research LU0130100216 US 4-Jul-2001 31-Dec-2009 216 
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Vaughan Nelson U.S. Core LU0130100562 US 22-Jun-2001 4-Feb-2006  
36 NATIXIS International Funds ( Lux ) I SICAV Loomis Sayles Global Equity Opportunities Fund LU0385841464 Global 2-Sep-2008 31-Dec-2009 3 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV European Value Fund (EUR) LU0064319337 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 798 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV European Equity Fund (EUR) LU0081952268 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 24 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV North American Value LU0076314649 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 300 
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37 Nordea 1, SICAV North American Growth Fund LU0095740188 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 237 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV Japanese Equity JPY) LU0097863921 Japan 1-Jan-2000 18-Jun-2009  
37 Nordea 1, SICAV Global Equity Fund (EUR) LU0109904242 Global 17-Apr-2000 31-Dec-2009 6 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV Global Value LU0160643358 Global 1-Oct-2003 31-Dec-2009 30 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV Japanese Value Fund LU0160643192 Japan 1-Oct-2003 31-Dec-2009 12 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV Global Core Equity LU0112467450 Global 2-Jan-2006 31-Dec-2009 6 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV Global Stable Equity Fund LU0278529986 Global 5-Mar-2007 31-Dec-2009 316 
37 Nordea 1, SICAV European Alpha Fund LU0326853404 Pan-Europe 13-Nov-2007 31-Dec-2009 88 
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Emerging Markets LU0130729220 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,114 
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV European Equity Selection LU0130731986 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 296 
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Global Equities LU0130734816 Global 5-Jul-2001 10-Nov-2003  
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Global Equities Selection LU0092017853 Global 9-Dec-2002 3-Mar-2009  
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV US Equities LU0155304727 US 26-Nov-2002 31-Dec-2009 82 
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Japanese Equities LU0095053426 Japan 14-Nov-2002 31-Dec-2009 46 
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Japanese Equity Selection LU0176900511 Japan 28-Nov-2003 31-Dec-2009 144 
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Pan European Equities LU0208619162 Pan-Europe 20-Dec-2004 7-Dec-2006  
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Emerging Markets Large Cap LU0209257525 Emerging Markets 31-Mar-2005 27-Jul-2009  
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV US Equities Selection LU0256840108 US 30-Jun-2006 31-Dec-2009 1,223 
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Quantam LU0262518268 US 1-Sep-2006 27-Oct-2008  
38 Pictet Funds (Lux) SICAV Euroland Equities LU0303497761 Euroland 29-Oct-2007 27-Feb-2009  
39 Pioneer Funds FCP Core European Equity LU0085424579 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 996 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP U.S. Research LU0085424652 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,325 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP Emerging Markets Equity LU0111920509 Emerging Markets 28-Jun-2000 31-Dec-2009 947 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP Euroland Equity LU0111919162 Euroland 28-Jun-2000 31-Dec-2009 403 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP Japanese Equity LU0111923941 Japan 28-Jun-2000 31-Dec-2009 375 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP European Research LU0111921226 Pan-Europe 28-Jun-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,605 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP Top European Players LU0111921499 Pan-Europe 4-Jul-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,292 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP Global Trends LU0133558949 Global 5-Oct-2001 31-Dec-2009 138 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP US Growth LU0133630565 US 5-Oct-2001 12-Dec-2008  
39 Pioneer Funds FCP US Value LU0133623198 US 5-Oct-2001 12-Dec-2008  
39 Pioneer Funds FCP U.S. Pioneer Fund LU0133646132 US 5-Oct-2001 31-Dec-2009 1,505 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP European Quant Equity LU0190664952 Pan-Europe 3-Jun-2004 31-Dec-2009 512 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP Top US Players LU0214788498 US 6-May-2005 16-Mar-2007  
39 Pioneer Funds FCP European Equity Yield LU0214788142 Euroland 6-May-2005 12-Dec-2008  
39 Pioneer Funds FCP North American Basic Value LU0243702080 US 27-Feb-2006 31-Dec-2009 641 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP Global Select LU0273972983 Global 30-Mar-2007 31-Dec-2009 380 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP European Potential LU0279966047 Pan-Europe 30-Mar-2007 31-Dec-2009 96 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP European Equity Growth LU0360608755 Pan-Europe 6-May-2008 31-Dec-2009 22 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP European Equity Value LU0313648098 Pan-Europe 6-May-2008 31-Dec-2009 215 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP US Research Value LU0347183856 US 11-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 136 
39 Pioneer Funds FCP US Research Growth LU0347184581 US 11-Jul-2008 31-Dec-2009 98 
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV Japan Equity LU0085130150 Japan 1-Jan-2000 15-Dec-2003  
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV Global Equities LU0085134061 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 62 
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV Global Growth Equities EURO LU0203974976 Global 12-Dec-2004 19-Dec-2008  
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV Emerging Markets Equities LU0187076913 Emerging Markets 1-Jul-2004 31-Dec-2009 2,230 
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV European Equities (EUR) LU0187077218 Pan-Europe 1-Jul-2004 31-Dec-2009 532 
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV North America Equities EURO LU0187077135 US 1-Jul-2004 17-Dec-2007  
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV Global Value Equities LU0203975437 Global 13-Dec-2004 31-Dec-2009 35 
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV US Premium Equities LU0434928536 US 13-Jul-2009 31-Dec-2009 1,747 
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV Emerging Stars Equities LU0254836850 Emerging Markets 2-Nov-2006 31-Dec-2009 803 
40 Robeco Capital Growth Funds SICAV European Stars LU0269137211 Pan-Europe 20-Nov-2006 31-Dec-2009 26 
41 Sarasin Investmentfonds SICAV EuropeSar LU0058891119 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 21-Dec-2007  
41 Sarasin Investmentfonds SICAV BlueChipSar LU0068337137 Global 1-Jan-2000 30-Mar-2007  
41 Sarasin Investmentfonds SICAV EquiSar - Global LU0088812606 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 328 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Equity Yield LU0106236267 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 77 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Global Equity Sigma LU0106254831 Global 1-Jan-2000 26-Sep-2008  
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Japanese Equity LU0106239873 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 185 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV US Large Cap LU0106261372 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 382 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Emerging Markets LU0106252389 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,338 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Large Cap LU0106236937 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 81 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV EURO Equity LU0106235293 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,378 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Euro Dynamic Growth LU0116149229 Euroland 1-Mar-2002 31-Dec-2009 325 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV EURO Active Value (EUR) LU0149524547 Euroland 9-Aug-2002 31-Dec-2009 203 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV North American Equity Sigma LU0151853412 US 30-Aug-2002 26-Sep-2008  
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Equity Alpha LU0161305163 Pan-Europe 31-Jan-2003 31-Dec-2009 710 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Japanese Equity Alpha LU0186876743 Japan 27-Feb-2004 31-Dec-2009 38 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Global Quantitative Active Value LU0203345920 Global 29-Oct-2004 31-Dec-2009 479 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Equity LU0215104596 Pan-Europe 1-Jun-2007 23-Jan-2009  
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Global Equity LU0215105999 Global 3-Jun-2005 31-Dec-2009 19 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Global Equity Alpha LU0225283273 Global 29-Jul-2005 31-Dec-2009 49 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Global Equity Yield LU0225284248 Global 29-Jul-2005 31-Dec-2009 43 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Dynamic Growth LU0227178638 Pan-Europe 31-Aug-2005 2-Dec-2009  
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Special Situations LU0246035637 Pan-Europe 31-Mar-2006 31-Dec-2009 1,192 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV US All Cap LU0263778622 US 31-Aug-2006 31-Dec-2009 5 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Active Value LU0248332834 Pan-Europe 31-Mar-2006 29-Sep-2009  
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Japanese Large Cap LU0270818197 Japan 1-Dec-2006 31-Dec-2009 41 
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42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Global Emerging Markets Opportunities LU0269904917 Emerging Markets 19-Jan-2007 31-Dec-2009 361 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Equity Opportunities LU0291345022 Pan-Europe 27-Apr-2007 10-Jun-2009  
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Global Dividend Maximiser LU0306806265 Global 13-Jul-2007 31-Dec-2009 16 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV European Dividend Maximiser LU0319791538 Pan-Europe 5-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 7 
42 Schroder International Selection Fund SICAV Global Quality Growth Equity LU0323591593 Global 17-Oct-2007 31-Dec-2009 112 
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Europe Fund LU0030166507 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2003 31-Dec-2009 237 
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Global Fund LU0030158231 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 113 
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Japan Fund LU0030163587 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 42 
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP North America Chance/Risk Fund LU0030166176 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 222 
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Europe 3 LU0030164395 Pan-Europe 3-May-2004 13-Mar-2009  
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Europe 2 LU0088160857 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 12-Jun-2009  
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Japan Chance/Risk Fund LU0110261509 Japan 22-May-2000 31-Dec-2009 65 
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Opportunity Europe LU0116859868 Pan-Europe 1-Feb-2001 23-Sep-2005  
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Global Chance/Risk Fund LU0122113094 Global 8-Jan-2001 31-Dec-2009 23 
43 SEB Fund 1 FCP Global Value Fund LU0256626523 Global 12-Jun-2006 31-Dec-2009 101 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Concentrated Europe LU0011956546 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 28 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities International LU0011956975 Global 1-Jan-2000 22-Aug-2005  
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Global LU0011957270 Global 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 34 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Japan Opportunities LU0011956629 Japan 1-Jan-2000 24-Apr-2009  
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Global Emerging Countries LU0066757278 Emerging Markets 15-Jul-2003 31-Dec-2009 104 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Euroland LU0108299768 Euroland 28-Feb-2000 31-Dec-2009 22 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities US Relative Value LU0130134629 US 6-Jul-2001 31-Dec-2009 630 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities US Concentrated Core LU0146904684 US 9-May-2002 31-Dec-2009 49 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities US Multi Strategies LU0146906036 US 9-May-2002 31-Dec-2009 21 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities US Focused LU0168016581 US 25-Aug-2003 31-Dec-2009 7 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Japan Target LU0183642551 Japan 15-Jan-2004 31-Dec-2009 51 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Japan Concentrated LU0197589152 Japan 24-Sep-2004 31-Dec-2009 9 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities US Large Cap Growth LU0084104370 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 28 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Euroland Value LU0219680641 Euroland 26-May-2005 31-Dec-2009 715 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Concentrated Euroland LU0219678587 Euroland 26-May-2005 31-Dec-2009 40 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV US Spectrum LU0244557426 US 28-Mar-2006 6-Apr-2009  
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Japan CoreAlpha LU0268886974 Japan 29-Nov-2006 31-Dec-2009 561 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Europe Expansion LU0311133697 Pan-Europe 29-Nov-2007 31-Dec-2009 88 
44 SGAM Fund SICAV Equities Europe Growth  LU0219679635 Euroland 19-Dec-2007 31-Jul-2009  
45 Sparinvest SICAV Global Value LU0138501191 Global 14-Dec-2001 21-Apr-2008 75742
45 Sparinvest SICAV European Value LU0264920413 Pan-Europe 2-Nov-2006 21-Apr-2008 71 
46 T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV US Blue Chip Equity Fund LU0133085943 US 5-Feb-2003 31-Dec-2009 61 
46 T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV US Large-Cap Value Equity Fund LU0133099654 US 2-Jan-2003 31-Dec-2009 151 
46 T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV Global Equity Fund LU0143551892 Global 28-Mar-2003 4-Dec-2008 478 
46 T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV US Large-Cap Growth Equity Fund LU0174119429 US 13-Nov-2003 31-Dec-2009 591 
46 T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV Global Emerging Markets Equity Fund LU0133084623 Emerging Markets 26-Oct-2004 31-Dec-2009 584 
46 T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV Japanese Equity LU0230817339 Japan 12-Apr-2006 31-Dec-2009 17 
46 T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV European Equity Fund LU0285830955 Pan-Europe 2-May-2007 31-Dec-2009 5 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP European Opportunity LU0006391097 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 538 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Japan LU0098994485 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 49 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP USA LU0098995292 US 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,299 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Euro Countries LU0089880644 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 1,600 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Euro Countries Opportunity LU0085870433 Euroland 6-Oct-2004 31-Dec-2009 53 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP US Opportunity (USD) LU0101706215 US 14-Feb-2000 31-Dec-2009 37 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP European Growth LU0118128569 Pan-Europe 6-Oct-2004 31-Dec-2009 55 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Megatrends LU0106959967 Global 10-Nov-2000 8-Jul-2005  
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Euro Stoxx 50 Advanced LU0141377779 Euroland 11-Mar-2002 31-Dec-2009 190 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Emerging Markets LU0171395170 Emerging Markets 17-Sep-2003 31-Dec-2009 982 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Euro Countries Accelerator LU0359906079 Euroland 4-Aug-2008 31-Dec-2009 6 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Euro Countries Defender LU0359906152 Euroland 16-Jun-2008 31-Dec-2009 149 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Euro Countries Navigator LU0359906236 Euroland 4-Aug-2008 31-Dec-2009 5 
47 UBS (Lux) Equity Fund FCP Euro Countries Optimizer LU0359906319 Euroland 4-Aug-2008 31-Dec-2009 111 
48 WestLB Mellon Compass Fund SICAV Global Equity Fund LU0093984572 Global 1-Jan-2000 16-Apr-2004  
48 WestLB Mellon Compass Fund SICAV Euro Equity Fund LU0093970191 Euroland 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 4 
48 WestLB Mellon Compass Fund SICAV European Equity Fund LU0093977873 Pan-Europe 1-Jan-2000 28-Nov-2008  
48 WestLB Mellon Compass Fund SICAV Global Emerging Markets Fund LU0093980075 Emerging Markets 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 128 
48 WestLB Mellon Compass Fund SICAV Japanese Equity Fund LU0093977956 Japan 1-Jan-2000 31-Dec-2009 5 
48 WestLB Mellon Compass Fund SICAV US Equities LU0152502240 US 27-Aug-2002 16-Apr-2004  
 1. Promoter number (see appendix 1).  
2. First date on which the sub-fund was part of the sample.  
3. Last date on which the sub-fund was part of the sample.  
4. Total Net Assets in EUR million as of 31 December 2009, provided the fund was part of the sample on that date.  
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Appendix 3 
Survey: Questions and answers 
A P P E N D I X  3  
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I General 
Questions and answers Results1
1 How long have you been in your role as board member of this UCITS umbrella? 
a Less than 1 year 3 (7.3%)
b Less than 3 years, but more than 1 year.  9 (22.0%)
c More than 3 years 29 (70.7%)
  
2 Are you the chairman of this board?  
a Yes  8 (19.5%)
b No 33 (80.5%)
  
3 What is your annual compensation for your role as board member of this UCITS umbrella?  
a None (covered by regular salary) 34 (82.9%)
b Less than EUR 5,000.  0 (0.0%)
c Between EUR 5,000 and 10,000.  1 (2.4%)
d Between EUR 10,000 and 20,000.  1 (2.4%)
e Between EUR 20,000 and 30,000.  1 (2.4%)
f More than EUR 30,000.  4 (9.8%)
  
4 Are you a board member of any other funds or umbrellas of the same promoter?  
a Yes 34 (82.9%)
b No 7 (17.1%)
  
5 Are you a board member of any other funds or umbrellas of (an) other promoter(s)?  
a Yes 14 (34.1%)
b No 27 (65.9%)
  
6A Are you invested in any of the sub-funds of this UCITS umbrella?  
a Yes    -> please continue at question 7  16 (39.0%)
b No     -> please continue at question 6B  25 (61.0%)
  
6B Have you been invested in any of the sub-funds of this UCITS umbrella in the past? 
a Yes 6 (24.0%)
b No 19 (76.0%)
  
6C Are you planning to invest (again) in any of the sub-funds of this UCITS umbrella in the 
future? 
a Yes 6 (24.0%)
b No 19 (76.0%)
  
7 What type of board member are you? (more than one answer possible) 
a Employee of the fund promoter or the promoter group 34 (82.9%)
b Former employee of the fund promoter or the promoter group 0 (0.0%)
c Employee of a service provider of the fund promoter or the fund, such as e.g. the transfer 
agent, the fund administrator or the legal advisor 
1 (2.4%)
d Independent, i.e. I do not have a current or previous employment tie with the fund pro-
moter or the promoter group and am not currently employed by any of the service pro-
viders of the UCITS. 
6 (14.6%)
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Questions and answers Results1
8 What type of board members sit on the board of this UCITS umbrella? (more than one 
answer possible) 
a Employees of the fund promoter or the promoter group 40 (97.6%)
b Former employees of the fund promoter or the promoter group 7 (17.1%)
c Employees of a service provider of the fund promoter or the fund, such as e.g. the transfer 
agent, the fund administrator or the legal advisor 
10 (24.4%)
d Independent, i.e. persons who do not have a current or previous employment tie with the 
fund promoter or the promoter group and are not currently employed by any of the 
service providers of the UCITS.  
17 (41.5%)
  
9 Why has this promoter chosen to have / not to have independent board members on the 
board of the umbrella?  
N.A. (open 
question)
  
II Board priorities 
Questions and answers Results2
10 When thinking about the primary functions of the board, please rate the following func-
tions according to their relative importance: 
a Setting of performance targets 8.2 (5.0)
b Making sure that an appropriate risk management framework is implemented and func-
tioning 
32.3 (30.0)
c Verifying the coherence of the investments with the prospectus 19.1 (20.0)
d Monitoring of the investment performance achieved 22.8 (20.0)
e Ensuring that the performance achieved is presented correctly and transparently to inves-
tors  
17.0 (20.0)
  
11 When thinking about the fiduciary role of the board, please rate the following aspects 
according to their relative importance: 
a Ensuring fair and consistent treatment of investors 29.2 (30.0)
b Ensuring fair pricing of the funds (NAV) 20.8 (20.0)
c Ensuring a fair level of fees and costs 17.6 (20.0)
d Ensuring consistency between fund prospectus/sales literature and reality 16.7 (20.0)
e Ensuring good performance for investors 15.6 (15.0)
  
12 When thinking about how the board adds value for the investors, please rate the following 
aspects according to their relative importance: 
a Creating the conditions for the funds to outperform 11.6 (10.0)
b Controlling and mitigating risk 27.7 (25.0)
c Avoiding conflicts of interest 21.4 (20.0)
d Providing quality control 21.6 (20.0)
e Providing cost control 17.7 (15.0)
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III Board activities & actions 
Questions and answers 0 1 2 2.5 3 4 6 3
13 How frequent are board meetings of this UCITS umbrella 
in an average year?  
0 1 9 1 1 26 3 
14 How often per year at board meetings does the board 
review risk management reports? 
1 2 9 0 1 26 2 
15 How often per year at board meetings does the board 
review investment restrictions breaches reports? 
0 2 10 0 1 26 2 
16 How often per year at board meetings does the board 
review compliance reports? 
0 4 11 0 0 24 2 
17 How often per year at board meetings does the board 
review investment performance reports? 
0 2 8 1 1 27 2 
18 How often per year at board meetings does the board 
discuss conflicts of interest?  
17 7 4 0 0 12 1 
    
 
Questions and answers Results1
19 In the past two years has this board benchmarked levels of management fees to competi-
tors and/or market averages?  
a Yes 34 (82.9%)
b No 7 (17.1%)
  
20 In the past two years has this board initiated changes to the level of management fees 
charged of one or more sub-funds?  
a Yes 26 (63.4%)
b No 15 (36.6%)
  
21 If applicable, what were reasons for initiating changes with regard to the level of man-
agement fees? (more than one answer possible) 
a Fee benchmarking to competitors and/or market averages 22 (84.6%)
b Fee comparison to other products in the promoter's range 16 (61.5%
c Fee in relationship to performance achieved 4 (15.4%)
d Fee in relationship to potential performance 4 (15.4%)
e Increase of assets under management (leading to economies of scale) 2 (7.7%)
f Other, namely … 4 (15.4%)
  
22 In the past two years has this board challenged the promoter with regard to the invest-
ment performance achieved of one or more sub-funds?  
a Yes 36 (87.8%)
b No 5 (12.2%)
  
23 In the past two years has this board initiated changes to the way one or more sub-funds 
are being managed?  
a Yes 23 (56.1%)
b No 18 (43.9%)
  
24 If applicable, what were reasons for challenging the promoter with regard to investment 
performance or initiating changes to the management of sub-funds? (more than one 
answer possible) 
a Continued underperformance 33 (91.7%)
b Volatility of the returns 6 (16.7%)
c Staff changes in the portfolio management team 7 (19.4%)
d Other, namely … 5 (13.9%)
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IV Opinions 
Questions and answers Disagree 
strongly
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
strongly
N.A./ 
Do not 
know3
25 The style of this board can be described as one of manage-
ment by exception.  
4 21 5 9 2 0
26 The modus operandi of this board is one of ratifying deci-
sions made elsewhere in the promoter group.  
4 17 4 12 4 0
27 This board functions as a "watchdog" on behalf of the fund 
investors.  
0 1 4 19 17 0
28 It is the responsibility of the board to make sure that all 
costs are presented transparently to investors (e.g. in the 
simplified prospectus / KIID).  
0 0 5 22 14 0
29 It is the responsibility of the board to make sure that all 
risks are presented transparently to investors (e.g. in the 
simplified prospectus / KIID).   
0 0 3 19 19 0
30 As long as the fund portfolio is compliant with restrictions 
imposed on the basis of regulations or the prospectus, 
investment performance is not a concern of the board.  
8 29 2 2 0 0
31 It is the responsibility of the board to make sure that fund 
investors pay a fair level of management fees for the ser-
vices they receive.  
0 4 13 20 4 0
32 The level of management and other fees is a commercial 
decision of the fund promoter, not a board issue.  
2 17 7 14 1 0
33 It is the responsibility of the board to take action against 
continued poor performance.  
0 4 4 25 7 1
34 Board members investing in the funds they oversee aligns 
their interests and those of fund investors.  
0 7 13 17 1 3
35 Independent board members are less effective, since they 
lack knowledge of the fund promoter and the funds.  
9 17 7 5 2 1
36 Having independent board members increases the disci-
pline of the promoter towards a board, e.g. in terms of 
reporting to the board and the submission of proposals.  
2 6 1 17 14 1
37 Having independent board members increases the quality 
of decision making of a board.  
2 7 11 11 9 1
38 Having independent board members increases the effec-
tiveness of a board in dealing with conflicts of interest 
between the promoter and fund investors.  
2 5 5 16 12 1
39 Having independent board members contributes positively 
to protecting the interests of fund investors.  
2 3 8 14 13 1
40 I would be in favour of legislation requiring boards of UCITS 
funds to have independent board members.  
3 9 11 10 8 0
41 I would be in favour of legislation requiring boards of UCITS 
funds to have a majority of independent board members.  
7 18 10 3 3 0
  
1. Number of participants who have given the particular answer, with percentage between brackets.  
2. For questions 10, 11 and 12, participants were asked to split 100 points across the 5 answers, according to 
their relative importance. Mean and median scores are given (the latter between brackets). 
3. Number of participants who have given the particular answer.  
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thereafter to form ABN AMRO Bank, as a Management Trainee. His first position was 
that of Investment Analyst in the bank’s Portfolio Strategy Department. In 1993, Jan 
Jaap obtained the degree of Certified European Financial Analyst from the Dutch Asso-
ciation of Investment Professionals. In the 1989-1993 period, he authored and co-
authored various articles in Dutch financial-economic journals on subjects including 
mergers & acquisitions and investment performance. In 1996, he co-authored a book 
on the Dutch investment funds industry, published by the Dutch Bankers Association.  
In the 1993-2008 period, Jan Jaap worked in several positions for ABN AMRO Asset 
Management (AAAM) in Amsterdam, Curaçao and Poland, most recently as Senior Vice 
President in charge of Global Product Management. For AAAM, Jan Jaap was a board 
member of the group’s Dutch-domiciled and Cayman-domiciled investment funds. In 
2007, he was a member of the Fund Governance working group of the Dutch Fund & 
Asset Management Association (DUFAS) on behalf of AAAM, advising the Ministry of 
Finance and the Dutch regulator on the fund governance framework for the Nether-
lands. Since September 2008, Jan Jaap is head of Product Strategy & Market Intelli-
gence at ING Investment Management. 
The combined experiences of working with fund boards as a product developer, 
having board responsibility and participating in the industry work group on regulatory 
aspects of governance, laid the foundation for Jan Jaap’s interest in investment fund 
governance. Jan Jaap started his research for this dissertation in the spring of 2009, 
and began work that autumn with Professor Dr. Christian Wolff as his supervisor. Since 
then, Jan Jaap combined his research as PhD Candidate at the Luxembourg School of 
Finance of the University of Luxembourg with his position at ING Investment Manage-
ment.  
